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IN MEMORIAM
HENRY SAWYER: ADVOCATE FOR THE UNPOPULAR
ARLN M. ADAMS
Ralph Waldo Emerson declared that "the true test of civiliza-
tion is, not the census, nor the size of cities, nor the crops,--no, but
the kind of [person] the country turns out."' If America is a great civi-
lization, and I believe it is, it is because of citizens like Henry W. Saw-
yer, III.
I first met Henry in 1946 at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School after we both had returned from service in the U.S. Navy dur-
ing World War II. Henry had been in a prior class, but I had been re-
t B.S. 1941, MAL 1950, Temple University;J.D. 1947, LL.D. (Hon.) 1999, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania; Retired Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit.
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leased a little sooner-apparently having served overseas somewhat
longer. Since we both were active on the Law Review, I had many op-
portunities to discuss with him specific cases as well as overall legal
philosophy.
I never doubted his brilliance; he had compiled a fine aca-
demic record at Chestnut Hill Academy and had been elected to Phi
Beta Kappa while an undergraduate at Penn. Henry quickly and co-
gently could analyze cases, the law, and concepts governing those
cases. He was quite articulate in expressing his views and intellectually
honest at all times.
Although he had come from a somewhat conservative back-
ground, he was disappointed with the entrenched Republican politi-
cal machine then dominating Philadelphia. Consequently, even while
in law school, he became an ardent supporter of the Clark-Dilworth
reform movement, which was making great strides locally. He enthu-
siastically campaigned for them, and they were elected mayor and dis-
trict attorney, respectively. Henry, himself, was elected to the Phila-
delphia City Council in 1956.
Henry's real calling was the law, however, and in 1960 he re-
turned to full-time practice with the distinguished firm of Drinker
Biddle & Reath, where he remained until his death. In 1953, he
agreed to serve as one of the defense attorneys in United States v.
Kuzma,2 a criminal prosecution brought against a group of Commu-
nist sympathizers under the Smith Act.3 A number of attorneys had
volunteered for service at the behest of the Chancellor of the Phila-
delphia Bar Association, who believed that even unpopular defen-
dants were entitled to appropriate legal representation. Although the
jury returned a verdict of guilty, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed that result.
4
The courageous effort of these attorneys-led by Tom
McBride, later a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court-further
249 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1957).
3 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994) (assessing liability for "[a]dvocating overthrow of the
government").
4 In speaking for a unanimous courtJudge Hastie stated:
Nor are we unmindful of the burden upon defense counsel who in this case
are volunteers donating months of professional services in a difficult and un-
popular cause in token of their high sense of responsibility of the bar to see
that all defendants in criminal cases receive competent professional represen-
tation.
249 F.2d at 622.
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roused Henry's interest in civil rights matters generally, and on behalf
of less affluent defendants in particular. In that regard, he repre-
sented plaintiffs and achieved victories in two seminal law and religion
cases before the Supreme Court: School District of Abington v. Schempp5
and Lemon v. Kurtzman.6 The Schempps were parents of two children
who challenged Abington High School's mandatory Bible reading pol-
icy as violative of the Establishment Clause. At issue in Lemon was
Pennsylvania's practice of making public funds available to sectarian
schools.
So effective were Henry's arguments before the Court in
Schempp and Lemon that Justice Brennan wrote: "Henry has made a
historic contribution to the nation and civil rights law, and few lawyers
who have appeared before the Supreme Court during my time have
matched his abilities." 7
Later, Henry agreed to serve as counsel in Gilfillan v. City of
Philadelphia, which involved an Establishment Clause attack on a pro-
posed expenditure by the City of Philadelphia to construct a vast altar
topped by a 60-foot cross at Logan Circle in downtown Philadelphia.8
Proponents intended the altar to enable the Pope, who was visiting
Philadelphia, to conduct a mass. Admission to the area surrounding
the altar was to be controlled by the Archdiocese.
A number of very active civil rights lawyers were asked to take
on this controversial assignment. Each declined because of the possi-
ble negative "fallout." When the Board of Directors of the American
Civil Liberties Union approached Henry, however, he did not hesitate
to take the case. So far as he was concerned, the validity of an impor-
tant constitutional issue was at stake.
When I taught the course on religion and the law at the Penn
Law School, I always called upon Henry to lead the class when we
reached Schempp and Lemon, and Henry never disappointed. He kept
the students mesmerized, recounting his trial strategy and the manner
in which he answered difficult questions from thejudges.
But the religion clauses of the Constitution were not Henry's
only civil rights concern. He was troubled by the treatment of blacks
- 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
6 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
7 Letter from William J. Brennan to James E. Coleman, Chair, Thurgood Marshall
Awards Committee (Apr. 23, 1997) (on file with the Univerity of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view).8 480 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
1999]
4 UNVEFRSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
in the South, and in response he agreed to go to Selma, Alabama in
1965 to defend those unjustly charged with breaking local ordinances.
He knew that his security would be threatened, as it eventually was,
but a higher calling urged him to go forward.
Henry handled an important case involving Philadelphia's fail-
ure to hire a fair number of black police officers.9 He pressed this
matter over a period of nine years before victory was achieved. One
issue on appeal was the appropriateness of the counsel fee, which was
provided by the applicable statute. Henry and his colleagues-includ-
ing Robert Reinstein, the present Dean of the Temple Law School-
requested only a portion of the payment they ordinarily would have
been entitled to claim.
At the time Henry did most of his civil rights work, it was not
popular for lawyers practicing with large law firms to become so in-
volved. Nonetheless, he devoted to these matters an enormous
amount of his own time with little or no compensation, and in addi-
tion, ran the risk of alienating his own clients as well as clients of the
firm. He never flinched, however, and his firm backed him to the hilt.
Henry established himself as one of Philadelphia's premier trial
lawyers, representing many national corporations in complicated and
protracted civil litigation. In all of these, he conducted himself in ac-
cordance with the highest professional standards. He was scrupu-
lously honest with his adversaries as well as with the courts. Although
aggressive, like most great trial lawyers, he always was courteous and
thoughtful with his opponents, both in and out of the courtroom.
Henry was able to see the critical question or questions in a
case and to confine himself primarily to those issues without pursuing
blind excursions and irrelevant matters. His clients were devoted to
him, his opponents admired him, and the courts respected him.
Aside from being a loyal and loving husband to his wonderful
wife, Grace, and an ardent supporter to his three children, Hal, Jona-
than, and Rebecca, he had scores of friends. And these friends were
from diverse areas-geographically and philosophically. Anyone visit-
ing in his home most certainly would become engaged in discussing
the critical political and social issues of the time, in addition to being
entertained by his extensive collection ofjazz recordings.
9 Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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When I considered a way to end this essay, I first thought of
words from Shakespeare's The Tempest, words that had special mean-
ing for Henry.'0 But then I believed it more apt to quote the language
used by Thomas Jefferson, in writing the A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom
[I] t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil govern-
ment for its officers to interfere when principles break out
into overt acts against peace and good order; ... [for] truth is
great and will prevail if left to herself; . .. she is the proper
and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear
from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of
her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors ceas-
ing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict
them. '
Henry Sawyer represented the very best in America, both in the
law and in society in general. He brought to his profession an origi-
nality of vision which was based on careful thinking and a keen sensi-
tivity, as well as a passionate belief in the rights of all citizens regard-
less of their color, gender, or religion.
0 SeeWILLAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEsr, act 4, sc. 1 ("Our revels now
are ended. These our actors...").
" See THOMASJEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLSHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779), in
2 THE WRrNmGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, 237-39 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898).
1999]
* * * * * *
A FRIEND'S PORTRAIT OF HENRYW. SAWYER, III
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR."
Henry W. Sawyer, III and his wife, Grace, were great art lovers.
Does not law, like art, seek to accommodate change within the frame-
work of continuity to bring heresy and heritage into fruitful tension?
As Alfred North Whitehead observed:
[A] society maintains its civilization by preserving its symbolic code while
giving expression to forces that, repressed, could break a society asun-
der. And so the basic dilemmas of art and law are, in the end, not dis-
similar, and in their resolution-the resolution of passion and pattern,
of frenzy and form, of convention and revolt, of order and spontaneity-
lies the clue to creativity that will endure.I
It is daunting to write about Henry, particularly for the Law Review
of Henry's law school-a school he revered, and to which he gave so
much honor. His classmates, colleagues, and the judges before whom
he appeared, received from Henry so much life, inspiration, intro-
spection, direction, and fun, that to think of him no longer here
brings tears to our eyes as when the last bars of Wagner's Parsifal fade
into silence. Many at the Philadelphia bar could write of Henry with
as much knowledge, relish, and relevance as I-in fact, even more.
I have, however, several significant regrets. The prime one, of
course, is that Henry no longer is here in person. Young lawyers
never again will be in his presence and never will share Henry's &an
and intellectual verve. They will be deprived of his path of inspiration
to affect the law in its highest function-to make this grand democ-
racy under law work for all in a civilized fashion. Finally, I regret that
thinking about Henry reveals a basic defect in the Constitution. His
very presence calls into question a clause in article I, section 9-the
one providing that "[n]o tide of nobility shall be granted by the
t Senior Partner and Senior Counsellor, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP;A.B., University
of Pennsylvania 1941; LL.B., Harvard Law School 1946; Law Clerk, Herbert F. Good-
rich, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Law Clerk, Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter; Chairman, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 1961-1975 and
1997-98; U.S. Secretary of Transportation, 1975-1977; Presidential Medal of Freedom,
awarded by President WilliamJ. Clinton in 1995.
' PAULA. FREUND, ONLAWANDJUMTCE i (1968).
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United States."2 As Thomas Jefferson once wrote to John Adams:
"For I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men.
The grounds of this are virtue and talents."3 Some suggest that John
Marshall, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison would have added
a third attribute of "natural aristocracy"-courage. They, unlike Jeffer-
son, fought in the Revolutionary War, just as Henry fought for this
country in World War II and the Korean War. In any event, perhaps
during a more credulous time, Henry W. Sawyer, III would have been
confirmed into this rare class of persons.
I truly enjoyed the time spent working through my thoughts about
Henry. For it is an absolute, ultimate joy to relive time spent with
Henry as a social friend, public figure, jazz expert, and ally or foe-be
it in politics or litigation. I think of riding the Chestnut Hill Local,
working through legal arguments to present to Thurgood Marshall
and Lou Pollak4 for the Brown v. Board of EducatioW brief. I picture the
family man, surrounded by Grace and the children, being guests at
each other's homes, drinking, eating, and trying to make sense out of
the political process, as well as the practice of law. I remember the
strong disagreements-which we had many times-yet always keeping
humor, respect, and friendship.
There is special affection for a human being who was-by any
1953 definition-a Philadelphia Swell or Philadelphia Brahmin, yet
knew that the A Train winds up in Harlem on 125th Street and Sev-
enth Avenue, and has the courage to enjoy with me the night life in
that special part of New York. Or knows-as Henry did by experi-
ence-that life and spirit resonate below Pine Street in Philadelphia.
Or that Temple University is not the only place in North Philadelphia
to learn how high and wide the human spirit can soar aided by jazz, by
courage, or by the inspirational preaching of a Leon Sullivan or a Bill
Gray, Sr. on a Sunday morning. Or to slip off to a nightclub in Atlan-
tic City when attending the Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit,
and have me realize that someone knows and understands Lou Rawls
much better than even Bill Hastie did.6
2 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), available in USA:
Letters of Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1826 (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://grid.let.rug.nl/
-usa/P/g3/writings/brf/efl23.htm>
4 Federal Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia; Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School (1975-78).
5 347 U.S. 483 (1964).
6 William H. Hastie was a Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit from 1950-71, and ChiefJudge from 1968-71.
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Henry's distinctive mark, or genre, is that of a great gentleman:
lettered, urbane, charming, witty, affable, and caring. He was some-
one who dealt with friend and foe without condescension and always
was approachable. A French expression-escalator de mots--refers to
the brilliant reply you should have made to the raconteur at the cock-
tail party, but only thought of going down the stairway when leaving.
Often in a social, political, or legal conversation, and especially in
court, I envied the fact that Henry came up with the bright thought in
the right canter or pace and the right words when I was still stum-
bling.
This portrait also reveals a young person who sought expression
and meaning in a political party,7 the minority party in Philadelphia at
the time, and clearly not the party of Philadelphia's Swells. He had
the nerve to live in its distractions, indeed to take an active part in its
activities. He leavened its coarseness, for example by insisting on an
ordinance that required all new building projects to earmark one per-
cent of its costs for art. Cities and counties across the country have
adopted this Sawyer brain-child. As the United States Secretary of
Transportation, I later adopted this policy for all projects financed in
whole or part by that Department.
Legislation often is described as being like sausage-you don't
want to see it being made. Can you imagine the taste or zest of the
sausage when mixed by Jim Tate,9 Raymond Pace Alexander,0 and
Henry Sawyer? History truly will suffer if the tales of the Philadelphia
City Council from 1956-59 that Sawyer reveled in and retold over a
Saturday beer at the Sawyer swimming pool are not among the rec-
ords of Drinker Biddle & Reath.
Now for a moment let us put on the canvas, Henry in the profes-
sion he so dearly loved. A lawyer's life, like every other occupational
life, has much drudgery-senseless bickering, stupid obstinacies, cap-
tious pettifogging-all disguising and obstructing the only sane pur-
pose which can justify the whole endeavor. These, of course, take an
inordinate part of the lawyer's time; they harass and befog the un-
happy wretch and at times nearly drive him from the particular work-
7I refer here to the Democratic Party.
8 See Shannon P. Duffy, Drinker Litigator Henry Sawyer Dies at 80, THE LEGAL
INTELLEGENCER, Aug. 3, 1999, at 3 (documenting the mark that Sawyer left on the
Philadelphia City Council).
9 President of Philadelphia City Council, and later Mayor of the City of Philadel-
phia.
'9 A leading member of the Philadelphia Bar, and later a judge in the Common
Pleas Court of Philadelphia.
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place where the work must be done. But near the end, when the trial
almost is complete or the appellate argument is to be called, the tur-
moil must stop and craftsmanship must take over. Then the resultant
joy in creativity begins. And out of this murk, the pattern emerges.
For the superb advocate, like Henry, it must be one's own pattern,
and one's own expressions. In that atmosphere, at that crucial mo-
ment, Henry reveals himself the master, as that rare lawyer who not
only knows, but, even more important, knows why, and, still more im-
portant, knows how. The gifted, attractive, remarkable, capacious-
minded Henry, with all-seeing eyes, lays aside efficiency and dispatch,
as he never is shy of recondite learning, always on point.
For example, in 1961, when he argued Deutch v. United States,"
Henry knew how to work through the pitfalls. Just two years prior, the
Court upheld a contempt of Congress citation in Barenblatt v. United
States.'2 Moreover, Watkins v. United States'3 essentially had spelled out
the almost absolute power of Congress. So what did Henry do? First
he skillfully briefed a far more sweeping constitutional question-
should a witness be compelled to inform on a friend? Years before
Americans expressed their uneasiness over the Lewinsky-Tripp matter,
Henry instinctively had grasped the discomfort of such a requirement.
Any Court, even in 1961, would wish to avoid answering that difficult
question and would seek resolution in a less controversial legal har-
bor. But first Henry had to share the unfairness of his client's treat-
ment by the court below. He made it crystal clear by suggesting that
the person who had persuaded the defendant to stay in the Commu-
nist Party was an agent of the FBI, a fact not even mentioned in the
D.C. Circuit opinion. Thereafter it became easier for the majority to
determine that the Government had not shown the defendant's re-
sponses about his associates to be pertinent to the congressional in-
quiry.
Another Henry signature style as an advocate was that he often
presented a Rhadamanthine detachment despite the fact that many
lawyers think that detachment can subvert a practical advocate's zeal.
In Greek mythology, after all, Rhadamanthus was a judge, not an ad-
vocate. Thus many think detachment to be more desirable in a judge
" 367 U.S. 456 (1961) (reversing a D.C. Circuit opinion that affirmed a contempt
of Congress conviction for a congressional witness who, even though freely admitting
all his own acts and meetings with reference to the Communist Party, refused to in-
form on others).
12 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
13 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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or scholar than in a trial lawyer in the pit or at the bar of an appellate
court. But in Freund's classic book,14 Justice Brandeis reminds us that
good opinions are made when the Court and the advocate are in
equal rhythm. In other words, as Jeremy Bentham said, "The Law is
not made by judge alone, but by judge and company."15 Thus a splen-
did technique in the hands of a master like Henry is to show detach-
ment-even though presenting the legal position quite sincerely,
quite effectively, and quite clearly-in order to get one to go along
with your contentious legal point. Henry often observed that a strong
but subtle suggestion often is better than a hit on the head to make
the key point in an argument very effectively. He recognized that the
great appellate judge does not wish to be accused, as Daniel Webster
often accused Chief Justice John Marshall, of just copying the advo-
cate's brief.
16
One cannot end this portrait without a dash about Henry's tre-
mendous sense of humor. His "all-seeing eye" gave him the capacity
to engage in and admire colleagues of sharply different philoso-
phies-whether right or left, rich or poor, black, red or white, dumb
or brilliant, Jew or Gentile-so long as they fairly engaged in discus-
sions and maintained a sense of humor. On one occasion, his love
and appreciation for the way that the Quakers managed the
Germantown Friends School conflicted with the fact that Henry twice
had been to war. Henry had heard the anger of enemy fire and thus
realized that, unfortunately, tyrants often could not be subdued by the
friendly thoughts of Quakers, their ability always to listen, never to
think ill of a human being, and to seek unanimity in the Meeting
House. As he left that one particular Quaker meeting, he said of an
opponent (known for voluminous comment), "He never took his eye
off the ball, for he never saw it." And when talking about Martin Dies,
Parnell Thomas, or Joe McCarthy-three of witch-hunt fame-he of-
ten remarked, "Why must there be so many bastards born in wed-
lock?"
Henry had an undying appreciation for Drinker Biddle & Reath-
the law firm that gave Henry the head, range, and support to do what
he thought necessary in civil rights and civil liberties cases. Henry be-
came an associate and a partner because of his brilliance as a lawyer
and his ability to represent large industrial corporations in the bet-the-
company cases, whether antitrust, securities, or patent matters. In a
14 PAUL FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT (1950).
'- Id. at 78.
16 See id. at 79-80.
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nationwide electrical antitrust suit, General Electric, the lead defen-
dant, retained Henry as local counsel 7 Before long, Henry's impres-
sive command of the law and facts of the case induced the defendant's
General Counsel to appoint Henry as lead counsel, replacing a pillar
of the D.C. trial bar and senior partner in a major D.C. firm. Earlier,
Henry had cut his teeth in the Viking Theatre case, a which introduced
him to the feverish, competitive world of movie distribution where
Louis Nizer was opposing lawyer. Henry also convinced Polish Com-
munists that the American Courts' hallmark was fairness and justice.
In the Polish Golf Cart case, where the United States was plaintiff,
Henry achieved a complete victory for his Communist client' 9
Henry-because of his performance as a corporate litigation law-
yer-became a partner in record time, even though his career was in-
terrupted after one year in law school by five years active duty as a U.S.
Navy Commander in the Pacific in World War II. After starting in
practice, he served one year in the Korean War, and two years in
Europe connected with NATO. He also handled more civil liberties
and civil rights cases than did most lawyers who practice exclusively in
these fields. Three were victories in the Supreme Courtr' but a com-
puter search reveals over thirty-five cases in the lower courts. Many of
Henry's causes were unpopular, and this occurred long before the
"white-shoe"21 law firms felt such pro bono work fit within their strat-
egy. In fact, many often felt their business, commercial, and govern-
mental clients would disapprove. But Drinker was strikingly different.
On the day in 1961 that Henry argued Schempp--challenging the
Lord's Prayer recitation in public schools-Messrs. Drinker, Biddle
and Van Dusen sat in the front row.
From the day Henry started practicing law-soon after his first
year of law school, interrupted by five years in the Navy, and during
his work on the Law Reiew-he always sought variety in everything.
He believed in Goethe's famous passage to those of any family wealth:
1 United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
'a Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir.
1963).
'9 See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
20 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1971); School Dist. of Abington Township
v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Deutch v. United States, 364 U.S. 456 (1961).
2, This term has nothing to do with race, but what the less fortunate of us who did
not go to Princeton or Virginia called those men who, in the style of 1938, wore white
shoes when dressed properly.
2' School Dist. of Abington Township v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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"You must labor to possess that which you have inherited."23 Henry
once expressed (during one of our Chestnut Hill Local rides) his rec-
ognition that routine is a kind of narcotic. It keeps the mind so occu-
pied that one thinks very little about what really matters, thus losing
the roar of the waves to the fullness of the sea. After all, such chal-
lenging adventures are not important for a lot of mankind. Emerson
put it right when he said that "[m]ankind is as lazy as it dares to be."24
But Henry always has been driven to reject what Anatole France
suggests in M. Bergerat "Je comprends, c'est mon faiblesse, il y a
beaucoup de face de ne pas comprendre."2' For Henry, it is always
important to weigh the pros and cons, and always important to play a
role in the great social and political issues of the day. Further, it al-
ways was important to Henry that that the court understand the busi-
ness issues of the client, or see that the wrongful uses of governmental
power-which bring out the worst in man-be retarded. Senator Wil-
liam Borah, and John Greenleaf Whittier, though a century apart,
help supply the last splashes to this portrait of Henry, as Jackson Pol-
lock, an artist so admired by Henry and Grace Sawyer, would do.
Senator Borah said:
The safeguards of our liberty are not so much in danger from those who
openly oppose them as from those who, professing to believe in them,
are willing to ignore them for their purposes.... The latter undermine
the very first principles of our government and are far the more danger-
ous.
And Whittier, about Charles Sumner, wrote:
"Forego thy dreams of lettered ease,
Put thou the scholar's promise by,
The rights of man are more than these."
He-heard, and answered: "Here am It "27
2JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUsT, pt. 1, 1. 682 (1886) ("Was du ererbt
von deinen Vatern hast, Erwirb es, um es zu besitzenl").
24 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 552 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
2 Translated, the passage means, "I understand, it's my weakness; there is much
face-saving in not understanding." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND
THEJUDGE 359 (1994).
" Nat Hentoff, Alan Balh's Wisdom, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1999, at A19.
27 JOHN GREENLEAF WHTrIER, Sumner, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF
JOHN GREENLEAPWHrrrIER 208 (1895).
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A VOICE FOR LIBERTY
STEWART DALZELLt
I first saw Henry W. Sawyer, III in action in 1973 when I served as
his junior associate in an unfair competition case that had been
transmuted into a Sherman Act section 1 claim. The defendants re-
tained Henry after suffering what was for them a catastrophic verdict
at the hands of ajury in a Philadelphia federal court. When I came
into Henry's office, he explained to me that the five individual defen-
dants were facing personal ruin as a result of the verdict and, more
immediately, from execution on the seven-figure treble damage
award.
Our urgent task was to stay execution on the judgment, while the
plaintiff corporation, through its able counsel, was insisting that the
individuals post their houses as security for the stay under Rule 62(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since all five of these men
were married, this meant that their wives' interests were at stake and,
as one would expect, they were horrified at the prospect of losing
their homes. We therefore filed a motion on behalf of the wives (as
well as their husbands) for relief from this Draconian condition, and
shortly thereafter, I for the first time, saw Henry Sawyer as an advo-
cate, pressing our motion before my now-colleague, Judge Raymond
Broderick.
What immediately struck me as I heard Henry arguing our motion
was what a terrific, impressive voice he had. If memory serves cor-
rectly, we were seated in Judge Broderick's chambers at the old Fed-
eral Courthouse at Ninth and Market Streets in Philadelphia. Seem-
ingly without raising the volume, Henry Sawyer's rich bass voice
nevertheless filled the room and kept everyone-most importantly,
Judge Broderick-in rapt attention. I still can hear the sound of that
voice saying to Judge Broderick, at a time when the women's move-
ment was still largely a gleam in feminists' eyes, "Your Honor, women
are people. They have an existence and interests separate and apart
from their husbands. These women had nothing in any way, shape, or
t United States District CourtJudge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. B.S.
1965, J.D. 1969, University of Pennsylvania. Judge Dalzell was associated with the
Philadelphia law firm of Drinker Biddle & Reath from 1970-1976, and then was a part-
ner with that firm (with Henry W. Saywer, III) until leaving for the bench in 1991.
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form to do with what the plaintiff claims in this case."
To my amazement, and before my very eyes, the voice worked its
magic. At least to the extent that we were given the opportunity to
provide substitute security-as it turned out, for less than the full
amount of the verdict-the marital homes were never again in dan-
ger. Indeed, the case ultimately settled on appeal,1 on terms that
brought our clients back from the brink of bankruptcy and enabled
them to put their energies and talents to rather rewarding business
successes in later years. As one might imagine, they were convinced
that Henry W. Sawyer, III had saved their business and personal lives.
They were right.
I thereafter had the great good fortune of working closely with
Henry Sawyer in other commercial litigation, most notably Outboard
Marine Corp. v. PezeteL2 In that case, we represented the then-state-
owned Polish entities who made golf carts that sold so successfully in
this country that the domestic manufacturers of those vehicles became
rather upset.3 In Pezetel and in other cases, I heard that unforgettable
voice, witnessed its crafty modulations, and beheld what it could do to
many tribunals and gatherings of lawyers.
Indeed, over the course of the more than fifty years that Henry
Sawyer practiced after his graduation from this law school in 1947, he
used that highly sophisticated voice in many cases in courts around
this country.4 As successful as Henry Sawyer was in tuning that voice
to advance the interests of his paying clients, he always in my years of
practice with him saw those cases, however zealously he argued them,
as a means to a larger end. Successful as he was in these private, and
I The case discussed in the text is C. Albert Sauter Co. v. Richard S. Sauter Co., 368 F.
Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
Interestingly, Henry was recommended to the Poles by Professor Louis B.
Schwartz, who taught me criminal and antitrust law at Penn, and for whom I worked as
a research assistant. Professor Schwartz remained as our co-counsel in the litigation
before Judge Murray Schwartz (no relation) in the Delaware District Court and in the
antidumping administrative proceeding in the United States Treasury Department.
4 A Westlaw search reveals over one hundred citations of reported cases in which
Henry Sawyer appeared as counsel from 1951 to the early 1990s. Of course, for much
of Henry's careerjudicial memoranda and opinions were not transmitted routinely to
Lexis and Westlaw. Thus, for example, there are no reported decisions in two signifi-
cant Robinson-Patman Act cases Henry and I worked on (together with Edward M.
Posner),Joseph Walsh Tire Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., CA. No. 74-1310 (E.D. Pa.) and Hub
Tire Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., C.A. No. 75-85 (E.D. Pa.), cited in Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
415 F. Supp. 193, 195 nn.1-2 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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largely commercial, cases,5 the reason this Law Review has gathered
these tributes is because of Henry Sawyer's contribution in public in-
terest litigation. And it was in that litigation that one always found
Henry Sawyer's heart and, above all, his voice in its most resonant and
powerful pitch.
Henry Sawyer usually is identified with his successes in two of the
century's most important Establishment Clause cases, School District of
7Abington Township v. Schempp6 and Lemon v. Kurtzman. There is no
question that both cases constitute major legal landmarks in First
Amendment jurisprudence, as well as in the everyday life of any
American who has ever set foot in a public or sectarian school. Given
the lopsided votes in the Supreme Court, however-eight-to-one in
Schempp and seven-to-one in Lemon--a detractor might contend that
Henry Sawyer was just lucky enough to be in the right place at the
right time and won two cases that really did not depend on the power
and sound of that great voice. Although I would argue to the con-
trary-particularly given the reality that Henry lost before the Lemon
three-judge court-it seems to me hard to dispose of such detraction,
at least directly.
Another Supreme Court case, however, provides conclusive evi-
In private litigation, Henry Sawyer probably was best known for his work in the
antitrust area, an expertise that began when he was (unsuccessful) trial counsel for the
plaintiff in Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir.
1963), though on the briefs and the certiorari petition, the Supreme Court did not
hear Sawyer's voice, but that of Edward Bennett Williams. The decision of the Court
of Appeals was affirmed by an equally divided Court. See 378 U.S. 123 (1964). Henry
always believed that his work for Viking Theatre led to General Electric's retaining him
in the civil electrical conspiracy price-fixing cases, a litigation so complex it became the
impetus for the later enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See, e.g., United States v. General
Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that state-mandated prayer and devotional Bible
reading in public schools are unconstitutional under the First Amendment's Estab-
lishment Clause).
403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that state financial aid to nonpublic schools was an
"excessive entanglement between government and religion" and therefore was uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendments Religion Clauses).
a In Schemp, onlyJustice Stewart dissented, see 374 U.S. at 308-20, though Justices
Douglas and Brennan wrote concurrences to Justice Clark's opinion for the Court.
Lemon involved one Pennsylvania and two Rhode Island cases. Justice White concurred
in the Pennsylvania case and dissented in the Rhode Island cases, see 403 U.S. 661-71,
and Justices Douglas and Brennan wrote concurrences to ChiefJustice Burger's opin-
ion for the Court in the Rhode Island cases. Justice Marshall did not participate.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969). District Judge Trout-
man wrote the majority opinion, in which DistrictJudge Luongojoined. Third Circuit
ChiefJudge Hastie dissented.
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dence that Henry Sawyer's voice indeed made a decisive difference,
not only in those two Establishment Clause cases, but also for the
cause of liberty in this country.
I refer to the case of Deutch v. United States.'0 At the time young
Bernhard Deutch came to Henry Sawyer's office, the nation was con-
sumed in what we now call the McCarthy Era. The facts of Bernhard
Deutch's case demonstrate how far the Zeitgeist had taken our political
and legal life from its constitutional moorings-as well as from the
common "decency" to which Joseph Welch referred in his famous col-
loquy with Senator McCarthy."
Two months before Welch's rhetorical questions about Senator
McCarthy's "decency," Bernhard Deutch was working in the Physics
Building of the University of Pennsylvania. He was served with a sub-
poena that commanded him to appear in Albany, New York two days
later before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. Though still only a graduate student, Deutch had
the good sense to choose Henry Sawyer as his lawyer.
The subcommittee in its grace granted Henry's request for a con-
tinuance, and the appearance occurred three days later than sched-
uled, and in Washington, D.C. As Henry later described the
Kafkaesque scene in his Brief for Petitioner, "Upon appearance at the
committee's office in the House Office Building in Washington,
[Deutch] and his counsel were directly shown into an office in which
there were seated several unidentified men; he was forthwith sworn
and without preamble the questioning commenced."1
2
The committee counsel informed Deutch that
[D]uring hearings at Albany last week, the committee heard testimony
regarding the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating
among undergraduates at Cornell University, among certain graduates
at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca.
10 367 U.S. 456 (1961). I have elsewhere, in a very different context, discussed
Henry Sawyer's effect on the Supreme Court in Deutch. See Stewart Dalzell, Faces in the
Courtroom, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 961, 967-68 (1998).
1 The great Boston lawyer's words to Senator McCarthy, after McCarthy's gratui-
tous slander of Welch's young associate, bear repeating to give the flavor of the era in
which Sawyer represented political outcasts like Deutch: "Until this moment, Senator, I
think I never really gaged [sic] your cruelty or your recklessness.... Let us not assassi-
nate this lad further, Senator. You have done enough. Have you no sense of decency,
sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?" Special Senate Investigation on
Charges and Countercharges Involving Secretay of the Army Robert T. Stevens et aL: Hearing
Before the Special Subcomm. Investigations of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 83d Cong., at
2429 (1954) (statement ofJoseph N. Welch to SenatorJoseph McCarthy).
12 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961) (No. 233).
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In connection with that testimony, the committee was informed that you
13were a member of one or more of those groups.
Whereupon, Deutch explained that he had met a charismatic
black law student at Cornell named Ross Richardson, who eventually
persuaded Deutch to join a small Communist Party cell. Richardson
would drive Deutch to the meetings and collect dues from him.
Although Deutch answered most of the subcommittee's questions,
he declined to answer five, all relating to people other than himself.
For example, the first question he declined to answer was:
1. The committee was advised that a witness by the name of Ross
Richardson has stated that you acted as liaison between a Communist
Party group on the campus and a member of the faculty at Cornell, and
that you knew the name of the member of that faculty, who was a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. Will you tell us who that member of the
faculty was?
14
As Henry Sawyer later told the Supreme Court, Deutch "respect-
fully told the committee that he was willing to tell all about his own
activities but that he could not, because of moral scruples, bring him-
self to inform on other people."'5 In any event, Deutch made it clear
that the subcommittee easily could get all of the requested informa-
tion from Ross Richardson.
When the House of Representatives voted a contempt citation
against Deutch, he was indicted for refusing to testify, a violation of 2
U.S.C. § 192.16 The bench trial took place in the District Court for the
District of Columbia in 1956, before District Judge Alexander
Holtzoff. In his brief opinion in support of the conviction as to four
of the five countsJudge Holtzoff not only gave a ringing endorsement
to the power of Congress to investigate domestic Communism in all its
details, but also summarily rejected Henry Sawyer's argument that the
particular questions were not pertinent to the subcommittee's inquiry.
13 I1. at 5-6.
14 I& at 8. The other questions and orders were:
2. Will you tell the committee, please, the source of that $100 contribu-
tion, if it was made?
3. Where were these meetings held?
4. Were you acquainted with Homer Owen?
5. The witness is directed to give the name of the person by whom he was
approached.
Deutch v. United States, 280 F.2d 691, 692 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
is Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 7.
16 See 2 U.S.C § 192 (1997) (setting forth liability for refusing to testify or produce
papers during a congressional investigation).
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To this contention Judge Holtzoff wrote that a congressional commit-
tee "has a right to obtain cumulative testimony" and that it may ques-
tion "several witnesses to the same matter in order to check the accu-
racy of the information that it is obtaining." 17  Judge Holtzoff
acquitted Deutch on Count Three, holding that someone "may not be
punished for contempt of Congress merely for stating that he does
not remember."'
During its long pendency in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the case had become rather more difficult owing
to the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Barenblatt v. United
States.'9 In that case the majority upheld, over First Amendment objec-
tions, the power of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities to inquire into a witness's past or present mem-
bership in the Communist Party. As the Court of Appeals interpreted
Barenblatt in Deutch's case, "[T]he Government has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the subject under inquiry and the pertinency of
the questions were made to appear at the committee hearing with 'in-
disputable clarity.'" 20 The Court of Appeals's affirmance thus could
not have come as a surprise.
On July 13, 1960, when Henry Sawyer filed his petition for a writ
of certiorari to the District of Columbia Circuit, he was facing what
then had to have seemed like a hopeless enterprise. The Supreme
Court only a year before had decided Barenblatt, with its approval of
wide-ranging and intrusive power on the part of Communist-hunting
congressional committees. Though Barenblatt was decided by a vote of
five to four, the fifth vote was supplied by the Court's newest member,
Justice Potter Stewart, who joined Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Whit-
taker and Clark.2' Where Lloyd Barenblatt had cited the First
Amendment as the basis for his refusal to answer, Bernhard Deutch
only mentioned "moral scruples." True, Henry by this time had
achieved some success for another "unfriendly" witness on the
17 United States v. Deutch, 147 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.D.C. 1956).
18 Id.
19 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
20 Deutch, 280 F.2d at 695. In addition to Barenblatt, the panel also cited Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), and flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958), for
the 2quoted proposition-all cases decided after the bench trial before judge Holtzoff.
Justice Black's dissent was unusually powerful, even for him, particularly in its
quiet anger in referring to the majority's "conclusion that on balance the interest of
the Government in stifling these freedoms [of speech, press, assembly and petition] is
greater than the interest of the people in having them exercised." 360 U.S. at 143
(Black,J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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grounds that a Senate subcommittee had failed to establish the subject
matter of the inquiry.22 But this argument was not available to him in
Deutch because, as seen above, the subcommittee counsel made the
purpose of Deutch's appearance quite explicit at the beginning of the
proceedings on April 12, 1954.2
When, probably very much to his surprise, the Supreme Court
granted his petition for a writ of certiorari, Henry Sawyer faced a
daunting task. The judicial branch seemed oblivious to Senator
McCarthy's death on May 2, 1957. Three years after that death, the
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed Judge Holtzoff, who was by
then one of the most accomplished district judges in the federal sys-
tem24 (the Court of Appeals panel included later-to-be Chief Justice
Burger). The Barenblatt majority in 1959 included the intellectual
weight of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan.
When it came time for the oral argument, however, Henry
brought with him his ultimate weapon: his voice. He used that voice
to tell quite a story. Henry stressed Ross Richardson's involvement in
keeping Deutch in the Party. He pointed out that when Deutch
wanted to resign his Party membership, Richardson retorted that
Deutch was a "white chauvinist" who could not stand having a black in
control. Deutch relented and remained in the Party until he left Cor-
nell to attend the University of Pennsylvania for his graduate work.
After recounting these facts, I suspect from many years' experi-
ence with him that Henry Sawyer then allowed a long, pregnant pause
to fill the courtroom with silence. He always would do this before his
punch line, and what a powerful one he had that day for his audience
of nine. Doubtless reaching down to the lowest registers of that grave
22 In Knowles v. United States, 280 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1960), Henry won a reversal
on behalf of a woman discharged from her position as a librarian in Norwood, Massa-
chusetts, who had been called three times to Washington to appear before the Sub-
committee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate.
When she appeared on July 29, 1955, "no statement was made as to the Subcommit-
tee's purpose in calling her, or as to the subject matter of the inquiry." Id. at 698. Her
conviction therefore was reversed with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See id. at
700.
See supra text accompanying note 13.
24 Among his accomplishments, Holtzoff had, with William W. Barron, written a
treatise, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, that Professor Charles Alan Wright ac-
knowledges was the "lineal" ancestor of our Wright and Miller. 1 CHARI.ES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MI=.ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at vii (2d ed.
1982). The Supreme Court regarded Judge Holtzoff as "the person who almost cer-
tainly drafted" what became the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1994).
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-56 (1984).
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voice of his that suitably could announce the Apocalypse, he then dis-
closed to the Court that, at all times, Ross Richardson worked as an
agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
On its face, Henry's shot at Ross Richardson was gratuitous and ir-
relevant to all but Bernhard Deutch and his advocate. Deutch was the
one who refused to answer the subcommittee's questions, not
Richardson. And Richardson's true role was utterly beside the point
regarding the pertinence of those five questions to the subcommit-
tee's inquiry.
But we know that this ornament to Henry's recitativ not only was
relevant, but decisive for at least one other listener in that audience.
As Henry many years later reported to me, "Justice Potter Stewart
(hitherto on the government's side of this issue) leaned forward and
said, 'Is that in the record, Mr. Sawyer?' I said indeed it was inasmuch
as Richardson was the sole witness against Deutch at the trial.' To
this Justice Stewart leaned back and said to a colleague (probably Jus-
tice Brennan), "'Outrageous... outrageous!'" in a volume "more voce
than sotto."26
In writing his opinion for the five-Justice majority reversing
Deutch's conviction, Justice Stewart, after recounting the basic facts,
mentioned, at the very end of one of those pregnant and powerful
footnotes the Supreme Court sometimes drops, that Ross Richardson
had joined the Party "at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. " 27 He then went on to hold for the Court that the questions in-
deed were not "pertinent to the committee's inquiry."
Technically speaking, Justice Harlan's dissent in Deutch had much
power, given the recent vintage of Barenblatt. But once the Court got
the whole story of Deutch's case, in truth and justice there is no doubt
that the conviction had to be reversed if the nation was to recover a
modicum of the decency that Joseph Welch and many others had
found so lacking in that poisonous time.
When Henry Sawyer's bass voice filled the silence of the Supreme
Court's chamber with the words, "Ross Richardson was at all times an
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation," 28 can there be much
25 Letter from Henry W. Sawyer to Stewart Dalzell 2-3 (Mar. 2, 1998) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Sawyer].
2 Id. at 3.
2 Deutch, 367 U.S. at 460 n.4.
These were the words Henry recited to me that he actually said. The Supreme
Court Clerk's Office was unable to find a transcript of the oral argument in its retriev-
able records when I sought it in 1998 in writing the essay cited above in note 10.
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doubt that these words, more than Joseph Welch's oft-quoted com-
ment to Senator McCarthy, truly began the end of this dark chapter in
our jurisprudence and national life? To be sure, that voice remained
jurisprudentially incorrect to some of the brightest and bestjudges for
some years after McCarthy's death-indeed, that voice so offended
the judicial sensitivities ofJustice Frankfurter in March of 1961 during
Sawyer's argument, that the learned Justice "turned his chair around,
facing backward" as Henry continued speaking.
Henry Sawyer's voice really did have that much power to it. True,
on a day-to-day basis it was often in the service of private interests,
since Henry had to make a living and someone had to pay for all of
that pro bono work. Indeed, Henry explicitly acknowledged to me
that his work on behalf of significant economic interests served these
larger ends.3 The truth of the matter is that I do not believe Henry
Sawyer ever made a dime representing Communists and other politi-
cal outcasts. It was simply of no interest to him.
But Henry Sawyer always would say that he got much more out of
representing these clients who could not pay him. He unquestionably
was not speaking of gaining notoriety. He was talking about some-
times actually achieving justice. And with that great voice of his, he
Sawyer, supra note 25, at 2 & n.4. To get another sample of the flavor of the ju-
dicial atmosphere long after the echo had died to Joseph Welch's comment, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Kaplan v. School District of Philadelphia, 388
Pa. 213 (1957) will do rather well. When that Court ruled against Henry Sawyer's cli-
ent, it began the opinion with the following two sentences:
On July 12, 1948, Samuel M. Kaplan, the plaintiff in this case, entered into a
contract with the School District of [Philadelphia], the defendant, to teach
English in the public schools of Philadelphia on a salary basis. So far as the
record shows, he demonstrated himself to be a competent teacher in his field,
but it was reported to the Superintendent of Philadelphia Schools that while
Kaplan was instructing the children in his classes how to express themselves in
English he was devoting time to an organization which, if successful in its
plans, would eventually have those children or their children's children speak-
ing Russian in a Russian state.
Id. at 214 (Musmanno,J.).
30 To its credit, besides providing a significant financial subsidy, Drinker Biddle &
Reath itself withstood a good deal of criticism when Henry was at the height of repre-
senting accused Communists in the McCarthy Era. He once told me a rather touching
story in this respect. After Henry Drinker died, his secretary of many years reported
for the first time to Henry Sawyer that a representative of one of the firm's largest cli-
ents called to complain to Mr. Drinker about the young Sawyer representing some
Communists in a protracted Smith Act prosecution. After Mr. Drinker assured himself
that the client took no exception to Henry's legal abilities or ethical performance-
indeed, the essence of the client's complaint was that too much talent was being put in
service of such disreputable people-Mr. Drinker advised the client that if he was so
upset he should take his business elsewhere.
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did more than that. He was one of the pillars of his time in securing
the liberties that benefit all Americans. Henry Sawyer's voice there-
fore spoke for every one of us.
LAWYER SAWYER
LouIs H. POILAle
Practicing lawyers tend to get short shrift from the law reviews, es-
pecially when it comes to lapidary statements. Although not an every-
day occurrence, it is not unusual for a law review to publish memorial
tributes to a deceased law professor held in high esteem. And so too
with an admired judge for whom the bell has tolled. But it is rare for
a practitioner to be celebrated in this way. So it is a good thing that
the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review-recognizing
that the practice of law is an established, here-to-stay, non-trivial in-
gredient of the profession-decided to dedicate an issue of the Law
Review to the memory of a practitioner, Henry W. Sawyer, III. Henry
was a singularly gifted advocate who achieved greatly in litigation of
great consequence. He ennobled our profession. He deserves to be
remembered in the pages of this venerablejournal-the Law Review of
which he was Managing Editor more than half a century ago.
The dominant dynamic elements, professional and personal, of
this remarkable lawyer have been faithfully captured in the three trib-
utes accompanying this one. Stewart Dalzell, in defining Henry Saw-
yer's decisive impact on trial and appellate courtrooms, has, in a com-
pellingly felicitous phrase, termed Henry a "Voice of Liberty."
William Coleman, building on Whitehead's linkage of art and law, has
crafted a lifelike "[p]ortrait" of Henry-a portrait of an artist who re-
mained a young man almost to the end of his long life. And Arlin Ad-
ams has traced the unorthodox career of a lawyer willing to take on
the " [u ] npopular" cases.
A comprehensive survey of Henry's artistry as an advocate would
call for close scrutiny of the dozens and dozens of trials and appeals
Henry handled in four decades of mastery of the courtroom. But the
timetable of this tributary issue of the Law Review does not permit a
research enterprise of that dimension. Perforce, it is necessary and
t United States DistrictJudge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. For his de-
scription of the events that led to the filing of the suit that was to bear fruit as School
Distfict of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the writer is indebted to
his friend Bernard Wolfmnan-professor of law at Harvard since 1976, and Dean of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School from 1970-75. See infra note 4 (describing
Wolfman's professional history).
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proper to confine our focus to the Sawyer cases of greatest public con-
sequence: the three cases Henry took to the Supreme Court. Confin-
ing the focus in this fashion foreshortens-and to that extent dis-
torts-Sawyer's corpus juris, it leaves out of account chapters of the
Sawyer story that matter a lot, such as the summer of 1965 which
Henry spent in Mississippi together with scores of other lawyers (most
of them younger) who signed on to protect the voting rights of black
Americans. But the three Supreme Court cases were of greatest pub-
lic consequence. In each Henry prevailed-to the immediate benefit
of his clients and to the lasting benefit of his country.
The Dalzell essay centers on the first of the three cases-Deutch v.
United States In arguing Deutch, Henry wove into his detailed recital
of the events giving rise to the prosecution a single electrifying fact-a
fact of no readily demonstrable doctrinal authority but of overwhelm-
ing moral authority-which, as the Dalzell essay explains, appears to
have been the ingredient which moved five justices to overturn
Henry's client's conviction for contempt of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities. I will discuss Henry's two other Supreme
Court victories-School District of Abington Township v. Schempp2 and
Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 In doing so, I will try to avoid another distortion
endemic in reprises of leading Supreme Court cases-the tendency to
look only at the argument and opinions in the Supreme Court, ne-
glecting what transpired below. In both Schempp and Lemon it is clear
that a masterly litigator planted in the trial court the seeds of the fruit
that was to ripen on appeal.
ABINGTON SCHOOLDISTRICT V. SCHEMPP
The Schempp case had its inception in a letter written in 1957 to
the Philadelphia chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. The
letter writer, Ellory Schempp, was a high school student, the oldest of
three Schempp children enrolled in the public schools of Abington
Township, a Philadelphia suburb. The letter described the discomfort
that Ellory, whose family was Unitarian, felt during the Bible reading
and recital of the Lord's Prayer that launched each school day. Ellory
wondered whether the ACLU-which, so he understood, cared about
issues of this sort-would regard this as a problem. Ellory had heard
good things about the ACLU's endeavors and he enclosed ten dollars
367 U.S. 456 (1961).
2 374 U.S. 203 (1963) [hereinafter Schempp].
3 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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to further those endeavors.
On receipt of the letter, Spencer Cox, the executive director of
the ACLU's Philadelphia chapter, consulted Bernard Wolfnan, an
ACLU member and young partner at Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen.4 Wolfrnan, who lived not far from Abington, agreed to call
upon the Schempps and explore the matter. An interview with Ellory
and his younger siblings, Donna and Roger-all three seriously trou-
bled by the obligatory prayer exercises-and then with their parents,
satisfied Wolfman that the Schempp family was prepared for the diffi-
culties that litigation might entail, if the board of the ACLU chapter
were to conclude that the chapter should take on the matter. Some
initial research persuaded Wolfman that the morning exercises that
disturbed the Schempps-the Bible reading portion of which was re-
quired by a Pennsylvania statute-posed substantial and unsettled
constitutional questions.
Wolfman then reported his findings to the board of the ACLU
chapter. All members of the Board were persuaded that the
Schempps' religious freedom issues were proper ACLU issues. Several
members, however, felt that taking on a litigation burden of such ex-
pectable magnitude was not a prudent allocation of limited resources,
given their commitment to assisting those still being tarred by McCar-
thyism and its dismal legacy. After extended discussion, the Board
voted-only to find itself equally divided. The deciding vote was that
of the Chair, Clark Byse, a Penn law professor s Byse noted that, as a
Catholic, he derived great comfort from the Bible; but, since all of his
fellow board members saw in the Schempp children's predicament
constitutional issues of gravity, he would vote with those who felt the
chapter should agree to take the matter on.
The Board's decision to provide counsel for the Schempps, how-
ever, did not mean that Wolfman would be that counsel. Wolfman
decided that for him, as a Jew, to represent the Schempps in a chal-
lenge to Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer merely
would add unnecessary and probably detrimental baggage to what
clearly would be a controversial and, in many quarters, an unpopular
cause. Wolfman so advised Spencer Cox and recommended that his
4 Wolfnan was a year behind Sawyer at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
and they served together as editors of the Law Review. In 1963, Wolfman left private
practice to return to Penn Law School as a member of the law faculty, and he served as
Dean from 1970-75. In 1976, Wolfianjoined the Harvard Law School faculty as Fes-
senden Professor of Law.
Byse left Penn for Harvard in 1958, where he is Byrne Professor Emeritus.
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friend Henry Sawyer-an ACLU member and young partner at
Drinker Biddle & Reath whom Wolfman had known since they were
fellow law students at Penn-be asked to assume the representation.
Cox acquiesced, so Wolfman presented the proposal to Henry Sawyer,
and Henry agreed to represent the Schempps.
In the District Court
In February 1958, Henry filed the Schempp complaint in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The defendants were the Abington School District, its Superinten-
dent, and other school officials. The object of the suit was to obtain a
decree enjoining the enforcement of section 1516 of the Public
School Act and to declare it unconstitutional. Section 1516 was a di-
rective that "[a] t least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, or
caused to be read, without comment, at the opening of each public
school on each school day, by the teacher in charge."7 Although not
required by the statute, the prescribed Bible reading was, in the
Abington schools, routinely followed by a recitation in unison of the
Lord's Prayer, which in turn usually was followed by the Pledge of Al-
legiance. Henry's theory of the case was that the prescribed Bible
reading, whether or not followed by the Lord's Prayer, constituted
both an establishment of religion and an infringement of the free ex-
ercise of religion in contravention of the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the provisions of the federal Judicial Code (Tide 28) then
in force, a constitutional challenge to a state statute was required to be
heard by a three-judge district court, at least one of whose members
was a circuitjudge. The Schempp district court consisted of Chief Cir-
cuitJudge Biggs and DistrictJudges Kirkpatrick and Kraft. When the
matter came on for trial, the district court heard testimony from the
Schempps regarding the incompatibility of certain aspects of Biblical
doctrine, especially portions of the KingJames Version, with the relig-
ious beliefs of the Schempp family. Further, both sides presented ex-
pert witnesses.
The expert witness presented by Henry Sawyer was Dr. Solomon
6 Public School Act, 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15-1516 (West 1949).
7The statute further provided that any schoolteacher having responsibility for
reading or causing the reading of the Bible verses who "shall fail or omit to do
so... shall, upon charges preferred for such failure or omission, and proof of the
same, before the board of directors of the school district, be discharged." Id. See also
infra note 12.
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Grayzel, an ordained rabbi who was editor of the Jewish Publication
Society. In its opinion, the district court summarized Dr. Grayzel's
testimony at some length:
Dr. Solomon Grayzel testified that there were marked differences be-
tween the Jewish Holy Scriptures and the Christian Holy Bible, the most
obvious of which was the absence of the New Testament in the Jewish
Holy Scriptures. Dr. Grayzel testified that portions of the New Testa-
ment were offensive to Jewish tradition and that, from the standpoint of
Jewish faith, the concept of Jesus Christ as the Son of God was "practi-
cally blasphemous." He cited instances in the New Testament which, as-
sertedly, were not only sectarian in nature but tended to bring the Jews
into ridicule or scorn. Dr. Grayzel gave as his expert opinion that such
material from the New Testament could be explained to Jewish children
in such a way as to do no harm to them. But if portions of the New Tes-
tament were read without explanation, they could be, and in his specific
experience with children Dr. Grayzel observed, had been, psychologi-
cally harmful to the child and had caused a divisive force within the so-
cial media of the school.
Dr. Grayzel also testified that there was significant difference in atti-
tude with regard to the respective Books of the Jewish and Christian Re-
ligions in thatJudaism attaches no special significance to the reading of
the Bible per se and that the Jewish Holy Scriptures are source materials
to be studied. But Dr. Grayzel did state that many portions of the New,
as well as of the Old, Testament contained passages of great literary and
moral value.
8
The expert witness for the defense was Luther A. Weigle, an or-
dained Lutheran minister who was Dean Emeritus of the Yale Divinity
School and Chairman of the Committee for the Preparation of the
Revised Standard Version of the Bible. The district court also summa-
rized Dr. Weigle's testimony at some length:
Dr. Luther A. Weigle, an expert witness for the defense, testified in some
detail as to the reasons for and the methods employed in developing the
King James and the Revised Standard Versions of the Bible. On direct
examination, Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was non-sectarian. He
later [presumably on cross-examination by Henry Sawyer] stated that the
phrase "non-sectarian" meant to him non-sectarian within the Christian
faiths. Dr. Weigle stated that his definition of the Holy Bible would in-
clude the Jewish Holy Scriptures, but also stated that the "Holy Bible"
would not be complete without the New Testament. He stated that the
New Testament "conveyed the message of Christians." In his opinion,
reading of the Holy Scriptures to the exclusion of the New Testament
8 Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. 398, 401-02 (E.D.
Pa. 1959) [hereinafter Schempp IH.
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would be a sectarian practice. Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was of
great moral, historical and literary value. This is conceded by all the par-
ties and is also the view of the court.
In September 1959, the district court, speaking through Chief
Judge Biggs, issued its opinion. The decision relied on the Supreme
Court's 1948 holding in McCollum v. Board of Education, which invali-
dated the Champaign, Illinois "released time" program.'0 Under that
plan, public school children were released from classes each week to
attend religious education conducted on school premises during
school hours. The Schempp district court concluded that Pennsylva-
nia's obligatory Bible reading program constituted an establishment
of religion. The court further held that the program inhibited the
free exercise of religion not only of students but also of their parents."
Although decided by the three-judge district court in 1959, and
notwithstanding the defendants' prompt filing of a notice of appeal,
Schempp was not to be addressed by the Supreme Court on the merits
until 1963. In December 1959, three months after the district court
judgment, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended section 1516.
The most significant change was the insertion-after the opening sen-
tence requiring daily readings from the Bible-of the following provi-
sion: "Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attend-
ing such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or
guardian."'2 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court vacated the district
9 Id. at 402.
10 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
1 Schempp III, 177 F. Supp. at 407 ("If the faith of a child is developed inconsis-
tently with the faith of the parent and contrary to the wishes of the parent, interfer-
ence with the familial right of the parent to inculcate in the child the religion the par-
ent desires, is clear beyond doubt."). The court also found that teachers were
unconstitutionally coerced, since failure to read, or arrange for the reading of, the ten
Bible verses put a teacher at risk of discharge under the 1949 Bible reading statute as
originally enacted. See id. at 406 ("The sanction imposed upon the school teachers is
discharge from their offices if they fail to observe the requirement of the statute.").
But see infra note 12 (describing the amendment to the 1949 Bible reading statute that
eliminated the threat of discharge for non-cooperating teachers).
12 In amending section 1516, the General Assembly also deleted the provision that
put a non-cooperating teacher at risk of discharge. See supra note 6. However, as the
district court was to note in the subsequent opinion reexamining the case in the light
of the 1959 amendments, a teacher "who refuses or fails to obey the mandate of the
amended statute may have his contract of employment terminated pursuant to 24 P.S.
§ 11-1122 (Supp. 1960)." Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp.
815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1962) [hereinafter Schempp Il]. Section 11-1122 provided that
"[t]he only valid causes for termination of a contract heretofore or hereafter entered
into with a professional employe [sic] shall be immorality, incompetency, intemper-
ance, cruelty, persistent negligence, mental derangement, advocation of or participat-
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court's judgment and remanded the case "for such further proceed-
ings as might be appropriate in light of [the amendments to the chal-
lenged statute] ."
On remand, after intermediate activity of no consequence, 4 the
district court held an additional trial. Edward Schempp-the chil-
dren's father-testified about his decision not to request that the two
Schempp children still in school be excused from attending Bible
reading pursuant to the amendment's opt-out provision: he was con-
cerned that his children would be "labeled as 'odd-balls.'"' 5 Further,
the district court learned that
The procedure followed in the Abington Senior High School, following
the amendment of Section 1516, did differ somewhat from that which
was in effect prior to the amendment. We describe it briefly. The chil-
dren attending the High School, Roger and Donna included, reported
to their "homerooms' at 8:15 A.M. And a few minutes thereafter the Bi-
ble reading began with each pupil seated "at attention." The Bible read-
ing consists of reading, without comment, over a loud speaker ten verses
of the KingJames Version of the Bible. Then the children stood and re-
peated, with the public address system leading them, the Lord's Prayer.
Next, still standing, the children gave the Flag Salute. They then sat
down. Announcements were made and when the announcements were
completed the students went to their classrooms for the first classes of
the day. 16
In February 1962, the district court, again speaking through Chief
Judge Biggs, issued an opinion supplementing and reaffirming the Es-
tablishment Clause aspect of its September 1959 opinion. Said Chief
Judge Biggs:
The reading of the verses, even without comment, possesses a devotional
and religious character and constitutes in effect a religious observance.
ing in un-American or subversive doctrines, persistent and willful violation of the
school laws of this Commonwealth .... " I. at 817 n.1. When the Supreme Court ul-
timately considered Schempp, the Court's opinion pointed out that "[t]he statute as
amended imposes no penalty upon a teacher refusing to obey its mandate. However, it
remains to be seen whether one refusing could have his contract of employment ter-
minated for 'willful violation of the school laws.'" Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208 n. 2
(1963) (quoting 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-1122 (West 1999)).
is Schenpp, 364 U.S. 298, 298 (1960).
14 See 195 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (allowing plaintiffs to amend their pleading
in light of the statutory amendment). To complete the procedural picture, see also
184 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1959), which preceded the Supreme Court's vacate-and-
remand order. There, the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to enter-
tain the defendant's motion for relief from the final decree in view of the fact that an
appeal had been taken to the Supreme Court. Id. at 383-84.
is Schempp I, 201 F. Supp. at 818.
16 1d. at 817-18.
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The devotional and religious nature of the morning exercises is made all
the more apparent by the fact that the Bible reading is followed immedi-
ately by a recital in unison by the pupils of the Lord's Prayer. The fact
that some pupils, or theoretically all pupils, might be excused from at-
tendance at the exercises does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the
ceremony for the "new" Section 1516, as did the statute prior to its 1959
amendment, unequivocally requires the exercises to be held every school
day in every school in the Commonwealth. The exercises are held in the
school buildings and perforce are conducted by and under the authority
of the local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the
statute requires the reading of the "Holy Bible," a Christian document,
the practice, as we said in our first opinion, prefers the Christian relig-
ion. The record demonstrates that it was the intention of the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to introduce a religious
ceremony into the public schools of the Commonwealth .
On the basis of the foregoing findings, Chief Judge Biggs relied
on McCollum v. Board of Education,8 the Champaign, Illinois "released
time" case, as he had done in the 1959 district court decision. 9 In ad-
dition to reinvoking McCollum, ChiefJudge Biggs quoted the Supreme
Court's assurance that "[w]e follow the McCollum case," articulated in
Zorach v. Clauson, which upheld the constitutionality of New York
20City's off-the-school-premises "released time" program. Notably,
ChiefJudge Biggs made no effort to show how the Supreme Court's
approval of the New York City program in Zorach could be squared with
its disapproval of the Champaign program in McCollum-or, more to
the pointjust how, putting aside the rhetoric in Zorach, the holding in
Zorach could be squared with the district court's determination that
Pennsylvania's Bible-reading ceremony did not pass constitutional
21
muster.
Stating that "[t]he Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has seen fit to
breach the wall between church and state," ChiefJudge Biggs went on
to "hold the statute as amended unconstitutional on the ground that
it violate[d] the 'Establishment of Religion' clause of the First
Amendment made applicable to the Commonwealth.. . by the Four-
17 Id. at 819.
18 Id. (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)).
19 Schempp III, 177 F. Supp. 398, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (quoting McCollum, 333 U.S.
203).
20 Schempp II, 201 F. Supp. at 815 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315
(1952)).
21 Distinguishing Zorach would not, in fact, have been a difficult matter. Zorach in-
volved religious exercises conducted by non-school authorities and not on school
premises. To say that Zorach was a manifestly different case does not signify that Zorach
was rightly decided.
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teenth Amendment.2 The ChiefJudge found it "unnecessary to pass
upon any other contention made by the plaintiffs in respect to the
unconstitutionality of the statute or the practices thereunder."2 In
short, the district court, on weighing the impact of the amendment
permitting parents to withdraw their children from the Bible-reading
ceremony, (1) reaffirmed its prior holding that the ceremony was re-
ligious and hence constituted a forbidden establishment of religion,
and (2) sub silentio withdrew from, but did not repudiate, its prior
holding that the ceremony worked a forbidden restraint on the free
exercise of religion. This was the judgment that Henry Sawyer would
have to defend before the Supreme Court.
Between the District Court and the Supreme Court
In April 1962, two months after the three-judge district court is-
sued its final opinion'in Schempp, the Maryland Cqurt of Appeals de-
cided Murray v. Curlett.24 The plaintiffs in Murray were William
Murray, a student in the Baltimore public schools, and his mother,
Madalyn. The Murrays were atheists and had gone to a Maryland state
court to seek a writ of mandamus directing the Baltimore Board of
School Commissioners to rescind, as unconstitutional, Article VI, sec-
tion 6 of the Board's Rules. That section provided that "[e]ach
school, either collectively or in classes, shall be opened by the reading,
without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of
the Lord's Prayer." The rule further provided that "[a]ny child shall
be excused from participating in the opening exercises or from at-
tending the opening exercises upon written request of his parent or
guardian."2
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. The court's decision analogized
the opening prayer exercise to permissible prayer ceremonies in the
state legislature, the Congress, and the state and federal courts. The
court also found persuasive the fact that "the appellant-student in this
case was not compelled to participate in or attend the program he
claims is offensive to him" 6 Next, the decision referenced Schempp
and noted that the Supreme Court:
22 SchemppI, 201 F. Supp. at 819.
23 Id.
24 179A.2d 698 (Md. Ct. App. 1962).
Id. at 699 (emphasis omitted).
2 Id. at 702.
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ordered per curiam that the judgment below be vacated and remanded
the case to the district court for further proceedings, after it was learned
that the Pennsylvania law had been so amended as to provide for the ex-
cusing of those students who objected to participating in a school open-
ing ceremony quite similar 
to that in Baltimore City.
2 -
In the court's view, "the remand of [Schempp] at least indicated that
the use of coercion or the lack of it may be the controlling factor in
deciding whether or not a constitutional right has been denied."28
Speaking to the district's court's decision on remand, the Murray
court noted that:
[i]n reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful that the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has, upon the remand, re-
heard the case, and again held (in an opinion byJohn Biggs, Jr., Circuit
Judge...) that the Pennsylvania statute is not constitutional despite the
fact that objecting students could have been excused on the request of
their parents, but we do not find the decision on remand persuasive and
decline to follow it."
Three members of the court, speaking through Chief Judge
Brune, dissented, arguing that "[t]here seems to be no substantial
room for dispute that the reading of passages from the Bible and the
recital of the Lord's Prayer are Christian religious exer-
cises... favor[ing] one religion and [doing] so against other religions
and against non-believers in any religion."30 For this reason, the dis-
senters concluded that the prayer recitation "is directly contra to the
prohibition against any 'law respecting an establishment of religion,'
contained in the First Amendment, as that provision has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court."M' The provision allowing parents to
excuse their children from participating did not, in the view of the
dissenters, "save the rule from collision with the 'establishment of re-
ligion' clause of the First Amendment, even if it could save it from col-
lision with the 'free exercise of religion' clause. 32 This was the case
because the "coercive or compulsive power of the State is exercised at
least to the extent of requiring pupils to attend school and it requires
affirmative action to exempt them from participation in these relig-




0 Id. at 708.
Id.
32 Id. at 709.
3Id.
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was "in accord with the result reached by a special three-judge District
Court in Pennsylvania in [Schemnqp].""
In June 1962, on the last day of the 1961 Term, the Supreme
Court, in Engel v. Vitalk held invalid New York's so-called "Regents'
Prayer'--"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers,
and our Country"-promulgated by the Regents of the State of New
York for daily recitation, on a non-compulsory basis, in New York's
public schools.35 Speaking through Justice Black, the Court held that
"it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers
for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government."4 Justice Stewart dissented.
On October 8, 1962, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Murray37  The Court then set the case down for argument with
Schempp. The arguments in Schempp and Murray took place in late Feb-
ruary 1963, just over a year after Chief Judge Biggs filed the second
merits opinion in Schempp. The Court's decisions in the two cases
were announced in'a single opinion on June 17, 1963, the last day of
the 1962 Term; the Maryland Court of Appeals judgment was re-
versed, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania judgment was af-
firmed. Justice Clark wrote the opinion of the Court. Justices Douglas
and Goldberg (the latter joined by justice Harlan) filed brief concur-
ring opinions, and Justice Brennan filed a seventy-five page concur-
ring opinion. All of the concurringJustices joined the opinion of the
Court. Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter in Engel v. Vitale a year be-
fore, again dissented.Y
The care with which Henry Sawyer had built the record in the dis-
trict court was fully vindicated in the Supreme Court. The Court's
opinion-following the opening paragraph that stated the central
constitutional question and how it was to be resolved-proceeded to
set forth "The Facts in Each Case." In stating the facts in Schempp, the
Court set forth verbatim the district court's summary of the testimony
of Dr. Grayzel, Henry Sawyer's expert witness, and of Dr. Weigle, the
defense expert whose testimony Henry turned to his own use.39 Fur-
Sid.
370 U.S. 421,422 (1962).
6 Id. at 425.
37 371 U.S. 809 (1962).
38 Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (describing the testimony of Dr. Grayzel
and Dr. Weigle before the district court).
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ther, the Court also set forth verbatim the district court's findings with
respect to the "devotional and religious nature of the morning exer-
cises."40 The crucial weight of this factual infrastructure becomes clear
when one reads the Court's statement of the governing constitutional
principles and the application of those principles to the two cases be-
fore the Court. In particular, the Court pointed to eight cases directly
considering the Establishment Clause.4 ' Taken together, these cases
articulated the following test of legislative power respecting religious
belief:
[What are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If ei-
ther is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitu-
tion. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion ....
Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we
find that the States are requiring the selection and reading at the open-
ing of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison. These exercises are pre-
scribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by
law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under the
supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those
schools. None of these factors, other than compulsory school atten-
dance, was present in the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. The trial
court in [Schempp] has found that such an opening exercise is a religious
ceremony and was intended by the State to be so. We agree with the
court's finding as to the religious character of the exercises. Given that
finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
There is no such specific finding as to the religious character of the
40 Schempp II, 177 F. Supp. 815, 819 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See supra text accompanying
note 17 (setting forth the court's reasoning with respect to the Establishment Clause
violation inherent in the statute).
41 In addition to McCollur, Zorach, and Engel, the five other cases referred to by the
Court included: Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a state constitu-
tional provision requiring that public officials make "a declaration of belief in the exis-
tence of God"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (sustaining "Sunday clos-
ing" law); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (sustaining government
reimbursement of parents for the cost of transportation to parochial schools); Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (town ordinance requiring license and pay-
ment of fee to engage in solicitation invalid as applied to door-to-door solicitation by
Jehovah's Witnesses); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a
statute forbidding public solicitation on behalf of a religious cause without a public
official's approval).
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exercises in [Murray], and the State contends (as does the State in
[Schempp]) that the program is an effort to extend its benefits to all pub-
lic school children without regard to their religious belief. Included
within its secular purposes, it says, are the promotion of moral values,
the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetua-
tion of our institutions and the teaching of literature. The case came up
on demurrer, of course, to a petition which alleged that the uniform
practice under the rule had been to read from the KingJames version of
the Bible and that the exercise was sectarian. The short answer, there-
fore, is that the religious character of the exercise was admitted by the
State.42
The dual Establishment Clause principles announced by the Su-
preme Court in Schempp--"[T]o withstand the strictures of the Estab-
lishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion"--were to be
the doctrinal building blocks of the triad of Establishment Clause
principles announced in Lemon v. Kurtzmann, Henry Sawyer's second
religion case.43
LEMON V. KURTZMAN
Lemon v. Kurtzman, Henry Sawyer's second campaign to enforce
the First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom, had as its tar-
get Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act-a statute enacted by the Pennsylvania general Assembly in 1968
with a view to alleviating the rapidly escalating financial burdens of
Pennsylvania's nonpublic schools.44 The statute authorized Pennsyl-
vania's Superintendent of Public Instruction to make a "contract" with
a nonpublic school under which the school would agree to teach one
or more "secular" subjects-mathematics, modem foreign languages,
physical science and physical education. The state would reimburse
the school for the costs of instruction, most particularly teacher's sala-
ries, books, and instructional equipment. The books and equipment
utilized in such a course were to be approved by the Superintendent
of Public Instruction, and state reimbursement could not be author-
ized for "any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the mor-
als or forms of worship of any sect."4
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-24.
For the author's views of Schempp and Engel at the time of the Schempp decision,
see Louis H. Pollak, Foreword: Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62
(1963).
"Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
4S Id. at 39-40.
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When the statute went into effect Pennsylvania spent approxi-
mately $5,000,000 annually to reimburse nonpublic schools pursuant
to these "contracts." The eleven hundred beneficiary schools had
educational responsibility for upwards of 500,000 pupils-twenty per-
cent of Pennsylvania's school population. More than ninety-six per-
cent of these pupils were enrolled in church-related schools. Those
who challenged the statute saw it as a device for funneling public
money to nonpublic-and, particularly, church-related-schools by
paying them for doing what they had traditionally done without de-
pending on public largesse.
In the District Court
As he had done in Schempp, Henry Sawyer brought his suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The suit-filed
in 1969-sought to enjoin further expenditures of state funds for this
allegedly unconstitutional enterprise.5 Once again, a threejudge dis-
trict court was convened. The panel consisted of District Judges Lu-
ongo and Troutman and Chief CircuitJudge Hastie.
The defendants moved to dismiss. On November 28, 1969, the
district court filed an opinion granting the motion.47 Judge Troutman
wrote for the court, stating that the doctrinal principles governing the
case were those announced by the Supreme Court in Schempp-i.e.,
that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there
must be "a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."48 Judge Troutman noted that "[tihe
plaintiffs allege as a fact that the purpose and primary effect of the
Education Act is to aid religion."49 However, Judge Troutman deter-
mined "that the allegation asserts not a fact but a conclusion of law
and as such is not admitted for the purposes of testing the sufficiency
of the complaint."5° He then held that "the purpose of the Education
Act can be found clearly on its face."51 Further, "[t]he Legislature has
See id. The plaintiffs included individuals suing as taxpayers and also the follow-
ing organizations: Americans United for Separation of Church and State; the Pennsyl-
vania Council of Churches; the PennsylvaniaJewish Community Relations Conference;
the Pennsylvania Conference of the NAACP; and the ACLU. The district court deter-
mined that the organizations did not have standing. Id. at 41.
47 Id. at 49.
Id. at 44 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
49 Id. at 43.
s Id.
s1 Id. at 45.
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declared that the purpose of the Education Act is 'to promote the wel-
fare of the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania' and 'to
promote the secular education of children of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania attending nonpublic schools.'"
2
Chief Judge Hastie dissented, stating that
the majority seems to view the question of the purpose and effect of the
statute as foreclosed by declarations in the statute itself that the legisla-
tive purpose is "to promote the welfare of the people of the Common-
wealth" and "to promote the secular education of children of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania attending nonpublic schools." With this I53
cannot agree.
Then-after pointing out that the issue before the court was not
"summary judgment where the factual posture of the case is estab-
lished by affidavits and exhibits" but a motion to dismiss with respect
to which "decision is controlled by the allegations of the complaint
and ourjudgment as to the potentiality of proof thereunder"5 -- Chief
Judge Hastie continued:
But even if inquiry as to purpose and effect should be confined to ex-
amination of the language and scheme of the statute, I cannot avoid the
conclusion that the primary purpose and effect of the enactment is to
help the nonpublic schools by supplying them with needed financial aid,
while whatever promotion of the public welfare is anticipated as a result
of such public assistance is at best an incidental consequence claimed in
justification of the state's action.
5 5
In the balance of his opinion, Chief Judge Hastie addressed the
larger implications of the case:
It has already been pointed out that sectarian schools are only part of
a complex of activities, many of them as 'secular' as the teaching of lan-
guages and physical science, which modem churches and religious insti-
tutions finance and conduct. Charities, hospitals, community centers
and homes for the aged and infirm are familiar examples.... If the
constitutional bar to state grants in all such cases should be removed, it
is reasonable to anticipate continuing political controversy in every state
and local community whether and to what extent public funds are to be
granted to subsidize a large number and a broad range of activities of re-
ligious organizations ....
So far we have escaped much of the divisiveness and antagonism of
52 Id.
53 Id. at 49-50.
54 Id. at 50 n.l.
W I&at5O.
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political differences and controversies about religious matters because
public financing of activities of religious organizations has been under-
stood to be prohibited by our Constitution. Professor Paul Freund has
perceptively pointed out that President Kennedy was able to avoid taking
a political position upon issues of religious character by relying upon
authoritative decisions on the constitutional separation of state and re-
ligion as controlling. [Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)]. But if the present statute is held to be
constitutional, I see no escape from the evils that attend a widespread
and pervasive intermingling of politics and religion.56
Henry Sawyer filed a notice of appeal, and on April 20, 1970, the Su-
preme Court noted probablejurisdiction.5
On June 15, 1970, a three-judge district court in Rhode Island
held invalid the Salary Supplement Act enacted by the Rhode Island
Legislature in 1969.58 Under that statute Rhode Island undertook to
pay to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools
salary supplements of up to fifteen percent of a teacher's salary. The
statute's stated purpose was "to assist non-public schools to provide
salary scales which will enable them to retain and obtain teaching per-
sonnel who meet recognized standards of quality."9 The court con-
ducted a trial, finding that the "evidence... fully corroborates the
legislature's finding of a financial crisis in non-public education, but
indicates that the crisis is largely confined to Rhode Island's Catholic
schools" in which "[alpproximately 95 per cent of the elementary
school children attending non-public schools are enrolled...."60
The financial problems besetting the elementary parochial
schools were found to have originated in the need to recruit hundreds
of lay teachers to supplement the nuns who historically had consti-
tuted more than ninety percent of the instructional staff. The efforts
of the parochial schools to recruit lay teachers, however, were made
more difficult by virtue of the steadily rising salaries of public school
teachers. The court determined that "[t]he Salary Supplement Act
will not relieve the parishes or parents of their escalating burden, but
will temporarily enable parochial schools to compete for qualified
teachers."61 The court found that "[o]n the one hand, it aids the qual-
5 Id. at51.
.5 397 U.S. 1034 (1970).
53 DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
59 Id. at 114
60 Id. at 115.
61 Id.
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ity of secular education; on the other, it provides support to a relig-
ious enterprise."62 In sum, the court saw "as the necessary effects of
the kind of legislation involved here not only substantial support for a
religious enterprise, but also the kind of reciprocal embroilments of
government and religion which the First Amendment was meant to
avoid." o The opinion of the court was written by CircuitJudge Coffin
and was joined by then-District Judge Bownes. Judge Pettine filed a
separate concurring opinion. On November 9, 1970, the Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction in the Rhode Island case, which
was then set down for argument with Lemon v. Kurtzman.
In the Supreme Court
Argument took place on March 3, 1971, and the Court issued its
decision on June 28, 1971-the last day of the 1970 Term.6 The
Court reversed the judgment of the Pennsylvania three-judge district
court and affirmed the judgment of the Rhode Island three-judge dis-
trict court. As was true in Schempp and Murray, the disposition of the
trial court that had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cog-
nizable cause of action was overturned, while the disposition of the
trial court that had conducted a trial was sustained.
Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court,6 and built
upon the groundwork laid in Schempp.
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumula-
tive criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular leg-
62 Id. at 119.
6 Id. at 122.
6Earley v. Dicenso, 400 U.S. 901 (1970).
65 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
Joining the opinion in its entirety were Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart and
Blackmun. Justice Marshall joined the Rhode Island portion of the Chief Justice's
opinion, but took no part in Lemon; Justice Marshall also filed a brief separate state-
ment. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion in whichJustice Blackjoined, and in
which Justice Marshall substantially joined (except insofar as the opinion addressed
Lemon. Justice Brennan filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice White filed an
opinion concurring in Lemon and dissenting in the Rhode Island case. I& at 604.
It seems a reasonable surmise thatJustice Marshall recused himself in Lemon for
the reason that the Pennsylvania Conference of the NAACP was one of the initial
plaintiffs (albeit dismissed for lack of standing, along with the other organizational
plaintiffs, by the district court). It is understood to have beenJustice Marshall's settled
practice not to participate in cases in which the NAACP was a party, in view of theJus-
tice's long and triumphant association with the NAACP (and its affiliate, the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational fund) in his lawyering days.
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islative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968) [quoting Schempp]; finally, the statute must not fos-
ter "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
6
7
Because the Rhode Island case had gone to trial, and hence had
generated a significant factual record, the opinion of the ChiefJustice
had considerably more to say about Rhode Island's salary supplement
program than about Pennsylvania's reimbursement program. The
ChiefJustice's discussion of the Pennsylvania program follows:
The Pennsylvania statute... provides state aid to church-related schools
for teachers' salaries. The complaint describes an educational system
that is very similar to the one existing in Rhode Island. According to the
allegations, the church-related elementary and secondary schools are
controlled by religious organizations, have the purpose of propagating
and promoting a particular religion's faith, and conduct their operations
to fulfill that purpose. Since this complaint was dismissed for failure to
state a claim for relief, we must accept these allegations as true for pur-
poses of our review.
As we noted earlier, the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to
ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role give rise to entan-
glements between church and state. The Pennsylvania statute, like that
of Rhode Island, fosters this kind of relationship. Reimbursement is not
only limited to courses offered in the public schools and materials ap-
proved by state officials, but the statute excludes "any subject matter ex-
pressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any
sect." In addition, schools seeking reimbursement must maintain ac-
counting procedures that require the State to establish the cost of the
secular as distinguished from the religious instruction.
The Pennsylvania statute, moreover, has the further defect of provid-
ing state financial aid directly to the church-related school. This factor
distinguishes both Everson and Allen, for in both those cases the Court
was careful to point out that state aid was provided to the student and his
parents-not to the church-related school. Board of Education v. Allen,
supra at 243-244; Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 18. In Walz v. Tax
Commission, supra at 675, the Court warned of the dangers of direct pay-
ments to religious organizations:
Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant
with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs,
could encompass sustained and detailed administrative relation-
ships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards.
67 Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
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The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indi-
cates that such programs have almost always been accompanied by vary-
ing measures of control and surveillance. The government cash grants
before us now provide no basis for predicting that comprehensive meas-
ures of surveillance and controls will not follow. In particular the gov-
ernment's post-audit power to inspect and evaluate a church-related
school's financial records and to determine which expenditures are re-
ligious and which are secular creates an intimate and continuing rela-
tionship between church and state. 68
It is clear that, although the Pennsylvania district court did not
conduct a trial, the ChiefJustice gave careful attention to the limited
proceedings that did take place. Thus, the Chief Justice specifically
adverted to the fact that Chief Judge Hastie had dissented.69 Moreo-
ver, in emphasizing the entanglement risks "presented by the divisive
political potential of these state programs,"70 the Chief Justice cited
(albeit without attribution to Chief Judge Hastie) the same page of
the same article by Professor Freund that the Chief Judge had in-
voked. The ChiefJustice put the matter succinctly.
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even parti-
san, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government, but political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to pro-
71
tect.
Lemon v. Kurtzman has been the law of the land for almost thirty
years. The attacks on its three-fold "test" have been numerous. But
the constitutional concerns animating the decision are no less valid
today than when ChiefJustice Burger (and Chief Judge Hastie) gave
voice to them.
CONCLUSION
In 1988, having heard that Henry Sawyer was in the process of
withdrawing from full-time active practice, a lawyer who had occasion
over the years to observe Henry as an appellate advocate wrote him a
letter. The letter-writing lawyer was WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., the Senior
Associate Justice, who had been a member of the Court since 1956--
five years before Henry argued Deutch. The letter said: "Since I've
68 Id. at 620-22.
69 Id. at 611.
70 Id. at 622.
71 Id.
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been here, few lawyers have equaled your advocacy."7 Praise from Sir
Hubert is praise indeed.
Letter from WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr. to Henry Sawyer, III.
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INTRODUCTION
Threats are often conditional promises to act inefficiently. The
threatener in effect says: "I will do something that hurts you more
than it helps me unless you pay me not to."' Threatening inefficient
action often in turn produces inefficiency because either the threat-
ener follows through on her threat, resources are squandered in ne-
gotiating to avoid the threatened behavior, or the contracting parties
take overly cautious steps to avoid being threatened. Contract schol-
ars have long understood that this problem might arise when promi-
2sors threaten to breach. If contract damages are not sufficient to fully
compensate a promisee for lack of performance, a promisor may
threaten to breach in order to extract more favorable terms. For ex-
ample, a seller may threaten to breach a supply agreement-even
Under this definition, threats are made to induce payment. See Robert Hale, Co-
ercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State 38 PoL SI. Q. 470, 476 (1923)
("If I plan to do an act or to leave something undone for no other purpose than to in-
duce payment, that might be conceded to be a 'threat.'"). In contrast, a promise to act
efficiently is not a threat because the promisor does not seek payment and the prom-
isee would not pay enough to stop the promisor from acting. Thus, the answer to the
age-old tough-guy question: "Is that a threat or a promise?" may turn on whether the
threatener/promisor seeks to change another person's behavior. Other characteristics
of threatening behavior are explored in Ian Ayres & BarryJ. Nalebuff, Common Knowl-
edge as a Barrier to Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1631 (1997).
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Strategic Delays and Fiduciay Duties, 74 VA. L. REV. 863, 870
(1988) ("Perhaps the most convincing argument for discouraging delay when the de-
fendant's behavior is not unambiguously wrongful is that such delay threatens to deter
desirable behavior by potential defendants."); Mary Lou Serafine, Note, Repudiated
Compromise After Breach, 100 YALE L.J. 2229, 2229 (1991) ("The repudiated compromise
arises when one party to a contract threatens to or does actually breach some term of a
contract and, rather than take the problem to court, the parties agree to a compro-
mise."). Threatening inefficient breach to negotiate a more favorable price is vividly
illustrated by Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 534 (N.Y. 1971)




when it is clear that performance is efficient-solely to renegotiate a
higher price. Because such renegotiations are often thought to be
presumptively inefficient, the rules invalidating bad faith or opportun-
istic renegotiation attempt to deter promisors from making the initial
threat.
A parallel problem has gone virtually unnoticed: threatening to
perform. In this article, we will present two broad contexts where par-
ties threaten inefficient performance of contractual promises or other
legal duties solely to gain bargaining power in a subsequent negotia-
tion:
1. A potential plaintiff who is owed a duty may, at times,
seek inefficient injunctive relief instead of damages
merely to induce a defendant (the person owing the
duty) to pay an amount higher than expected court-
awarded damages.
2. And, more perversely, a potential defendant who owes a
duty to another may, at times, threaten to perform an
inefficient duty merely to induce the plaintiff (the per-
son owed the duty) to accept an amount less than ex-
pected court-awarded damages.
When a performance of some duty becomes inefficient (in the
straightforward sense that the cost of performance is greater than the
benefit), we will show that one side often will desire to threaten per-
formance merely to gain bargaining power. The impulse to threaten
inefficient performance does not connote, however, an ability to make
credible threats. We will discuss conditions under which such threats
are credible, giving rise not only to substantial negotiation costs but
also to bargaining outcomes that diverge substantially from make-
whole damages.
In the contractual context, promisees at times will inefficiently
seek specific performance not because they value actual performance
more than damages, but because they want to sell their court-ordered
right to performance back to the promisor. These promisees repre-
sent to the court that monetary damages would be insufficient to
make them whole and then-before the ink dries on the injunction-
offer a price to relieve the promisor of the court-ordered duty. Judge
Posner foresawjust this possibility in declining to award an injunction
to a coal seller:
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With continued production uneconomical, it is unlikely that an order of
specific performance, if made, would ever actually be implemented....
[B]y offering [the seller] more than contract damages... [the buyer]
could induce [the seller] to discharge the contract and release [the
buyer] to buy cheaper coal .... Probably, therefore, [the seller] is seek-
ing specific performance in order to have bargaining leverage with [the
buyer], and we can think of no reason why the law should give it such
leverage.3
When promisors seek to breach what have become inefficient prom-
ises, promisees may seek specific performance merely to induce the
promisors to pay more than expectation (make-whole) damages.
To understand the incentives promisees have to seek inefficient
specific performance, consider a stylized variation on the facts of
Peeryhouse.4 A miner has promised to return the topsoil on a farmer's
strip-mined land to its original position. Imagine that the cost of mov-
ing the topsoil turns out to be $30,000, but that the court is expected
to award only diminution-in-value damages of $10,000 if the miner
fails to perform. If we also assume that the farmer's actual benefit
from performance (moving the soil) is $8000, the farmer has a strate-
gic rationale for seeking specific performance of the contract5 If the
court awards specific performance, then the Nash bargaining solu-
tion6 is for the miner to pay the farmer $19,000 to avoid moving the
soil.7 Even though $10,000 in damages provides more compensation
than $8000 in make-whole relief, the farmer has an incentive to seek
3 Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279-80
(7th Cir. 1986).
4 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
5 Judith Maute has suggested that the plaintiffs attorney may have elected not to
seek specific performance in order to increase the size of his contingent fee. SeeJudith
L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Rvisited: The Ballad of Willie and
Lucil 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1341, 1449-50 (1995).
6 The bargaining solution is the amount at which the bargaining parties ultimately
settle. The settlement amount could conceivably be anywhere within the parties' bar-
gaining range. However, in this Article we have chosen to use the Nash bargaining
solution, which maximizes the product of the parties' bargaining gains. See, e.g., FRANK
STAH-ILER, EcoNoMIc GAMES AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR: THEORY AND APPLICATION
40-41 (1998) (describing the role of John Nash in the development of economic the-
ory and the basic principles of his bargaining solution).
(8000 + 30,000)/2. An agreement to avoid performing the injunction creates a
total surplus of $22,000. The Nash solution splits this surplus between the two parties.
The defendant pays the plaintiff $11,000 less than she would have spent had she per-
formed-the difference between the $30,000 cost of performance and the $19,000
payment to the plaintiff under the Nash solution. The plaintiff receives $11,000 more
than he would have received in the event of performance (the difference between the
$19,000 payment and the $8000 benefit from performance).
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an inefficient injunction in order to increase his bargaining power.
Scholars have mistakenly argued that "an injured party would not
choose specific performance unless damages undercompensated the
party."' This simple example, however, shows that plaintiff/promisees
may choose specific performance even when damages would over-
compensate them. Although the equal division of the bargaining sur-
plus implied by the Nash bargaining solution (which implicitly as-
sumes equal bargaining power) may not apply to particular contexts,
under a variety of alternative bargaining-power assumptions, the
farmer/promisee will threaten inefficient performance as a bargain-
ing chip.
Plaintiffs also seek inefficient injunctions outside of contractual
settings. Indeed, the incentive to seek inefficient injunctions solely
for settlement value is a possibility whenever the law gives aggrieved
parties the option to seek an injunction instead of monetary dam-
ages.9 For example, consider the classic 1895 encroachment case of
8 JAMEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 217 (4th ed.
1995) (footnote omitted).
9 See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, (Econ)stitutional Law: Standing, Harm, and Re-
vealed Preference (Aug. 29, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review) for examples of several threats to seek injunctions in contexts
outside of contracting. As the authors point out, a company may bring an antitrust
action seeking an injunction to block a merger as being anticompetitive. The com-
pany seeks not to redress its own injury, but instead to capture a share of the gains the
merging parties will achieve by selling back the injunction. See id at 35 n.71. See also
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconcling Private Incentives
and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 (1995),which states:
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have taken the position that merger in-
junction actions are inherently inferior to damage actions. They argue that
injunction actions create acute holdup problems because each plaintiff can
threaten to block the acquisition unless paid the merger's full transactional
value, a sum likely to exceed any threatened injury to the plaintiff.
Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1169 (1982)).
Even constitutional claims may be used to extract a settlement. In designing an
auction of Personal Communications Services frequencies, the Federal Communica-
tion Commission ("FCC") initially proposed rules giving bidding preferences to firms
owned by women and/or minorities and to small businesses in the auctions for certain
licenses. Telephone Electronics Corporation ("TEC"), whose $200 million in annual
revenues made it too large to qualify for bidding preferences as a small business, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of race and gender preferences. TEC's president was clear
about why he had sought the injunction against the auctions: once it blocked the auc-
tions, TEC could offer to drop its suit in exchange for an agreement with the FCC to
grant it the bidding preference for which it had been ineligible. The FCC was about to
grant TEC an exemption when TEC formed a joint venture with several larger firms
and dropped its suit. SeeAyres & Siegelman, supra, at 36-38.
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Pile v. Pedrick.° After being misinformed by a surveyor, Pedrick built a
factory wall with a foundation that extended 1 3/8 inches onto Pile's
land (below the surface of the land). The court offered Pile a choice
of either damages for the permanent trespass or a court order to re-
move the wall. Pile insisted upon the latter.
Imagine that Pedrick's cost of removing the wall was $10,000, but
the court's estimate of permanent trespass damages was only $500. If
we also assume that Pile's actual benefit from performance (removing
the wall) was $0, we can see Pile had a strategic rationale for seeking
an injunction-even if Pile knew that tearing down the wall was ineffi-
cient. The Nash bargaining solution in the shadow of an injunction
was for Pedrick to pay Pile $5000.11 Even though performance was in-
efficient and damages provided more than make-whole relief, Pile had
an incentive to seek an injunction in order to increase his bargaining
power. As we will show more formally below, the incentive to seek in-
efficient injunctions is particularly strong when the likely court-
awarded damages are substantially lower than the cost of perform-
ance.
Lest our gentle reader think that the incentive of plaintiffi to seek
inefficient injunctions is merely another perverse, but other-worldly,
implication of game theory, consider the two common law chestnuts
of Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co.' 2 and Rievman v. Burlington Northern
Railroad Co.'
5
In Edwards, the defendant, in 1874, "at a cost of some sixty thou-
sand dollars erected a stamp mill on the banks of Hill creek."4 The
operation of the mill necessitated depositing large quantities of sand
on the bottom lands below. AsJustice Cooley summarized:
The year following the erection of defendant's mill, complainant pur-
chased a piece of land through which the creek runs a short distance be-
low the mill, and upon which the mill as operated was depositing sand.
The land was not purchased for use or occupation, but as a matter of
speculation, and apparently under an expectation of being able to force defen-
dant to buy it at a large advance on the purchase price. It was offered to de-
fendant soon after the purchase, and though no price was named, the
valuation which has been put upon it by complainant and his witnesses is
from three to five times what it cost him, and this perhaps gives some in-
10 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895).
n ($10,000 +$0)/2.
12 38 Mich. 46 (1878).
13118 F.R.D. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
14 Edwards, 38 Mich. at 48.
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dication what his expectations were.'s
As Edward Yorio has noted: "[T]he peculiar facts of Edwards
dramatize how equitable remedies may be used to extort overcompen-
satory settlements."16 Edwards represents a strategic "coming to the
nuisance" in order to extort a supercompensatory payment.
For a more contemporary example, consider the facts of Rdewnn,
In this case, bonds issued in 1896 were secured with realty that by
1985 was worth billions of dollars more than the outstanding principal
of the bonds. The terms of the bond mortgages, however, severely in-
hibited the sale and development of the realty. A class of bondholders
brought suit "to enjoin the [defendant] Railroad from substituting
other collateral for [the realty] by which the bond mortgages [were]
secured."17 The court expressly endorsed the bondholders' right to
"hold up" the defendant for an immediate "premium" payment of
$35.5 million (in addition to providing substitute collateral that virtu-
ally eliminated any chance of default) by threatening specific en-
forcement of the collateral provisions.8 Examples abound in which
the plaintiffs seek inefficient injunctive relief in order to extract a
premium above the value of actual performance.'9
I. (emphasis added).
16 EDWARD YoRIo, CONTRACr ENFORcEMENT: SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE AND
INJUN~floNS 85 (1989).
1 Rievman, 118 F.R.D. at 30.
is See id. at 33 ("The bondholders' lien ... permits [bondholders] to insist on re-
ceiving the 'hold-up' premium to which that lien has given rise."). The court, how-
ever, also refused to allow a minority of bondholders to extract even more money from
the defendant by objecting to the $35 million premium. Id
19 See, e.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265,
279 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Probably, therefore, [the seller] is seeking specific performance
in order to have bargaining leverage with [the buyer] ... ."); Foster v. American Mach.
& Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that an injunction prohib-
iting infringement "is not intended as a club to be wielded by a patentee to enhance
his negotiating stance"); Bracewell v. Appleby, [1975] Ch. 408, 416 (refusing to grant
an injunction that would prohibit the defendant from occupying his own house be-
cause an in part injunction would place plaintiffs in "an unassailable bargaining posi-
tion"); see a/soYORIO, supra note 16, at 83 ("The availability of specific performance or
injunctive relief gives the plaintiff considerable leverage in negotiations between the
parties.").
Defendants against whom injunctions issue at times pay an amount in settlement
instead of performing. For example, in Tulk v. Moxhay, Tulk sued to prevent Moxhay
from building on Leicester Square garden. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). Since
Tulk's deed had a covenant requiring that the Square be "uncovered with any build-
ings," the court granted Tulk the injunction. See id. at 1143. The Tulk family ulti-
mately traded its injunctive right in exchange for a valuable option. See JEssE
DUKEMINIER & JAms E. KRIER, PROPERTY 863 (3d ed. 1993) (explaining the subse-
quent history of TuA v. Moxhay).
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While these previous examples concern how people who are owed a
duty can have an incentive to threaten inefficient performance of in-
junctions, it is also possible that people who owe a duty will threaten
inefficient performance merely to increase their bargaining power.
People who owe performance of a duty are likely to threaten ineffi-
cient performance whenever expected damages equal or exceed the
cost of performance. This can be seen in a contractual setting when a
court is expected to award cost of performance damages.
Whenever expected court-awarded damages exceed the prom-
isee's benefit from performance, a promisor's threat to perform may
induce the promisee to settle a case for less than the court award. Re-
turning again to a stylized variation of Peevyhouse, imagine now ajuris-
diction that would award $30,000 as cost of performance damages if
the miner breached its promise (to restore the topsoil of the strip-
mined land), even though the farmer's value of actual performance is
only $8000. Before performance is due, the promisor might try bar-
gaining her way out of performing by offering to pay the promisee
some amount between $8000 and $30,000, say by splitting the differ-
ence at $19,000-again, the Nash bargaining solution.
The naive promisee at this point might respond: "Why should I
accept $19,000 when my contract damages will be $30,000?" A savvy
miner, however, will answer: "You're mistakenly assuming that I will
breach if we don't reach agreement. If we don't renegotiate this con-
tract, you should know that I am going to perform and you will end up
with only an $8000 benefit."
The promisor gains bargaining power by threatening to perform.
Even though the promisor knows performance is inefficient, threaten-
ing performance can be an individually rational strategy because it
In a recent, excellent article, Ward Farnsworth found that in twenty recent nui-
sance cases in which injunctions were issued, the parties failed to negotiate whether a
payment would be made in lieu of performance. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nui-
sance Cases Bargain AfterJudgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedra 66 U. CmH. L. REV. 373,
381-83 (1999). Farnsworth argues that acrimony and distaste for bargaining may have
deterred such negotiations. See id. at 384. If the Farnsworth result were generally true,
then one might reasonably doubt whether plaintiffs ever seek injunctions in order to
extract supercompensatory payments from the defendant. Besides the aforemen-
tioned counterexamples such as Edwards, there are strong reasons to question whether
one can make a generalization from these twenty observations. Farnsworth only exam-
ines appellate decisions. As he acknowledges, the litigants that fail to settle by this
point in the litigation might be strongly predisposed toward acrimony and distaste for
bargaining. See id. And even to the extent that one can generalize the result, our pro-
posed reforms, by more explicitly stating when an injunction is alienable, may encour-




disproportionately hurts the promisee. Moreover, under the assumed
facts, the threat is credible because in the absence of agreement actual
performance would cost the promisor no more than he would have to
pay in damages-indeed, actual performance potentially saves attor-
ney fees.
Inefficient performance threats can produce both ex ante and ex
post types of inefficiency. Ex post, a threat of inefficient performance
might entail the cost of the negotiations themselves, and the costs re-
sulting when the failure to reach a bargain results in inefficient per-
formance. As Richard Epstein has noted: "Injunctive relief thus poses
two major risks: first, that parties will waste enormous resources in
bargaining over the surplus and, second, that they will not be able to
reach any agreement at all given the tendency to bluff and bluster."20
More subtly, the prospect of being threatened ex post may distort ex
ante behavior. Thus, in the contract setting, the prospect of both in-
efficient threats and payoffs that substantially diverge from make-
whole damages may adversely affect the parties' original willingness to
contract or to rely on the contract.
Inefficient threats are commonplace in bargaining. Jones may re-
sist selling her car to Smith, even though she knows that Smith values
it more, merely to induce a higher purchase price. The inefficiency
produced by such quotidian threats, however, is greatly reduced by
competition. Smith can look for other sellers. The performance
threats analyzed in this article are distinguishable because they arise
under conditions of bilateral monopoly.! Once a court orders Pedrick
to remove the encroaching wall, Pile is the only person to whom
Pedrick can look to avoid the performance inefficiency!' Threaten-
ing inefficient behavior to induce more favorable contract terms is
more worrisome when the parties do not have outside, competitive
options. The common law at times, such as in the case of salvage,
constrains the parties' ability in bilateral monopoly contexts to make
inefficient threats as a way of limiting the potential inefficiencies and
inequities of such negotiations.2
20 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASESAND MATERIALS ONTORTS 714 (6th ed. 1995); see also
Ken Binmore et al., Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities, 108 ECON. J. 1279, 1279
(1998) (finding that experimental subjects with imperfect information often fail to
achieve efficient bargaining outcomes).
21 The unique efficiency problems posed by bilateral monopolies are discussed in
Ian Ayres, Monsanto Lecture: ProtectingProperty With Puts, 32 VAT- U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
Pedrick is the only person Pile can hold up.
See infra notes 24-25 (suggesting legal rules which would reduce the parties' use
of inefficient threats).
1999]
54 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
Under conditions of bilateral monopoly, it is presumptively ineffi-
cient for either promisor or promisee to threaten inefficient perform-
ance merely to gain renegotiation bargaining power. The law might
usefully be structured to deter such threats-even though it does not
intervene to regulate negotiations where the bargainers have outside
options. Courts, however, will often have difficulty distinguishing effi-
cient from inefficient threats. For example, promisees might seek
specific performance because they place a high subjective value on
performance rather than a desire to sell their injunction back to the
promisor. Our solution is to suggest legal rules that economize on the
parties' private information, particularly on the threatened party's
knowledge.24
We will argue that the law can give the threatened party options
to make inefficient threats less attractive. In particular, we assess the
efficiency effects of two remedial reforms that undermine the credibil-
ity of inefficient threats:
Inalienable Injunction Option: Before asking plaintiffs to elect
monetary or injunctive relief, courts could routinely give defen-
dants an option to make any injunctive relief inalienable. Threat-
ened parties would have the option of forgoing their ability to buy
their way out of an injunction. By exercising this option, a threat-
ened promisor in effect would be telling the promisee: "Force my
performance if you really want my performance, but don't seek an
injunction merely to hold me up for money." Under the facts of
Pile, making the injunction inalienable might have deterred the
plaintiff from seeking the inefficient injunction to have the en-
croaching wall removed. The plaintiff might have preferred
monetary damages (of $500) to an inalienable injunction that
would have provided the plaintiff only a negligible benefit.
Private Additur and Remittitur Courts could routinely give the
24 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have shown how liability rules can economize
on private information. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726-27 (1996) ("[U]nder the liabil-
ity rule, the state is able to make implicit use of injurers' information about prevention
costs, because injurers know their actual prevention cost, which they compare to aver-
age harm."); see also Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond 106 YALE LJ. 703, 749 (1996) (discussing the advan-
tages of higher order liability rules, including the fact that they harness information
efficiently). Our theory suggests that when one side has the option of choosing a
property rule negotiation, the other side should be given an offsetting option.
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threatened party the option to commit to "less favorable" mone-
tary damages. Before performance is due, promisees could be
given the option to decrease the potential legal damages they
would receive in the event of breach. Likewise, before promisees
commit to injunctive relief, promisors could be given the option
to increase the potential legal damages they would pay in the
event of breach. This would amount to a system of private additur
and remittitur, in which plaintiffs could choose before trial to re-
duce the damages they would potentially collect and defendants
could choose to increase the damages they would potentially pay. 5
An extension of the earlier cost of performance strip-mining ex-
ample shows how these options might work. When a promisor, bar-
gaining in the shadow of $30,000 cost of performance damages, inef-
ficiently threatens to perform, the farmer/promisee should have the
option of reducing his legal damages to, for example, $25,000. While
choosing lower legal damages seems superficially "less favorable" for a
plaintiff/promisee, doing so can actually benefit the promisee. As
long as the promisor can credibly threaten performance, it may be
able to buy back its promissory duty for a relatively small amount (say
$19,000). By lowering the background damages, the promisee can
make the promisor's threat non-credible. The promisor might still
claim that he will perform in the absence of renegotiation, but the
promisee (having reduced the damages) could now respond, "I don't
believe you; when push comes to shove, you will breach and pay me
$25,000 instead of performing at a cost of $30,000." Surprisingly, the
promisee can increase its expected payoff by reducing its potential legal dam-
ages.
While plaintiff remittitur and defendant additur, combined with
injunction inalienability, can both deter threats of inefficient per-
formance, we will argue that there is a stronger case in equity and effi-
ciency for structuring the law to deter plaintiffs' threats of inefficient
injunctions. Plaintiffs' threats are likely to drive plaintiffs' payoffs sub-
stantially above make-whole damages while defendants' threats are
likely to drive plaintiffs' payoffs down closer toward make-whole dam-
A provision in an initial agreement that fixed liquidated damages as the exclu-
sive remedy could obviate the need for the additur and remittitur options. But parties
may be reluctant to fix liquidated damages when they cannot anticipate what the
amounts should be at the time they enter the contract. As discussed below in Part
IV.A, our proposed reforms only constitute default rules that would govern in the ab-
sence of a contrary agreement.
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ages. We suggest that courts give defendants the options of injunctive
inalienability and additur to deter plaintiffs' efforts to increase pay-
ments above expectation damages, but that courts not try to deter de-
fendants' efforts to use performance threats to reduce damages to-
ward the expectation amount.
While it is nigh-on impossible to construct a single damage rule
that will induce efficient behavior along all possible dimensions, 26iv-
ing defendants the options of inalienability and additur leads toward
more efficient plaintiff precaution and, under certain conditions,
more efficient defendant reliance as well as a possibility of more effi-
cient ex post negotiations. The strongest rationale for injunctive inal-
ienability (and additur), however, is based not on efficiency but on
equity. Some injunctions are granted in order to give the plaintiff
rights-holder an entitlement to bargain for whatever exchange value
the plaintiff can negotiate. Injunctions against patent infringement,
for example, are often aimed at giving the patentee the ability to ne-
gotiate a high licensing fee. But judges award many, if not most, in-
junctions merely to provide the plaintiff the "use value" of actual per-
formance.Y "Use value" injunctions are granted in part because of
courts' concerns that monetary damages may not fully compensate the
plaintiff. Giving plaintiffs the option to seek alienable injunctions re-
duces the chance of undercompensation at too high an equitable
price by creating the possibility of substantial overcompensation. Giv-
ing plaintiffs instead the choice of either an inalienable injunction or
damages (possibly enhanced by the defendant) retains the prime
benefit of an alienable injunction, the elimination of the threat of
undercompensation, by ensuring that plaintiffs can receive in kind the
actual performance to which they are entitled. But an inalienable in-
junction sharply reduces the inequitable risk of overcompensation-
that is, the risk that plaintiffs will seek an injunction solely for the pur-
See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 466,
488-89 (1980) (concluding that although the use of damage measures is in the mutual
interest of both parties to a contract and leads to efficient behavior, factors such as the
respective risk aversion of the parties and limited information of the enforcing court
can limit the effectiveness of such measures). In a 1985 article, Robert Cooter empha-
sizes the difficulty of formulating efficient legal rules when efficiency requires bilateral
precaution. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precau-
tion, 73 CAL L. REv. 1, 4 (1985) (arguing that, because assigning full responsibility for
the injury to one party or parceling it out between the parties cannot fully internalize
costs for both of them, there is no level of compensation that achieves double respon-
sibility at the margin).
2 The distinction between "use value" and "exchange value" is discussed below at
notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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pose of receiving a payment far greater than the amount that they ac-
tually value performance.
Common law courts already respond to the problem of plaintiffs
threatening inefficient performance by denying injunctions that im-
pose disproportionate hardship on the defendant in comparison to
the benefit that the plaintiff would derive from performance of the• • • 28
injunction. We support these decisions. Often, however, courts with
imperfect information or courts worried about the possibility of plain-
tiff undercompensation grant an injunction where the defendant's
burden outweighs the plaintiff's benefit. Courts should accordingly
go beyond the decisions judiciously denying injunctions; they should
consider regulating plaintiffs' ability to hold up defendants for super-
compensatory amounts.
Our defendant additur and inalienability options rely on the
game-theoretic prediction that such defendant options can deter
plaintiffs from initially seeking injunctions. A problem with such re-
forms is that if they do not succeed in deterring plaintiffs, they can
lead toward even more inefficient performance. As an alternative, we
suggest that judges consider subjecting all injunctive settlements to
the same type of remittitur analysis to which a jury award would be
subjected. A remittitur review of injunctive settlements-that is set-
tlements whereby defendants agree to pay plaintiffs in lieu of per-
formance-would amount to an ex post judicial cap on how much
plaintiffs could gain from an injunction. Such a review might achieve
some of the deterrence effects of inalienability, without seeming like
such a radical departure from current procedure and without creating
as great a risk of inefficient performance. Any of our proposed re-
forms-judicial remittitur, inalienability, or defendant additur-
should be thought of as default rules that the parties could disclaim in
an initial contract or that defendants could disclaim at an early stage
in the litigation before the plaintiff elects monetary or injunctive relief.
This Article is divided into four sections. The first section ex-
plores the conditions under which people who are owed duties and
people who owe duties will threaten inefficient performance. The
second section shows how the inalienable injunction and private re-
mittitur and additur options will deter such threats by undermining
their credibility. The third section assesses the ex ante and ex post ef-
ficiency effects of threats to perform and of our proposals to stop
28 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (addressing the common law undue
burden rules that courts use to deny injunctive relief in certain situations).
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them. The final section discusses more specific means by which courts
may limit threats to perform.
I. A UNIFYING THEORY OF PERFORMANCE THREATS
This section presents a simple model to show (1) when someone
who owes or is owed a duty will desire to threaten inefficient perform-
ance and (2) when such a threat will be credible. In this model, imag-
ine that a potential defendant owes some duty of performance to a
potential plaintiffY2 The duty might be contractual in nature (as in
the Peevyhouse duty to return topsoil) or non-contractual in nature (as
in the Pile duty to remove an encroaching wall). Assume that:
C = the defendant's cost of performance; and
B = the plaintiff's benefit from performance.
Because we are interested in exploring threats when performance
is inefficient, we also assume that at the time performance is due C >
B. 30 If either side credibly threatens performance (as formally defined
below), the parties will negotiate to avoid the inefficiency-specifi-
cally, the defendant will offer to pay the plaintiff to release the defen-
dant from her performance duty. When the parties have asymmetric
information about B and C, this negotiation can produce inefficient
results. For now, we assume B and C are common knowledge between
the players and negotiation costs are nil so that the players expect ne-
gotiations to succeed. We also assume the expected negotiated
amount the defendant pays for the plaintiffs release in the shadow of
a credible performance threat is:
N = cc C + (1 - a) B, where (x - [0,1] is a measure of plaintiff's
bargaining power.
C and B are the players' "threat points" or "BATNAs" (best alter-
native to negotiated agreement) once performance has been credibly
threatened. The negotiated amount, N, falls somewhere between
these threat points depending on the parties' relative bargaining
By flip of a coin, we have decided to refer to the plaintiffs and the defendants by
male and female pronouns respectively.
s0 Even though contractors would not enter into a contract expecting C to be
greater than B, after a contract is formed, C may turn out to be higher than expected
(or B may turn out to be lower than expected).
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31power, which for convenience, we have reduced to the scalar, a.
Finally, we assume that if the defendant fails to perform, the plain-
tiff can seek either specific performance or monetary damages equal
to:
D = expected monetary damages if the defendant fails to perform
(and if plaintiff does not seek specific performance).
We will consider the players' incentives under a range of different
damage levels-including subcompensatory (D < B), compensatory
(D = B), supercompensatory (D > B), and a special subcategory of su-
percompensatory, cost of performance (D = C).
Two conditions must be present before performance threats will
generate bargaining. First, one of the parties must desire to threaten
performance (motive), and second, that party must be able to make a
credible threat (opportunity).
A. The Motive to Threaten Inefficient Performance
The relationship between the level of damages (D) and the ex-
pected payoff from negotiation (N) will determine which side has an
incentive to make a threat. The motive to threaten inefficient per-
formance is the motive to supplant the damage award with a more fa-
vorable negotiated amount. More specifically:
" If D < N, the plaintiff will want to threaten inefficient perform-
ance to increase his expected payment; and
" If D > N, the defendant will want to threaten inefficient per-
formance to decrease her expected payment.
These inequalities suggest that one side or the other will often
have a desire to threaten inefficient performance in order to supplant
the expected award of damages. Damages are usually set to approxi-
mate B in order to make the plaintiff whole, or alternatively set to ap-
31 Bargaining power might turn on a host of bargaining primitives, including pro-
cedure (take-it-or-leave-it vs. alternating offers, etc.), the players' relative impatience,
the cost of bargaining, and even the hopes of the parties involved. SeeJennifer Ger-
arda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. R.EV. 1661, 1669 (1997) (argu-
ing that hope acts as an independent, primitive variable upon which negotiation be-
havior depends).
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proximate C (as with cost of performance or restitutionary awards) .32
When the parties bargain in the shadow of a performance threat,
however, the negotiated amount, N, will systematically be between B
and C. The larger the inefficiency (i.e., the more C exceeds B), the
larger the likelihood that one side or the other will have a strong in-
centive to change the expected payment from D to N. Thus, in our
earlier encroachment example, when legal damages were set to ap-
proximate B, the plaintiff had a strong incentive to seek an injunction
to threaten inefficient performance and the likely negotiation it in
turn would produce. In our cost of performance example, where
damages were set to approximate C, the promisor had a strong incen-
tive to threaten inefficient performance to reduce her ultimate pay-
ment. In a richer model, the costs of renegotiation and the costs of
failed negotiation could dampen the parties' desire to make such
threats, but perversely, the more inefficient performance becomes,
the larger the chance that at least one party will have a desire to
threaten inefficient performance.
B. When Willa PotentialDefendant'sPerformance Threat Be
Credible?
Motive, however, does not connote opportunity. Only credible
threats of inefficient performance will spur negotiation. If the threat-
ened party has no reason to believe the threatener will carry out the
threat to perform, he has no reason to bargain. This credibility prob-
lem particularly restricts the ability of potential defendants to threaten
inefficient performance. The opportunity for defendants to threaten
performance arises when, before performance is due,3 3 potential de-
32 Cost of performance damages can approximate expectation damages under the
assumption that the plaintiff will use the damage amount to purchase performance
and thereby put himself in the same position as if the defendant had performed. See
Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Sum-
mers, 69 IowA L. REV. 497, 506 (1984). When changed circumstances cause the defen-
dant's cost of performance to radically exceed the plaintiff's benefit, however, then the
plaintiff is unlikely to use the cost of performance damages amount received to buy
substitute performance-so that cost of performance puts the plaintiff in a better cir-
cumstance than actual performance.
33 After performance is due, a promisor cannot credibly threaten to perform (un-
less the promisor has a right to cure, see U.C.C. S 2-508 (1989)). More generally, a per-
son owing some non-contractual duty to another cannot threaten inefficient perform-
ance if there is not sufficient opportunity to contract for payment instead of
performance. Imagine, for example, a stylized version of Hewlett in which a court im-
posed a tort duty of care on barge operators to carry a particular radio in case of an
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fendants threaten to actually perform their promise or noncontractual
duty-instead of failing to perform and being held liable for damages
(D). The potential defendant implicitly threatens the plaintiff. "Let
me pay you N instead of D or else I will perform and you'll only have a
benefit of B." This threat is only credible, however, if the plaintiff be-
lieves that if he refuses the offer, the defendant will actually perform.
In the simple model, the defendant's threat will be credible only if-
D>C.
When expected damages equal or exceed the defendant's ex-
pected cost of performance, the defendant will be able to credibly
threaten performance in the absence of renegotiation because carry-
ing through on the threat costs the defendant the same as or less than
paying damages.
While legal damages often focus on making the plaintiff whole, in
a variety of contexts courts instead invoke a "disgorgement" principle
that attempts to put the defendant in the same position as if she had
performed her duty.Y One particular form of disgorgement remedy,
cost of performance damages, can often give potential defendants the
ability to make a credible performance threat. If cost of performance
damages equal the defendant's actual cost of performance, the de-
fendant loses nothing by carrying out her threatened performance in
the event that negotiations fail.
Commentators have correctly noted that cost of performance
damages and other extraordinary damages that place the defendant
emergency. See Hewlett v. Barge Bertie, 418 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1969). If the perform-
ance of this duty is inefficient (meaning the cost of performance is greater than the
benefit of reduced accident costs), then we might imagine barge owners threatening
to perform the duty unless the class of beneficiaries (potential accident victims) agreed
to indemnify the barge owners for any tort liability stemming from failure to take this
type of care. But the class of potential signatories is so vast that there is not a practica-
ble opportunity to contract-and therefore no opportunity to threaten.
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach of Contrac 94YALE L.J. 1339, 1354-69 (1985) (discussingiudicial use
of the disgorgement principle in cases "involving fiduciaries, sellers of goods who
would be liable in conversion, and sellers of land"). Courts often struggle with the is-
sue of whether to give cost of performance or cost of repair damages when such dam-
ages would greatly exceed a "diminution in value" measure. See, e.g., Heninger v.
Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106-09 (1980) (explaining the use of the dimunition of value
and restoration damages where replacement costs are unreasonable);Jacob &Youngs,
Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (arguing the merits of dimi-
nution of value versus cost of completion remedies in a breach of contract case where
"the cost of completion is grossly and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be at-
tained").
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in the position of performance are (like specific performance) a spe-
cies of what Calabresi and Melamed called "property rules," which
tend to deter defendants from non-consensual takings.3  Avery Katz
has called such damages "liquidated specific performance," arguing
that such remedies give the plaintiff all of the gains from efficient
breach3 6 But the foregoing shows that cost of performance and other
disgorgement damages may not result in giving the plaintiff all of the
gains from performance. By allowing the defendant to credibly
threaten inefficient performance, disgorgement remedies may allow
the defendant to bargain to pay substantially less.
What happens when damages are less than the defendant's cost of
performance (D < C)? It would at first seem that the promisor's
threat to perform would lose its credibility. The validity of this con-
clusion, however, hinges on the divisibility of the defendant's per-
formance. In a 1996 article, Lucian Bebchuk showed that plaintiffs
who expect to spend more litigating than they would gain from win-
ning a suit might still have a credible threat to sue if the litigation
37costs are incurred in stages over time. Bebchuk's insight can be ap-
plied in the bargaining context where the anticipated damage award
is less than the cost of performance. If the defendant's performance
is due in discrete stages, it may be credible for the defendant to
threaten performance even though the total cost of performance is
greater than the expected damages. For example, assume that the to-
tal cost of performance is 30, but that it is broken up into two discrete
stages each costing 15. Assume also that the plaintiff's benefit (B)-is'8,
that expected damages (D) are 27, and that the parties have equal
bargaining power and an opportunity to bargain before each stage of
See generally David D. Haddock et aL, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordi-
nary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990) (developing a property analysis of the
role of extraordinary legal sanctions in an efficient legal system and extending the
model to explain various seemingly illogical and disjointed tort and contract damage
rules).
36 Avery Katz, Reflection on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 541,547 (1988).
37 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats to Sue 25J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996) (utilizing backward induction to explain why
defendants can expect to settle negative value suits due to the divisibility of litigation
costs). When litigation costs are divisible, the costs incurred in the last stage may be
less than the damage award, making a threat to sue credible at that stage. If the parties
reach this stage, they will expect to settle. The plaintiff will of course take this antici-
pated last-stage settlement into consideration when he decides whether to embark on
the next-to-last stage. If his payoff from this last-stage settlement is greater than his
next-to-last stage litigation costs, then he has reason to initiate a suit. In other words,
his litigation threat is credible.
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performance. Then it is possible to show-A la Bebchuk-that the de-
fendant can credibly threaten performance. Even though the total
cost of performing (30) is more than the defendants expect to pay in
legal damages (27), the division of performance over time makes the
threat credible. It can be shown that if the parties have equal bargain-
ing power in equilibrium, the defendant should only expect to pay the
plaintiff 17.25 to release herself from her duty, an amount substan-
tially less than either damages or cost of performance. The defen-
dant's threat to perform will be credible for any fixed damage amount
greater than 26.5. This example shows then that performing over
time can increase the defendant's ability to make credible threats of
inefficient performance.
The size of D is crucial to determining whether the defendant's
threat to perform is credible, but if the performance threat is credible
the damages have no independent impact on the expected settle-
ment. A core result of non-cooperative bargaining theory is that the
negotiated amount will be a function of the parties' threat points. If
33 Breaking performance into two stages makes the defendant's performance
threat credible. In the last stage, the defendant will actually prefer to perform (since
she will spend 15 rather than pay damages of 27). Since her performance threat at this
last stage is credible, the parties would agree to settle at this stage (if they ever reached
this stage) for 11.5 (the midpoint solution between the plaintiff's benefit of 8 and the
seller's non-sunk prospective costs of 15). Anticipating this negotiation at the last
stage, the defendant prefers to expend 15 at the first stage, since 15 + 11.5 = 26.5 is less
than damages at 27. But given that the staged costs make full performance credible
from the beginning, both parties prefer to negotiate immediately, settling on a pay-
ment midway between the parties' threat points: a (8 + .5 (26.5 - 8)) = 17.25 payment
by the defendant to the plaintiff.
39There is, however, a caveat concerning this analogy to Bebchuk's litigation cost
model. In the litigation cost model, expenditures on suit preparation are assumed not
to be correlated with the amount of damages that would be awarded in the suit. In
other words, a non-credible threat becomes credible since the division into stages
makes the litigation costs the party has yet to incur drop, while the suit damages re-
main constant. In contrast, damages awarded in a breach of contract suit may be a
function of the performance that has occurred. For example, a painter paints the bot-
tom floor of a house, but announces that he will breach the contract before complet-
ing the second floor of the house. The cost of painting the first floor will likely be de-
ducted from the damages that would have been awarded had the contract been
breached before any performance. If the level of damages and the cost of perform-
ance decrease by exactly the same amount, the threat will remain non-credible. For
this reason, if partial performance reduces the expected damage award (D), then the
plaintiff's performance threat will only be credible where the adjusted damage award is
proportionally larger than D. This might happen if the court believes it is difficult for
a second contractor to pick up where the first contractor left off. Contracts involving
some sort of learning curve would be one example. In this case, the cost of comple-
tion damage award would necessarily be greater than the original promisor's remain-
ing cost of performance.
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the defendant can credibly threaten performance, then the relevant
payoffs in the absence of agreement become B and C. The level of
damages should play no role in determining the size of the negotiated
amount (N) other than ensuring credibility because, in the shadow of
a credible performance threat, there are no circumstances under
which the defendant will ever have to pay court-awarded damages.
Focusing on the defendant's ability to make credible threats also
illuminates an interesting distinction between cases of "impossibility"
and "impracticability." Defendant threats are not credible when per-
formance itself is literally impossible. A defendant facing cost of per-
formance damages, however, can credibly threaten performance when
performance is possible but merely impracticable (i.e., extremely
costly). The law, at times, responds to evidence of either impractica-
bility or unconscionability by reducing the defendant's expected
damages. This is primarily accomplished by using the diminution in
value damage measure instead of a cost of performance measure"
(and more rarely by voiding the defendant's duty to perform alto-
gether, effectively reducing the defendant's damages for nonperform-
ance to $0).41 If lawmakers wish to deter defendant threats,4 there is a
stronger case for reducing the defendant's damages when the defen-
dant's performance is merely impracticable not impossible. Reducing
damages substantially below the cost of performance when perform-
ance is impracticable can render the defendant's threats non-credible.
When the defendant's performance is impossible, however, it is not
necessary to reduce the defendant's liability to deter performance
threats. The defendant can not credibly threaten to do the impossi-
ble. Thus, while we normally think that evidence of impossibility pro-
vides a stronger rationale for relief than mere impracticability, from
the standpoint of deterring the defendant's threats of performance,
the opposite is true.
C. When Will a Plaintiff's Performance Threat Be Credible?
Plaintiffs threaten to cause defendants' performance by seeking
injunctive orders of performance. The major obstacles in making this
threat are equitable rules limiting the award of this "extraordinary"
40 SeeJacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (awarding dimi-
nution in value damages where cost of performance damages were excessive).
41 See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1997) (discussing when breach of contract due to the im-
practicability of performance does not constitute a breach of duty).
Ultimately we will argue they should not. See discussion infra Part III.
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remedy. The primary limitation, as traditionally formulated, is that
injunctions will only be granted to prevent an irreparable injury (or as
equivalently formulated, if there is no "adequate legal remedy") .4 But
Douglas Laycock has shown as a matter of positive U.S. law that "[t]he
irreparable injury rule almost never bars specific relief" and an emerg-
ing consensus is that courts routinely give plaintiffs an option for spe-
cific relief in a far wider range of contexts than previously thought.4
Under a variety of doctrines, however, courts will still deny injunc-
tive relief that imposes undue hardship on a defendant (in compari-
son to the benefit that the plaintiff will derive from the injunction).
4
5
These undue burden limitations make good economic sense because
they limit the ability of plaintiffs to threaten inefficient performance
when their motive to do so is the strongest. The essence of the "un-
due burden" rules is to identify circumstances where the defendant's
cost of performing some duty (C) far exceeds the plaintiffs benefit of
performance (B) . It is in just these circumstances that the amount
expected from negotiating away an injunction (N) is likely to far ex-
ceed what the plaintiff might receive in court-awarded damages, and
that plaintiffs will therefore have an incentive to seek the injunction as
a bargaining chip.47 The refusal of courts to issue injunctions that
43 See, e.g., United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974)
(examining the prerequisites for issuance of an injunction).
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURYRULE 23 (1991).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1977) (intentional nuisance
should be enjoined as unreasonable only if "gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of
the actor's conduct"); YORIo, supra note 16, at 41 ("For specific performance to be
proper, however, the marginal benefit to the promisee must be sufficiently great that it
outweighs the marginal costs imposed on the promisor and on the legal system."); see
alo DOUGLAS LAYcOcK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 219
(1985) ("One of the grounds for vacating a final judgment of injunction is that the in-
junction is causing undue hardship to defendant....").
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364(1)(b) (1979) (discussing
when injunctive relief is inappropriate due to unreasonable hardship to the party in
breach); YORIO, supra note 16, at 110 ("[T]he issue of equitable relief is viewed often
in terms of a balancing test, with specific performance denied if the burden on the de-
fendant from enforcement of the contract would exceed the benefit to the plaintiff.");
see e.g., Ben Simon's, Inc. v. Lincoln Joint-Venture, 535 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Neb. 1995)
(refusing to issue an injunction to tear down restaurant built in violation of lease be-
cause benefit to plaintiff was greatly exceeded by burden on defendant).
47 The classic illustration of this is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d
870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) ("The total damage to plaintiff's properties is, however, relatively
small in comparison with the value of defendant's operation and with the conse-
quences of the injunction which plaintiffs seek."). As parsed recently by Judge Posner
The defendant's factory was emitting cement dust that caused the plaintiffs
harm monetized at less than $200,000, and the only way to abate the harm
would have been to close down the factory, which had cost $45 million to
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would impose an undue hardship on defendants has "the effect of
preventing the plaintiff from using an equitable remedy to extort an
oveicompensatory settlement."48 The possibility of such equitable de-
fenses accordingly undermines the credibility of plaintiffs' perform-
ance threats. A court's refusal to grant an injunction on such equita-
ble grounds, however, also increases the chance plaintiffs will be
undercompensated by monetary damages.
Because of this risk of undercompensation, courts at times do
grant injunctions when defendant's injunctive burden (C) is substan-
tially greater than plaintiffs benefit (B). Courts often have difficulty
assessing the true costs and benefits of injunctive performance and
thus may be unable to determine whether performance would be inef-
ficient. Even when courts believe that performing an injunction
would be inefficient, their worry that damages would be inadequate
(i.e., would undercompensate a plaintiff) may cause them to issue an
injunction as an equitable matter.49 Courts might be especially con-
cerned that, because juries decide the awards, the risk of undercom-
pensation is unavoidable.
When courts do give plaintiffs the choice of monetary or injunc-
tive relief, plaintiffs can credibly threaten to seek injunctive perform-
ance. It might seem at first that plaintiffs could not credibly threaten
to seek an injunction when they would benefit less from injunctive
performance than from expected damages (B < D). After all, defen-
build. An injunction against the nuisance could therefore have created a
huge bargaining range (could, not would, because it is unclear what the cur-
rent value of the factory was) .... If the market value of the factory was actu-
ally $45 million, the plaintiffs would be tempted to hold out for a price to dis-
solve the injunction in the tens of millions ....
Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1992).
YoRIo, supra note 16, at 84.
49 Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913), provides an ex-
treme example of some courts' willingness to issue injunctions where the cost to the
defendant far exceeds the plaintiff's benefit. In the Union Bag case (discussed later in
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872) the plaintiff's harm was assessed at $100 per year while the
cost of complying with the injunction was the permanent closing of a mill representing
an investment of more than $1,000,000. See 101 N.E. at 805. The New York Court of
Appeals concluded: "Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared
with the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason for
refusing an injunction." Id. at 806. See Part I.D below, for a discussion of the use of
injunctions when there is a concern about undercompensation. See also Part II.B for a
discussion of how a legal regime involving private additur may reduce the probability
of undercompensation. Anthony Kronman has argued that the "uniqueness" test
helps to identify those cases in which a court cannot obtain, at reasonable cost, enough
information to permit it to award damages without imposing an unacceptably high risk
of undercompensation on the injured promisee. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Per-
formance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 359-63 (1978).
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dants have an analogous trouble threatening performance when the
cost of performance is greater than the cost of damages (C > D). This
analogy fails because, unlike defendants, plaintiffs have the ability to
commit to performance in the absence of a successful negotiation.
The structure of civil litigation gives plaintiffs the ability to make such
a pre-negotiation commitment. There is almost always a period of
time between the plaintiffs election of an injunctive remedy and the
defendant's actual performance. Since the defendant will be willing
to pay N once the plaintiff has sought an injunction, it becomes
credible for a plaintiff to seek the injunction-even if B < D.
Figure 1 is a simple game-tree example showing why a plaintiff can
credibly seek an inefficient injunction, even when the plaintiff's bene-
fit from receiving actual performance is less than his expected dam-
ages. In this example, we assume that the defendant's performance of
some duty is inefficient (B = 0 < C = 30). Expected legal damages are
supercompensatory (D = 1 > B = 0), but less than the expected negoti-
ated payment that would result if the plaintiff could credibly threaten
to cause performance (D = 1 < N = 15). We also assume the parties
negotiate initially, and that the plaintiff then sues for either an injunc-
tion or monetary damages. If the plaintiff elects an injunction, the
parties have an opportunity to negotiate again. The circles in the fig-
ure identify the decision makers at each stage of the game, and the
brackets show the monetary payoffs (for the plaintiff and defendant,









Fieure 1: Credibility of Seeking Ininnetinn Whan R e n
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Solving backward, it is easy to see that if the parties reach the final
negotiation node, both will prefer to settle (i.e., to agree to dissolve
the injunction against the defendant in exchange for payment of 15 to
the plaintiff). Foreseeing this outcome, the plaintiff will strongly pre-
fer an injunction (with a 15 payoff) to monetary damages (with a 1
payoff). Finally, because both parties can foresee that the plaintiff will
elect injunctive relief, they are likely to settle immediately for N = 15
(especially if litigation costs are positive).
D. When Do Performance Threats Cause Payoffs to Diverge From Make-
Whole Compensation?
Restricting our attention to the situation in which performance is
inefficient (so that B < N < C), damages can fall into one of four rele-
vant damage ranges as depicted in Figure 2:
r 2I i
Figure 2: Four Possible Expected Damage Ranges When Performance Is Inefficient
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Table 1 summarizes much of the foregoing discussion in terms of
these four damage ranges.
Damage Level Whose Motive Is the Threat Expected
To Threaten Credible? Payment
1. D<B<N<C Plaintiff Yes N
2. B<D<N<C Plaintiff Yes N
3. B<N<D<C Defendant No 5  D
4. B<N<C<D Defendant Yes N
Table 1: Credible Threats in Four Potential Damage Ranges
When expected damages are in Ranges 1 or 2, the plaintiff will
want to seek injunctive relief to increase his expected payoff from D to
N.'5 As long as the court is willing to issue an injunction in this type of
case (for example, where there is no finding of an undue burden on
the defendant), the plaintiff's threat to seek an injunction will be
credible and the parties will try to negotiate a payment of N to avoid
the inefficiency.
The possibility that court-awarded damages will fail to make the
plaintiff whole (Range 1) is one of the primary justifications for grant-
52ing injunctions. Judge Richard Posner in particular has criticized the
inaccuracy of court-awarded damages relative to negotiated outcomes
in the shadow of an impending injunction: "A battle of experts is a
less reliable method of determining the actual cost to [plaintiff] of
[not receiving defendant's performance] than negotiations between
[plaintiff] and [defendant] over the price at which [plaintiff] would
feel adequately compensated for [not receiving performance].""
Once we appreciate the possibility of threatening inefficient perform-
ance, however, we see that the payment negotiated in an injunctive
50 The threat may be credible, however, if costs are incurred in stages as in the
Bebchuk model. In this case, the expected payment would be N as well. See Bebchuk,
supra note 37, at 29 (stating that when costs are incurred over time, a plaintiff's other-
wise noncredible threat to sue may become credible).
51 Of course, if the defendant's performance creates no benefit for the plaintiff,
then Range 1 will be a null set-i.e., there is no possibility that damages will be less
than the plaintiff's benefit.
52 See Miller v. LeSea Broad., Inc., 87 F.3d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
damages may be "an inadequate remedy... because of the defendant's lack of sol-
vency or because of the difficulty of quantifying the injury to the victim of the
breach").
5s Waigreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992).
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shadow can sharply diverge from make-whole damages. Injunctions
not only generate negotiation costs but also introduce inaccuracies of
their own. Damages may over- or undercompensate, but injunctions
create the risk of substantial overcompensation, and this risk grows
when the bargaining range grows. When the inefficiency of perform-
ance creates a huge bargaining range, damages may better approxi-
mate true make-whole relief than negotiations in the shadow of a
credible performance threat._"
In Range 2, the threat of inefficient performance unambiguously
moves the plaintiff's payoff further away from make-whole relief. Ex-
pected damages are already above the make-whole level and threaten-
ing inefficient performance only exacerbates the problem (B < D <
N). In Range 1, by contrast, inefficient performance threats substitute
a supercompensatory payment (N > B) for subcompensatory damages
(D < B). In both ranges, as the difference between the defendant's
cost and the plaintiffs benefit grows, it becomes likely that the negoti-
ated payment (which must fall between these two amounts) will devi-
ate more from make-whole relief than even speculative damages. Giv-
ing plaintiffs the option of injunctive relief thus can give plaintiffs the
opportunity to raise damages substantially above the break-even level.
In damage ranges 3 and 4, it is the defendant's turn to threaten
performance, in the hope of reducing her expected payment from D
to N.55 This threat clearly will be credible in Range 4 because the cost
of following through on the performance threat is less than the cost of
paying damages. However, in Range 3, the performance threat will
not be credible unless divisible performance extends a potential de-
Judge Posner sees the primary costs of damage remedies to be the costs of court
determination and the costs of inaccuracy, while he sees the primary costs of injunctive
relief to be the private "bilateral monopoly" cost of determining the payment:
[When an inefficient injunction creates a large bargaining range,] both par-
ties will have an incentive to devote substantial resources of time and money
to the. negotiation process. The process may even break down, if one or both
parties wants to create for future use a reputation as a hard bargainer; and if it
does break down, the injunction will have brought about an inefficient result.
All these are in one form or another costs of the injunctive process that can be
avoided by substituting damages.
Id. at 276. Both injunctive and damage remedies can produce determination costs and
inaccuracies. It is important to recognize that negotiating in the shadow of perform-
ance threats does not necessarily produce outcomes that more accurately approximate
make-whole damages than court-determined awards.
55 For ease of exposition, Table 1 ignores the case when expected damages equal B
or N or C. D = B will generate the same result as Range 1; D = N will make each side




fendant's ability to threaten along the lines of the Bebchukian argu-
ment discussed above.:
Performance threats by defendants, unlike performance threats by
plaintiffs, move the plaintiff's expected payoff unambiguously toward
make-whole relief. Potential defendants threaten performance when
expected court-awarded damages exceed the expected settlement with
the plaintiff, which must itself exceed the plaintiffs benefit of per-
formance (D > N > B). While plaintiff threats tend to cause the plain-
tiff's payoffs to exceed make-whole relief, defendant threats (if suc-
cessful in producing a negotiated settlement) cause the plaintiffs
payoff to approximate more closely make-whole relief. This distinc-
tion will play an important role in Part III when we analyze its implica-
tions for choosing efficient legal rules.
II. HARNESSING PRIVATE INFORMATION To DISCREDrr
PERFORMANCE THREATS
This section describes how the law might be changed to under-
mine the credibility of performance threats. The basic approach is to
give the threatened party a countervailing option which makes actu-
ally carrying through on the threat unprofitable for the threatener.
We begin by showing how allowing defendants to make injunctions
inalienable can deter some plaintiff threats (in Range 1). By inalien-
able, we mean only that the defendant cannot pay the plaintiff to re-
lease the defendant from her duty to perform the injunction5 7 Inal-
ienability simply prohibits defendants from paying plaintiffs in lieu of
See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
57 There is currently a strong consensus that defendants can freely negotiate to
discharge their injunctive duties. See DUIEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 19, at 863 ("It is
said that 'an injunction is for sale,' meaning the person who holds it may sell it to the
enjoined party if the price is right."). Some courts have even held that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not give them power to restrict the ability of disputants to
settle, instead of perform, an injunction. See Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the parties have a "right to unconditional dismissal under
Rule 41(a) (1) (ii)"); Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 896 (5th
Cir. 1977) ("The only provision [in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] for approval
of a settlement is that for dismissal or compromise of a class action . . . ."). For a fur-
ther discussion of inalienable injunctions, see Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 9. Still,
there is no compelling equitable or efficiency reason whyjudges, in tailoring the scope
of an equitable remedy, should not be able to restrict the alienability of injunctions. At
least one case seems to imply that a permanent injunction, once issued, would be inal-
ienable. See Rievman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 118 F.R.D. 29, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("Should defendants be permanently enjoined from prematurely releasing
the ... lien.., that lien would cease to confer any 'hold-up' value on the bonds.").
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performing an injunction. The plaintiff's injunctive right would be
freely alienable to anyone except the defendant. Plaintiffs worried
that legal remedies would be inadequate would still be free to seek in-
junctions, but the inalienability of the injunction would tend to assure
that it was sought for the performance itself and not for the extra bar-
gaining power conferred by the threat of performance.
We then show that allowing the threatened party to adjust pro-
spective damages seemingly against its own interest, what we call pri-
vate additur and remittitur, can further undermine the credibility of
the other side's threats. For example, if a defendant says that A dol-
lars should be added onto any court-determined damage award (D),
then a plaintiff must choose between the benefits of a possibly inal-
ienable injunction and inflated expected damages (D + A). Per-
versely, because of the possibility of inefficient threats, defendants can
actually make themselves better off by petitioning the court to award larger
damages and plaintiffs can make themselves better off by petitioning the court
to award smaller damage.
A. The Inalienable Injunction Option
Figure 3 illustrates the potential of an inalienability option to de-
ter threats of inefficient injunctive performance. For concreteness,
assume an encroachment dispute in which the defendant's cost of
removing the encroachment is 30, the plaintiff's benefit of unen-
croached land is de minimis (= 0), expected damages are 1, and the
expected negotiated payment, if an alienable injunction issues, is 15.8
These were the same numbers used above in Figure 1, where we saw
that the plaintiff, under existing law, has an incentive to threaten inef-
ficient injunctive performance-even though damages are expected
to be supercompensatory.
58 Although we have chosen an encroachment setting, the simple economic struc-
ture might also capture many contractual disputes where the defendant's cost of per-
formance ends up being far greater than the plaintiff's benefit from performance.
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The game tree in Figure 3 is modified, however, to give the de-
fendant an option to make any injunction awarded inalienable. 9 If
the underlying values (B, D, C, and N) are common knowledge, the
defendant foresees that if she chooses inalienability, the plaintiff will
have an incentive to opt for monetary damages. The plaintiff prefers
the damages option since actual performance of an inalienable in-
junction gives the plaintiff no benefit (B = 0), while damages are ex-
pected to be 1. For this reason, if the defendant elects "inalienabil-
59 The order of play in the game is as follows: in the first stage, the parties negoti-
ate; in the second stage, the defendant chooses whether an injunction would be inal-
ienable or not; in the third stage, the plaintiff elects injunctive or damage relief; and
finally, if the defendant has chosen alienability in the second stage and the plaintiff has
chosen injunctive relief in the third stage, the parties then have an opportunity to bar-
gain to discharge the injunction.
60 See Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 1, at 1632 n.2 ("'Something is common knowl-
edge if it is known to each player, and, in addition, each player knows that the other
player has this knowledge; knows that the other person knows the player knows it; and
so forth.'") (quoting DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 304
(1994)).
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ity," she will pay damages of only 1. In contrast, choosing "alienable"
would recreate the plaintiff's incentive to threaten inefficient per-
formance and hence would lead to a much larger payment (N = 15).
In equilibrium, the parties are likely to settle initially for 1 (since they
know that this will be the outcome if they continue to progress
through the stages of the game) .61
In order for inalienable injunctions to deter inefficient injunctive
threats effectively, it is important that: (1) the defendant be able to
move first, i.e., be able to commit to inalienability before the plaintiff
commits to injunctive relief, and (2) the parties not be allowed to "set-
tie" a case for money once the defendant commits to inalienable in-
junctive relief. If the court first asks the plaintiff whether he wants in-
junctive relief and only then asks the defendant whether the
Figure 4: Inalienability Option Only Effective if Defendant Chooses First
61 This simple game excludes negotiation and litigation costs. Adding these costs
does not, however, qualitatively change the central result that giving defendants an
inalienability option can deter plaintiffs' incentives to seek inefficient injunctions.
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injunction should be inalienable, the plaintiff will still threaten an in-
junction. 2 Under this scenario (as illustrated in Figure 4), once the
plaintiff commits to an injunction, the defendant will choose to have
the injunction be alienable so that she can avoid paying 30. The inal-
ienability option is only effective in deterring inefficient injunction
threats if the defendant can commit to inalienability before the plain-
tiff commits to an injunction.
Moreover, inalienability options will only be effective if the court
can enforce their inalienability, i.e., if they can prohibit monetary set-
tlements of lawsuits after a plaintiff has opted for an inalienable in-
junction. In many litigation settings, one can imagine a delay of sev-
eral weeks between the time that a plaintiff opts for injunctive relief
and the time that the court actually issues the injunction. If plaintiffs
know that they will have an opportunity to bargain to settle a lawsuit
for monetary damages before an injunction is actually issued, then
notwithstanding the defendant's choice of "inalienability," plaintiffs
will seek an injunction in order to gain bargaining power to settle the
case before the injunction actually issues. As shown in Figure 5 below,
the ability to settle for money after the defendant and plaintiff opt for
"inalienable" and "injunction" respectively fails to deter inefficient in-
junctive threats. The plaintiff forces a negotiation with the same ex-
pected payoff as we saw under the current injunctive scheme (in Fig-
ure 1) without an inalienability option for the defendant.
Indeed, even if the court prohibits monetary settlements (in the
interim between the plaintiff's election of injunctive relief and the ac-
tual issuance of the injunction), the court also needs to worry that the
parties will negotiate a monetary settlement after an injunction issues,
notwithstanding the nominal inalienability of the court's order. After
the fact, the parties will have a joint interest in negotiating away the
inefficiency of the injunction and may be willing to collude to circum-
vent the inalienability restriction. To create the beneficial ex ante ef-
fects of the inalienability restriction, courts therefore will need to de-
ter ex post settlements.
62 This analysis suggests that by adhering to the traditional election-of-remedies
doctrine (which required plaintiffs to initially choose, and thereby be wedded to, a
prayer for either monetary or injunctive relief), courts may unwittingly facilitate plain-
tiffs in threatening inefficient injunctive performance. SeeYORIO, supra note 16, at 213
("[In] the traditional election-of-remedies doctrine... the plaintiff was required to
choose-and be wedded to-a single remedial theory.").
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Courts could accomplish this in many settings by placing judicial
liens on defendants' property that would only be lifted on proof to the
court that the defendant had actually performed the injunction.
Courts would find verifying actual performance easiest in contexts in-
volving positive, durable injunctions-that is, orders that defendants
do a particular act one time. For example, in Pile the court could have
refused to lift a judicial lien until it was shown photographic proof
that the fence was removed. In contrast, it would be much harder for
courts to deter ex post settlements concerning negative, non-durable
[Vol. 148: 45
THREATENING INEMFCENT PERFORMANCE
precautions-that is, orders that defendants should not do a particular
act over time. For example, if a court ordered a defendant not to
trespass on the plaintiffs adjoining driveway, the court would have
trouble verifying whether the parties covertly cut a deal to settle (i.e.,
nullify) an inalienable order. Even here the court might offer boun-
ties to third parties who provide evidence of such a settlement. The
court could threaten contempt sanctions, including jail for defendants
who fail to perform inalienable injunctions and for plaintiffs who ac-
cept ex post payments.63
The take home lesson of this section is that a properly imple-
mented inalienable injunction may, in at least some contexts, deter
plaintiffs from threatening inefficient injunctions.6 It is important to
emphasize, however, that the examples thus far have concerned only
supercompensatory damages (D = 1 > B = 0), what we earlier called
Range 2.65 Inalienable injunctions deter plaintiffs from making ineffi-
cient performance threats when damages are supercompensatory
(Range 2), but inalienable injunctions might actually induce ineffi-
cient performance when damages are subcompensatory (Range 1).
When damages fail to make the plaintiff whole, the plaintiff will con-
tinue to prefer injunctive relief-even if the injunction is inalienable.
For example, if we change the foregoing example by raising B from 0
63 For the inalienability commitment to be effective, the court must not only have
knowledge of whether the injunction is actually performed, but must also have the po-
litical will to follow through and require inefficient performance over the ex post pro-
tests of both the plaintiff and defendant. In certain contexts, the judicial lien may be
sufficient to apprise the court of performance, but the difficulty of assuring the court's
political will may be another reason to favor thejudicial remittitur alternative discussed
below in the text accompanying notes 119-20. The civil contempt power is discussed
extensively in Bagwel v. International Union, 423 S.E.2d 349, 356 (Va. 1992), rev'd, 512
U.S. 821 (1994).
64 Defendants may, as a theoretical matter, already be able to privately opt for inal-
ienability-by entering into a Schelling-like commitment contract with a third party.
See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Ti STRATEGY OF CONFuCr 22-28 (1960) (describ-
ing the benefits of introducing a third party into two-party negotiations). Under such
a contract, the defendant would promise to pay a third party some outrageously large
sum if the defendant were ever found to have negotiated her way out of a duty to per-
form. Such contracts would not completely destroy the incentive to negotiate one's
way out of performance, rather the incentive would now exist for the defendant to pay
off the third party as well as the plaintiff to avoid performance. If effective third-party
commitment contracts are feasible, one might expect a commitment race whereby
plaintiffs sought to commit to seeking an injunction before the defendant committed
to inalienability.
See supra discussion accompanying Table I (introducing the concept of ranges of
super- and subcompensatory damages). Ranges 3 and 4 also concern supercompensa-
tory damages, but as discussed above, since D > N in these ranges, the plaintiff would
not desire to replace court-ordered damages with injunctive relief.
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to 2 (holding D = 1, C = 30, and N = 15 constant),66 then the plaintiff
would opt for an injunction over damages, even if the defendant had
previously declared that any injunction would be inalienable. The
plaintiff prefers an inalienable injunction under this fact pattern be-
cause it produces a payoff of 2 while court-ordered damages produce
a payoff of only 1. Even though performance of the injunction is mas-
sively inefficient (C = 30 > B = 2), the plaintiff still prefers actual per-
formance to damages. When damages are subcompensatory, both
parties may be worse off with an inalienable injunction than with an
67alienable injunction.
The possibility of subcompensatory damages thus provides a
strong reason for not asking courts to routinely make injunctions inal-
ienable. Inalienablility is an effective deterrent in Range 2, but courts
will often have difficulty determining whether damages are sub- or su-
percompensatory, i.e., whether the parties are interacting in a Range
1 or a Range 2 context. The magnitude and direction of D's deviation
from B may depend on the plaintiffs subjective valuation of B, a
valuation that may be difficult to verify. Instead of asking courts to
impose inalienability only when the court is confident that damages
are not subcompensatory, we prefer giving defendants the inalienabil-
ity choice. This preference is motivated by our belief that the defen-
dants are likely to be better informed about the underlying relation-
ships among the values of B, C, N, and D. We cannot see why a court
should impose an inalienability restriction when the defendant ob-
jects. If the defendant thinks that inalienability would fail to deter a
plaintiff from seeking an injunction, we think courts should generally
defer to the defendant's judgement.
The inalienability restriction is a natural outgrowth of courts' con-
cern about issuing injunctions that impose undue burdens. We envi-
sion that courts at times should continue to deny injunctions when
they are confident that a plaintiff is seeking the injunction as a bar-
gaining chip to supplement otherwise adequate damages. In other
settings, when the court is suspicious that the plaintiff is merely trying
to threaten inefficient injunctive performance, the court might pro-
pose inalienability and ask if the defendant objects or give the defen-
dant the option of making any injunction inalienable.
66 Assuming that N is unchanged (when B increases) effectively increases the de-
fendant's bargaining power. Alternatively, we could assume that bargaining power (a)
is unchanged and increase N to 16.
67 Anticipating the possibility of inefficient performance, parties in a "Range 1"
situation are likely to settle for N before the defendant chooses "inalienability."
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B. The Defendant's Damage Adjustment Option-Private Additur
Granting defendants an inalienability option is effective in aeter-
ring performance threats where the court is likely to award super-
compensatory damages in Range 2, but making the injunction inal-
ienable will not deter plaintiffs from seeking injunctions where the
court is likely to award subcompensatory damages (Range 1). Indeed,
even if the court is expected to issue precise make-whole damages (D
= B), the plaintiff will have a credible threat to seek an inefficient in-
junction-because an inalienable injunction will make the plaintiff
just as well off as monetary damages. To deter plaintiffs from seeking
inefficient injunctions when damages are subcompensatory or exactly
compensatory (D < B), something more than inalienability is needed.
To solve this Range 1 problem, we recommend giving defendants
a "private additur" option in addition to the "inalienability" option de-
scribed above. Before a plaintiff is allowed to commit to injunctive re-
lief, the defendant would be able to commit to paying an "additur"
amount (A) in addition to any damages awarded by a jury. If the
plaintiff chooses monetary instead of injunctive relief, the defendant
would be required to pay A in addition to any amount awarded at
trial. The ultimate trier of fact would remain uninformed about the
additur arrangement so that D would be unaffected.6 This private
additur option would accordingly have the effect of raising the plain-
tiff's expected payoff of monetary damages from D to D + A.6
If we analyze a Range 1 example, we can see that the additur op-
tion in combination with the inalienability option can deter a larger
range of inefficient performance threats than the inalienability option
alone. If D = 1, B = 2, N = 15, and C = 30, a defendant would have an
incentive to choose inalienability and to choose A = 1 + s. The plain-
tiff would now face the choice of receiving the benefits of an inalien-
able injunction (B = 2) or the benefits of monetary relief (D + A = 2 +
s). The plaintiff in pretrial negotiations could threaten to seek an in-
junction unless the defendant pays 15, but this threat would no longer
be credible. In the absence of agreement, the plaintiff would seek
monetary relief instead of an inefficient injunction.
68 The court would need to require a litigation bond or establish a damage escrow
to ensure that the defendant would be able to pay D + A.
The additur regime might instead be structured to allow the additur amount to
be a function of the damages amount-so that the defendant could guarantee the
plaintiff a minimum level of damages.
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Perversely, the defendant is made better off by asking the court to
increase the potential damages it must pay. While this result seems
nonintuitive, Eric Rasmusen has noted: "One of game theory's most
profound lessons... is that a player can benefit from new rules which
reduce his payoffs on out-of-equilibrium paths."70 By invoking the pri-
vate additur option, the defendant lowers her expected payment from
15 to 2 + s; without a damage increase, the defendant would expect
the plaintiff to seek an injunction, and therefore would be willing to
pay 15 to avoid incurring the cost of performance of 30. Private addi-
tur changes the plaintiff's threat point in any pretrial negotiation.
Without private additur, the plaintiff in the absence of agreement
faces a choice between monetary and injunctive relief. Since by as-
sumption in Range 1 monetary relief is inferior to the benefits of ac-
tual performance, the plaintiff can credibly threaten to seek an in-
junction. But private additur changes the plaintiff's best alternative.
With private additur, monetary relief (yielding 2 + s) now dominates
the benefit of seeking actual performance (2).
In simple models, the defendant would need to make the net
monetary damages only infinitesimally larger than B in order to deter
the plaintiff from seeking an injunction. In more complicated models
(for example where the defendant is uncertain about the size of B)
and in the real world, however, we believe that defendants would set
additur amounts to make net damages substantially exceed their esti-
mates of B. In the foregoing example, a defendant might set net
damages at 8 or 10, as well as opt for inalienability, to increase the
chance that the plaintiff would be sacrificing not a trivial amount to
follow through on her threat, but a more substantial shortfall (8 or 10
as opposed to 2).
It will strike many readers that defendants already have an option
of private additur because a defendant in pretrial negotiations can di-
rectly offer to settle the case for D + A. There is a crucial contractual
distinction, however, between settlement offers and private additur
offers. A defendant's settlement offer is not "firm" and hence its ef-
fectiveness can be destroyed merely by a plaintiff's rejection. The tra-
ditional common law rule is that an offeree's rejection or counteroffer
destroys an initial offer.7 Accordingly, a defendant's settlement offer
70 Eric Rasmusen, Book Review, 33J. ECON. LITERATURE 1979, 1980 (1995) (re-
viewing KEN BINMORE, 1 GAME THEORY AND THE SocIAL CONTRACt: PLAYING FAIR
(1994)). Here a player benefits from reducing her payoff on what was an out-of-
equilibrium path-in order to make it (monetary relief) an equilibrium path.
71 See, e.g., Beverly Way Assocs. v. Barham, 276 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244 (Ct. App. 1990)
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is not effective in changing the plaintiff's BATNA. In Range 1, if the
defendant offers to pay the plaintiff 3 to settle the suit, the plaintiff by
merely responding "no" destroys the defendant's offer and again
makes credible the threat of seeking an injunction. Since the private
additur amount is an irrevocable offer to settle, the plaintiff's resis-
tance cannot change the fact that the plaintiff, in electing remedies,
must choose between an inalienable injunction yielding B and money
damages of D + A.2
By making a firm commitment to pay higher monetary damages
(and by opting for inalienability of any injunction), defendants can
deter plaintiffs' inefficient performance threats and thereby decrease
their ultimate expected payment. Defendants will only exercise their
private additur option when they believe court-awarded damages will
be undercompensatory, in order to discourage plaintiffs from seeking
inefficient injunctions. The additur option harnesses defendants' pri-
vate information in an attempt to transform subcompensatory awards
into awards that better approximate make-whole compensation. The
additur option allows a defendant to convert a Range 1 undercom-
pensatory threat into a Range 2 supercompensatory threat, which
then can be deterred by making the injunction inalienable. If defen-
dants find it in their self-interest to commit to paying higher damages
(in order to deter plaintiffs from seeking inefficient injunctions),
courts should acquiesce in their requests.73
("It is hornbook that an unequivocal rejection by an offeree, communicated to the of-
feror, terminates the offer .... "); RESTATEMiENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 36 (1979)
(stating that a rejection or counter-offer terminates the offeree's power of acceptance).
The U.C.C. already allows merchants to make limited firm offers regarding the sale of
goods. See U.G.C. § 2-205 (1962) ("An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revo-
kable.... ."). The U.C.C. provisions, however, would not apply to most settlement ne-
gotiations and the firmness created by the U.C.G. does not nearly match the firmness
the court could demand with performance bonds and escrows and even the possibility
of contempt proceedings if the defendant failed to live up to her additur offer.
The private additur offer is not structurally the same as a take-it-or-leave-it offer
because we would allow either the plaintiff or the defendant to make additional non-
firm offers. Still, the irrevocability of the private additur offer in this model has the
same effect as giving the defendant the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The
defendant would never have an incentive to make other offers or to accept other offers
from the plaintiff. The private additur offer effectively limits the plaintiff to one of two
choices: accepting or rejecting monetary damages.
73 A caveat to this proposal and others in this paper is that in the contractual set-
ting we would propose that inalienability and damages adjustment options be just de-
fault rules. See infra Part IV.A.
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C. The Plaintiff's Damage Adjustment Option-Private Remittitur
An analogue to private additur can similarly be used to deter po-
tential defendants from threatening inefficient performance when
damages are in Range 4. As discussed earlier, if potential damages
equal or exceed the defendant's cost of performance, the defendant
will credibly threaten to perform unless the plaintiff accepts a pay-
ment substantially less than damages. Thus, if B = 0, N = 15, C = 30,
and D = 32, before breaching the defendant will threaten to perform
if the plaintiff does not accept 15 in lieu of performance. The defen-
dant's threat is credible because in the absence of agreement, the de-
fendant would rather perform her duty at a cost of 30 than pay 32 in
damages.
It is again possible to give the threatened party options to under-
mine the credibility of the other side's threats. Just as we gave defen-
dants additur options to counter the possibility of plaintiff perform-
ance threats, it is possible to give plaintiffs a "remittitur option" to
counter the possibility of defendant performance threats. A remittitur
option would allow the plaintiff to announce a remittitur amount (R)
by which any court award would be reduced. For example, if the ju-
risdiction is likely to impose cost of performance damages (D), the
plaintiff could announce that the defendant would only have to pay D
- R. In the foregoing Range 4 example (B = 0, N = 15, C = 30, and D =
32), the plaintiff would have an incentive to set R equal to 2 + s. Do-
ing so would reduce the defendant's net expected damages to 30 - e
and thereby undermine a threat to perform (at cost 30) if negotia-
tions failed. 74
Giving plaintiffs an option to reduce the amount they would re-
ceive in damages increases their expected payment. In the foregoing
example, if the plaintiff fails to reduce expected damages (setting R =
0), the defendant will be able to credibly threaten performance and
thereby negotiate a payment of only 15; but if the plaintiff reduces his
expected monetary damages by a little more than 2, the defendant will
74 Our discussion of Bebchuk suggests that when performance costs are incurred
over time, a defendant may under some circumstances credibly be able to threaten
performance even when the total costs of performance are greater than the expected
damages the defendant would have to pay for breaching. See supra notes 37-39 and ac-
companying text. Even when the Bebchuk result holds, however, this simply means
that there will be some critical level C* < C that will determine when a defendant
threat will be credible. Under the Bebchuk variation, the defendant would set the re-




simply breach the contract and pay the plaintiff an amount much
closer to 30.
Just as defendant additur could change the plaintiff's BATNA
when the plaintiff was threatening an inefficient injunction, plaintiff
remittitur can change the defendant's threat point. In Range 4, the
defendant's best alternative to a negotiated agreement is to perform
her duty, but the remittitur makes the defendant's best alternative fail-
ing to perform her duty (and paying damages) if the parties cannot
agree to an alternative arrangement.7 Plaintiffs will only take the ex-
treme step of committing to lower damages if they believe doing so
will counteract the defendant's threat to behave inefficiently. As with
defendant additur, the option is self-regulating. Plaintiffs will have no
incentive to set the remittitur amount too high.
An important problem with implementation, however, concerns
the procedural setting of defendant threats. Since potential defen-
dants use the threat of performance before performance is due, po-
tential plaintiffs under current law would not have standing to bring
suit, much less announce a remittitur amount. For example, in the
contractual setting, a promisor who uses a performance threat to ne-
gotiate a settlement price that is less than the expected damages
would not give the promisee a basis for filing a lawsuit. The threat not
only occurs before performance is due, but the threat to perform is
the antithesis of anticipatory repudiation. Perversely, a promisor's
threat is more akin to what the U.C.C. calls giving adequate assurance
that, notwithstanding higher costs, the promisor still intends to per-
form when performance comes due.76 Yet while it is necessary for a
promisee to be able to commit before a breach to seek R less than a
jury would normally award, it is not necessary that the commitment be
filed with a court. It is only necessary that the law allow potential
plaintiffs to make irrevocable offers to reduce potential damages at
the time the potential defendant threatens breach. In the end, these
problems of implementing plaintiff remittitur are not of great con-
cern-because the next section finds that even a perfectly imple-
mented regime often does not further net equity and efficiency.
Thus, while we favor defendant inalienability and additur options, we
disfavor the use of plaintiff remittitur to deter defendant performance
As emphasized above, a remittitur offer, unlike a mere settlement offer, cannot
be destroyed by the other side's rejection of the offer.
76 See U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (1989) ("When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise
with respect to the performance of either party the other may... demand adequate
assurance of due performance . . ").
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threats.
Table 1 identified credible performance threats supported by
three different damage ranges. In this section we have shown three
ways to modify current remedial doctrines to discourage such threats.
Giving defendants an inalienability option was sufficient to deter
Range 2 plaintiff threats; this inalienability option and defendant ad-
ditur together were sufficient to deter Range 1 plaintiff threats; and
finally, plaintiff remittitur was sufficient to deter Range 4 defendant
threats. In each of these settings, by giving the threatened party coun-
tervailing options, courts can harness private information to deter
threats of inefficient performance. Rendering such threats non-
credible is likely to reduce the costs of negotiation because the parties
have little, if anything, about which to negotiate. Such efficiency ef-
fects are properly the topic of the next section.
III. SHOULD THREATS OF INEFFICIENT PERFORMANCE BE DETERRED?
Just because the law can be structured to deter threats of ineffi-
cient performance does not mean that the law should be so struc-
tured. Indeed, this section argues on the basis of equity and efficiency
that the law should presumptively use injunctive inalienability and de-
fendant additur to deter plaintiff performance threats, but should not
try to deter defendant performance threats.
A. Equity
The strongest rationale for deterring plaintiff performance threats
is the equitable impulse to deter plaintiff overcompensation. Plaintiff
threats increase the risk of plaintiff overcompensation, while defen-
dant threats reduce the risk of plaintiff overcompensation. As shown
above in Table 1, plaintiffs will at times seek injunctions instead of su-
percompensatory damages because they expect to extract an even
larger amount from defendants if injunctive performance is threat-
ened."
By contrast, defendant threats reduce the risk that defendants will
Table 1 also showed, however, that plaintiffs may also threaten injunctions when
damages are subcompensatory (Range 1). In such circumstances, the plaintiff's threat
substitutes an inequitable supercompensatory payoff for an inequitable subcompensa-
tory payoff. However, as performance becomes increasingly inefficient (C > B), it be-
comes increasingly likely that plaintiff performance threats will cause a larger absolute
deviation from make-whole damages (B)-that is, (B - D) < (N - B).
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have to overcompensate plaintiffs. Credible defendant threats of inef-
ficient performance occur when expected damages are supercompen-
satory (D > C > B) and have the effect of reducing the plaintiff's pay-
off toward make-whole damages. Moreover, defendant threats reduce
the risk of plaintiff overcompensation without increasing the risk of
plaintiff undercompensation. Defendant threats are useful only in
inducing plaintiffs to accept some amount between a minimum de-
fined by the plaintiff's benefit from performance and a maximum de-
fined by the defendant's cost of performance. There are no condi-
tions under which a plaintiff can be induced to accept a settlement
amount less than its valuation of performance, for the simple reason
that a plaintiff faced with such an offer would tell the defendant to go
ahead and perform.
Inalienable injunctions combined with defendant additur share
the equitable traits of defendant threats: they reduce the risk that de-
fendants will be forced to overcompensate plaintiffs without increas-
ing the risk that plaintiffs will be undercompensated. Courts at times
issue what they have every reason to believe are inefficient injunctions
(B < C) because they have a strong aversion to the possibility that a
comparatively innocent plaintiff will be undercompensated. Giving
plaintiffs the remedial choice of injunctive or monetary relief helps
assure that plaintiff; will not be undercompensated, because plaintiff;
can always choose the performance that is due them. The current
practice of giving plaintiffs the choice of alienable injunctions, how-
ever, leads to the obverse risk-that plaintiffs may be massively over-
compensated by using injunctions to bargain for settlement amounts
that may be as much a function of the defendant's cost of perform-
ance as they are the plaintiff's valuation of performance. Instead of
giving plaintiffs the weapon of alienability, we prefer a regime that
preserves plaintiffs' unfettered rights to actual performance of the
duty they are owed but which undermines their ability to bargain for a
payoff in excess of the amount by which they value performance.
Making injunctions inalienable does just this. Inalienability does not
increase the risk that plaintiffs will be undercompensated, because
they can still opt for specific performance, but it does reduce the risk
that defendants will be forced to overcompensate plaintiffs by limiting
plaintiffs' opportunities to use injunctive remedies merely as a strate-
gic tool for extracting high settlements.
The foregoing discussion of over- and undercompensation implic-
itly assumes, however, that a plaintiff is only entitled to the "use value"
of performance-that is, the benefits that flow to the plaintiff from
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the defendant actually performing (or the monetary equivalent of this
value). In some settings, however, it is possible to think that a plaintiff
should have a right to either use or sell a particular right at stake-
and that by granting an alienable injunction a court merely maintains
the plaintiff's "exchange value" of the right in question. For example,
if a landowner (Pedrick), after initially attempting to buy a small strip
of land from his next door neighbor (Pile) then "willfully" en-
croaches, a court in equity may want to issue an alienable injunction
to recreate the bargaining setting that the defendant wrongfully
avoided. In such settings, a payment negotiated in the shadow of an
alienable injunction (N) may be more equitable than a payment
which more closely approximates the plaintiffs use value (B). 78 Ac-
cordingly, courts might usefully distinguish between mistaken and
willful encroachment--granting inalienable injunctions only for the
former. More generally, "exchange value" injunctions may be appro-
priate whenever a plaintiff has wrongfully converted a defendant's ex-
change right.
Courts should consider whether in issuing an injunction they seek
to protect merely the plaintiff's "use value" or the plaintiff's "ex-
change value." Even though property rights are said to traditionally
include the right to exclude, 7 and hence the right of a property
owner to resist selling to enhance her exchange value, most contracts
intend to give the promisee only the use value of consideration and
not the right to hold up the promisor for sums disconnected from the
promisee's "expectation." In the end, distinguishing between "use
value" and "exchange value" entitlements restricts the application of
our analysis but still leaves a vibrant class of cases in which defendant
inalienability and additur could further equity.
Finally, there is also an equitable sense in which inalienable in-
junctions help deter fraud on the issuing courts. Plaintiffs seeking in-
junctions may represent that monetary relief could not make them
whole and then figuratively turn around before the ink is dry on the
injunction and start bargaining for monetary relief. The attempt to
sell injunctive rights is not necessarily fraudulent; a finding of fraud
would turn on the often implicit representations made during litiga-
78 As discussed infra at note 114, however, an injunction does not necessarily recre-
ate the bargaining setting the parties initially faced. After the wall is built, the bargain-
ing situation has fundamentally changed, and the resulting bargain (which now de-
pends on the cost of wall removal) may be drastically different than it would have been
earlier.
79 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Lan, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1363 (1993) (dis-
cussing idealized Blackstonian bundle of property rights).
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tion. Still, one can easily imagine that many courts fail to consider
that injunctions they grant may be bargained away." At a minimum, it
might be useful for courts in deciding whether monetary damages are
inadequate to have an explicit dialogue with plaintiffs about whether
they intend to sell their injunctive right and if so, for how much.
B. Efficiency
The efficiency effects of moving to a system of inalienable injunc-
tions and defendant additur are more muddled. While our proposed
reform has the salutary effect of moving the plaintiffs expected payoff
toward expectation damages, law and economics scholars in the last
decade have found it increasingly difficult to conjure a single damage
measure that induces both sides to behave efficiently on a variety of
dimensions both before (ex ante) and after (ex post) a potential
breach.8 ' This section shows that our reform proposal--giving defen-
dants the choice of inalienability and additur-is likely to induce
more efficient defendant precaution and risk allocation. We also
show limited conditions under which our proposal could enhance the
efficiency of plaintiff reliance and ex post bargaining.
While much of our analysis derives from the literature on efficient
contract damages, the analysis can be extended to noncontractual set-
tings as well. For example, in our earlier encroachment example, de-
fendant precautions (in reducing C) could alternatively be modeled
as precautions to avoid negligent encroachment and plaintiff reliance
(in increasing B) could be modeled as actions that either mitigate or
fail to mitigate the plaintiff's damages from such encroachment. In
some non-contractual contexts, however, the ex ante effects of inal-
ienability and additur are likely to be much more attenuated. In such
settings, the utility of our reform proposal turns instead on equitable
and ex post bargaining considerations.
8o Judge Richard Posner is a notable exception. See supra text accompanying
note 3.
81 Some scholars have shown, however, certain contexts in which parties can in-
duce efficient investment by agreeing to alienable injunctions (ordering specific per-
formance of the original contract if parties fail to renegotiate). See, e.g., Philippe
Aghion et al., Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information, 62 ECONOMETRiCA 257,
268 (1994) (arguing that when one party is given "the adequate choice of the default
option," and the other is endowed with all the bargaining power, efficient investments
can be achieved).
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1. Ex Ante Effects on Defendant Precaution,
Plaintiff Reliance, and Risk
Contract remedies can affect not only who will bear the risk of in-
efficient performance (the risk that C will end up being greater than
B) but also the size of this risk by affecting plaintiffs' and defendants'
incentives to make investments that change the expected benefits and
costs of performance. Damages can affect the defendant's precau-
tionary investment in reducing C and the plaintiff's reliance invest-
12ment in increasing B. This section analyzes the effect of giving de-
fendants inalienability and additur options on the ex ante efficiency of
defendant precaution, plaintiff reliance, and the parties' risk alloca-
tion.
The willingness of defendants to invest in reducing C and the will-
ingness of plaintiffs to invest in increasing B will turn, in part, on their
expectations about how their respective investments will affect the size
of the payment that the defendant will make to the plaintiff if per-
formance does not occur. If the expected payment is tied exclusively
to the plaintiff's benefit and is therefore disconnected from the de-
fendant's cost, then the defendant will have an incentive to invest effi-
ciently in precaution, and the plaintiff will have an incentive to invest
excessively (from an efficiency standpoint) in reliance. This is a slight
generalization of the standard result that expectation damages lead
defendant/promisors to make efficient investments to protect against
unexpected increases in the cost of performance.3 The defen-
dant/promisor acts efficiently because, otherwise, she will have to pay
the plaintiff/promisee for the benefits the latter has forgone because
of the breach. Expectation damages thus measure the real social cost
of failure to perform. Tying the level of damages to the plaintiff's
benefit makes the defendant a residual claimant with regard to her
82 Recent work has also analyzed the effect of expected damages on "cooperative"
investments-i.e., the possibility that plaintiffs could invest to reduce C or that defen-
dants could invest to increase B. SeeYeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung, Contract Dam-
ages and Cooperative Investments, 30 RANDJ. ECON. 84, 85 (1999) (defining a hypotheti-
cal "cooperative" investment by the seller as one that "increases the buyer's benefit
(stochastically) without lowering the seller's cost of performance").
83 See Shavell, supra note 26, at 487 ("[U]nder the expectation measure, our results
indicate that to the extent that each party... believes he himself will default, he will
engage appropriately in reliance ....."); see also Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisen-
berg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1432, 1464 (1985) ("Expectation
damages... therefore cause the promisor to internalize the cost of his failure to take




decision of how much to invest in reductions in C. As a residual
claimant, the defendant bears the full costs and receives the full bene-
fits of her decisions, so (to the extent she maximizes profits) she will
make the socially optimal decision.
In contrast, a plaintiff anticipating expectation damages may not
make the socially optimal decision. Tying the level of damages to the
plaintiff's benefit externalizes the effects of the plaintiff's investment
decisions. Under such a regime, in deciding whether to invest in in-
creasing B, the plaintiff does not take into account the possibility that
an increase in costs may cause performance to become inefficient.
The plaintiff will receive B in kind or in money regardless of whether
the defendant performs-so the plaintiff has an incentive to rely ex-
cessively.84
A converse story holds for damages that are tied exclusively to the
defendant's cost and are therefore disconnected from the plaintiff's
benefit. If we put aside for a moment the possibility of defendant per-
formance threats, then setting damages equal to the defendant's cost
of performance makes the plaintiff a residual claimant with regard to
his investments in increasing B. The plaintiff's reliance therefore will
be limited since, in the event of breach, he may find it in his best in-
terest to take C in cash (rendering worthless any investments that were
to have paid off in the event of performance). At the same time, set-
ting damages at cost of performance means that the defendant will no
longer take into account B in determining precaution, only C itself.
As a result, such a regime will cause the plaintiff to invest efficiently in
reliance but will cause the defendant to invest excessively in precau-
tion. In a world without defendant performance threats, defendants
realize that they will be liable for paying the cost of performance (in
kind or its monetary equivalent) whether or not performance turns
out to be efficient, and thus they invest too highly in precautionary
measures designed to limit their ultimate cost of performance.
The important lessons here are that (1) as the size of the expected
defendant payment becomes less connected to the realized cost of
performance, the defendant's incentives to invest in reducing C will
become more efficient; and (2) as the size of the expected defendant
84 A plaintiff excessively relies when the plaintiff makes an investment a profit-
maximizing actor would not make if it had to absorb its own costs in the event of non-
performance. See Shavell, supra note 26, at 487 ("[T]o the extent that each party be-
lieves he will be the victim of a breach, he will engage in excessive reliance ... ."); see
also Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 1465-68 (discussing a party's "surplus-
enhancing reliance").
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payment becomes less connected to the realized plaintiff benefit from
performance, the plaintiff's incentives to invest in increasing B will
become more efficient.a We were careful in the previous sentence to
use the term "expected defendant payment" instead of "expected
damages," because initial investments should turn not on nominal
damages that the court might award, but, rather, on the actual pay-
ments that the parties expect in the shadow of potentially credible
threats of inefficient performance. Thus, in a jurisdiction that awards
cost of performance damages, the plaintiff and the defendant should
expect a payment of N (to be negotiated when performance becomes
inefficient) instead of a payment of C.
Understanding how the ex ante investments of the plaintiff and
the defendant will be tied to their expectations about the sensitivity of
ultimate defendant payments to realized levels of the costs and bene-
fits of performance allows us to assess the efficiency of deterring plain-
tiff and defendant threats. Table 2 shows, for the four damage ranges
initially discussed in connection with Table 1,86 how our proposals to
deter performance threats would affect the expected defendant pay-
ment in the event that performance were to become inefficient. The
table also summarizes the effects on different dimensions of ex ante
efficiency. Pluses indicate that the proposed legal regime in question
produces superior precaution, reliance, or risk allocation relative to
the conventional regime. Minuses indicate that the alternative legal
regime's expected outcomes are worse than those of the conventional
regime.
&5 It is possible to have damages that are disconnected from marginal changes in
both the defendant's cost and the plaintiff's benefit. Indeed, Cooter and Eisenberg
have shown that a number of common law rules-for example, denying damages for
excessive reliance-as well as liquidated damage clauses may have the effect of induc-
ing efficient ex ante investment behavior of both plaintiffs and defendants. See Cooter
& Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 1467 (noting that, under existing law, "the expectation
and reliance measures undoubtedly contemplate that only reasonable reliance will be
conpensated").
See supra table in text accompanying note 50 (summarizing the effects of ineffi-
cienct threats in four defined damage ranges).
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Table 2: Efficiency Effects of Deterring Performance Threats
Possible
Damage Ranges (1) (2) (3) (4)
When D<B<N<C B<D<N<C B<N<D<C B<N<C<D
Performance is
Inefficient
Whose Threats Plaintiff Threats No Threats Defendant
Are Credible (potentially deterred by Threats
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When damages are below the amount that might be negotiated in
the shadow of a performance threat (Ranges 1 and 2), a plaintiff
given a traditional choice of remedies, will seek an alienable injunc-
tion to increase his expected payment to N. If, however, defendants
know B, C, and D and are given the inalienability and additur choice,
then they will deter the injunction threats. In Range 1, where dam-
ages are subcompensatory, the defendant will opt for inalienability
and will choose an additur amount that causes the defendant's ex-
pected payment to slightly exceed the plaintiffs benefit of perform-
ance (B + F). In Range 2, where damages are supercompensatory, the
defendant will choose inalienability which, in turn, will cause the
plaintiff to opt for damages of D.
Giving defendants the inalienability and additur options increases
the efficiency of their ex ante investments in reducing C because de-
fendants' expected payoffs are less correlated with the ultimate size of
C. If injunctions are alienable, the defendant expects to pay N, which
is explicitly a function of C; when the parties have equal bargaining
power, the negotiated payment N will equal (B + )/2. This means
that the defendant's precautions reduce not only the expected cost of
performance, but also the expected payment when performance does
not occur. Alienable injunctions thus will lead to excessive defendant
investment. Inalienability and additur regimes, in contrast, create ex-
pected payments that are unconnected to the ultimate size of the de-
fendant's cost of performance. In Range 1, the expected payment is
slightly above the plaintiffs benefit from performance, and in Range
2, the supercompensatory damage amount is, by assumption, more of
an estimate (albeit overly generous) of the plaintiffs benefit than of
the defendant's cost. Defendants' investments lower their costs when
performance occurs but not when performance does not occur, so de-
fendants have better incentives to take the efficient level of precau-
tion."'
87 Table 2 also shows why giving plaintiffs remittitur options can exacerbate defen-
dants' incentives to invest excessively in reducing their costs of performance. When
defendants can credibly threaten performance in Range 4, they expect to pay an
amount (N) that is only partially responsive to reductions in C. If the Nash bargaining
outcome applies, every dollar reduction in C will lead to a fifty cent reduction in N. If
plaintiff remittitur is allowed, however, the defendant will expect to pay just slightly
less than her cost of performance (C -&); if the defendant reduces cost of performance
(C) by one dollar, she simultaneously reduces her damage payment for failure to per-
form (C - e) by one dollar. Since investments in reductions in C greatly reduce the
amounts that the defendant will pay when performance does not occur, a plaintiff re-




While giving defendants inalienability and additur options unam-
biguously increases the efficiency of defendants' ex ante investments
(in reducing C), the effect of deterring performance threats on plain-
tiffs' ex ante investments (in increasing B) is much more ambiguous.
When court-awarded damages are expected to be less than the plain-
tiffs B (i.e., when damages are in Range 1), the inalienability and ad-
ditur options undermine the plaintiff's incentives to invest efficiently
by making ultimate damage payments more sensitive to B. In the
shadow of traditional alienable injunction threats, plaintiffs expect
that an investment intended to increase the value of B will be only
partially recovered if performance does not occur. Under the Nash
bargaining outcome, for example, plaintiffs would expect every dollar
increase in B to result in only a fifty cent increase in N, the payoff if
the defendant fails to perform. Under the deterrence regime, how-
ever, a defendant will have an ex post incentive to announce an addi-
tur amount that raises its expected payment slightly above the plain-
tiff's realized benefit of performance (B + s). Accordingly, when
defendant additur is allowed, plaintiffs will expect that investing to in-
crease B by one dollar will increase their expected payoff by one dol-
lar whether or not performance turns out to be efficient. For this rea-
son, deterring plaintiff threats in Range 1 exacerbates the plaintiff's
incentive to over-rely.
In Range 2, however, a threat deterrence strategy may induce
more efficient plaintiff investments in increasing B. The crucial ques-
tion is whether the supercompensatory damages (D) are more or less
sensitive to changes in B than the amount expected to be negotiated
in the shadow of a performance threat (N). This will turn in part on
the relative bargaining power of the parties, but it is also partially de-
pendent on the methodology by which the court calculates damages.
Damage calculations that are generous but relatively insensitive to
marginal investments to increase B will tend to channel performance
threats into Range 2 and give the plaintiff as well as the defendant in-
centives to make more efficient ex ante investments.ss Cooter and
Eisenberg have suggested that several common law principles may al-
ready be in place to reduce the sensitivity of damages to excessive reli-
S While we do not endorse giving plaintiffs remittitur options to deter defendant
performance threats, our analysis suggests that the remittitur option will tend to in-
crease the efficiency of the plaintiff's investments. The remittitur option makes the
defendant's expected payments less sensitive to B than bargaining in the shadow of a
credible performance threat. (This can be seen in Table 2, as (C -8) is less sensitive to
changes in B than N.) As a result, plaintiffs risk losing more of their investment in B if
performance becomes inefficient, and they therefore have less incentive to over-rely.
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89
ance.
Table 2 also shows that deterring plaintiff performance threats
can lead to a more efficient allocation of risk when at least one of the
parties is risk averse and the inefficiency of performance is due to an
unexpected increase in cost.90 Mitch Polinsky has shown that breach
remedies allocate among the contractual parties the risk stemming
from changes in circumstances. 9  For example, Polinsky has shown
that when production costs fluctuate, the optimal damage payment in
terms of risk allocation will be somewhere between the plaintiff's ex
ante expected benefit from performance (B) and the defendant's ex
ante expected cost of performance (C. j ,. 92 Setting damages equal
to B is one way that the plaintiff can avoid risk-because the plaintiff
will receive a (monetary or in kind) benefit equaling B whether or not
performance occurs, leaving the defendant to bear all the risk.93 If the
defendant is risk averse and the plaintiff risk neutral, however, then
the plaintiff should bear all the risk. Reducing damages from B to
C ..... has the effect of shifting risk from the defendant to the plaintiff.
If the ultimate performance cost equals C ane, the (party who would
otherwise be a) defendant will perform and get her initial expected
profit; if the performance cost rises above C .. , the defendant will
breach the contract and pay damages of C. .. once again getting her
initial expected profit. If both the plaintiff and the defendant are risk
averse, then the ideal damage level from a risk allocation perspective
would be somewhere between C,,, and B. 94
Inefficient threats can produce damage payments outside of this
range. A plaintiff who threatens inefficient performance, for exam-
ple, will expect to receive a payment of N, which exceeds the optimal
risk-allocation damage range ceiling of B. Having this option to seek
89 See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 1467 (stating that the existing practice
of limiting damage awards to reasonable reliance costs makes damages somewhat in-
sensitive to actual reliance).
90 A similar analysis applies if performance becomes inefficient due to an unex-
pected decrease in the benefit of performance.
91 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983), for a discussion of optimal risk allocation under various cir-
cumstances, including different reasons for breach and different risk preferences
among buyers and sellers.
See id. at 442 (discussing optimal damage payments when production costs fluc-
tuate).
93 See id. at 443 (explaining that if the buyer is risk averse and the seller is risk neu-
tral, the optimal damage payment equals the buyer's benefit).
94 See id. at 442 (explaining that if both parties are risk averse, the optimal damage
payment is between the seller's normal production cost and the buyer's benefit).
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high damages effectively forces the plaintiff to buy and forces the de-
fendant to sell a lottery ticket. The plaintiff bears the risk of receiving,
and the defendant bears the risk of paying, a supercompensatory
amount in the event performance does not occur. Deterring plaintiff
performance threats with inalienability and additur options reduces
the lottery component of nonperformance by reducing damages from
N down to D or (B + E) and, thus, provides a more efficient risk alloca-
tion if at least one of the parties is risk averse.
2. Ex Post Effects
Threatening inefficient performance may occasion needless costs
of bargaining and, if bargaining breaks down, result in inefficient per-
formance. These ex post bargaining inefficiencies are largely a func-
tion of the parties' potentially imperfect information. While plaintiffs
are likely to know the value of receiving defendants' performance (B)
and defendants are likely to know the cost of performing (C) as per-
formance becomes due, the parties may not know each other's valua-
tion. When plaintiffs are imperfectly informed about C and defen-
dants are imperfectly informed about B, ex post bargaining may be
inefficient.
When damages fall in Range 2 (B < D < N < C), giving defendants
inalienability and additur options to deter plaintiff threats enhances
bargaining efficiency. As summarized in Table 2, the defendant will
opt for inalienability (but not additur), and the plaintiff will respond
by electing monetary damages (D). There will be no chance of the
inefficient performance actually occurring, as can happen if bargain-
ing fails in the shadow of a credible performance threat. Additionally,
the plaintiff and the defendant at most would need to bargain over
any uncertainty in the ultimate size of court-awarded damages (D)
and over how to split the total costs avoided by not having an actual
trial. This latter negotiation is likely to be more efficient because the
parties will have better information about the much smaller issues at
stake.95
When plaintiff performance threats arise in Range 1 (or when the
defendant is uncertain whether B is greater or less than D), however,
it is ambiguous whether giving defendants inalienability and additur
options would improve ex post bargaining efficiency. For example,
95 We might, however, imagine situations in which the parties have better informa-
tion about G and B than they do about what ajury might award as D.
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imagine the following Range 1 scenario:
Both the plaintiff and the defendant know that the defen-
dant's C has unexpectedly risen to $150. The defendant is not
sure of the exact value of the plaintiff's B but she believes that
it is equally likely to be any value above $0 but below $100.96
The parties also both know that a court would only award
nominal damages which for simplicity we assume to be $0.
Under these assumptions, the plaintiff will threaten an inefficient
injunction, and the defendant knows that damages are in Range 1 (D
= 0 < B < 100 < C = 150).9' In the simpler model with full information
discussed above, the defendant knew the exact size of B and so could
choose an additur amount (A) such that supplemented damages
would exceed the plaintiff's valuation (D + A > B). In this scenario,
the defendant can ensure an efficient result by making the injunction
inalienable and choosing an additur amount of slightly more than
$100. The plaintiff would then seek monetary damages, thus avoiding
the possibility of inefficient performance.
The defendant, however, will often not have an incentive to an-
nounce such a high additur amount. Giving the defendant inal-
ienability and additur options in a sense allows the defendant to make
the plaintiff a take-it-or-leave-it offer." Defendants with the power to
make take-it-or-leave-it offers-but who are imperfectly informed
about the plaintiff's benefit of performance-will often find it to their
advantage to reduce the additur amount so that there is some chance
that plaintiffs will still opt for an inefficient (and now inalienable) in-
In other words, the defendant knows only that B is uniformly distributed be-
tween $0 and $100.
97 The bargaining inefficiencies produced in this model are similar to a stylized
version of the Peevyhouse case discussed in DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 224-32 (1994). The authors examine a situation in which there are two
"types" of plaintiffs: a high-valuing type who places a subjective value of $800,000 on
land restoration, and a low-valuing type who values such reclamation at only $200,000.
The cost of restoration is commonly known in their model to be $1,000,000. Id. at
224-26. As in this example, it is common knowledge that performance is inefficient,
but plaintiffs with relatively high valuations nevertheless seek injunctions in equilib-
rium. For further discussion of this example, see Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining. Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE LJ. 1027,
1061 n.105 (1995) (discussing "exit options" in the context of Baird, Gertner, and
Picker's Peevyhouse example).
98 After the defendant chooses inalienability and announces an additur amount
(A), the plaintiff must either accept the monetary offer (of D + A), or reject it (and
thereby accept performance). Once the plaintiff takes or leaves the offer, the inal-
ienability of the injunction ensures that there are no further negotiations.
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junction.99 Under the foregoing assumptions, for example, the de-
fendant would minimize her expected payments by choosing inal-
ienability and announcing an additur amount of only $75--meaning
that twenty-five percent of the time the plaintiff would still choose an
injunction that would result in inefficient performance.'09
When a defendant is poorly informed about the plaintiff's benefit
of performance, then a defendant additur option can lead to less effi-
cient ex post outcomes. When the defendant knows relatively more
about B than the plaintiff knows about C, however, inalienability and
additur options will tend to produce more efficient bargaining even in
Range 1.101 In the extreme case, if the defendant knows B precisely
(but the plaintiff does not know C precisely), then defendant inal-
ienability and additur options will eliminate the chance of inefficient
performance, since the defendant will name an additur amount which
slightly exceeds the plaintiff's benefit of performance and thus will de-
ter the plaintiff from opting for an inalienable injunction. Allowing
99 Strategic inefficiencies often arise when one side to a negotiation has bargaining
power (such as having a monopoly on the right to make offers) and the other side has
private information. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency
and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729, 737-42 (1992) (providing an ex-
ample of a commercial carrier with market power negotiating with shippers who have
private valuation information).
100 If the defendant chooses an additur A of $100, she will pay $100 in damages
100% of the time; the plaintiff's benefit from performance B is always less than $100,
so he will always opt for the $100 in damages rather than the injunction. The defen-
dan's expected payment ifA is $100 will therefore be 1.0 * $100 = $100. In contrast, if
the defendant chooses an A of $25, there is a 25% chance that the plaintiff's B will be
less than A, so there is a 25% chance that the plaintiff will opt for damages at a cost to
the defendant of $25. At the same time, there will be a 75% chance that the plaintiff
will refuse $25 and instead demand performance, which costs the defendant $150. If
the defendant offers an additur amount of $25, she can therefore expect to spend (on
average) (.25 * 25) + (.75 * 150) = $118.75. In other words, under the assumptions of
the above scenario, the defendant who chooses a total damage payment A between 0
and 100 will have an A% chance of paying A, and a (100 - A) % chance of paying $150.
She will choose A to minimize her expected payment, which can be represented by the
equation (.01A)A + (1- .01A) 150. The A that minimizes the payment is $75. If the
defendant offers the plaintiff $75 in damages, she can expect to pay out .75 * 75+ .25 *
150 = $93.75.
101 Because the effect of giving defendants inalienability and additur options in
Range 1 turns on whether defendants are relatively informed about the plaintiffs'
benefit of performance (B), Table 2 characterizes the effect on ex post bargaining effi-
ciency as ambiguous.
Ive Conversely, when the plaintiff knows more about the defendant's C than the
defendant knows about B, giving the plaintiff a remittitur option will tend to produce
more efficient ex post bargaining. When given a remittitur option, a knowledgeable
plaintiff can set a remittitur amount at a level that would eliminate bargaining by en-
suring that performance threats are not credible.
1999]
98 UNIVERS17= OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW
the plaintiff to obtain an alienable injunction, in contrast, might lead
to inefficiency because a plaintiff who does not know the defendant's
true cost of performance might demand such a high payment that set-
tlement negotiations drag on or break down entirely.
In sum, granting defendant inalienability and additur options has
attractive equity and efficiency characteristics. As an equitable matter,
inalienability and additur options decrease the chance of overcom-
pensation without increasing the chance of undercompensation. As a
matter of efficiency, Table 2 suggests that deterring plaintiff threats
will induce more efficient (1) ex ante defendant precautions and (2)
joint risk-bearing. Moreover, if courts commit to damages which are
generous but relatively insensitive to plaintiff reliance, deterring
plaintiff threats with inalienability and additur options will also induce
more efficient (3) ex ante plaintiff reliance and (4) ex post bargain-
ing. We emphasize, however, that alternative and richer assumptions
about ex ante decision-making might reverse some of these results. '03
While comprehensive efficiency analysis is becoming increasingly dif-
ficult as lawyer/economists develop increasingly complex models, the
appealing equity and efficiency attributes of the deterrence strategy
make it a plausible reform candidate.
IV. MEANS OF ADDRESSING THREATS OF INEFFICIENT PERFORMANCE
A. Default Choice of Legal Regime
As we have discussed, one means to deter performance threats is
to implement a legal regime allowing the defendant inalienability and
additur options. Since many performance threats can arise in con-
tractual settings, however, it is necessary to analyze default choice. For
example, should the default interpretation of contracts be that injunc-
tions were meant to be inalienable (unless the parties opt out of inal-
ienability) or should the default interpretation be that injunctions
were meant to be alienable (unless the parties opt into inalienability)?
This section argues that inalienability should be a default rule-mean-
ing that all court-ordered injunctions should be presumptively inal-
ienable unless (1) the parties explicitly contracted for alienability of
injunctions ex ante or (2) the defendant unilaterally petitioned the
103 For example, we do not consider the potential effects of inalienability and addi-
tur options on one party's decision to make investments that benefit the other party.
See Che & Chung, supra note 82, at 54, for a discussion of the role of damage rules in
inducing such "cooperative investments."
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court to allow any injunction to be alienable at some point in the pro-
ceeding before the plaintiff irrevocably elected injunctive or monetary
relief.l' We do not argue that courts should change their practice
about when to issue injunctions.05 Instead, we suggest that whenever
a court decides that an injunction is appropriate, it should presump-
tively prohibit the defendant from discharging the injunction by pay-
ing the plaintiff.16
We must first justify why our proposal should be merely a default
or presumptive rule instead of a mandatory feature of all injunctions.
We see no reason based on either externalities or parentalism why
plaintiffs and defendants should not be free to contract ex ante foralienble . .. 107
alienable injunctions. Indeed, Table 2 shows that inalienability and
additur may cause less efficient behavior on certain dimensions. For
example, if damages are likely to be either undercompensatory or
perfectly compensatory, then the parties may want to contract to give
the plaintiff the option of seeking alienable injunctions in order to
induce more efficient plaintiff reliance."" When a plaintiff's ex ante
reliance investments in increasing B are particularly salient, the plain-
104 As a legal matter, we would also enforce "firm" contractual inalienability provi-
sions that waived defendants' options subsequently to waive inalienability. As we dis-
cuss above in the text accompanying note 98, however, we predict that defendants will
seldom have an incentive to waive inalienability ex post, so that such a provision would
serve little purpose.
105As discussed above, we are attracted both to the "undue burden" rule which
tends to deny injunctions when the defendant's cost (c) is much greater than the
plaintiff's benefit (B), see supra note 46-48 and accompanying text, and to the equitable
impulse to issue inefficient (C > B) injunctions nonetheless when jury-awarded dam-
ages (D) may be subcompensatory (D < B), seesupra notes 49 and accompanying text.
10S-To the extent possible, we have also suggested that when giving plaintiffs the
choice between injunctive and monetary relief, courts should strive to assure that dam-
ages will be generous. Doing so can reduce the defendant's expected payment (com-
pared to a regime with alienable injunctions) and has attractive equity and efficiency
consequences. Specifically, the more uncertain the court's assessment of the plaintiff's
B, the more generous the court's assessment of damage should be.
107 In contrast, however, we do see externality reasons for restricting a plaintiff's
ability to unilaterally opt for alienability after a dispute has arisen. A plaintiff does not
bear all the costs of bargaining or failing to reach an agreement in the shadow of an
alienable performance threat, and thus may choose alienability even when doing so is
socially inefficient. In fact, the plaintiff is likely to bear a much smaller proportion of
the costs, since the defendant must bear the cost of the inefficient performance.
108 See supra text following note 87 (noting that where court-awarded damages are
less than the plaintiff's benefit, inalienability and additur options undermine the plain-
tiff's incentives to invest efficiently); see also William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and
Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RANDJ. ECON. 39, 50-51 (1984) (noting that
ex post bargaining in the shadow of alienable injunctive relief may produce more effi-
cient ex ante plaintiff reliance).
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tiff and the defendant might jointly decide to contract ex ante for al-
ienable injunctions!"
Our proposal would also allow the defendant to unilaterally opt
for alienability at any stage before the plaintiff made an irrevocable
election between monetary and injunctive relief.1 This unilateral op-
tion would apply not only to contractual settings, but also to any non-
contractual settings-such as the encroachment example-where a
court might give the plaintiff the choice of injunctive or monetary re-
lief. Our model suggests that defendants armed with an additur op-
tion would rarely petition the court to make any prospective injunc-
tion alienable. Without the additur option, defendants in Range 1
might opt for alienability, fearing that plaintiffs would prefer an inef-
ficient, inalienable injunction to subcompensatory damages. Defen-
dants who also have the additur option, however, can eliminate the
risk of subcompensatory damages and hence their primary rationale
for preferring alienability. Inalienability and additur in effect give de-
fendants the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Game theory sug-
gests that once a dispute arises, defendants would rarely have a ration-
ale for forgoing the right to maintain an offer monopoly-which
would have the same effect as opting for alienability. Concluding that
defendants would rarely have an ex post incentive to choose alienabil-
ity, however, is not a reason for limiting their ability to do so. We see
neither externality nor parentalism rationales for prohibiting defen-
dants from opting for alienability at an early stage of a dispute, and,
accordingly, we would allow it. Parties already have the ability to con-
tract ex ante to make damages the exclusive remedy in case of breach,
thus prohibiting injunctions. It is arguably less of an intrusion on ju-
dicial power to give parties the limited option of making injunctions
inalienable rather than the more expansive intrusion of stripping
judges' injunctive power altogether.
Finally, it is useful to justify explicitly why the inalienability default
that we propose is superior to an alienability default. t ' As a descrip-
109 For example, a factory contracting to buy an expensive but standardized ma-
chine may understand that there is relatively small risk that C will fluctuate but a sub-
stantial risk that B will fluctuate if the buyer is not given adequate incentives to rely.
110 As discussed above in notes 60-63 and accompanying text, a defendant must be
able to commit to inalienability before the plaintiff elects a remedy in order to under-
mine the credibility of the plaintiff's performance threat.
I We also believe that the default additur amount should be zero dollars. When
damages are compensatory or supercompensatory, the defendant would opt for a zero
dollar default, and even when damages are likely to be undercompensatory, the court
is ill-equipped to choose an additur amount.
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five matter, the alienability of current injunctions is probably a default
characteristic; parties under prevailing law can contract ex ante to
waive the right to settle for money in lieu of performing an injunc-
tion.' This means that alienability is probably the current default,
one that contractual parties could avoid by expressly contracting ex
ante that any injunction that might issue would not be alienable.
We believe that an inalienability default is both more efficient and
more equitable than the current alienability default. Our previous
analysis of ex ante and ex post efficiency suggests that a majority of
transacting parties are likely to substantively prefer inalienable to al-
ienable injunctions. Thus, an inalienability default is likely to be the
majoritarian default that minimizes the costs of contracting around.
Moreover, in a world in which contracting parties rarely address
whether or not injunctions will issue, much less whether such injunc-
tions should be alienable, we predict that few parties would contract
around either default. To the extent that there are some parties that
would substantively prefer alienable injunctions and others that would
substantively prefer inalienable injunctions, the choice of default will
largely determine which type of failures to contract we see. Because
we believe inalienability to produce more equitable payoffs, we also
believe that failures to contract around an inalienability default pro-
mote equity, while failures to contract around alienability defaults
conduce toward inequity (in the form of an enhanced probability that
defendants will have to overcompensate plaintiffs).
B. Considerations in the Decision to Grant Injunctive Relief
This Article highlights several factors that should be considered in
shaping injunctive relief. First, in deciding whether to grant plaintiffs
the option of injunctive relief, courts should weigh the possible undue
burdens that injunction performance might impose on defendants
against the potential that monetary damages will undercompensate
plaintiffs. 113 Judges should continue to deny injunctions that impose
undue burdens on a defendant as compared to the benefit to the
12 Some decisions suggest, however, that the alienability of injunctions is an im-
mutable characteristic. Seesupra note 57.
113 This is analogous to Judge Posner's balancing approach in American Hospital
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that a
preliminary injunction should be granted if P * HP > (1 - P) * Hd, where P equals the
probability that the denial of the preliminary injunction would be an error, HP equals
the harm the plaintiff would suffer if the injunction were denied, and Hd equals the
harm the defendant would suffer if the injunction were granted).
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plaintiff. Second, when issuing injunctions, courts should consider
whether the injunction is meant merely to protect a plaintiff's right in
its "use value" of performance or whether the injunction is meant to
go further and protect the plaintiff's right to the "exchange value."
The strongest justification for alienable injunctions exists when a de-
fendant is found to have wrongfully acted to circumvent a plaintiff's
right to bargain for a higher price. Thus, an injunction against a "will-
ful" encroacher who unilaterally takes, instead of negotiating for the
additional land, is more likely to be created to recreate the plaintiff's
exchange value. Alternatively, an injunction against patent infringe-
ment may have not only the goal of protecting the patentee's use
value (the value of practicing the invention), but also the goal of pro-
tecting the patentee's exchange value (the value of being able to ne-
gotiate for a high licensing fee by threatening not to license) .
When the court is merely granting an injunction to protect a
plaintiff's right to the "use value" of performance, however, there is a
stronger rationale for making the injunction inalienable. Courts or-
dering specific performance of contractual promises, for example, are
most likely trying to give the plaintiff the benefit of actual perform-
ance and not a weapon to hold up the defendant for a payment that
would put the plaintiff in a position dramatically superior to that re-
sulting from actual performance.15 Contractors would rarely agree
that when changed conditions make the defendant's performance in-
efficient that plaintiffs should be able to hold up the defendant for
part of the inefficiency.
1 6
114 A problem with "exchange value" injunctions (that is, injunctions that aim to
protect the plaintiff's right to block all non-consensual entitlement transfers) is that
they can also overcompensate the plaintiff once the defendant has relied to her detri-
ment on the taking. Thus, in the willful encroachment context, the amount that the
plaintiff might have bargained for ex ante (before the encroaching wall was con-
structed) might be much less than the amount that the plaintiff might be able to bar-
gain for in the shadow of an injunction ordering the wall to be removed (at substantial
defendant cost).
us Injunctive orders concerning child custody are probably intended to protect
parents' use value and not to create a bargaining chip that has an exchange value for
the beneficiary.
116 This is especially true when the inefficiency is caused by bad news (i.e., by an
increase in a seller's expected costs). When the inefficiency is caused by good news
(i.e., by an increase in a seller's opportunity cost of performance), however, there is a
chance that the parties would agree to share in the good news. Thus, if a seller agrees
to sell a widget for $100 to an initial buyer and then, before performance, is due an-
other buyer offers $2,000 (an amount substantially above the initial buyer's valuation),
the parties might negotiate for the initial buyer to participate in the good news. How-
ever, even here, if the initial buyer is relatively risk averse, the parties would tend to
place the risk of a subsequent buyer showing up on the seller. See Polinsky, supra note
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Third, when giving plaintiffs an election between injunctive and
monetary relief, courts should, to the extent possible, strive to make
the monetary damages generous-that is, to assure that the damages
are supercompensatory to the extent that they fall into Range 2. We
have shown that generous damages combined with inalienable injunc-
tions can actually reduce defendants' expected payment by inducing
plaintiffs to opt for monetary damages. Supercompensatory damages
can be both more equitable (moving the defendants' expected pay-
ment closer to make-whole compensation) and more efficient (pro-
ducing more efficient ex ante incentives and ex post negotiations)
than subcompensatory damages. This "generosity principle" also mili-
tates in favor of giving defendants an option to increase damages paid
to plaintiffs through an additur.
C. Judicial Review of Injunctive Settlements
This Article's analysis also suggests that, as an alternative to the in-
alienability and additur options, courts should review the substance of
injunctive settlements and reject those settlements where defendants
pay an amount above any reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's possi-
ble benefit" 7 Such a review might be similar to a court's evaluation of
whether a liquidated damage amount is reasonably commensurate
with a plaintiff's actual damages." 8 Couched differently, a court might
subject a proposed settlement payment (in lieu of injunctive perform-
ance) to the same remittitur analysis to which it would subject a jury
award." 9 Traditionaljudicial remittitur is an amount announced after
91, at 432 (discussing optimal risk allocation according to buyers and sellers' risk aver-
sions). If the seller agrees to sell a widget for $100 to an initial buyer and then the cost
of performance rises unexpectedly to $10,000, it is less likely that the buyer and seller
would agree to allow the buyer to profit from this bad news. A legal regime permitting
alienable injunctions would result in a higher variance of returns for both the buyer
and the seller compared to a regime that only permitted expectation damages.
1 To be consistent with our earlier analysis, courts might, before asking plaintiffs
to elect a remedy, ask defendants whether any injunction settlement should be subject
to remittitur review.
18 See Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liqui-
dated Damages Rule 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1200-05 (1994) ("While courts potentially
can invalidate underliquidated provisions, such maneuvers are much less frequent
than the invalidation of overliquidated damages.").
n1 This analysis might require thatjudges listen to evidence about the level of po-
tential damages since such evidence might not have been introduced in an injunction
proceeding. Because the defendant ex post may have lower incentives to contest the
plaintiff's evidence of professed benefits, it might even be appropriate for courts to
assess the plaintiffs potential benefit of performance before issuing an injunction.
This evidence might already have been introduced to satisfy the equitable prerequisite
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ajury has made its award, but it would be possible for courts in issuing
an injunction to move first by simultaneously announcing a "settle-
ment cap"--the maximum amount that a defendant might pay to dis-
charge its injunctive duty. To the extent that this maximum is below
the cost of performance threat point, it may mitigate the potential
damage of a threat to perform inefficiently. Such a settlement cap
would compress the bargaining range and, therefore, would likely
produce a settlement amount that would more closely approximate
make-whole compensation." Moreover, a price cap on alienable in-
junctions would make negotiations more efficient. For example, if it
will cost a defendant $10,000 to remove an encroaching wall, but ac-
tually removing the wall will only produce a benefit of $500 for the
plaintiff, then we can imagine how the parties would react to an alien-
able injunction with a $1000 settlement cap. The plaintiff would likely
elect injunctive relief, and the parties would quickly settle for $1000.
Because in the absence of a settlement the injunction will be per-
formed, the judicial settlement cap does not change the parties'
threat points. Rather, it limits the maximum amount that the plaintiff
can hope to take away from such a negotiation. The likely result is
that the parties will settle more quickly and with fewer bargaining
breakdowns since there is no risk that the plaintiff will hold out seek-
ing too much money.
Richard Epstein has explicitly argued for analogous price con-
strained bargaining games in other bilateral monopoly settings. ' 21 In
discussing the classic necessity context of dock usage during the exi-
gencies of a storm,12 Epstein considers a legal regime that would give
a dock owner "the absolute right to exclude, but if he chooses to ad-
that an injunction's burden is not undue in comparison with the plaintiff's benefit.
Our judicial remittitur proposal would require the parties to submit a proposed
dollar settlement for judicial review. If the judge found the proposed amount to be
unreasonably high and announced a lower remittitur amount, the plaintiff would then
have the choice of demanding actual performance or accepting the lower remittitur
amount. Giving the plaintiff this subsequent choice of performance assures that the
plaintiff will not be undercompensated.
12 To the extent that the parties' information about the cap was more certain than
the parties' information about the defendants' cost of performance, most bargaining
models would predict more efficient negotiations in the shadow of the cap.
121 See RIcHARD A. EPSrEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 57 (1993) (proposing
that a dock owner have the absolute right to prevent a boat owner from using the
dock, but if the dock owner permits the use of the dock then his compensation will be
limited to the dock's rental value plus the damage caused by the boat).
122 SeePloofv. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (holding that the plaintiff had the
right to moor his sloop to the defendant's dock when a "sudden and violent tempest"
arose that threatened the sloop and the lives of the people in it).
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mit, then it can only be on condition that he accept a compensation
package limited to the rental value of the dock, plus the property
damages caused by the owner"'23 Epstein sees that constrained price
bargaining may be more efficient:
The use of this two-point distribution in effect rules out all intermediate
solutions and thus makes it impossible to haggle over the price within
some large range. In particular, the dockowner cannot insist on captur-
ing the net worth of the shipowner, so that the bargaining problem is
therefore effectively obviated.
A regime that legally constrains the price over which parties might
bargain can thus avoid the ex post inefficiencies of bilateral monopoly
haggling. When applied to the injunctive setting, capping the maxi-
mum amount that the defendant could pay in lieu of injunctive per-
formance can not only streamline ex post negotiations, but also pro-
duce more efficient ex ante incentives and an arguably more
equitable result.
Unlike our more extreme inalienability proposal, price regulation
(of either the ex ante price cap or the ex postjudicial remittitur kind)
merely restricts the free alienability of injunctions. Restricting the
price at which injunctions can be sold may also produce a more ro-
bust way to avoid inefficient injunctive performance. The defendant
inalienability and additur options are crucially premised on game-
theoretic predictions that plaintiffs will not seek injunctions if the
benefits from actual performance can be made less than expected
trial damages. The model predicts that few plaintiffs would seek in-
junctions once a defendant has opted for inalienability. If this deter-
rent effect does not come to pass, however, inalienable injunctions
may lead to more inefficiency than the current alienability regime.
Capping the amount that defendants can settle for may not deter as
many plaintiffs from seeking inefficient injunctions, but it may lead to
more efficient (and equitable) settlements in lieu of actual perform-
ance. Plaintiffs who represent to a court that they really want per-
formance because monetary damages are inadequate have little rea-
son to complain if the court allows the defendant to commit to a
maximum price above which she cannot pal to buy back the injunc-
tion.
12 EPsTEIN, supra note 121, at 57.
124 R
1999]
106 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown that people who are owed duties
(potential plaintiffs) and people who owe duties (potential defen-
dants) may threaten inefficient performance of those duties solely to
improve their individual payoffs. Potential plaintiffs will at times
threaten to force defendant performance by seeking injunctions in-
stead of accepting monetary damages, while potential defendants will
threaten to perform prior to breach instead of paying monetary dam-
ages.
Naive Holmesianism would suggest that when changed circum-
stances make some performance inefficient, a promisor merely has
the choice between performing and paying damages. In many con-
texts, however, the promisor has not two, but three choices to consider:
performing, paying damages, or negotiating in the shadow of a credi-
ble performance threat. We have shown that the amounts paid in the
shadow of performance threats by plaintiffs or defendants can differ
substantially from those amounts that would be assessed as legal dam-
ages. Moreover, appreciating the third possibility of negotiating in
the shadow of performance threats leads to different predictions
about the parties' preferences and behavior. Once we allow for the
possibility of performance threats, we see that plaintiffs at times may
perversely prefer lower expected damages-because lower damages
may render defendant threats of inefficient performance incredible.
And defendants at times may prefer higher expected damages-be-
cause higher damages may induce plaintiffs to opt for legal instead of
equitable relief.
In the contractual context, threats to breach inefficiently are
thought to be presumptively opportunistic. If fishermen in the mid-
dle of an Alaskan fishing season threaten to breach their promise to
fish, not because they face unexpectedly high performance costs but
solely to renegotiate a higher wage, the employees' actions are
roundly condemned by the common law and commentators alike as
acting in bad faith.2'
Yet a similar consensus has not emerged with regard to threats to
perform inefficiently. If a plaintiff seeks an injunction for perform-
12 See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) ("No as-
tute reasoning can change the plain fact that the party who refuses to perform, and
thereby coerces a promise from the other party to the contract to pay him an increased
compensation for doing that which he is legally bound to do, takes an unjustifiable
advantage of the necessities of the other party.").
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ance that he knows to be inefficient when expected damages are more
than compensatory, he intentionally subjects himself to both the risk
of prolonged negotiations and the risk that negotiations will fail and
inefficient performance will ensue. If either risk were to materialize,
costs could be high for all parties involved. In considering the effects
of granting Walgreen an injunction to prevent another pharmacy
(Phar-Mor) from renting space at a particular mall, Judge Posner ac-
knowledged the inefficiencies that could result from negotiations:
Suppose the cost to Walgreen of facing the competition of Phar-Mor at
the Southgate Mall would be $1 million, and the benefit... of leasing to
Phar-Mor would be $2 million. Then at any price between those figures
for a waiver of Walgreen's injunctive right both parties would be better
off.... But each of the parties would like to engross as much of the
bargaining range as possible-Walgreen to press the price toward $2 mil-
lion, [Phar-Mor] to depress it toward $1 million. With so much at stake,
both parties will have an incentive to devote substantial resources of time
and money to the negotiation process. The process may even break
down, if one or both parties want to create for future use a reputation as
a hard bargainer, and if it does break down, the injunction will have
brought about an inefficient result.1
2 6
Judge Posner acutely understood that the costs of bargaining are
likely to be positively correlated with the size of the bargaining range.
When an inefficient injunction creates "a huge bargaining range[,]
... the costs of negotiating to a point within it might... [be] im-
mense." 127 As we have seen, bargaining in the shadow of either plain-
tiff or defendant performance threats can create just such large bar-
gaining ranges. Bargaining in the shadow of payments based on
expectation damages (as would occur under the inalienability and ad-
ditur regime in Ranges 1 or 2) can be much more efficient because
the bargaining range is likely to be smaller; the money to be saved by
avoiding going to court (largely attorneys' fees) is much smaller and
more easily estimated than the money to be saved from avoiding inef-
ficient performance.
Courts award inefficient injunctions in part to reduce the possibil-
ity that relatively innocent plaintiffs will be undercompensated by
monetary damages. By granting injunctions, however, courts may un-
wittingly increase the chance of overcompensation. Making injunc-
tions presumptively inalienable and giving defendants the option of
private additur reduces the risk of this overcompensation without in-
126 Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992).
27 Id. at 278.
19991
108 UNIVERS17Y OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVWEW
creasing the chance that plaintiffs will be undercompensated. Less
radically, courts might simply treat proposed defendant settlements
(in lieu of injunctive performance) as jury awards and subject them to
similar scrutiny for potential remittitur. We have shown that while ef-
ficiency is not unambiguously improved along every dimension, on
the whole presumptive inalienability and defendant additur arguably
enhance both efficiency and equity. Plaintiffs who represent to a
court that they really want performance because monetary damages
are inadequate have little reason to complain if the court allows the
defendant to commit to either inalienability or a maximum price
above which she cannot pay to buy back the injunction.128 Deterring
plaintiff threats of inefficient performance can potentially reduce the
costs of ex post negotiations and move the ex post payments closer to
make-whole compensation.
128 This Article suggests that when plaintiffs threaten inefficient performance (via
injunctions) defendants should have offsetting options. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 24,
at 745, analyzed the converse situation where a defendant threatened inefficient
breach (via anticipatory repudiation) and suggested that plaintiffs should be given the
offsetting option of being able to purchase specific performance.
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SUPPLEMENTALJURISDICTION AND SECTION 1367:
THE CASE FOR A SYMPATHETIC TEXTUALISM
JAMES E. PFANDER
INTRODUCTION
Something appears to be going badly wrong with the interpreta-
tion of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ("section 1367"). In the nine short years
since Congress enacted it as one of several "noncontroversial" provi-
sions of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,' the statute that de-
fines the supplementaljurisdicuon of the district courts of the United
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to Steve Burbank,
Ellen Deason, Rick Marcus, Tom Mengler, John Oakley, Tom Rowe, David Shapiro,
Joan Steinman, and Jay Tidmarsh for helpful comments on earlier drafts. In suggest-
ing the need for a sympathetic reading, I follow the lead of the drafters of section 1367
although my reading of the text departs from theirs in a number of particulars.
' See Section 310 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994)) [hereinafter section 1367]. For
the text of section § 1367, see infra note 43. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
was assembled by selecting "noncontroversial" changes from among those recom-
mended by the Federal Courts Study Center. AbnerJ. Mikva &James E. Pfander, On
the Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress's
Residual Statute of Limitations, 107 YALE L.J. 393, 398 (1997) (noting the method House
Subcommittee Chairman Kastenmeier used in selecting features of the Report of the
Study Committee for incorporation into an implementing bill). On the origins of sec-
tion 1367, see Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to
Codif SupplementalJurisdiction, 74JTDICATURF 213, 213-14 (1991), andJohn B. Oakley,
Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of FederalJurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improve-
ments Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 757-63 (1991). See generally
Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: A Constitutional and
Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 859-89 (1992).
2 Before section 1367 codified them under the common label of "supplemental
jurisdiction," the doctrines of "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction had developed
along two separate lines in the decisional law of the Supreme Court. See Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (describing pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction as "two species of the same generic problem"). For nice accounts of the
separate but related development of the doctrines, see Richard D. Freer, A Principled
Statutory Approach to SupplementalJurisdiction, 1987 DunE L.J. 34, and Richard Matasar, A
Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer. The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction,
17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103 (1983). As both works suggest in their titles, the doctrines
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction often marched under the supplemental banner
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States has attracted an enormous body of scholarly commentary,
much of it critical of Congress's handiwork.3 With this body of critical
commentary have come the predictable calls for reform and revision.
Although defenders of the statute initially argued that the federal
courts could work around the problems through flexible interpreta-
tion,5 the prospects for such creative solutions have diminished in re-
before they were codified in such terms in section 1367.
3 Professor Richard Freer was among the first and sharpest critics of the statute.
See Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life after Finley
and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute; 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 471 (1991) [hereinafter
Freer, Life After Finley] (attacking the supplemental jurisdiction statute for "maiming
efficient packaging of diversity cases... precluding supplemental jurisdiction in alien-
age cases and confusing areas that had been relatively clear"). Professor Freer's cri-
tique drew a defense from the drafters-Tom Rowe, Steve Burbank, and Tom
Mengler-and the exchange grew increasingly heated. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al.,
Compounding Confusion or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to
Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 943-44 (1991) [hereinafter Rowe et al., A Reply]
("Professor Richard Freer purports to separate the wheat from the chaff and then pro-
ceeds to torch the farm, exuberantly and extensively telling the federal courts how to
get it all wrong."); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The
Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 963 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Arthur & Freer, The Disaster] ("If Professor Freer in fact torched the entire farm, it
is because there was so much dry straw lying around after the three drafters finished
tilting with the strawmen they created in their response to Professor Freer's article.");
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al, A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993, 1006
(1991) [hereinafter Rowe et al., A Coda] ("[We trust that cooler heads than those of
Professors Arthur and Freer will join us in resisting their call to gut or scrap a needed
statute that is already proving its value."); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close
Enough for Government Work. What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY
L.J. 1007, 1007 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Close Enough] ("[If only someone
had spent as much time writing the statute as the trio [of drafters] has spent writing
about the statute."). This more pointed rhetoric may have persuaded other scholars to
steer clear of the controversy, at least initially. Some of the contributors to an Emory
Symposium on the subject one year later appear to have worried about becoming en-
tangled in a similar exchange. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing Jurisdiction, 41
EMORY L.J. 3, 4 (1992) (describing both the drafting Trio and the critical Duo as right
in certain respects and studiously declining to offer any opinion on "each point in
the... debate"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Debate Over § 1367: Defining the Power
to Define FederalJudicial Power, 41 EMORYL.J. 13, 13 (1992) (noting the "intensity" of the
debate but describing it as a mistake to "join issue").
4 Professors Freer and Arthur initially called for statutory revision as part of their
criticism of section 1367. SeeArthur & Freer, The Disaster, supra note 3, at 985 (describ-
ing a congressional fix as the only sensible course). Since then, calls for revision have
occurred with great regularity. See Christopher M. Fairman, Abdication to Academia: The
Case of the Supplemental jurisdiction Statute, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 157, 190 (1994)
(calling for Congress to undertake "immediate minor revisions, major deliberative ac-
tions and a revised disclaimer"); infra note 8 (listing proposed revisions). For an ac-
count of the current reform efforts of the American Law Institute, see infra notes 69-74
and the accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 960 n.90 (arguing that the reference
in the legislative history might help to overcome the possibility that the statute had al-
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cent years as the federal courts have adopted a more text-centered
.6approach to statutory interpretation. This rigorous textualism now
threatens to reshape the rules of federal jurisdiction quite dramati-
cally and to produce results that appear very much at odds with the
relatively modest expectations of the enacting Congress.7
As a consequence, a growing consensus of academic opinion now
holds that Congress should revise the law of supplemental jurisdic-
tion. One recent symposium featured articles from a variety of re-
spected scholars, many of whom agree that section 1367 requires at
least a tune-up if not a more substantial legislative overhaul. 8 This
tered the rule of Zahn v. International Paper Co.); id, at 960 (suggesting that sympathetic
interpretation of the statute might solve many of the problems identified by the crit-
ics); cf. Arthur & Freer, The Disaster, supra note 3, at 983 (suggesting that the call for
"sympathetic" interpretation will not overcome statutory ambiguity). For more on the
problem of Zahn, see infra notes 48-54.
6 Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the theory of statutory
interpretation. A generation ago, courts made routine use of the legislative history of
federal statutes, taking for granted the idea (now associated with the Legal Process
school) that statutes respond purposively to some mischief that Congress has identi-
fied. Such purposive interpretation has faced two primary challenges: one from the
public choice theorists and a second from those who emphasize the centrality of the
text in the interpretive process. For an overview, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROcEss Ii (William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994). On the rise of textualism generally, and its influence on both
academics and federal judges, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 1509, 1511-14 (1998) (book review) (identifingJustice Anto-
nin Scalia as the Court's leading textualist in the course of reviewing his essay on in-
terpretation).
Justice Scalia placed his interpretive stamp on the law of supplementaljurisdiction
in his opinion for the Court in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 552 (1989), empha-
sizing the absence of any textual basis for the assertion of pendent-party jurisdiction.
Although Congress adopted section 1367 in response, the subsequent interpretation of
the statute owes much to the literal textualism thatJustice Scalia insisted upon in Fin-
ley. See infra text accompanying notes 36-42 (describing the Finley opinion authored by
Justice Scalia).
Most of this disputation has centered on the application of the new statute to ac-
tions within the diversityjurisdiction of the federal district courts. See Stromberg Metal
Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that section
1367 also changes amount-in-controversy rules in ordinary multi-party diversity litiga-
tion); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that section
1367 relaxes strict rules governing amount-in-controversy determinations in diverse-
party class action litigation). For a more detailed account of Abbott Laboratories and
Stromberg see infra text accompanying notes 50-59. See generally Freer, Life After Finley,
supra note 3, at 475-76 (objecting to the statute's restrictive approach to diversityjuris-
diction).
8 All four of the lead authors in the symposium support statutory change. See
Richard D. Freer, Toward a Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction in Di-
versity of Citizenship Cases, 74 IND. L.J. 5, 17 (1998) (arguing for statutory revision to
broaden supplemental jurisdiction in diversity proceedings);John B. Oakley, Integrat-
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movement for a statutory fix coincides with last year's action of the
American Law Institute ("ALI"). Acting at its meeting in May 1998,
the ALI approved Tentative Draft No. 2 of a fully revised version of
section 1367.9 The ALI Draft presents a new conceptual approach to
the issues of supplemental jurisdiction and traces the implications of
its new approach in illuminating and sometimes exhausting detail.
Approval of the draft lends the ALI's prestige as an agency of law re-
form to the movement for a statutory revision.
Although amendments to the statute may indeed prove necessary,
their adoption should await the judicial consideration of an alterna-
tive approach to the interpretation of section 1367. The alternative
presented in this Article, which I refer to as "sympathetic textualism,"
represents an attempt to fuse two competing approaches to the inter-
pretation ofjurisdictional law, those of the legislative historians and of
the rigorous textualists. In the wake of section 136 7 's adoption, opin-
ion about the workability of the statute divided into two camps. On
ing Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the Work of the
American Law Institute, 74 IND. LJ. 25, 45-52 (1998) (setting forth views of the reporter
to the ALIJudicial Code Revision Project on its proposals for statutory change); Tho-
mas D. Rowe, Jr., Section 1367 and All That: Recodifying Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction,
74 IND. L.J. 53, 70-73 (1998) (proposing a revision of section 1367(b) that would mod-
ify the statute's operation in diversity); Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents: Supplemental Juris-
diction, Removal and the ALI Revision Project, 74 IND. LJ. 75, 114-22 (1998) (suggesting
an amendment to address the problem of supplementaljurisdiction in removed cases).
A good many other participants in the Indiana symposium express support for
amendments as well. See, e.g., Howard P. Fink, SupplementaIJurisdiction-Take It to the
Limit, 74 IND. L.J. 161, 161 (1998) (supporting an abolition of all limits on supplemen-
tal jurisdiction in diversity matters); Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of Nonsense: Reform-
ing SupplementalJurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 181, 189-94 (1998) (proposing an abolition of
complete diversity, a relaxation of the restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction, and
the use of amount-in-controversy rules to limit docket pressure). On the other hand,
at least some observers support a move away from more detailed rules and back to a
regime ofjudicial discretion. See Edward H. Cooper, An Alternative and Discretionay §
1367, 74 IND. L.J. 153, 153-54 (1998) (urging the adoption of an amendment that
would restore a measure of judicial discretion in the interpretation of supplemental
jurisdiction); David L. Shapiro, SupplementalJurisdiction: A Confession, An Avoidance, and
a Proposal, 74 IND. L.J. 211, 218-20 (1998) (same). Like these commentators, I doubt
the efficacy of greater statutory detail and support a restoration of the lawmaking part-
nership between Congress and the courts.
9 The American Law Institute published Tentative Draft No. 1 of its Federal Judi-
cial Code Revision Project in April 1997. Although Draft No. 1 was returned for fur-
ther drafting, the Institute approved the supplemental jurisdiction proposals con-
tained in Tentative Draft No. 2 at its meeting in May 1998. See Civil Procedure-
Supplemental Jurisdiction: ALI Advocates Proposed Amendment to Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute, 66 U.S.L.W. 2719 ( May 26, 1998) (reporting the ALI's unanimous approval).
For the details of the ALI proposal, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERALJUDICIAL
CODE REVISION PRoJECr, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2 (1998) [hereinafter ALI DRAFT].
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one side were the drafters of the statute and its defenders, who argued
that the federal courts could resolve textual problems with the statute
through reliance upon legislative history. In contrast to those who in-
voked legislative history, the statute's critics insisted upon the inter-
pretive primacy of the text and argued that the statute might well un-
settle jurisdictional law. The debate between the historians and the
textualists over the meaning of the supplemental jurisdiction statute
corresponded to a similar debate in legisprudential circles over the
role of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Indeed, it was the
Court's leading textualistJustice Antonin Scalia, who emphasized the
centrality of the text in Finley v. United States,° the jurisdictional deci-
sion that led to the adoption of section 1367.
In calling for a sympathetic textualism, I propose a reading of sec-
tion 1367 that attempts to bridge the gap between these two schools of
interpretive thought. My sympathetic approach takes the expressed
purpose of Congress and the history of pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion as valid (if not controlling) considerations and uncovers new in-
terpretive possibilities in the language of the statute. I thus follow to
some extent the lead of the more historically minded drafters of the
statute, who first called for a "sympathetic" consideration of legislative
purpose in the interpretation of the statute." The textualism I ad-
vance here may also appeal to the more rigorous textual critics of the
statute. For even the most committed textualist will often invoke can-
ons of statutory construction to aid the interpretive process, as Justice
Scalia's own textualist decision in Finley reveals. Finley invoked the
canon that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, does not
intend to change their effect unless such intention is "'clearly ex-
pressed.'' 12 Such a rule establishes a regime of continuity with the
past, very much in keeping with the insights in Professor David Sha-
piro's thoughtful defense of the use of the canons in the interpretive13
process. The canons can thus assist the textualist, as Professor Sha-
piro notes, in a "sincere and sympathetic effort" to uncover the mean-
ing of a statute by reminding us all that statutes rarely produce unan-
10 490 U.S. 545, 552 (1989).
" See supra note 5 (noting the drafters' preference for a sympathetic interpretation
for the statute).
12 Finey, 490 U.S. at 554 (quoting Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187,
199 (1912)).
13 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 925 (1992) (arguing that "the dominant theme running through most inter-
pretive [canons] that actually influence outcomes is that close questions of construc-
tion should be resolved in favor of continuity and against change").
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nounced but revolutionary changes in the law.'
4
My sympathetic textualism produces a reading of section 1367 that
fits well both with the legislative history's expressed desire to preserve
the established rules of complete diversity and with the canonical em-
phasis on continuity with the past. In particular, my approach reads
section 1367(a) as having incorporated the joinder and aggregation
rules of complete diversity into its requirement that the district courts
first obtain "original jurisdiction" of the claims in a civil action. On
this account, the grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a)
does not supplant diversity's joinder and aggregation rules but comes
into play in diversity proceedings only after those requirements have
been satisfied. Similarly, the restrictions in section 1367(b) operate to
prevent the erosion of the complete diversity requirement that might
otherwise result from an expansive application of what was once
termed the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. So read, the statute
leaves in place differences that had marked the pre-codification op-
eration of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction in federal-
question and diversity matters, and occasions none of the unexpected
changes in law that the current interpretive approach ascribes to the
statute. In thus proposing a reading of section 1367 that corresponds
to Congress's apparent design, this Article's "sympathetic textualism"
may obviate the need for further legislative tinkering and restore the
courts' role in the further elaboration of supplemental jurisdictional
law.
The Article develops its case for a sympathetic interpretation of
section 1367 in three parts. Part I reviews the origins of the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute and sketches its academic and judicial re-
ception. I show that, beneath the surface of an ongoing debate over
its proper interpretation, a broad consensus has developed concern-
ing the meaning of the statutory text. Part II of the Article presents a
more sympathetic alternative to the standard account of the text.
Building on the important jurisdictional distinction between federal-
question cases and diverse-party controversies, and the way that dis-
tinction informed the evolution of the judge-made doctrines of pen-
dent and ancillary jurisdiction that became supplemental jurisdiction,
the Article proposes and defends an interpretation of section 1367(a)
that leaves the federal courts free to apply the tenets of diversity juris-
diction as they continued to evolve before and after the statute's adop-
tion. Part III suggests that the Article's contrast between sympathetic
14 Id. at 926.
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and unsympathetic textualism may shed some light on current debates
over the proper role of the federal courts in the interpretation ofju-
risdictional statutes and on the need for further reform of the kind
now contemplated in the work of the ALI.
I. THE STANDARD AccouNT OF SECTION 1367
Although fierce academic battles have marked much of the field
of supplemental jurisdiction, 5 some uncontested terrain remains.
Perhaps most importantly, one finds in the literature a virtually uni-
versal and largely unspoken consensus about the best way to under-
stand the interplay between the first two subsections of section 1367.16
The Article describes this reading as the standard account of section
'- See supra note 3 for its collection of citations giving an overview of the battle-
ground. One author assessed the casualties by ascribing to his mother the comment
that a "lot of fur" was flying. Rowe, supra note 8, at 53.
'6 One finds the assumption that the broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in
section 1367(a) operates with the same impact in both federal-question and diversity
matters in virtually every published writing on the subject. See ALI DRAFt, supra note
9, at 58, 76 (showing that the reference to Rule 20 occasions a decisive narrowing of an
otherwise broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction by indicating that section 1367(a)
would have had a "revolutionary" effect on difrsity litigation but for the restrictions in
subsection (b), and that the "plain meaning" of section 1367 trumps the aggregation
rules in diversity only where the plaintiffs sue a single defendant); Arthur & Freer, The
Disaster, supra note 3, at 982 (indicating that the grant ofjurisdiction in subsection (a)
.over all claims satisfying the constitutional test for supplemental jurisdiction" may
overrule Strawbridge); Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 485 (noting that section
1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional limit while section
1367(b) creates exceptions; recognizing the omission of the exception for Rule 23;
and so assuming full pendent-party jurisdiction was conferred in subsection (a));
Wendy Collins Purdue, The New Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-Flawed But Fxabl4 41
EMoRYLJ. 69, 77 (1992) (indicating that section 1367(b) fails to answer the question
ofjurisdiction presented by class actionjoinder under Rule 23 or by nondiverse plain-
tiff joinder under Rule 20 and thus revealing an assumption that subsection (a)
authorizes supplemental jurisdiction of such matters in diversity); Rowe et al., A Reply,
supra note 3, at 960-61 nn.90-91 (acknowledging that section 1367 might overrule Zahn
and Strawbrnidge and thus interpreting section 1367(a) as a broad grant of pendentju-
risdiction applicable to diversity matters); Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party
Heard From, 41 EMoRYLJ. 85, 95-96 (1992) (indicating that, in diversity matters and in
the absence of an exception in subsection (b), the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in subsection (a) requires not an inquiry into consistency with section 1332 but an in-
quiry into transactional relationship under Article III); see also Lilly, supra note 8, at 184
(describing the broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a) as operat-
ing without regard to the jurisdictional basis on which plaintiff grounds the action);
Stephen C. Yeazell, Teaching SupplementalJurisdiction, 74 IND. LJ. 241, 246 (1998) (de-
scribing the broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a) as partially
retracted as to diversity matters in subsection (b)).
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1367. To understand the standard account and to see how it influ-
ences modem interpretations of the statute requires some back-
ground on the nature of supplemental jurisdiction. After providing
the necessary background, this Part sets out the standard account of
section 1367, notes its influence with courts and commentators, and
shows how it informs the revision project of the ALL.
A. The Origins of SupplementalJurisdiction
Section 1367 represents an attempt by Congress to codify the doc-
trines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under the common rubric
of supplemental jurisdiction. 7 The Supreme Court had developed
the two doctrines in a series of decisions running well back into the
nineteenth century 8 without much in the way of explicit guidance
from Congress 9 and without identifying an entirely satisfying concep-
tual or statutory basis for them.2 0 As a consequence, the judicial doc-
17 See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 860 (expressing approval of Congress's "benefi-
cial" decision to abandon the old labels of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in favor
of the generic term "supplementaljurisdiction").
18 Ancillaryjurisdiction developed first, as the Supreme Court agreed to permit the
assertion of jurisdiction over claims brought by intervenors who sought to perfect
claims to property other litigants had previously brought within the custody of a fed-
eral court. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860) (upholding
jurisdiction over "ancillary and dependent [claims] ... without reference to the citi-
zenship or residence of the parties"). The Court extended ancillary jurisdiction in a
series of subsequent cases. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926)
(upholding ancillary jurisdiction over defendant's compulsory counterclaim under
state law). See generally Freer, supra note 2, at 50-53 (arguing that the development of
ancillaryjurisdiction served the twin goals of allowing efficient packaging of cases and
avoiding duplicative litigation).
Pendent jurisdiction developed along a separate track, as plaintiffs in federal-
question cases came to join state-law claims as part of their "cause of action" against the
defendant. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 247 (1933) (describing federal copyright
claim and state unfair competition claims as two grounds in support of the "same cause
of action"); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1909) (holding
that jurisdiction over federal due process claim encompassed related state-law claim
challenging rates as having exceeded state authority); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at
870-71 (describing how pendent-claim jurisdiction developed separately from ancillary
jurisdiction).
'9 SeeJAcKH. FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDUE § 2.12-.14 (1985) (describing
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as judicially created); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 103-06 (5th ed. 1994) (describing the judicial origin of pen-
dent and ancillary jurisdiction doctrines); cf. Freer, supra note 2, at 55 (noting the
.oxymoron [ic]" tradition of regarding supplemental jurisdiction as a "common law"
doctrine of "subject matter jurisdiction" and arguing that such doctrines should be
seen as interpretations of the statutory grant ofjurisdiction over a civil action).
20 On the lack of an adequate statutory foundation, see Freer, supra note 2, at 55.
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trine of supplemental jurisdiction showed some of the messy signs of
case-by-case elaboration, with curious stops and starts along the way.
Although the Court adopted a rather expansive approach to pendent
jurisdiction in the federal-question context of United Mine Workers v.
21Gibbs its more cautious approach in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Krogersought to prevent ancillary jurisdiction from eroding the rule of
complete diversity. 2
The contrast between Gibbs and Kroger provides a useful introduc-
tion to the conceptual underpinnings of supplemental jurisdiction
and to the debate that continues to swirl around the statute. In Gibbs,
the plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging both a secondary-
boycott claim under federal labor law and a state-law claim for inter-
ference with advantageous business relations.23 In the current par-
lance of supplemental jurisdiction, we would refer to the federal-
question claim as "jurisdictionally sufficient," 'jurisdiction confer-
ring," or, in the words of the ALI Draft, "freestanding," to convey the
notion that the claim supports an assertion of original jurisdiction on
its own and without regard to any other claim in the action.24 By way
of contrast, the state-law claim lacked this jurisdictional sufficiency or
freestanding quality in light of the absence of complete diversity be-
tween the plaintiff and defendants. Nonetheless, the Gibbs Court
agreed that the district courts may assert what was then known as pen-
dent-claim jurisdiction over the state-law claim. The Court reasoned
that the state-law claim arose from the "same common nucleus of op-
erative fact" as the freestanding claim and the two claims thus formed
2' 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966) (holding that pendentjurisdiction exists over state-
law claims which constitute part of the same constitutional "case" as one or more fed-
eral-question claims).
22 437 U.S. 365, 373-77 (1978) (citing the complete-diversity rule in refusing to
permit plaintiff tojoin a claim against a nondiverse, impleaded third-party defendant).
2' See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 718-20 (describing the plaintiff's suit and the circumstances
giving rise to it).
24 Courts and commentators have struggled somewhat in their search for the best
shorthand expression to capture the concept of a claim that falls within the district
court's original jurisdiction and might provide ajurisdictional anchor for the assertion
of supplementaljurisdiction. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 372 n.11 (distinguishing between
"federal" and "nonfederal" claims); Palmer v. HospitalAuth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th
Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between "anchor[]" claims and "supplemental" claims); cf.
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 869 (distinguishing the "jurisdiction ... supporting" fed-
eral-question claim in Gibbs from the "jurisdictionally insufficient" state-law claim). I
agree with the ALI drafters that the term "freestanding" captures the idea ofjurisdic-
tional sufficiency as well as any. See ALI DRAFT, supra note 9, at 35-43 (defining and
illustrating the difference between "freestanding" and "supplemental" claims).
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a single constitutional case for purposes of Article 111.. The Court
also noted that a decision to permit the district courts to hear the
claims would serve the interests of litigant convenience and judicial
economy and help to secure the just and speedy resolution of dis-
26putes.
Although similar concerns with litigant fairness and judicial econ-
omy underlay the development of ancillary jurisdiction, the Court's
decision in Kroger revealed a competing concern for the complete-
27diversity rule. In Kroger, the plaintiff brought suit against a single di-
verse defendant, asserting a state-law claim for personal injuries that
satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement.28 (The ALI Draft
would treat such a claim as "freestanding."2) The defendant im-
pleaded a third-party defendant in accordance with Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the new defendant
might bear responsibility for some portion of any award to the plain-
tiff.s0 The plaintiff responded by asserting claims against this new de-
fendant, as Rule 14 further contemplates.3 ' Both supplemental
claims-that by the defendant and that by the plaintiff-satisfied the
"common nucleus" test of Gibbs and a decision to permit jurisdiction
The Gibbs Court acknowledged that the two claims might not satisfy the test of
Hum v. Oursler, 270 U.S. 593 (1926), as two grounds in support of the same "cause of
action" but dismissed the Hum test as "unnecessarily grudging." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
Instead, the Court held that the district courts may assert pendent-claim jurisdiction
over a state-law claim that arises from the same "common nucleus of operative fact" as
the federal-question claims. Id This "common nucleus" test has been quite widely re-
garded as allowing the exercise of jurisdiction over claims that satisfy many of the
transactional tests set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as extending
the scope ofjurisdiction to the boundaries of Article III of the Constitution. Cf. infra
note 45 (describing the contention that Article III permits district courts to hear set-off
claims that do not satisfy the common-nucleus test).
2 See id. at 726 (noting that the justification for pendent jurisdiction "lies in con-
siderations ofjudicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants").
See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374 (noting that under a sufficiently expansive theory of
supplemental jurisdiction, "a plaintiff could defeat the statutory requirement of com-
plete diversity by the simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of di-
verse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants").
28 Id. at 367.
See ALI DRAFr, supra note 9, at 36-37 (noting that its definition of a "freestand-
ing" claim encompasses claims within the original jurisdiction of the district courts on
the basis of both the federal-question and diversityjurisdictional grants).
30 See FED. R. CV. P. 14(a) (providing for the defendant to implead a third-party
defendant on a claim that such defendant "is or may be liable" for some portion of the
plaintiff's claim against the original defendant).
31 See id. (providing that the plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party
defendant arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant).
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over the entire "case" would have served the interests of convenience
and economy. But the Kroger Court refused to go so far, emphasizing
the availability of state court as a convenient, alternative forum. While
the Court expressed a willingness to permit the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over the defendant's ancillary claims against a new party under
Rule 14,32 it refused to extend such jurisdiction to the claims of the
plaintiff against the new party.3 3  The Court worried that plaintiffs
might omit nondiverse defendants from their initial complaint, await
their predictable impleader under Rule 14, and then amend their
complaint to assert the previously omitted claims, a strategy that might
undermine the complete-diversity requirement.s
Although the restrictive approach of Kroger attracted some nega-
tive reviews,35 it was the Court's decision in Finley v. United State36 that
gave rise to the enactment of section 1367. The Finley plaintiff
brought suit against the United States for tort damages (a "freestand-
ing" claim under federal law) and joined state-law claims against non-
diverse defendants who allegedly bore responsibility for the airplane
crash that led to the litigation. Despite the obvious transactional re-
lationship among the claims, the Finley Court refused to permit the as-
sertion of what was then termed pendent-party jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's state-law claims against the nondiverse defendantsss The
32 See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375 n.18 (citing with apparent approval decisions that
authorize the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over claims by defendants against im-
pleaded third-party defendants).
See id at 375-76 (emphasizing that the proposed assertion of ancillary jurisdic-
tion over a claim by a plaintiff who had voluntarily chosen the federal diversity docket
differed significantly from that over a claim by a defendant "haled into court against
his will").
See id. at 377 ("To allow the requirement of complete diversity to be circum-
vented as it was in this case would simply flout the congressional command.").
See Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 459-61 (arguing that Kroger was
wrongly decided); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 880 (arguing that Krogerfailed to de-
fine the "permissible limits of supplementaljurisdiction").
490 U.S. 545 (1989). All of the scholarly andjudicial commentary on the statute
recognizes the decisive role that Finley played in leading Congress to adopt section
1367. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2d, § 3523, at 65 (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter
FEDERAL PRACTICE] (ascribing the origins of section 1367 to the decision in Finley);
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 889 (same). -
37 See Finley, 490 U.S. at 546 (noting that plaintiff sued the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FrCA") and then "moved to amend the federal complaint to
include claims against the original state-court defendants, as to which no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction existed").
See id. at 553, 556 (stating that "[t]he statute here defines jurisdiction in a man-
ner that does not reach defendants other than the United States" and declining to
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Finley Court acknowledged the strength of the arguments of litigant
convenience and judicial economy, arguments made stronger by the
plaintiff's inability as in Kroger to join claims against all the defendants
in a single state court proceeding.39 But the Court nonetheless re-
fused to approve jurisdiction over the pendent parties, citing the ab-
sence of any written statutory authorization for such jurisdiction.4 0 Al-
though the Court distinguished Gibbs and the situation of pendent-
claim jurisdiction,4 ' its emphasis on the absence of a statute appeared
to threaten many established forms of supplemental jurisdiction over
additional parties.42
permit the assertion of pendent-partyjurisdiction).
39 See id. at 555 (acknowledging that its decision would sacrifice the efficiency and
convenience of litigating multiple claims in a single action); cf. id. at 555-56 (refusing
to adopt dicta in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976), which had hinted that the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred in the FTCA over claims against the United States pro-
vided a strong argument for the exercise of pendent-partyjurisdiction).
'0 See id. at 552 (emphasizing that the jurisdictional grant in question spoke of
"civil actions on claims ... against the United States" and did not, by its terms, author-
ize claims against anyone else).
41 See id. at 549-51 (emphasizing the fundamental analytical difference between the
pendent-claim jurisdiction in Gibbs and the joinder of parties not named in any claim
that is independently cognizable); id. at 556 (describing Gibbs as "a departure from
prior practice" that the Court had no intent to "limit or impair").
42 See Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and AndllaiyJurisdiction, 1990 BYU
L. REV. 247, 258-60 (arguing that the rationale of Finley threatened ancillary jurisdic-
tion as well as the pendent-claim jurisdiction recognized in Gibbs); cf. McLaughlin, su-
pra note 1, at 887-89 (noting that Finley threatened Gibbs by characterizing the decision
as a departure from prior practice and summarizing post-Finleyjudicial decisions).
Apart from the threat, Finley also issued an invitation to Congress. By emphasizing
the need forjurisdiction conferred by "written law," Finey, 490 U.S. at 547 (quoting Ex
parteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807)), the Court obviously contemplated the
possibility that Congress might supply the law in question. The Court also supplied a
set of "interpretive rules" to enable Congress to "know the effect of the language it
adopts." Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. The rules appeared earlier in the opinion, in the
course of its rejection of the argument that existing statutory provisions conferred ju-
risdiction in terms flexible enough to support an exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
This argument for flexible interpretation rested upon the recodification of the juris-
dictional statutes in 1948 against the backdrop of decisions that had expanded the
scope ofjurisdiction over civil actions to take account of the growth in the litigation
unit reflected in the Federal Rules. But the Finley Court rejected this flexible ap-
proach, noting that the real growth in pendentjurisdiction came in Gibbs-a decision
that came down well after the 1948 recodification had occurred. See id. at 555 (noting
that the liberalization of pendent-party jurisdiction effected by Gibbs occurred "nearly
20 years later" than the recodification the plaintiff relied on).
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B. The Text and Meaning of Section 1367
Congress responded with section 1367.4 As commonly inter-
preted, the statute confers a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in subsection (a), allowing the district courts to hear nonfederal
claims that bear an appropriately close relationship to the claims over
which the court has originaljurisdiction 4 The statute follows Gibbs in
defining the scope of supplemental jurisdiction and expressly permits
the assertion of jurisdiction over pendent parties, thus supplying the
'3 Section 1367 reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdic-
tion over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve thejoinder or intervention of additional par-
ties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plain-
tiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under
Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such
claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim under subsection (a) if-(l) the claim raises a novel or complex issue
of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in excep-
tional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining juris-
diction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and
for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same
time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled
while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed un-
less State law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the
United States.
4 See, e.g., Lilly, supra note 8, at 184 (describing the statute as opening in subsec-
tion (a) with a "broad conferral of supplemental jurisdiction" and following that grant
with limits in subsection (b) on the scope of such jurisdiction in diversity matters);
Yeazell, supra note 16, at 246 (explaining that the statute "establishes a broad jurisdic-
tional grant in subsection (a) and then retracts much of that grant in subsection (b),
whose restrictions apply to diversity-only cases").
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statutory underpinning that the Finley Court identified as missing.
45
Subsection (b) seeks to preserve certain of the limitations that had de-
veloped on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the diversity
cases. In particular, subsection (b) codifies the rule of Kroger by fore-
closing the assertion of jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 14.16 Subsection (c) codifies the dis-
cretionary factors that the Gibbs Court had directed district courts to
consider in determining whether to assert supplemental jurisdiction.
47
Although section 1367 has generated an enormous body of schol-
arly literature and a raft of conflicting lower court decisions, the
proper reading of its text has become a matter of quite widespread
consensus. Both the statute's detractors and defenders agree that
subsection (a) provides a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction
that applies to both federal-question and diversity proceedings and ex-
tends to the limits of Article III. Both camps agree that the exceptions
to this grant of supplemental jurisdiction appear in subsection (b)
and operate primarily in diversity litigation. But despite widespread
agreement about the interplay between subsections (a) and (b)-what
I call the standard account of section 1367-scholars and courts dis-
agree about the legal effect of the enacted words. Critics charge that
the plain meaning of the statute makes or threatens a series of sweep-
ing changes in the law of supplemental jurisdiction; defenders cite
legislative history that clearly shows a desire on the part of Congress
simply to overrule Finley and codify most of the pre-Finley status quo.
For useful discussions of the relationship between the constitutional limits of
supplemental jurisdiction and the "common nucleus" test of Gibbs, see William A.
Fletcher, 'Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and Defensive Set-Off. Beyond the Gibbs Test,
74 IND. L.J. 171 (1998), which argues in favor of the existence of constitutional power
to adjudicate an unrelated defensive set-off, despite the absence of any common nu-
cleus among the freestanding and supplemental claims. See also McLaughlin, supra
note 1, at 890-95 (explaining the relationship between the constitutional case or con-
troversy requirement and the supplementaljurisdiction statute).
16 On the statute's preservation of the rule of Kroger, see McLaughlin, supra note 1,
at 936-40. Critics of the statute admit that it preserves the rule of Kroger, and focus
their criticism on the decision to do so. See, e.g., Arthur & Freer, The Disaster, supra
note 3, at 975-78 (arguing that Krogerwas wrongly decided and that the statute not only
preserved but extended its wrongheaded features); Freer, supra note 8, at 13-15
(same).
47 As the Supreme Court explained, subsection (c) "codifie[s] [the] principles" of
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity that inform the discretionary regime of
Gibbs. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997).
For doubts about the effectiveness of the codification, see ALI DRAFT, supra note 9, at
78-95 (arguing that the statute may have invited lower federal courts to refrain from
hearing claims, such as "freestanding" and ancillary claims, to which the regime of dis-
cretion should not apply).
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One can best understand this familiar debate over the proper
roles of text and legislative history in statutory interpretation by con-
sidering the impact of section 1367 on the amount-in-controversy rule
of Zahn v. International Paper Co.48 The Zahn Court held that, even
where the claims of the named plaintiffs meet the threshold amount,
diversity jurisdiction does not extend to those unnamed members of a
plaintiff class whose individual claims fail to meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement. The standard account of the statute holds
that the plain meaning of section 1367 alters the outcome in Zahn.
After jurisdiction attaches to the jurisdictionally sufficient claim of a
single, named class representative (a "freestanding" claim), section
1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over the jurisdictionally
insufficient but related claims of the additional class members.
Moreover, since 1367(b) does not specify an exception for claims
joined under Rule 23 (class actions), the broad grant in subsection (a)
controls the outcome.
Although the argument that the text of section 1367 overrules
Zahn first appeared in Professor Freer's critique of the statute,' the
Fifth Circuit has given it the force of law. Its decision in In re Abbott
Laboratories, Inc.5' features the standard textual argument in the heart
of its opinion: "Section 1367(a) grants district courts supplemental
jurisdiction over related claims generally, and § 1367(b) carves excep-
tions. Significantly, class actions are not among the exceptions.
" 2
Having made the textual argument, the Abbott Laboratories court ac-
knowledged that the House had included a statement in the legislative
history to the effect that the section was not intended to overrule
Zahn.53 But the court refused to look behind the text, concluding that
section 1367 authorized the assertion ofjurisdiction rejected in Zahn.i
48 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
' See id. at 301 (holding that the district courts, sitting in diversity, may not assert
jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members who fail to meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement).
o See Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 485-86 (criticizing the statute as a
threat to Zahn and implying that the disclaimer of this interpretation in the legislative
history is an insufficient precaution); ef. Freer, supra note 8, at 18 (opining that "[a] II
observers agree that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, on its face, overrules Zahn7).
5' 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
52 Id at 527.
53 See id at 528 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), repinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 n.17, which, the court states, "cites Zahn as a pre-Finley case
untouched by the Act").
54 See i& at 528-29 (stating that "[w]e are persuaded that under § 1367 a district
court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, although they
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The Fifth Circuit expressly refused to enter into a discussion of the
"wisdom of Zahn"; that was "not our affair."55
With the growing emphasis on textualism, and the accompanying
distrust of legislative history, the widespread acceptance of the stan-
dard account of section 1367 appears likely to threaten a number of
established jurisdictional rules. In Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mechanical, Inc.,s the Seventh Circuit followed the lead of the Fifth in
holding that section 1367 overrules the jurisdictional rule of Clark v.
Paul Gray, Inc.57 The Clark court held that diversity jurisdiction at-
taches only to the claims of plaintiffs, joined under Rule 20, whose in-
dividual claims meet the amount-in-controversy threshold.s The
Stromberg court concluded that section 1367 altered that result by con-
ferring a supplemental jurisdiction on the district courts broad
enough to encompass the related, but jurisdictionally insufficient,
claims of additional plaintiffs.59
Much the same textualism informs the Fourth Circuit's decision
that section 1367 overturns the legal-certainty rule of St. Paul Mercury
Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.60 The St. Paul court held that diversity ju-
risdiction attaches at the threshold to claims that the plaintiff asserts
in the complaint, unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claims
will not satisfy the jurisdictional amount.61 In Shanaghan v. Cahil,62 the
Fourth Circuit read section 1367 as supplanting the St. Paul rule. In
particular, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the summary disposition
of one of three aggregated claims-a disposition that brought the
amount claimed below the jurisdictional amount-brought into play
the discretionary power of the district court to decline jurisdiction
over the remaining claims.6 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. .
" I& at 529.
'6 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
57 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that section 1367 overrules Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583
(1939)).
See Clark, 306 U.S. at 589 (holding that a claim asserted in a diversity case must
separately meet the amount-in-controversy requirement).
'9 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., 77 F.3d at 931.
303 U.S. 283 (1938).
61 See id. at 288.
62 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).
0 See id. at 112 (holding that "[i]fsome event subsequent to the complaint reduces
the amount in controversy, such as the dismissal of one count... , the court must then
decide in its discretion whether to retain jurisdiction over the remainder of the case").
See also Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that when
dismissal of claims reduces the amount in controversy below the statutory minimum,
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this discretionary regime departed from the old rule, which had
treated the amounts claimed in the complaint as controlling and ig-
nored actual awards in determining whether the plaintiff satisfied the
jurisdictional amount requirement. Nonetheless, the court concluded
that section 1367 had effected a change in the law by making the dis-
cretionary regime of subsection (c) applicable to such aggregated
claims.64
Scholars have identified a good many other settled jurisdictional
rules that the statute, read in keeping with the standard account,
might alter. Without elaborating all of the potentially affected areas,
it seems plain that section 1367 might alter the complete-diversity rule
of Strawbridge v. Curtis and could modify in important respects the
manner in which supplemental jurisdiction operates in removed
cases.6 The Court itself has already interpreted section 1367 as con-
ferringjurisdiction on the district courts to hear pendent claims in the
nature of cross-system petitions for appellate review of state adminis-
trative proceedings, a decision driven by the kind of textualism that
informs the standard account.67 As a result of these and other possible
changes, scholars who initially defended the statute against charges of
ambiguity have now reluctantly concluded that some re-drafting may
be necessary.
"the district court has discretion to entertain the remaining claim if it so chooses," pur-
suant to section 1367(c)'s discretionary dismissal provision). But see Wolde-Meskel v.
Vocational Instruction Project Community Serv., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that "[w]hen state law claims are aggregated, regardless of the amounts at
issue, all of them together are 'original,' and none of the constituent claims are 'sup-
plemental,'" making section 1367(c)'s discretionary-dismissal regime inapplicable).
6See Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 111 (holding that "the strict St. Paul rule is inconsistent
with the statutory framework of § 1367 and so must be modified to fit the contempo-
rary congressional view of federaljurisdiction").
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). The complete-diversity rule of Strawbridgev. Cur-
tiss holds that citizens of the same state may not appear on opposing sides of a diversity
proceeding. See id. The failure of section 1367(b) to include thejoinder of additional
plaintiffs under Rule 20 could support a textual argument that the statute overrules
Strawbridge See, e.g., Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 961 n.91 ("We can only hope
that the federal courts will plug that potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity
requirement. ... ").
For a summary of the questions that scholars have raised about the application
of section 1367 to actions removed to federal court, see infra notes 151-56 and accom-
panying text.
67 See City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 168-69
(1997) (holding that a pendent claim seeking appellate review of a local administrative
decision may fall within section 1367's grant of supplementaljurisdiction).
"See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 8, at 53-54 (suggesting that the time has come to shift
the focus of the debate regarding section 1367 from the problems with the current
statute to the best way to redraft it). But cf id. at 57-58 (worrying cogently that highly
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C. The Proposal of the American Law Institute
The movement for reform received a boost from the decision of
the American Law Institute to approve a new and more detailed draft
of section 1367 (the "ALI Draft") for possible enactment into law by
Congress. According to the project's Reporter, John B. Oakley, the
ALI Draft of section 1367 proposes to reconceptualize the interplay
between original and supplemental jurisdiction.6 Based upon the in-
sight that the rules now governing thejoinder of claims and parties in
diversity jurisdiction are themselves rules of supplemental jurisdic-
tion,7 the ALI Draft proposes a more general approach that distin-
guishes between "freestanding" and "supplemental" claims.7' Then,
with admirable rigor and attention to detail, the ALI Draft specifies a
set of rules to govern the exercise of supplementaljurisdiction. In the
course of the work, the ALI Draft revises and extends the criticisms
that others have made of the current version of section 1367.
Although they defy easy summary, the 165 pages that comprise the
ALI Draft and its accompanying commentary, memoranda, and ap-
pendices reveal much the same commitment to a rigorous textualism
that has characterized the Abbott Laboratories and Stromberg decisions.7
literal textualism may undermine the creation of a sound, practical relationship be-
tween the federal courts and Congress).
69 As the ALI Draft acknowledges, reconceptualization comes at a price. In a can-
did and, to my mind, accurate description of the likely reaction of many judges and
practicing lawyers, the draft admits that readers who try to take in the complexity of
the statute may feel some "indigestion." ALI DRAFT, supra note 9, at xvii.
70 See id. (concluding that the rule of complete diversity is not in tension with the
concept of supplemental jurisdiction but is a rule of supplemental jurisdiction that re-
stricts its operation in diversity cases).
7 According to the Draft, "freestanding" claims are those that come "within the
original jurisdiction of the district courts without reliance upon supplemental jurisdic-
tion." Id. "Supplemental" claims are not freestanding but they bear a relationship to
them such that, together, they form a single case or controversy within the meaning of
Gibbs. See id- at 35-39 (setting forth the text of a proposed replacement for section
1367(a) which distinguishes in a definitional section between freestanding and sup-
plemental claims). By breaking down the jurisdictional analysis into what it calls claim-
specific terms and by treating both federal-question claims and diversity claims as po-
tentially "freestanding," the ALI Draft makes clear that it intends to extendjurisdiction
on a conceptually similar basis to supplemental claims in both federal-question and
diverse-party proceedings. See id. at 31-37 (laying out the basis for a reconceptualiza-
tion of supplementaljurisdiction).
7 To see that the ALI Draft proceeds upon the same interpretative assumption as
the Abbott Laboratories and Stromberg courts, consider its discussion of proposed section
1367(c), which performs the same function as current section 1367(b) in reining in
the grant of supplemental jurisdiction in an earlier section. See id. at 58-59. In the
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The draft itself acknowledges as much, in the course of questioning
the legitimacy of "the sort of pragmatic discretion rather than express
legislative command that long colored the whole realm of diversity ju-
risdiction."7 Viewing the days of such pragmatic discretion as num-
bered, the ALI Draft notes that "[t]he legitimacy of this pragmatic dis-
cretion was questioned in [Finley], and the enactment the following
year of present § 1367 substituted a new regime of close attention to
the literal text and plain meaning of the statutory conferral of sup-
plemental jurisdiction."74  The ALI Draft carries this new regime of
close attention to literal text to its logical conclusion, specifying in
some detail the way in which its rules of supplemental jurisdiction play
out in a variety of different contexts. One can quibble with certain of
the choices in the ALI Draft, and an enacting Congress might well
tinker with its provisions. Ultimately, though, a decision to adopt
something like the ALI Draft would move the law of federal jurisdic-
tion decisively away from a reliance upon pragmatic discretion and
decisively into the realm of textual literalism.
Perhaps the combination of Finley and section 1367 leaves us with
no alternative to an increasingly detailed jurisdictional code. But be-
fore we endorse the textual literalism of the ALI Draft, this Article
proposes that we explore a more sympathetic approach to the inter-
pretation of current section 1367. Such an approach may make it
possible to retain the statutory underpinning of supplemental jurisdic-
tion and to preserve some portion of the pragmatic discretion that
had informed the evolution of the rules of diversity before the codifi-
cation. It certainly avoids the textualist overkill of such cases as Abbott
Laboratories and Stromberg.
IL. TOWARD A MORE SYMPATHETIC READING OF SECTION 1367
Carefully read, section 1367 reveals no clearly expressed intention
to alter the laws of diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, quite the contrary.
Section 1367(a) appears to assume that the existing rules of complete
diversity will continue to apply and that the grant of supplementalju-
course of its analysis, the ALI Draft describes current section 1367(a) as "imperfectly
articulated in claim-specific terms"-terms that would have "revolutionary" conse-
quences but for the restrictions in section 1367(b). Id. at 58. Here, then, we see the
same interpretation of section 1367(a) that characterizes the standard account of the
statute-a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity-party cases followed by
a restriction on the grant. See supra note 16.
73 AL DRAFr, supra note 9, at 65.
74 1.
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risdiction will come into play only after the plaintiff has submitted
claims that properly invoke such original jurisdiction. Consider again
the language of the first sentence of subsection (a):
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) . .. in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy.75
Literally read, this language provides for the assertion of supple-
mental jurisdiction only as to claims that bear a transactional relation-
ship to the "claims" asserted in a "civil action" of which the district
courts have "original jurisdiction." The statute thus appears to distin-
guish between joinder and aggregation issues that inform the exis-
tence of original jurisdiction and those that operate as part of the dis-
trict courts' supplemental jurisdiction.
In this textual distinction lies the key to the sympathetic reading
of section 1367. Before Finley, the Court had developed doctrines of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that operated quite differently in
federal-question and diversity proceedings. In federal-question cases,
original jurisdiction attached to any well-pleaded complaint that as-
serted a substantial federal claim; pendent jurisdiction came quickly
into play to govern the plaintiff's initial joinder of additional claims
along the lines the Court developed for pendent claims in Gibbs (but
rejected for pendent parties in Finley). In the pre-Finley world of di-
versity, by contrast, the rules of original jurisdiction (rather than of
supplemental jurisdiction) governed a broad range of initial joinder
and aggregation questions.76 Only after original jurisdiction attached
in accordance with these fairly elaborate rules of complete diversity
did the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction come into play. One can
thus read section 1367(a) as having incorporated the rules of com-
plete diversity into the statute's requirement that the district courts
first obtain original jurisdiction of the cause. Sympathetically read,
the statute would overrule Finley in federal-question, cases but would
still enable the federal courts to retain the pre-Finley rules of diversity
jurisdiction, in keeping with the views outlined in the House Report
that accompanied the statute.77
7 See supra note 43 (providing the text of section 1367).
76 For a summary of the rules that govern the determination of diversity of citizen-
ship and amount in controversy, see infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
7 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 27-29 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (ex-
plaining the need for and effects of the codification of supplementaljurisdiction). For
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This Part of the Article presents the argument for a sympathetic
reading of section 1367. It begins with a review of the rules of pen-
dent and ancillary jurisdiction that developed before Finley, emphasiz-
ing the differing operation of those rules in federal-question and di-
versity proceedings. Next, this Part considers both textual and
structural evidence that section 1367 preserves and incorporates these
pre-Finley differences. Finally, this Part tests the sympathetic reading
in light of predictable arguments against its adoption and concludes
that the sympathetic reading outperforms the standard account of the
statute.
A. Pre-Finley Distinctions in the Operation of SupplementalJurisdiction
Despite conceptual similarities, the pre-Finley doctrines of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction remained quite distinct in the work of the
Supreme Court.7 In addition to its preservation of the nominal dis-
tinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, the Court flatly
refused to apply pendentjurisdictional concepts to cases in diversity. 9
Instead, the Court continued to apply rules of law that it had devel-
oped in the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332's ("section 1332") pro-
vision for the exercise of diverse-party jurisdiction.80 As a practical
the HOUSE RElORT's discussion of the preservation of diversity, see infra notes 104,
112.
78 See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing the Supreme Court's develop-
ment of the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in a series of decisions
running well back into the nineteenth century); see alsoPAUL M. BATOR ETAL, HART&
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 1685 n.1 (3d ed. 1988)
(noting the distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction: pendentjurisdic-
tion applies to efforts by plaintiff "(as in Gibbs) tojoin with a federal claim a nonfederal
claim over which the court has no independent basis ofjurisdiction" while ancillary
jurisdiction applies "with respect to claims asserted after the filing of the original com-
plaint").
It was broadly recognized that the pre-nley federal-question doctrine of pen-
dentjurisdiction did not apply to cases based on diversity of citizenship. SeeWRIGHT,
supra note 19, at 158 (noting that most pre-Finly courts "recognized that whatever the
merits, or lack thereof, of th[e] concept [of pendent jurisdiction] to bring in addi-
tional parties in cases in which there is a federal question or to overcome problems of
amount in controversy, it was not properly used to avoid the longstanding requirement
of complete diversity"); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 869 (noting that in pre-iniey
pendent-claimjurisdiction the freestanding claim was a "federal law claim"and distin-
guishing ancillary jurisdiction as applicable to both federal-question and diversity ju-
risdiction).
8See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-98 (1973). The Zahn
Court concluded that its interpretation of the term "matter in controversy" in the di-
versity statute required each member of the class to set up a claim that met the
amount-in-controversy requirement and so refused to apply the doctrine of supple-
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matter, the refusal to import pendentjurisdiction concepts into diver-
sity litigation meant that issues of transactional relationship and litiga-
tion convenience-the coin of the realm for supplemental jurisdic-
tion-had far less to do with the scope of the claims a plaintiff might
permissibly join in a diverse-party proceeding than the established
rules of aggregation and complete diversity that the Court had worked
out long before Gibbs came down in 1966.
Consider first the well-established complete-diversity requirement
of Strawbridge v. Curtiss.s1 Chief Justice Marshall's cryptic opinion in
Strawbridge has come to stand for the proposition that citizens of the
same state may not appear on opposing sides of an action within the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal trial courts. 2 Although it applies
chiefly to section 1332 and does not control the scope of Congress's
power under the diversity grant in Article 111,s the complete-diversity
rule operated to preclude the assertion of many forms of pendent-
party jurisdiction in the diversity context. Thus, a citizen of Illinois
may sue a citizen of Texas and properly invoke diversity of citizenship
as the basis ofjurisdiction. But the Illinois citizen may notjoin an ad-
ditional plaintiff from Texas, or an additional defendant from Illinois,
even if the claims by and against these additional parties would satisfy
the transactional tests of Rule 20 and Gibbs.8 In a complete-diversity
inquiry, then, pendent-party jurisdiction would have no application.
The rules of aggregation similarly confirm the inapplicability of
pendent jurisdiction to claims in diversity. Consider first the aggrega-
tion rule that permits a plaintiff to join a series of claims against a di-
verse defendant to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Quite in contrast
to the rules of pendentjurisdiction in Gibbs, the aggregation rules do
not require any transactional relationship among the aggregated
claims.85 Nor do they require that any one of the aggregated claims
satisfy the jurisdictional threshold on its own; the law requires only
mental (ancillary) jurisdiction to permit the joinder of related, but below-threshold,
claims by class members. Id. at 294-98.
81 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
82 See id. (holding that jurisdiction based on diversity requires "complete diver-
sity"); see alsoWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 156 (illustrating the complete-diversity rule).
83 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Gas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (hold-
ing that the complete-diversity rule does not apply to actions brought under the
authority of the interpleader statute, 28 U.S.G. § 1335, and upholding the constitu-
tionality of the minimal diversity approach of the interpleader statute).
84 See WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 156 (illustrating the operation of the complete-
diversity rule in similar terms).
See id. at 210 (noting the absence of any requirement that claims aggregated to
meet the amount-in-controversy threshold satisfy a test of transactional relationship).
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that the total value of all of the claims meets or exceeds the statutory
minimum. 6 Transactional relationship was equally irrelevant to the
rules of aggregation that governed the joinder of additional parties.
In Snyder v. Harris, the Court ruled that plaintiffs in a class action un-
der Rule 23 may not aggregate the value of their several transaction-
ally related claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.87
The Court expressly based its decision on the statutory reference in
section 1332 to the "matter in controversy" and held that each plain-
tiff's claim must meet the minimum amount-e Similarly, as noted
above, the decisions in Clark and Zahn preclude the assertion ofjuris-
diction over the jurisdictionally insufficient claims of co-plaintiffs,
joined under Rules 20 and 23 respectively, even where one of the
plaintiffs asserts a claim that meets the jurisdictional threshold.8 Like
Snyder, Zahn refused to adopt a test of ancillarity, 0 choosing instead to
rely upon the established jurisdictional rules of diversity to determine
the propriety of hearing the claims of the additional plaintiffs. 9'
In Finley itself, the Court noted this essential distinction between
the operation of supplemental jurisdiction in federal-question and di-
versity proceedings. Although the Finley Court was willing to assume
that the plaintiff's claims satisfied the constitutional "common nu-
cleus" test for the assertion of pendentjurisdiction identified in Gibbs,
it emphasized that the Gibbs test did not always control supplemental
jurisdictional issues in different jurisdictional contexts. Pointing to
Zahn as an example, the Finley Court noted that a transactional rela-
See id. (explaining that unrelated claims, none of which meet the amount-in-
controversy threshold, may be aggregated as long as the total value of the claims satis-
fies the threshold amount).
87 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
See id. at 336-39 (stating that "Congress has... consistently amended the
amount-in-controversy section and re-enacted the 'matter in controversy' language
without change of its jurisdictional effect against a background ofjudicial interpreta-
tion" which did not permit aggregation of "separate and distinct claims").
89 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-98 (1973) (refusing to
permit exercise ofjurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members, joined un-
der Rule 23, that did not meet the jurisdictional threshold); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,
306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (refusing to permit exercise ofjurisdiction overjurisdiction-
ally insufficient claims of additional plaintiffsjoined under Rule 20).
'0 See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 299 (noting that the doctrine of aggregation rests not upon
the transaction-basedjoinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but on "this
Court's interpretation of the statutory phrase 'matter in controversy'"); Snyder, 394 U.S.
at 336-37 (explaining that the doctrine of aggregation rests upon the Court's interpre-
tation of the phrase "matter-in controversy" as precluding aggregation).
9' See WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 214 (describing Zahn as the "death blow" to the
lower court trend toward the application of the ancillarity principle to the determina-
tion of aggregation questions).
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tionship among claims did not alone suffice to establish the existence
of jurisdiction over new parties. As the Finley Court noted in its ac-
count of Zahn, "we based this holding upon 'the statutes defining the
jurisdiction of the District Court,' ... and did not so much as mention
Gibbs."
B. Rereading Section 1367 in Light of Pre-Finley Law
The Court's continued emphasis on the applicability of the rules
of diversity in cases like Snyder, Clark, and Zahn may explain why sec-
tion 1367(a) draws a sharp distinction between "original jurisdiction"
and "supplemental jurisdiction." In federal-question cases such as
Gibbs and its progeny, original jurisdiction attached to a federal-law
claim in the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint; joinder of additional
nonfederal claims triggered the application of the rules of supple-
mental (pendent) jurisdiction. But in diverse-party litigation, section
1332 and its collection of complete diversity and aggregation rules
controlled the plaintiffs ability to join additional claims and parties.
9 3
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 550 (1989).
93 Under the rules that govern the timing ofjurisdictional determinations in diver-
sity, the federal court bases its determination as to the citizenship of the parties on the
facts in the original complaint and does so as of the date of the filing of the action. See
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K.N. Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (discussing "the
well-established rule that diversity of citizenship is assessed at the time the action is
filed"). Butjurisdiction does not attach at the outset for all time. If the plaintiff sub-
sequently proposes to amend the complaint to join a nondiverse party, the district
court must either reject the amendment or dismiss (or remand) the action. See, e.g.,
Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (5th Cir. 1987) (specifying test for
scrutiny of post-removal motion by plaintiff to add nondiverse defendant). Similarly,
the district court must dismiss the action if a nondiverse party proposed for joinder
meets the test of indispensability. See Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570, 579 (1873) (stat-
ing that where nondiverse parties are not indispensable, dismissing such parties is
preferable to joining them and then dismissing the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction). The district court, moreover, must align the parties in accordance with
their real interest in the action and must dismiss the action if, as realigned, the parties
do not satisfy the diversity requirement. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314
U.S. 63, 69, 74-75 (1941) (explaining that"[d]iversityjurisdiction cannot be conferred
upon the federal courts by the parties' own determination of who are plaintiffs and
who are defendants"). Finally, although the district and appellate courts can dismiss
any non-indispensable parties whose presence would otherwise defeat diversity (juris-
dictional "spoilers"), the remaining parties must satisfy the requirements of diversity.
See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989) (holding that
"courts of appeal have the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party," but
noting that, at the appellate level, such authority should be "exercised sparingly."). See
generally WRIGHT, supra note 19, §§ 28-30, at 171-80 (explaining when parties' diversity
is determined, which parties are considered in that determination, and a court's ability
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District courts sitting in diversity in the pre-Finley era would have had
no occasion to consider supplemental jurisdictional issues until after
the plaintiff had filed a complaint with claims and parties aligned in
ways that satisfied the settled rules of original jurisdiction in section
1332.9 Section 1367(a), with its requirement that "original jurisdic-
tion" first attach to the "claims" in a civil action before the court may
invoke supplemental jurisdiction, thus incorporates the pre-Finley law
distinguishing original from supplementaljurisdiction in diversity. 95
The same statutory distinction between original and supplemental
jurisdiction applies to federal-question litigation but carries less sig-
nificance in that context. As we have seen, a plaintiff with a substan-
tial federal-law claim under Gibbs was free to invoke the district court's
original jurisdiction over that claim and its supplemental jurisdiction
over a related nonfederal claim in the same well-pleaded complaint.
Original jurisdiction concepts still control and still operate distinctly
from supplemental jurisdiction concepts, but the original jurisdiction
inquiry remains quite discrete and focuses entirely upon the existence
of a substantial federal-law claim.9 To be sure, the Finley Court re-
fused to extend the concept of supplemental jurisdiction to encom-
pass a pendent claim against a new party, finding a lack of statutory
authority in the provision that conferred original jurisdiction on the
district courts in claims against the United States. But Congress re-
to realign parties).
That supplemental jurisdiction operated differently in federal-question and di-
versity matters was a commonplace of the pre-Finley scholarship. See, e.g., Freer, supra
note 2, at 62-63 (describing the limits that complete diversity imposes on the plaintiff's
joinder of additional parties; noting the absence of any similar restriction in federal-
question matters; and concluding that courts would have no occasion to reach a pen-
dent-party jurisdiction issue in diversity since the requirements of original jurisdiction
would not have been met).
9- Cf. Peterson v. BASF Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 964, 970-71 (D. Minn. 1998) (invok-
ing legislative history to reject claim that section 1367 overrules Zahn and suggesting
that section 1367(a) may incorporate some complete-diversity limits from prior law). I
am indebted to Professor Steinman, who read an early draft of this Article, for bring-
ing the Peterson decision and its reference to the possible incorporation of diversity lim-
its in section 1367(a) to my attention.
Professor Freer made precisely this point, writing some years before the Finley
decision and the adoption of section 1367. Professor Freer first noted that pendent-
party concepts had no application to diversity litigation, in light of the complete-
diversity rule. He then distinguished federal-question proceedings, noting that "where
originaljurisdiction is based on the general federal-question statute, the pendent-party
case will present a supplementaljurisdiction problem .... " Freer, supra note 2, at 63.
In suggesting that section 1367(a) differentiates between diversity and federal-question
proceedings, in short, the argument in the text simply urges that the statute carried
forward distinctions that the prior law of original and supplemental jurisdiction had
recognized.
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sponded to that restrictive conception of supplemental jurisdiction by
expressly declaring in section 1367(a) that "[s]uch supplemental ju-
risdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention
of additional parties. "97 Congress cured the Finley problem, in short,
by redefining supplemental jurisdiction to include additional parties
and left the rules of original jurisdiction alone.98
This sympathetic reading of section 1367(a) in light of prior law
has a series of important implications for the interpretation of sup-
plemental jurisdiction under the new statute. Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the sympathetic reading preserves the rules of complete diver-
sity and aggregation that the Court had developed in the course of
construing section 1332. As a gloss on the provisions of section 1332,
these rules were understood to govern the plaintiffs joinder of claims
and parties in diversity litigation brought within the original jurisdic-
tion of the district courts. Section 1367(a) appears to incorporate all
of these rules ofjoinder and aggregation by referring to civil actions
"of which the district courts have original jurisdiction."" The lan-
guage of the statute suggests a neat, if not entirely logical or concep-
tually consistent, °° distinction between the rules of original jurisdic-
tion in diversity that were to govern the plaintiffs joinder and
aggregation of claims and parties and the rules of ancillary jurisdic-
tion that were to control the defendant's joinder of claims and parties
in subsequent pleadings.
In preserving a broader array of rules to govern original jurisdic-
tion over additional claims and parties in diversity than in federal-
question proceedings, section 1367(a) leaves in place a distinction be-
tween pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that had grown up in prior
cases. As we have seen, the pre-Finley decisions steadfastly refused to
apply pendent jurisdiction concepts to diversity matters. Rather, the
established body of law governing complete-diversity and aggregation
continued to govern the plaintiffs initial assertion of claims. The ref-
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). Commentators agree that the statute accomplished
the goal of overturning Finley by including this explicit provision for the exercise of
pendent-party jurisdiction. See, e.g., Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 473 (ap-
proving of the implicit overruling of Finley).
On this account, then, the statute directly overrules Finley by including addi-
tional parties within the ambit of supplemental jurisdiction that the plaintiff may in-
voke, as in Gibbs, at the initial pleading stage.
'9 See supra note 43 (setting forth the text of section 1367).
1W For a criticism of this absence of conceptual consistency, see ALI DRAFr, supra
note 9, at xvi, 58 (describing current section 1367 as "imperfectly articulated in claim-
specific terms").
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erence in section 1367(a) to the necessity of first securing "original
jurisdiction" makes it clear that these joinder and aggregation rules
would continue to control in diversity litigation. The provision for the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims related to those
"within such original jurisdiction" can only sensibly refer, at least in
the diversity context, to the established doctrine of ancillary jurisdic-
tion, which traditionally applied to the claims and parties joined in
subsequent pleadings filed by defendants and intervening pares.1 01
This sympathetic reading of section 1367(a) fits well with the lan-
guage and structure of subsequent provisions of section 1367.102 Con-
sider first the provisions of section 1367(b), which specify a variety of
situations in which the district courts, sitting in diversity, may not ex-
ercise the supplemental jurisdiction that has been conferred upon
them in subsection (a). The statute bars such jurisdiction "over claims
by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24"
of the Federal Rules and over "claims by persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19" when exercising such jurisdiction
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332.203 The statute reflects a concern with the preservation of the
rules of diversity and a desire to preclude the grants of supplemental
(ancillary) jurisdiction from eroding those rules.
More than merely confirming a general spirit of cautious restate-
ment, subsection (b) offers strong structural support for a sympathetic
interpretation of the scope of subsection (a)'s grant of supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity. The exceptions specified in subsection (b)
operate as a bar to the assertion of jurisdiction over claims that plain-
10 See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 874 (noting that ancillaryjurisdiction applies to
claims "asserted in an ongoing federal lawsuit after the filing of the original com-
plaint"); FRIEDENTHAL ETAL, supra note 19, §§ 2.12, 2.14 at 65-67, 76-81 (same).
'02 It bears noting that the distinctive operation of supplemental jurisdiction in
federal-question and diversity matters parallels a well-known distinction in these two
familiar sources ofjudicial power. As ChiefJustice John Marshall noted, Article III of
the Constitution distinguishes between federal-question "cases" (jurisdiction "depends
on the character of the cause," and not on the identity of the parties) and party-based
"controversies" ("jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties"). Co-
hens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1816). See generally James E. Pfander,
Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555,
604-17 (1994) (discussing the distinction and its implications for the interpretation of
Article III). Even though this constitutional distinction has no immediate relevance to
the proper interpretation of the statute, it may help to explain why the doctrine of
pendent parties met resistance in the diversity context. Cf Freer, supra note 2, at 62-63
(noting the difference between the subject-matter focus of federal-question jurisdic-
tion and the party-based focus of diversity jurisdiction).
103 See supra note 43 (setting forth section 1367).
1999]
136 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:109
tiffs would propose to bring, not in the first instance, but in response
to other claims that have been inserted into the proceeding by other
parties. Subsection (b)'s exception for claims by plaintiffs against per-
sons made parties under Rule 14 offers a definitive illustration. All
commentators agree that the reference to Rule 14 codifies the Su-
preme Court rule in Kroger,TM a case in which the Court refused to
permit the district court to assert ancillary jurisdiction over the plain-
tiff's claim against a nondiverse party joined by the defendant under
Rule 14.105 The Kroger Court laid special emphasis on the fact that the
ordinary rules of diversity jurisdiction would bar the plaintiff from as-
serting claims against the nondiverse defendant in the first instance.16
Unwilling to permit an end-run around this rule of complete diversity,
the Kroger Court adopted a narrow interpretation of ancillary jurisdic-
tion. Although the Court seemingly agreed to permit the assertion of
ancillary jurisdiction over the impleader claims of defendants under
Rule 14, and in other settings,0 7 the Court refused to countenance the
expansion of ancillary jurisdiction to encompass a Rule 14 claim by
the plaintiff against the newly impleaded defendant.
Notice how closely the underlying structure of section 1367 fol-
lows the rationale of Kroger. Subsection (a), sympathetically read, pre-
serves the rules of complete diversity and confers supplemental (ancil-
lary) jurisdiction over new claims and parties joined in pleadings
subsequent to the plaintiff's initial complaint. But subsection (b), like
Kroger, creates a restriction on the scope of such ancillary jurisdiction
to preserve the essential features of the complete diversity require-
ment. In other words, the ancillary focus of the exceptions in subsec-
tion (b) tends to confirm that the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in subsection (a) operates in effect as a grant of ancillary jurisdic-
tion."8 Because Congress had preserved the rules of complete diver-
1'4 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 935-38 (describing the manner in which
section 1367(b) codifies and extends the rule of Kroger).
105 See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (holding
that the "policy of [section 1332] calls for its strict construction" and that "[t]o allow
the requirement of complete diversity to be circumvented as it was in this case would
simply flout the congressional command" (citations omitted)).
' Id. at 373-74 (citing Strawbidge and Zahn).
107 Id at 375 n.18 (citing with apparent approval lower court decisions that had as-
serted ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, impleader
claims, and claims by intervenors as of right).
'05 The remaining exceptions in section 1367(b) also focus on the containment of
ancillary jurisdiction. In foreclosing jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against per-
sons joined under Rules 19 and 24, subsection (b) seeks to preserve the rule that ancil-
lary jurisdiction does not extend to necessary parties (Rule 19) and to produce the
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sity and aggregation in subsection (a), it was simply unnecessary for
Congress to establish exceptions in subsection (b) other than those
necessary to rein in the scope of ancillary jurisdiction and to preserve
the result in Kroger.
C. Testing the Sympathetic Reading
1. The Grant of SupplementalJurisdiction
Notwithstanding the tight fit between the sympathetic reading and
the language, structure, and legislative history of the statute,1' 9 one
can imagine plausible, if ultimately unconvincing, arguments against
the interpretation. Consider first the argument that, by using the
term "supplemental jurisdiction" in section 1367(a), Congress must
have intended to bring the doctrines of pendent and ancillary juris-
diction into congruence rather than to preserve their differences un-
der a new label. On this account, the plenary grant of supplemental
jurisdiction in section 1367(a) operates identically in both federal-
question and diversity cases and extends to the boundaries of a consti-
same result with respect to those who intervene as defendants (Rule 24). See generally
Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 955-59 (discussing the statute's resolution of the
necessary-party/intervention anomaly). Original diversityjurisdiction did not attach to
such claims under pre-Finley decisional law; rather, such claims were analyzed under
the rules of ancillarity. See, e.g., 7 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1610, at 150-54 (2d ed. 1986) (treating, in pre-1iney discussion, the
Rule 19/24 anomaly as a question of ancillaryjurisdiction). For an ancillary interpre-
tation of the reference to Rule 20, see infra notes 113-19.
"9 If the language and structure of the statute reveal a desire on the part of Con-
gress to maintain the rules of diversity and to authorize ancillaryjurisdiction only inso-
far as that jurisdiction poses no threat to those rules, then the legislative history pro-
vides additional confirmation. The House Judiciary Committee Report explains that
the statute responds to Finley by providing statutory authority to hear supplemental
claims, including claims involving the joinder of additional parties. But the Report
also suggests quite clearly that its codification of the rules of supplementaljurisdiction
will preserve an existing distinction between federal-question and diversity litigation:
In federal-question cases, it broadly authorizes the district courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims, including claims involving
thejoinder of additional parties. In diversity cases, the district courts may ex-
ercise supplemental jurisdiction, except when doing so would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of the diversity statute.
HousE REPORT, supra note 77, at 28. The Report thus confirms that the statute leaves
in place the rules governing the assertion of original jurisdiction in diversity proceed-
ings, including the rules ofjoinder and aggregation that govern original jurisdiction of
the plaintiff's initial complaint. The same conclusion emerges from the Report's fur-
ther statement that the "section is not intended to affect the jurisdictional require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were
interpreted prior to Finley." Id. at 29.
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tutional "case" under Article III.1'0 Something like this argument, or
this unspoken assumption, informs virtually every published account
of section 1367 and deserves to be taken seriously."' Indeed, many
observers who have otherwise found much to criticize in the statute
have applauded Congress's decision to end the pendent/ancillary dis-
tinction through adoption of the supplemental label.'
I share the view that we should strive for doctrinal coherence in
the application of supplemental jurisdiction concepts, but I do not be-
lieve that such a goal requires that we view the use of the term sup-
plemental jurisdiction as reflecting a congressional decision to import
pendent jurisdictional concepts into diversity litigation. On my ac-
count of the statute, supplemental jurisdiction can operate just as it
did in the pre-Finley era. In federal-question litigation, the rules of
original jurisdiction require only a substantial federal-law claim for
supplemental (pendent) jurisdiction to support the adjudication of
the plaintiffs additional, nonfederal claims. In diversity litigation, by
contrast, the rules of original jurisdiction governjoinder and aggrega-
tion issues in the plaintiff s complaint and supplemental (ancillary)
jurisdiction applies to the subsequent joinder of claims and parties.
In conceptual terms, supplemental jurisdiction operates in the same
way in both settings, coming into play only after the demands of
original jurisdiction have been satisfied and applying to claims that
satisfy the transactional relationship test of Article III. On this ac-
count, the same test of transactional relationship might well apply in
both the federal-question and diversity contexts, thus achieving a
measure of doctrinal coherence. At the same time, section 1367(a)'s
preservation of the rules of original jurisdiction would, at least in di-
versity proceedings, defer the application of this supplemental juris-
dictional analysis until after the complaint passed muster. It may well
prove useful to continue to talk of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
to keep these distinctions straight, as many scholars have done in writ-
ing about the operation of the statute.13 Still, the crucial statutory dis-
See suprq note 43 (setting forth the text of section 1367).
See supra note 16 (citing articles which view subsection (a) as a broad grant of
supplemental jurisdiction).
112 See, e.g., Freer, Life AfterFinley, supra note 3, at 473 (noting that the use of the
term "supplemental jurisdiction" reflects a "clear trend" in case law and academic lit-
erature); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 860 (referring to the abolition of the pendent
and ancillary labels as "beneficial").
113 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 925 (noting that the statute can be under-
stood by referring to the former doctrines of pendent-claim, pendent-party and ancil-
laryjurisdiction).
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tinction lies in its incorporation of the rules of original jurisdiction,
which govern a much broader array ofjoinder and aggregation issues
in diversity than in federal-question litigation. Once jurisdiction at-
taches, the statutory grant of supplementajurisdiction may operate in
much the same way in a variety of settings. What we used to think of
as ancillary jurisdiction, for example, would continue to be available
in both federal-question and diversity litigation.'
14
One can, in short, read Congress's decision to provide for the ex-
ercise of "supplemental jurisdiction" as something other than a direc-
tive to achieve precisely the same outcomes in both federal-question
and diversity litigation. Congress did not express any desire to change
the manner in which the doctrine operates in discrete cases (aside
from its provision for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
additional parties). After all, the statute did not coin the term "sup-
plemental jurisdiction"; scholars had previously used the term to refer
to both pendent and ancillaryjurisdiction.us The statute's use of the
phrase, therefore, conveys no desire to change the established opera-
tion of the underlying doctrine. Indeed, the Finley decision itself in-
voked a canon of construction under which a codification of existing
jurisdictional practices would presumptively carry forward past inter-
pretations unless that statute contains some clear expression of con-
gressional intent to depart from the settled rule.Y6 One can scarcely
discover an intent to change the law in Congress's decision to use the
supplemental label standing alone, particularly in view of its drafters'
avowed desire to avoid controversy. If one were inclined to consider
it, moreover, the legislative history expressly disclaims any intention to
make broad changes in the law.
17
"1 See id. at 874 (noting that, unlike pendentjurisdiction, ancillary jurisdiction ap-
plied whether the original jurisdiction claim was founded on a federal question, diver-
sity of citizenship, or some other basis).
's See supra note 2 (citing earlier use of the term "supplementaljurisdiction").
116 See supra note 42 (discussing Finley).
1 The clearest evidence in the legislative history appears in the House Judiciary
Report, which includes the following statement:
The doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, in this section jointly la-
beled supplementaljurisdiction, refer to the authority of the federal courts to
adjudicate... [nonfederal] claims [that meet the test of Gibbs]....
... This section would authorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as
essentially restore the pre-Finey understandings of the authorization for and
limits on other forms of supplementaljurisdiction.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 77, at 27-28. These statements, in a Report that emphasizes
a desire on Congress's part to restore understandings of the "limits" on other, pre-
Finley forms of supplementaljurisdiction, provide the backdrop for a sympathetic read-
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The congressional disclaimer corresponds to the conclusion that
emerges from a consideration of the correspondence among the
drafters of the supplemental jurisdiction statute. In the Explanation
that accompanied a discarded version of the statute, the authors ex-
pressly stated that the "purpose of the proposal is to codify the judi-
cially created doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as the
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended.""' In reviewing that
draft, one of the three principal drafters of the final version of section
1367 expressed "complete support" for the proposal to "codify the
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.""s Although the
terms of the codification changed over the course of the next few
weeks, the correspondence of the drafters reveals no departure from
this fundamental desire to codify pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
Indeed, the apparent focus of the drafters was to rewrite the draft
statute to preserve the rule in Kroger and to bring the rules governing
the assertion of diversity jurisdiction over parties joined under Rules
19 and 24 into congruence with Krogers spirit.1
20
ing of the statute.
"1 Hearing on H.R. 5381 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prerty, and the
Administration of the Justice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong. 689 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearing] (Explanation of the Proposal to Codify Supplemental Jurisdic-
tion accompanying Letter from Arthur D. Wolf, Professor, Western New England Col-
lege School of Law, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of theJustice (June 8, 1990)). Although
the Wolf draft appeared in H.R. 5381 as late as September 6, 1990, Congress later
chose to adopt a substitute measure that was largely the work of Professors Mengler,
Rowe, and Burbank. See Fairman, supra note 4, at 160-70 (recounting the progression
of drafts from that of Wolf, to the substitute ofJudge Weis, and finally to the Septem-
ber 11, 1990 draft that became law).
"9 Letter from Thomas M. Mengler, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign College of Law, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of the Justice (June 13, 1990), in
Hearing supra note 118, at 701.
'20 One can see this focus on the problems associated with diversityjurisdiction and
the preservation of Kroger in the correspondence of Professor Burbank, Professor
Mengler, and Professor Kramer, a consultant to the Federal Courts Study Committee.
See Letter from Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
to Thomas M. Mengler, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College
of Law (Aug. 14, 1990), in Hearing, supra note 118, at 706-07 (raising the question of
whether Krogerwould be overruled by the proposed statute); Letter from Thomas M.
Mengler to Stephen B. Burbank (August 24, 1990), in Hearing, supra note 118, at 708-
09 (affirming that the proposed language would overrule Kroger); Letter from Larry
Kramer, Professor, University of Michigan Law School, to Joseph F. Weis Jr., Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Aug. 31, 1990), in Hearing supra
note 118, at 713, 714-15 (arguing that an early draft of section 1367(b) that had ap-
peared in the working papers of the Federal Courts Study Committee and that ulti-
mately became the vehicle the drafters relied upon in crafting the statute avoided the
problem of overruling Kroger by "preserving pre-Finkey limitations on pendentjurisdic-
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One finds an echo, perhaps unconscious, of the drafters' desire to
preserve the distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in
the terms of the statute itself. The statute refers to the existence of
original jurisdiction over the "claims" in a "civil action" and thus ap-
pears to reject the notion that a single, jurisdictionally sufficient claim
will support the exercise of plenary pendent jurisdiction in diversity
matters. Previous decisions as to the scope of diversity jurisdiction
scrutinized the claims and parties in the action as a whole for compli-
ance with the requirements of section 1332; as noted above, a single,
jurisdictionally sufficient claim would not have supported the joinder
of nondiverse parties orjurisdictionally insufficient claims. In its focus
on the need for jurisdiction over the claims in a civil action, section
1367 decisively differs from the conceptual apparatus of the ALI Draft.
The ALI Draft aims to transform the operation of supplemental juris-
diction by treating anyjurisdictionally sufficient claim (including one
in diversity) as a "freestanding" claim that will, by definition, support
the assertion ofjurisdiction over supplemental claims that satisfy the
case-or-controversy test of relatedness. There may be good reasons to
shift from an action-specific focus to a claim-specific focus, as the ALI
Draft suggests, but there is no reason to believe that Congress had an-
ticipated that change in the law when it enacted section 1367. Rather,
the statute appears to preserve the action-specific focus of the rules of
complete diversity and aggregation that had evolved up to that point.
2. Jurisdiction over Civil Actions and the Overruling of Finley
To the extent that section 1367(a) operates in diversity only after
the district court first secures original jurisdiction over the civil action,
one might doubt its effectiveness in overruling Finley in federal-
question cases.'21 Finley held that the jurisdiction of the district courts
under the FTCA extends to claims against the United States but does
not reach related state-law claims against nondiverse pendent par-
ties.In Section 1367(a) set out to overrule Finley by conferring sup-
plemental jurisdiction on the district courts and by making it clear
that such jurisdiction includes claims against new parties. But as we
have seen, the statute provides for the assertion of supplemental juris-
diction only after the district court has acquired original jurisdiction
over the civil action. So while a district court was free (before section
tion in diversity cases").
1I am indebted to David Shapiro for drawing this possibility to my attention.
'2 See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (describing Fin!e's holding).
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1367's enactment) to exercise original jurisdiction over a federal-
question claim against a single defendant, Finley itself concluded that
such original jurisdiction did not extend to related state-law claims
against additional, nondiverse parties.Iss Lacking original jurisdiction
over all of the plaintiff's claims in the civil action, the district court in
a case like Finley may appear to lack the statutory predicate for bring-
ing section 1367(a)'s grant of supplemental jurisdiction into play. In
other words, as one treatise noted in analyzing the problem addressed
here, "if the courts applied the language of § 1367(a) literally, it
would defeat the main purpose of the statute-overruling Finley."1
24
In contrast, I believe that the literal terms of section 1367(a) can
both preserve the rules of original jurisdiction in diversity and secure
the overruling of Finley. Although Finley ruled out pendent-partyju-
risdiction in federal-question cases, it did leave pendent-claim jurisdic-
tion and the rule of Gibbs intact.' 2- The preservation of Gibbs, however,
coexists uneasily with the Finley Court's emphasis on the need for writ-
ten statutory authority; the absence of written authority that Finley
read to foreclose jurisdiction over claims against pendent parties ap-
peared to many to plague the assertion of pendent-claim jurisdiction
as well. The drafters of section 1367(a) thus set out to provide statu-
tory authority for both Gibbs and Finley and did so in that portion of
the statute that confers supplemental jurisdiction over "all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III." This language, clearly meant to codify Gibbs, assumes that
the district court will hear pendent claims in a federal-question pro-
ceeding not as part of the court's original jurisdiction over a civil ac-
tion but as part of the statutorily conferred grant of supplemental ju-
127risdiction. The statute thus resolves the anomalous status of Gibbs
2 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553, 556 (1989).
124 LARRYL. TEPLY& RALPH U. WH1TEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 124 (1994).
'2 See Finey, 490 U.S. at 549-51, 556 (distinguishing pendent-claim from pendent-
party jurisdiction and expressing no desire to impair the continuing vitality of Gibbs,
despite the fact that it departed from past practice in asserting jurisdiction without
statutory authority).
1 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing concerns over the breadth
of Finley's holding).
12 Most observers agree that the grant of supplemental jurisdiction over related
claims in section 1367(a) codifies the pendent-claim jurisdiction rule in Gibbs. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 925. Yet the logic of the action-specific focus that Profes-
sors Teply and Whitten rely upon in doubting the statute's effectiveness in overruling
Finey would also render the statute essentially irrelevant to pendent-claim jurisdiction.
See TEPLY & WHiTrEN, supra note 124, at 123-24. The Teply-Whitten approach reads
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after Finley by defining pendent-claim jurisdiction as part of the dis-
trict court's supplemental, not original,jurisdiction. 2 s
The statute's treatment of pendent claims as lying within the dis-
trict court's supplemental jurisdiction helps to make clear that the
statute authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over pendent parties as
well. Immediately following the grant of supplemental jurisdiction,
the statute provides that "[s]uch supplemental jurisdiction shall in-
clude claims that involve thejoinder or intervention of additional par-
ties."' 29 In effect, then, the statute provides for pendent-partyjurisdic-
tion by providing a statutory foundation for Gibbs, and by extending
such jurisdiction to include the addition of new, pendent parties. It
thus assumes that a single "freestanding" or jurisdictionally sufficient
federal-question claim will bring into play the district court's supple-
mental jurisdiction over related claims; in other words, the statute
continues and codifies the claim-specific approach to pendentjuris-
diction in federal-question cases that the Gibbs Court had developed.
Such an approach belies the argument that district courts must defer
their inquiry into the existence of supplemental jurisdiction until after
the rigorous original jurisdiction demands of Finley have first been
met.
3. The Rule 20 Wrinkle
One might also argue that the sympathetic reading of the statute
cannot well account for the appearance in subsection (b) of a provi-
sion that restricts supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs
section 1367(a) as preserving pre-codification rules of supplemental jurisdiction in
federal-question cases and would presumably include the Gibbs rule within the scope of
the district courts' originaljurisdiction. On such a reading, the grant of supplemental
jurisdiction in section 1367(a) over related claims would be redundant ofjurisdiction
already available as an original matter. It makes a good deal more sense, I submit, to
read section 1367(a) as conferring supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims and
thus to confirm a claim-specific approach to federal-questionjurisdiction.
' In describing Gibbs as anomalous after Finey, I simply mean to note that the ra-
tionale of Finley's insistence upon written statutory authorization raised doubts as to
whether existing jurisdictional statutes conferred pendent-claim jurisdiction on the
district courts. On the one hand, Fney expressly refused to treat the statutory grant of
jurisdiction over a "civil action" as having acquired a judge-made gloss that included
supplementaljurisdiction. See supra note 42. On the other hand, the Finey Court ex-
pressed no desire to impair Gibbs. See supra note 125. Finey thus left it uncertain as to
whether a district court's pendent-claim jurisdiction under Gibbs would come into play
as part of its originajurisdiction or as part of supplementaljurisdiction.
29 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). See supra note 43 for the full text of the statute.
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against persons made parties under Rule 20 .iss The Rule 20 exception
plays a major role in the standard account of section 1367, operating
as an important restriction on the otherwise broad grant of supple-
mental jurisdiction in diversity matters conferred in subsection (a).s'
In contrast to the standard account, the sympathetic reading posits
that section 1367(a) incorporates the complete-diversity rules that
preclude plaintiffs from joining additional, nondiverse defendants
under Rule 20. If subsection (a) already precludes the plaintiffs from
joining nondiverse defendants, one might plausibly ask why subsec-
tion (b) also includes language to foreclose the assertion of claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 20. The standard
account of the reference to Rule 20 in section 1367(b), in short, ap-
pears to undermine the sympathetic reading of section 1367(a).
But one can develop a sympathetic alternative to the standard ac-
count of the Rule 20 reference that fits well with the interpretation of
section 136 7 (a) proposed in this Article. Recall that section 1367(b)
seeks to protect complete diversity from situations, like that in Kroger,
in which plaintiffs seek to rely upon the district court's ancillaryjuris-
diction over claims they assert against nondiverse defendants that oth-
ers have joined to the litigation. In its effort to prevent an erosion of
complete diversity through such ancillary jurisdiction, section 1367(b)
deliberately uses the passive voice. Subsection (b) does not directly
bar plaintiffs from joining nondiverse defendants under Rule 20;
rather, it declares that plaintiffs may not assert claims against "persons
made parties" under Rule 20. The statute thus can be read to con-
template that the persons in question will have been made parties by
someone other than the plaintiff; the language of section 1367(b) lit-
erally addresses itself to the plaintiff's subsequent assertion of claims
130 Rule 20 provides in relevant part that all parties may join as plaintiffs in an ac-
tion "if they assert any right to relief... arising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact com-
mon to all these persons will arise in the action"; the same transactional test governs
thejoinder of multiple defendants. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
11 See, e.g., Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931-32
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting the Rule 20 limits on the otherwise broad scope of section
1367(a)); ALI DRAFr, supra note 9, at 68 (describing the effect of the reference to Rule
20 as withdrawing supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants
joined under that rule, but as failing to withdraw such jurisdiction over claims by addi-
tional plaintiffs joined under the same rule and ascribing the difference in treatment
to an error in drafting); Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 961 n.91 (relying on the
reference to Rule 20 in arguing that the statute preserved so much of the complete-
diversity requirement as relates to thejoinder of nondiverse defendants).
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against these new parties.1 2
The Federal Rules furnish examples of situations in which defen-
dants may join additional parties under the transactional test of Rule
20: Rule 13(a) specifies that a defendant must assert an available,
transactionally related "compulsory" counterclaim against an oppos-
ing party and Rule 13(g) authorizes a cross-claim against a co-party.1
(Rule 14 incorporates similar joinder rules in permitting impleaded
third-party defendants to set up counterclaims and cross-claims under
Rule 13.)134 Once a new claim has been asserted under these Rules,
Rule 13(h) expressly permits a defendant to join additional defen-
dants as parties to these counterclaims and cross-claims,'35 so long as
2 One can probably best explain the reference to Rule 20 as a drafting error, in-
deed, most accounts of the statute adopt that view. See, e.g., Rowe et al., A Reply, supra
note 3, at 961 n.91 (describing the omission of claims by plaintiffs,joined under Rule
20, as a "far more serious" problem than others the critics had identified); Steinman,
supra note 16, at 100-01 (raising doubts about the nature of the error and maintaining
that Rules 15 and 21, rather than Rule 20, are the proper rules for adding parties post-
filing). It appears that the error resulted from an excess of caution on the part of the
drafters. Although they had framed a statute that sought to preserve the complete-
diversity requirement, last-second concerns led them to add a reference to Rule 20 in
the limiting provisions in section 1367(b). Compare Letter from Thomas M. Mengler,
Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College of Law, to Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Professor, Duke University School of Law (Aug. 28 1990), in Hearing, supra
note 118, at 716-17 (describing his changes to a draft of 1367(b) and listing exceptions
for claims by plaintiffs against parties joined under Rules 14, 19, and 24, but omitting
any reference to Rule 20), with Draft, prepared by Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B.
Burbank & Thomas M. Mengler, Sept. 11, 1990, in Hearing, supra note 118, at 722 (in-
cluding in section 1367(b) an exception for claims against persons made parties under
Rule 20 and suggesting that the addition of Rule 20 occurred in early September). See
also Fairman, supra note 4, at 166-69 (tracing the progression of drafts and noting in
particular that the reference to Rule 20 first appeared in the September 11 draft of
Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler). Similar last-second concerns prompted the drafters to
worry about their failure to include a restriction for claimsjoined under Rule 23. They
caught the Rule 23 implications too late, however, to address with a change to the
statutory language and so relied upon a curative reference in the legislative history in-
stead. See Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 960 n.90 (describing the attempt to ad-
dress the Rule 23 problem through a curative reference in the legislative history).
These concerns reflect an acceptance of what I have called the standard account, rest-
ing as they do on the view that section 1367(a) conferred a broad grant of supplemen-
tal (pendent-party) jurisdiction in diversity matters. The curative efforts reveal that the
drafters did not read section 1367(a) itself as an adequate defense of the complete-
diversity requirement.
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), 13(g).
" FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(h) (specifying that persons "other than those made parties to
the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance
with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20"). Cf. TEPLY & WHITrEN, supra note 124, at 132-
33 n.295 (suggesting a similar interpretation of the Rule 20 reference as applicable to
ancillaryjurisdiction over partiesjoined under Rule 13 (h)).
1999]
146 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:109
the claims against such new parties satisfy the transactional test of
Rule 20."6 Section 1367(a) extends the district court's ancillary juris-
diction to the claims that defendants assert against such newly joined
parties. But the Rule 20 exception in section 1367(b) can be read to
follow Kroger in refraining from permitting the plaintiffs to assert
claims against them in circumstances that might erode the complete
diversity requirement-137 So read, the Rule 20 exception conforms to
the general thrust of section 1367(b), which, sympathetically read,
operates not as a constraint on what the plaintiff does in the initial
complaint but on what the plaintiff does later with respect to subse-
quently joined parties.
Although a sympathetic reading of the Rule 20 exception does not
conform to the drafters' understanding of section 1367(b)'s opera-
tion, it may make as much sense as the standard account. For one
thing, the standard account of the Rule 20 exception contains its own
shortcomings. Most importantly, the exception fails to preclude the
plaintiff from filing a diversity action and later moving to join addi-
tional, nondiverse plaintiffs under Rule 20 as parties within the grant
of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a). The sympathetic ac-
count of the statute avoids what the drafters rightly termed this "gap-
ing hole" in the complete-diversity rule.'38 Moreover, the sympathetic
account of the Rule 20 exception makes better sense of the subse-
quent language in section 1367(b). Recall that section 1367(b) does
not operate as a flat bar to the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h). To be sure, some observers have taken issue with func-
tional interpretation of the reference in section 1367 to Rule 20, arguing that its rule
of transactional relationship for the joinder of parties does not actually provide a
measure of the propriety of such joinder in the context of pending litigation. See
Steinman, supra note 16, at 100-01 (arguing that Rule 20joinder does not apply to the
addition of parties post-filing). These observers argue that the statute should have re-
ferred instead to Rule 15 as the rule that actually provides the standard for leave to
amend the pleadings to add additional parties. ML I do not share this criticism of the
statute's reference to Rule 20. All of the rules referred to in the statute set forth a test
of transactional relationship. It is these tests of transactional relationship, and not
general standards for amendment of the pleadings, that inform the questions ofjoin-
der and supplemental jurisdiction in the course of motions for leave to amend under
Rule 15.
'37 Of course, one might argue that the proposed interpretation of the Rule 20 ref-
erence suffers from redundancy insofar as it incorporates thejoinder rules in Rule 14,
which appears as a separate exception in section 1367(b). Yet one can see the rules as
performing discrete functions: the reference to Rule 14 incorporates the test for the
impleader of third-party defendants (as in Kroger) and Rule 20 governs the assertion of
claims against parties added to the litigation in connection with counterclaims and
cross-claims allowed under Rule 13.
"' See supra note 65 (quoting the statute's drafters).
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over claims by plaintiffs but only bars the jurisdiction when it would be
"inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." m
One has difficulty seeing how a district court could possibly find that
an action in which plaintiffs have invoked Rule 20 to join nondiverse
defendants would be consistent with the complete diversity rules of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss. But the assertion of claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 20 by someone other than the plain-
tiff might have a less dramatic tendency to erode the complete diver-
sity rule, at least so long as the proposed joinder did not present the
threat of strategic manipulation that persuaded the Court to enforce
the complete diversity rule in Kroger.
D. Applying the Sympathetic Reading
Sympathetically read, section 1367 produces results that closely
conform to the House Report's assertion that the statute was meant to
preserve thejurisdictional requirements of the diversity statute. Recall
that section 1367(a) provides for the assertion of supplemental juris-
diction only after "original jurisdiction" has attached to the claims in
the plaintiffs complaint. This means that section 1367(a) does much
of the work of preserving diversity by incorporating the rules of com-
plete diversity into that term. While section 1367(a) makes ancillary
jurisdiction available after the rules of complete diversity have been
satisfied and jurisdiction attaches, section 1367(b) creates exceptions
to the scope of such ancillary jurisdiction to provide further protec-
tion for the rule of complete diversity.
40
" 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
,40 Professors Tidmarsh and Transgrud have suggested an "alternate" reading of
section 1367(b) that would make its restrictive provisions inapplicable to cases such as
Abbott Laboratories and Stromberg. SeeJAYTDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANsGRUD, COMPLEX
LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 355-56 (1998). In constructing their alterna-
tive, Professors Tidmarsh and Transgrud emphasize the language that limits the appli-
cation of section 1367(b) to matters founded "solely on section 1332." Id. at 355. They
note that Abbott Laboratories and Strombergfail to satisfy the demands of complete diver-
sity (as understood in cases decided before the statute became law) and could on this
account fall outside section 1367(b) power such that the provisions in section 1367(b)
do not come into play. Id. They also note that Snydermay present a different question
from that in Zahn, inasmuch as none of the claims in Snyder came within the district
court's original diversityjurisdiction. Ik at 356.
While this alternate reading focuses on the interplay between sections 1367(a) and
(b) and offers an interesting textual alternative to Abbott Laboratories and Stromberg, it
differs in important respects from (and thus presents problems that do not plague) the
sympathetic account. For example, the authors of the alternate reading struggle with
what they see as a problem of tautology; if section 1367(a) permits less than complete
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1. Preserving Zahn and Clark
The sympathetic reading of section 1367 produces results wholly
consistent with the legislative history and remains true to the language
of the statute that Congress adopted. It, thus dissolves the apparent
tension, reported in cases such as Abbott Laboratories and Stromberg be-
tween the supposedly clear results demanded by the literal text and
the more modest claims in the legislative history. The Abbott Laborato-
ries court mistakenly assumed that section 1367(a) conferred a plenary
grant of pendentjurisdiction on the federal courts, sitting in diversity.
With such a grant in place, the court looked for exceptions in section
1367(b). Finding no exception there for claims brought by additional
parties joined as plaintiffs under Rule 23, the Abbott Laboratories court
concluded that Congress had unthinkingly overruled Zahn. The
Stromberg court ascribed the same interpretive significance to the omis-
sion of thejoinder of plaintiffs under Rule 20 in the course of its deci-
sion to regard section 1367 as a legislative overruling of the Clark rule.
Both courts erred in looking for an explicit exception on the face
of section 1367(b). The exceptions appear instead in the require-
ment that "original jurisdiction" attach to the complaint of the plain-
tiffs in section 1367(a). The established rules of Zahn and Clark form
a part of the jurisdictional requirements in diversity proceedings, and
they were both incorporated into section 1367(a) by reference. Con-
gress thus had no reason to create any explicit exception in 1367(b)
for claims by plaintiffs joined under either Rule 23 or Rule 20. Juris-
diction over claims entailed in thejoinder of additional plaintiffs had
always required that those plaintiffs meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement; the Zahn Court had explicitly refused to substitute the
diversity, then that leaves little for the diversity-linked provisions of section 1367(b) to
accomplish. Id. at 355. But if one sees section 1367(b) as operating in the diversity
context to cabin the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction that comes into play only after
the rules of original diversityjurisdiction have been satisfied (as in the sympathetic ac-
count), then 1367(b) can still play a useful role. Similarly, the authors of the alternate
reading worry that its emphasis on the need to satisfy the demands of original jurisdic-
tion in 1367(a) would jeopardize the assertion of pendentjurisdiction in cases such as
Gibbs. Id at 355-56. But reading section 1367(a) to require satisfaction of the de-
mands of original jurisdiction (i.e., including the diversity rules) poses no threat to
Gibbs once one recalls that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction governs jurisdiction
over related state-law claims joined with federal-question claims at the initial pleading
stage. By preserving a conceptual distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion and by recalling that pendent jurisdiction was (and may remain) simply unavail-
able in diversity, the sympathetic account avoids the pitfalls that Professors Tidmarsh
and Transgrud identify.
SUPPLEMENTAL JUPISDICTION
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as the measure of such joinder and
section 1367 seemingly preserves that choice in language preserving
the rules of originaljurisdiction.
Recent decisions, which explicitly reject the approach of Abbott
Laboratories and Stromberg, provide some basis for optimism. In Leon-
hardt v. Western Sugar Co., the Tenth Circuit rejected the textualism of
the two prior circuit decisions and concluded that Zahn remains good
law.' 41 Citing an early draft of this Article, the court found that the
text of section 1367 can be read "literally, and unambiguously" to in-
corporate the established rules governing the amount in controversy
requirement for diversityjurisdiction.'4 Some months later, in Merit-
care Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., the Third Circuit followed the
Tenth Circuit's lead in rejecting the argument that section 1367 over-
rules Zahn.'4 Although the Third Circuit found the Tenth's account
of the text attractive, it ultimately based its decision on the legislative
history (as had the Tenth) following the established rule that courts
may defer to the legislative history in the face of ambiguities in the
relevant text.44 Writing for the court, Judge Joseph Weis-the judge
who had chaired the Federal Courts Study Committee and had repre-
sented the Judicial Conference in testimony about the statute in
1990-made a compelling case that the history pointed to the preser-
vation of the complete diversity rules.
2. Preserving St. Paul
The sympathetic reading also helps to expose the flaws in the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Shanaghan v. Cahill, which read section
1367 as replacing the bright-line rule of St. Paulwith the discretionary
regime of section 1367(c).45 Shanaghan proceeded by assuming that
4 160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "a literally and textually
faithful reading of section 1367(a) leads to the opposite conclusion from that of [Ab-
bott Laboratories and Stromberg]").
l4 Rd at 639 n.6, 640.
4 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that section 1367 "preserves the pro-
hibition against aggregation... and thus maintains the traditional rules governing di-
versity").
14 See id. at 222 (finding "sufficient ambiguity in [section 1367] to make resort to
the legislative history appropriate").
145 58 F.3d 106, 112 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that under section 1367 courts should
"weigh convenience and fairness to both parties, as well as the interests of judicial
economy" in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over claims that fall below the
amount-in-controversy requirements post-filing).
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the assertion of jurisdiction over claims aggregated to meet the juris-
dictional threshold represented an assertion of supplemental jurisdic-
tion under section 1367(a). In truth, however, the federal courts have
long applied their aggregation rules, not as a matter of supplemental
jurisdiction, but as a matter of original jurisdictional analysis. Since
the district court's power to hear the additional claims in Shanaghan
did not, strictly speaking, derive from the grant of supplemental juris-
diction in section 1367(a), the Fourth Circuit had no basis for bring-
ing the discretionary regime of section 1367(c) into play. 4 7 Subsec-
tion (c), after all, permits the district court to refrain from exercising
"supplemental," not original, jurisdiction. One might defend the out-
come in Shanaghan as part of a considered review of the messy aggre-
gation rules that govern original jurisdiction, but such a review would
have to confront the controlling language of St. Paul more directly.
3. Joinder in Alienage Cases
The sympathetic reading also lays to rest the concern that section
1367 might have unwittingly foreclosed the assertion of pendent-party
jurisdiction in alienage cases. The sympathetic reading teaches that
146 See supra text accompanying notes 80-92 (discussing the distinction between ag-
gregation rules and supplemental jurisdiction).
147 For a well-reasoned rejection of Shanaghan that emphasizes the distinction be-
tween rules of original and supplemental jurisdiction in diversity matters, see Wolde-
Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Community Services, Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 64-65 (2d Cir.
1999). But see Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (following
Shanaghan).
148 It was Professor Freer who first argued that section 1367(b) flatly bars the use of
pendent-partyjurisdiction in alienage matters. See Freer, Life AfterFinley, supra note 3,
at 474-75 ("Although no one objects to pendent parties jurisdiction in [alienage cases],
the statute outlaws its use, probably through inadvertence."). Professor Freer based his
argument on the standard account of the Rule 20-reference in section 1367(b), which
he took to apply to any attempt by plaintiffs to join additional defendants in matters
within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332. Seeing the reference to
section 1332 as requiring complete diversity in alienage jurisdiction, as well as citizen-
citizen diversity, Professor Freer argued that the drafters had inadvertently eviscerated
pendent-party jurisdiction. The drafters responded by arguing that section 1367(b)
did not require such an outcome, pointing to the language at the end of the provision
that forecloses supplemental jurisdiction only where inconsistent with the jurisdic-
tional requirements of section 1332. See Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 954-55
(noting that after the passage of section 1367, federal courts remain free to "abolish
the complete diversity rule for alienage jurisdiction"). According to the drafters, the
statute simply refused to address the question of pendent parties in alienage, leaving
the matter for resolution ultimately by the Supreme Court. See id. Compare Arthur &
Freer, The Disaster, supra note 3, at 978-81 (expressing doubt that the statute's text can
be construed to leave the matter to judicial discretion), and Arthur & Freer, Close
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the rules governing original jurisdiction in section 1332 matters re-
main intact, having been incorporated by reference into section
1367(a). Just as it preserves the rules of complete diversity in suits
brought under section 1332(a) (1), section 1367(a) can be read sym-
pathetically to preserve the role of the federal courts in giving shape
to the rules of diversity in alienage cases under section 1332(a)(2).
The rules of diversity in alienage matters have arisen by virtue of the
federal courts' interpretation of the demands of original jurisdic-
tion;14 1 they do not depend on the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in section 1367(a) and do not come within the ambit of the restrictive
language in section 1367(b). One can thus conclude that the statute
preserves the status quo, just as its defenders have argued, without
having to rely upon the language in section 1367(b) that relaxes its
otherwise flat prohibition of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
in specified situations under section 1332."o
4. SupplementalJurisdiction After Removal
Early comments on the supplemental jurisdiction statute ex-
pressed a variety of concerns about its application to removed ac-
tions.51 Some observers, for example, questioned whether the statute
would apply to removed cases at all, noting that the final version of
Enough, supra note 3, at 1012 (suggesting that courts interpreting the statute will not
reach uniform conclusions regarding its application), with Rowe et al., A Coda, supra
note 3, at 998-99 (restating the claim of statutory agnosticism on the issue of alienage
jurisdiction).
"9 The question ofjurisdiction in alienage cases continues to evolve. See Rowe, su-
pra note 8, at 59-61 (summarizing the rules of complete diversity that have emerged in
section 1332 (a) (2) cases but arguing that the rules make no sense and inappropriately
restrict access to federal courts for aliens who may suffer bias in state courts). Profes-
sor Rowe acknowledges that the Supreme Court might yet rewrite these rules but con-
siders the prospect unlikely and on that basis urges statutory reform. See id. at 61. I
have no quibble with the proposed reform and simply note that the current statute
does not codify a complete-diversity rule for alienage matters but leaves the matter for
resolution by the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, in the interpreta-
tion of the grant of originajurisdiction.
'so For an account of the drafters' argument for the preservation of the status quo,
relying upon the language in section 1367(b), see supra note 148.
," See Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 485 (questioning whether the statute
applies to removed cases); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 949-52 (pointing out inequities
to plaintiffs in removed actions if the statute is applied); Karen Nelson Moore, The
SupplementalJurisdiction Statute: An Important but Controversial Supplement to Federal Juris-
diction, 41 EMoRY LJ. 31, 58-60 (1992) (discussing the statute's possible effects on re-
moval cases). But seeJoan Steinman, SupplementalJurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases:
An Unsurveyed Frontier of Congress' Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 308-10 (1993) (sup-
porting the applicability of the statute).
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the statute dropped the specific reference to removed actions that had
appeared in an early draft 5 2 Others expressed doubts that section
1367(b) applied to actions removed on the basis of diversity; these
doubts stemmed from the perception that removal jurisdiction de-
pends upon the interaction of sections 1332 and 1441 and not "solely"
on section 1332 as section 1367(b) specifies. 53 Still others worried
about the unfairness that might result from the application of Kroger
(and other restrictive rules of complete diversity) to plaintiffs who had
not chosen the federal forum.-" Finally, some observers argued that
the restrictive references to specific federal rules in section 1367(b)
might have no application to litigation governed by state rules of pro-
cedure.' Coupled with the standard account of section 1367(a), the
inapplicability of section 1367(b) limits to removed cases appeared to
have threatened some broadening of federal removal jurisdiction.55
Sympathetic interpretation can overcome these interpretive prob-
lems. The removal statute provides for removal by the defendants of
any "civil action" of which the district courts have "original jurisdic-
tion."57 This test of original jurisdiction focuses on the plaintiff's state
court complaint and considers whether its allegations meet the stan-
dards for the assertion of federal-question or diversity jurisdiction.s
It thus appears plausible to conclude that many of the same rules that
govern the interplay between original and supplemental jurisdiction
in actions instituted in federal court will also apply to actions removed
152 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 151, at 59 (noting that the specific reference to re-
moval cases dropped out during the drafting process).
113 SeeFreer, Life Afler Finley, supra note 3, at 485 (arguing that removaljurisdiction
is not founded solely on section 1332 and hence is not within the provisions of section
1367(b)); Moore, supra note 151, at 58 (same). But see Steinman, supra note 151, at
328 (considering and rejecting the argument for the inapplicability of 1367(b) to re-
moved cases).
114 See Moore, supra note 151, at 58-59 (arguing that because the plaintiff in a re-
moved case had initially chosen state court, the reasons for limiting supplemental ju-
risdiction emphasized in Krogerdo not apply).
'S' See Steinman, supra note 151, at 330 (arguing that section 1367 does not apply
to claims against persons made parties under state law prior to removal).
6 See Steinman, supra note 8, at 103 (noting the possibility that section 1367 could
be read to give federal courts jurisdiction over state-law class actions regardless of the
citizenship and amounts in controversy of class members); Steinman, supra note 151,
at 331 (concluding that section 1367(b)'s inapplicability to removed diversity cases
could expand federaljurisdiction over class actions).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
See generally WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 224 (describing the rules that govern the
determination of original and removal jurisdiction as "equated" and "linked" though
not entirely coincident).
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to federal court. Whether the action begins in federal court or comes
there on removal, the plaintiff's complaint must allege a civil action
over which the district courts have originaljurisdiction. By its terms,
section 1367(a) applies to "any" such civil action and confers jurisdic-
tion over related claims.
The parallel structure of the removal and supplemental jurisdic-
tion statutes dissolves many of the uncertainties that others have iden-
tified. First, it appears quite clear, as the Supreme Court recently
held, that the supplemental jurisdiction statute applies to removed ac-
tions.'59 Second, the sympathetic reading of sections 1367(a) and (b)
essentially eliminates any concern that supplemental jurisdiction will
unduly expand the scope of diversity jurisdiction in removed cases. If,
as sympathetically construed, section 1367(a) incorporates the de-
mands of complete diversity into its provision for the assertion of
original jurisdiction, then the same rules that govern plaintiff's join-
der and aggregation of parties and claims will apply to diversity mat-
ters initiated in and removed to district court. Only after the com-
plaint satisfies such rules can the defendants remove and bring the
doctrine of federal supplemental (ancillary) jurisdiction into play. As
a consequence, section 1367(b)'s arguable inapplicability to actions in
state court does not present an inordinate threat of broadened sup-
plemental jurisdiction in removed diversity proceedings. Section
1367(a), as we have seen, preserves the complete diversity rules and
section 1367(b) attempts to prevent ancillary jurisdiction from erod-
ing them. I6 Facing time constraints, most defendants will have re-
moved the action before moving to implead or otherwise add parties
whose joinder would present post-removal questions of ancillary juris-
diction.1
61
" See City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165
(1997) (declaring that section 1367(a) applies with "equal force" to actions filed in
and removed to federal court and that removed actions must satisfy the demands of
original jurisdiction by definition).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 93-108 (discussing section 1367(a)); text ac-
companying notes 130-39 (discussing section 1367(b)).
"" The procedural rules governing removal require the defendants to file their no-
tice of removal in district court no later than 30 days after they receive the initial plead-
ing, or, if the action is not initially removable, within 30 days of the date on which it
becomes so. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (defining the period within which a de-
fendant may remove an action to federal court). This requirement of speedy removal
may explain why we have yet to see any cases that test the applicability of Kroger to a
situation in which the plaintiff had already asserted claims against a nondiverse third-
party before removal was effected. Cf. Steinman, supra note 8, at 104-05 (noting the
absence of decided cases). Professor Steinman rightly notes the theoretical possibility
of such cases. See id.
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III. SYMPATHETIC TEXTUALISM ANDJUDGE-MADE
JURISDICTIONAL LAW
So far, this Article has suggested that a sympathetic textualism can
produce answers to discrete interpretive issues that fit well with the
text of the statute and with the apparent understanding of Congress.
This Part of the Article steps back from the particular issues to argue
that the sympathetic reading of section 1367 also provides a stronger
foundation on which to build a workable body of jurisdictional law.
By reading section 1367 as a general grant of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction and as a decision otherwise to leave many jurisdictional
issues untouched, the sympathetic account narrows the range of issues
that the federal courts must regard as ones that Congress has defini-
tively resolved. So read, the statute leaves a much broader range of
issues for resolution by the federal courts, inviting them, in effect, to
exercise the kind of pragmatic discretion that had long characterized
judge-made jurisdictional law in the years preceding Finley. By pre-
serving a role for the federal courts in the development of jurisdic-
tional law, the sympathetic reading may avoid the stubborn textualism
of Abbott Laboratories and the elaborate detail of the ALl Draft.
Of course, one can argue that Congress should, as a matter of first
principles, play the lead role in the development ofjurisdictional law.
Congress, after all, bears responsibility for the decision to create infe-
rior federal courts and has broad, if not unfettered, control over the. .. 162
scope of theirjurisdiction. Many thoughtful observers have empha-
sized the importance of legislative control of jurisdiction and have
worried that the courts will take too many liberties with their jurisdic-
tional grants. Professor Martin Redish, for example, speaks for many
when he argues that the federal courts have no principled basis on
which to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that Congress has
conferred upon them.Iss Similar arguments for legislative primacy
underlie criticisms of other doctrines in which the courts exercise
162 For an account of the Madisonian Compromise and its embodiment in provi-
sions of Article III that authorize but do not require Congress to create lower federal
courts, see BATOR ET AL., supra note 78, at 11. See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 551 (1962) (describing the "great constitutional compromise" that authorized but
did not obligate Congress to create inferior courts and noting that, once created, such
courts remained "subject to jurisdictional curtailment").
'0 See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of theJudicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (1984) (arguing that abstention doctrines are inconsistent
with American political theory).
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some discretion in defining what matters to hear.' 64
Among the most persuasive responses to this emphatic argument
for legislative primacy, Professor David Shapiro has advanced a subtle
and, to me, quite persuasive argument that the federal courts-properly
exercise a principled discretion in giving more particular content to
general jurisdictional statutes. 6' As Professor Shapiro notes, experi-
ence and tradition teach that the question whether to exercise juris-
diction and decide the merits of a particular dispute may defy general
legislative definition; courts may enjoy functional advantages over the
legislature in the necessary fine tuning. In suggesting the need for a
dialogue between the courts and the legislature, 66 Professor Shapiro
argues for the widely held view that the business of defining the con-
tours of judicial power represents a shared responsibility of the First
and Third Departments.
67
Certainly as a matter of history, much jurisdictional law has grown
out of an unspoken partnership between the legislative and judicial
branches of government. Congress has tended to provide relatively
general jurisdictional grants and the Supreme Court has often played
a fairly active role in shaping what we now think of as jurisdictional
law. In a range of familiar cases, the Court has adopted interpreta-
tions ofjurisdictional statutes that redefine the scope of federal power
along lines scarcely visible in the legislative text)6 Many observers de-
'A CompareALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH: THE SUPREME
COURTAT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962) (defending the Court's use ofjusticiabil-
ity doctrines to exercise discretion to avoid the merits of some controversial issues)
with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues--A Comment on Pinciple and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) (criticizing such discre-
tionary avoidance as an unprincipled refusal to exercise jurisdiction that Congress has
conferred on the Court).
'65 See David L. Shapiro,Jurisdiction andDiscretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (1985)
(arguing that courts are uniquely qualified on jurisdictional matters and should con-
tinue to have "measured authority" to declinejurisdiction).
'6 See id. at 577 (advocating a "productive dialogue").
167 Professor Friedman has seconded Shapiro's call for dialogue between the courts
and the legislature. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MIcH. L. REV.
577, 580-81, 668-69 (1993) (arguing against rigid separation of powers thinking and in
favor of a dialogic approach to defining the judicial role). The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (holding that
Butford abstention can only be applied when "equitable or otherwise discretionary" re-
lief is sought), reaffirmed the existence of the district court's equitable discretion to
refrain from adjudicating particular disputes.
i' See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville RR. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908)
(holding that only those federal questions that appear on the face of the well-pleaded
complaint can support the district court's assertion of arising-under jurisdiction); Os-
born v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (holding that
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scribed the evolution of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in the pre-
Finley years as simply another illustration of the way in which the Court
adapted jurisdictional law to take account of evolution in our under-
standing of the proper scope of a civil action.'1
Practical considerations help to explain the role of the federal
courts in making jurisdictional law. For a variety of reasons having to
do with the nature of the political process, Congress simply has not
done an effective job of keeping jurisdictional rules in good repair.1
Partly this congressional neglect reflects the inability of federal judges
to play an institutionally effective role in securing jurisdictional legis-
lation; partly it reflects the absence of well-organized interest group
support; partly it reflects the relatively specialized nature of the sub-
ject matter and its inaccessibility to those without special competence
in the subjects of civil procedure and federal courts.'7 ' For all these
reasons, Congress has been content, absent a crisis, to leave the elabo-
ration ofjurisdictional rules to the courts and similar specialists.
Even those who agree that the courts play an appropriate, and not
just an inevitable, role in the development ofjurisdictional rules may
Article III empowers Congress to assign federal trial jurisdiction over any claim in
which a federal ingredient appears); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267
(1806) (holding, despite the absence of any clear constitutional or statutory require-
ment to that effect, that minimal diversity would not support federal trial jurisdiction).
,69 See Freer, supra note 2, at 55-60 (arguing that one can best rationalize the judge-
made doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as an interpretation of the statu-
tory grant of original jurisdiction over "civil actions").
'70 For a summary of Congress's work on the judicial code of the United States, see
WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 21-23 (describing the codifications of 1911 and 1948; noting
the absence of any systematic updating of jurisdictional provisions; questioning the
skill of the initial drafting and the quality of subsequent amendments; and opining
that the time has come for the preparation of a new judicial code). In keeping with
these concerns, Professor Wright supports, in his capacity as president of the AI, the
ALI's currentjudicial code revision project.
Although it has left jurisdictional rules in disrepair, Congress has taken an in-
creased interest in the rule-making process in recent years. See Charles Gardner Geyh,
Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169, 1187-91 (1996) (describing the period from 1973 to the
present as one of heightened interaction between the judiciary and a Congress that is
more willing to suspend and modify proposed procedural rules and expressing some
optimism about the prospects for more effective interactions in the future).
17 For a general account of the difficulties that arise from interactions between
Congress and the judiciary in the course of the extrajudicial making ofjurisdictional
and procedural law, see Geyh, supra note 170. Professor Geyh persuasively argues that,
despite some questions of self-interest, federal judges participate effectively in the
lawmaking process because they are "extraordinary lawyers" who may understand the
law and the implications of proposed reforms better than their legislative counterparts.
Id. at 1219 (noting judges' unique expertise in matters such as procedure and judicial
administration).
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view Finley as signaling the beginning of a new era.'7 With its empha-
sis on the necessity for written authority, the Finley Court made what
some have seen as a decisive break with the past. On this account, Fin-
ley brought to a close the free-wheeling jurisdictional days of Gibbs and
inaugurated an era of close attention to statutory text. If the Finley
Court foreswore the exercise of what the ALI Draft perceptively de-
scribes as pragmatic discretion in fashioning jurisdictional rules,'"
then decisions such as that in Abbott Laboratories arguably proceed with
appropriate deference to the command of their judicial superior in
hewing closely to the textualist line.
The argument makes sense as far as it goes but the Finley decision
proceeds upon the assumption that the ultimate responsibility for the
content of jurisdictional law rests with Congress, not the Supreme
Court.'7 4 In a world of avowed legislative supremacy, a decision by
Congress to reestablish the partnership with the federal courts by
delegating some responsibility for jurisdictional law to the federal
courts would seemingly answer any doubts about the legitimacy of the
judicial role. No constitutional principle forbids Congress from mak-
ing such a delegation and it thus seems apparent that a post-Finley
delegation of law-making authority from Congress to the federal
courts would trump the new emphasis on literal textualism in Finley
itself.
175
17 For the argument that Fnley and section 1367 signal a new era of literal textual-
ism in the law of supplementaljurisdiction, see Arthur & Freer, The Disaster, supra note
3, at 979 (arguing that the courts may not ignore the literal commands of a statute
clear on its face); Freer, supra note 8, at 7 (arguing that the statutory model adopted in
section 1367 "locks" future efforts into the same statutory model and precludes reli-
ance on a regime ofjudicial discretion); and Purdue, supra note 16, at 74-75 (opposing
development of the law through lower court decisions and arguing instead that the
statute should provide clear and concrete answers, as in the model of Treasury Regula-
tions). Cf. Rowe, supra note 8, at 54-58 (expressing general support for an interpretive
approach that preserves a measure of judicial discretion and maintains a practical,
working relationship between the federal courts and Congress but nonetheless con-
cluding that certain features of the existing statute require a fix).
17 For the ALI Draft's view of the demise of pragmatic discretion in judicial inter-
pretation of jurisdictional grants, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the All Draft's approach to the statute).
14 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989) (arguing from implicit
separation of powers grounds that the federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction
without an appropriately clear grant of legislative authority).
175 Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter's famed dissent in Textile Workers Un-
ion v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Although
Frankfurter argued against the constitutionality of a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
that enabled federal courts to adjudicate suits for violation of collective bargaining
agreements, he did so based upon his contention that the statute merely conferred
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Precisely such a delegation can be said to flow from the relatively
open-ended grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367. Read
sympathetically, the statute supplies the grant of statutory authority
that the Finley Court had identified as missing and otherwise attempts
to reestablish the role of the federal courts in working out the details
of supplementaljurisdiction. Three provisions in particular appear to
restore a measure of judicial discretion. First, section 1367(a) incor-
porates the rules of original jurisdiction in diversity, rules that had
previously developed through the exercise of some judicial discretion
and remained in flux to some degree. Second, section 1367(b) estab-
lishes that the district courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction in di-
versity matters only where they find it to be consistent with the juris-
dictional principles of section 1332. This test of consistency
incorporates the pragmatic analysis of the Kroger decision, where the
Supreme Court balanced the threat to the complete diversity re-
quirement against the arguments for litigant fairness in determining
whether to hear the claim.175 Third, section 1367(c) incorporates the
rules governing the discretionary decline ofjurisdiction that the Gibbs
Court had earlier specified.1 7 The statute thus provides a framework
within which the federal courts may continue to work out sensible ju-
risdictional rules.
The question of alienage jurisdiction provides an excellent illus-
tration of the statute's operation as a jurisdictional framework. 78 Ac-
jurisdiction on the federal courts to apply state-law rules of decision. See id. at 460-62
(arguing that the provision merely granted litigants access to a federal forum and did
not authorize the development of substantive federal law in this area of labor dis-
putes). The majority, however, had interpreted the statute as a substantive delegation
of lawmaking power to the federal courts and had concluded that federal rules of deci-
sion would control. See id. at 451 (opinion of Douglas,J.) (finding that § 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the en-
forcement of these collective bargaining agreements"). While Frankfurter challenged
the wisdom of accepting such a delegation without more guidance from Congress, id.
at 463-65 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) he did not question Congress's constitutional
power to effect such a delegation.
'76 For an overview of the Kroger litigation and the Court's decision to reject ancil-
lary jurisdiction over the claims of the plaintiff against an impleaded third-party de-
fendant, see supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra note 47 (quoting the Supreme Court's recent description of the func-
tion of section 1367(c)). Compare Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist.
Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1551-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (characterizing the exceptional circum-
stances test in section 1367(c) as narrower than its counterpart in Gibbs) with Brazinski
v. Amoco Petroleum Additives, Inc., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing the
statute as codifying and not altering the judge-made principle of pendentjurisdiction).
'7 For a summary of the alienage question, see supra notes 148-50 and accompany-
ing text.
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cording to most observers, the federal courts had yet to decide
whether to allow pendent-party jurisdiction in alienage cases when
section 1367 became law." It takes a great leap of interpretive faith to
conclude that Congress addressed that question one way or another in
section 1367. It makes far more sense to conclude that Congress sim-
ply left the matter in the hands of the courts through its provision in
section 1367(a) for the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction only after the
demands of original jurisdiction had been satisfied. The statute does
not specify the contours of that original jurisdiction and thus leaves
the process of determining the proper boundaries between original
and ancillary jurisdiction to the federal courts."O
Whatever one's view of the merits of that question, I believe that
the preservation of a judicial role provides a better prescription for
the long-term health ofjurisdictional law than the rigorous textualism
of Abbott Laboratories. Recall that in Abbott Laboratories, the Fifth Circuit
not only refused to give effect to the legislative history but also quite
deliberately refused to consider the "wisdom" of its conclusion that
section 1367 had effectively, if unwittingly, overruled Zahn)8 In the
end, the Abbott Laboratories court refused to take any responsibility for
the jurisdictional rule that it applied; it simply declared the legislative
text clear on its face and walked away. Perhaps the court meant to
teach Congress a lesson, as Judge Pollak suggested in characterizing
the opinion as an example of interpretive "gotcha."'82 In any case, the
'79 See supra note 149 (noting the continued evolution ofalienagejurisdiction).
,80 Some may wonder if the district courts would enjoy the same authority to re-
think the rules of complete diversity as part of the process of elaborating the meaning
of original jurisdiction in section 1367(a). In my view, the question turns not on the
meaning of the statutory language but rather on the nature of the district court's obli-
gation to respect the unamended decisional law of the Supreme Court. The Court it-
self has created the rules that govern diversity of citizenship and amount-in-controversy
and those decisions bind lower courts. In the alienage context, by contrast, the Court
has yet to speak and the process of lower court development may continue. Of course,
the lower courts may have reached a consensus that will reduce the likelihood of any
further review by the Court. SeeRowe, supra note 8, at 59, 61 (noting consensus among
lower courts on the alienage jurisdiction question and viewing Supreme Court in-
volvement as unlikely).
181 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Abbott
Laboratories).
182 According to Judge Pollak, writing in Russ v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insur-
ance Co., 961 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the issue presented by the supposedly clear
text of section 1367(b) was "almost impenetrable to any audience other than specialists
in civil procedure in the federal courts." Id. at 819. In such a context, Judge Pollak
suspects that most members of Congress would have relied upon the legislative history
as the definitive extrinsic aid to statutory meaning. See id. (noting that the House Judi-
ciary Committee issued a detailed report discussing section 1367). For the federal
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decision certainly proceeds upon the assumption that Congress has
asserted control over the rules of supplemental jurisdiction and must
deal with the consequences of its own mistakes. A similar assumption
underlies the ALI Draft.
I suspect the law of federal jurisdiction will lose much if this rigor-
ous textualism takes hold. Consider that the doctrine of supple-
mental jurisdiction-so essential that Congress acted quickly in the
wake of Finley to provide the necessary statutory authority--evolved
through the exercise ofjudicial discretion in the interpretation ofju-
risdictional law. One need not applaud each instance of this law to
recognize that the rigorous textualism of Finley and Abbott Laboratories
will ultimately displace the judicial role. The loss from such a pruning
ofjudicial discretion could be considerable, leaving Congress with lit-
tle guidance on jurisdictional issues and few incentives to approach
them. One certainly has difficulty in seeing what would have moved
Congress to work out the details of pendent-claim jurisdiction had the
Court been unwilling to show the way in Gibbs.
CONCLUSION
I am unwilling to present the story of section 1367 as a morality
play, in which the forces of good interpretation went to war with the
forces of bad interpretation and lost. Reality rarely conforms to such
simplistic assessments, and we have already witnessed some of the un-
fortunate consequences of rhetorical overkill. Yet it remains true that
a statute Congress designed to achieve rather modest goals may well
result in unsettling and confusing the law of supplemental jurisdiction
to such an extent that it will require further congressional repairs. I
courts, to assert jurisdiction against the weight of such clear history was to say to Con-
gress: "We know what you meant to say but you didn't quite say it. ... [B]etter luck
next time." Id. at 820 (internal quotations omitted). Judge Pollak notes that under
such a "gotcha" approach, Congress and the courts play antagonistic rather than coor-
dinate roles in the government of the United States. See id. (drawing support for his
decision from the need for Congress and the courts to work together as "parts of a sin-
gle government").
'" A good many observers share this concern. See Cooper, supra note 8, at 153
(supporting a regime of broadened judicial discretion and arguing that the detailed
codification of the ALI cannot answer every question); Lilly, supra note 8, at 189 (sug-
gesting that because "issues of supplemental jurisdiction arise in such varied con-
texts... their resolution is ill-suited to statutory treatment"); Shapiro, supra note 8, at
218 (questioning the need for detailed codification and continuing to support devel-
opment through case law).
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have presented an alternative, sympathetic interpretation in the hope
that these results can still be avoided.
* * * * * *
ELECTION 2000: POINT / COUNTRPOINTSERIES
As the presidential election of 2000 is upon us, we present to the
readers of Volume 148 a series of essays addressing law and the
American political system. Each issue of the volume will include two
essays-in the form of a point/counterpoint debate-on a given sub-
ject. We have developed this series in an effort to raise the level of
civic discourse during an election cycle critical to our nation's future.
Future issues of Volume 148 of the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review will include discussions of the following topics:
Issue 2: Campaign Finance Reform
Issue 3: Urban Sprawl
Issue 4: Regulation of Guns as Consumer Products
Issue 5: War Powers Act
The following is the first exchange in our series. These essays ad-
dress the proper role of legal academics in the political process.
Here, Professors Neal Devins and Cass Sunstein present a provocative
debate framed by the letter-writing campaign by law professors to in-
fluence the 1998 impeachment of President Bill Clinton. Please note
that Professor Sunstein responds directly to Professor Devins's cri-
tique. Professor Devins's rebuttal is contained in the footnotes of his
piece.
(163)
* * * * * *
POINT / COUNTERPOINT
BEARING FALSE WITNESS: THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND
THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
NEAL DEViNS
Academic freedom may prove to be one of the casualties of the
Clinton impeachment.' By signing letters about the constitutional
standards governing impeachment, an issue most of them know very
little about, many academics placed partisanship and self-interest
above all else. The logic of academic freedom, however, cannot be
squared with academics who see celebrity and power as more impor-
tant than the pursuit of truth. Grounded in the belief that academics
searching for knowledge in free universities will strengthen a free so-
ciety, academic freedom insulates the academy from political attack.
2
It also gives credibility to the writings, testimony, court filings, talk
show appearances, and other activities of academics who seek to influ-
ence public policy. At the least, academic freedom conveys the mes-
sage that scholars who speak out on public issues know something
about those issues. When academics join forces to send a purely po-
litical message, their reputation as truth-seekers will diminish and,
with it, their credibility. While that day has not yet arrived, it is rapidly
approaching. Accusations of political correctness run amok andgofns3 aebcmn" " "4
goofiness are becoming increasingly mainstream. Unless academics
t Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and
Mary. Special thanks to Mary Sue Backus for her research assistance, counsel, and
good cheer. Thanks also to John Duffy, Lou Fisher, Mike Fitts, Mike Gerhardt, Mike
Klarman,John McGinnis, Alan Meese, Tom Merrill, Bob Nagel, David Rabban,Jeremy
Rabkin, Suzanna Sherry, and participants at a University of Georgia workshop for their
help.
'Another casualty, of course, is the independent counsel statute, the Ethics in
GovernmentAct, which expired on June 30, 1999. See DavidJohnston, Attorney General
Taking Control as Independent Counsel Law Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at Al (noting
that support for the statute eroded because of accusations by both parties that it was
being used as a "political weapon against incumbents").
2 See infra notes 15-19, 83-85 and accompanying text (arguing that society accords
academics, and perhaps judges, privileges it accords no one else).
3 See Ray Suarez, Too Many in Academe Stayed Grandly Above the Fray, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 6, 1998, at B8 (saying that in the academy, "[e]very example of
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can answer these charges, they risk becoming irrelevant. Conse-
quently, when a significant number of law professors and historians
hold themselves out as experts when they are not, they mislead, and
all academics pay a price. For this very reason, academics can ill af-
ford another nail to be placed in the coffin of the dispassionate aca-
demic expert. Rather, they must hold politically motivated professors
accountable for abusing academic freedom.
The practice of bolstering a political argument with the help of an
academic expert was on full display during the Clinton impeachment.
In explaining why he could not have committed a "high crime and
misdemeanor," the President asked rhetorically: "[W]hy did nearly
900 constitutional experts say that they strongly felt that this matter
was not the subject of impeachment.A5 The President, of course, was
referring to two open letters sent on his behalf-one from 400 histori-
6ans; the other from more than 430 law professors.
The President was hardly alone in referring to these letters. His
lawyers entitled a section of their House Judiciary Committee submis-
sion "Recent Statements by Historians and Constitutional Scholars
Confirm that No Impeachable Offense is Present Here."7 Along the
same lines, Democrats contended that the "scholarly support for the
[President] ... is overwhelming, and it cannot be ignored"8 while Re-
publicans complained that the letters "substitute[d] political opinion
for scholarly analysis."9
A decade earlier, 2,000 legal academics banded together in an-
freaky marginality, youthful goofiness, and faculty softheadedness was defined as the
norm").
' See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (calling attention to accusations
that "political correctness, like-minded thinking, and intolerance have corrupted the
academic ethic").
5 Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Labor Leaders and an Exchange with Reporters,
35 WEmy CoMP. PRES. DoC. 46, 47 (Jan. 13, 1999).
" See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 105th Cong. 334-39, 374-83 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings] (recording the historians' and law professors' letters).
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Submission by Counsel for President
Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Dec. 8,
1998) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/L2R?/urn:pd:://oma.eop.gov.us/
1998/12/11/12.text.l>.
8 145 CONG. REc. S1567 (dally ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
9 145 CONG. REc. S294 (daily ed.Jan. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Canady).
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other letter-writing campaign. The subject: Robert Bork. The objec-
tive: to communicate that Bork's thinking was outside the constitu-
tional mainstream. This campaign also hit pay dirt. Finding Judge
Bork "[o]utside the [tiradition of Supreme Court U]urisprxdence,"
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report highlighted this "unprece-
dented" opposition to the nomination.'0
Beyond Bork and impeachment, academics have written joint let-
ters on abortion, affirmative action, bankruptcy reform, campaign fi-
nance, copyright reform, gun control, international human rights, su-
permajority requirements, the nomination of federal court judges,
and much more." Portraying their signatories as "concerned legal
scholars," "constitutional scholars," "professors of law," and "profes-
sors of bankruptcy and commercial law,"2 these letters are intended to
communicate the consensus opinion of academic experts.' 3  While
these letters have not overtaken expert testimony and individual let-
ters to Congress, letter-writing campaigns have become an increas-
0 SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDIcIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORKTO BE AN
ASsOcIATEJUsTIcE OFTHE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, Exec. Rep. No. 100-7, at 6-
7, 13 (1987). By highlighting the attention these letters received, I am not suggesting
that academic letter writing changes votes in Congress. Rather, academic letter writing
provides rhetorical cover to members of Congress who have already made up their
minds. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing the prominent role
played by congressional staffers in organizing academic letter-writing campaigns).
" See, e.g., Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong. 255 (1981) (statement of Laurence Tribe) (describ-
ing joint letter writing in opposition to human life legislation as "an unprecedented
unison of voices"); Constitutional Scholars' ConferenceJoint Statement, Constitutional
Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98
YALE UJ. 1711, 1712 (1989) [hereinafter Scholars' Statement] (examining how Croson
should affect municipal governments' affirmative action programs throughout the na-
tion); Richard B. Lillich, Introduction: The Growing Importance of Customary International
Human Rights Law, 25 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 23-24 (1995) (discussing the "ubiqui-
tous... 'Affidavit of International Law Scholars' that has become the norm in recent
human rights cases"); Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors
in Opposition to HR 604, HR 2589, and S 505, "The Copyright Term Extension Act"
(on file with author and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (available at
<http://www.public.asu.edu/-dkarjala/letters.htm>). See also infra notes 22, 45, 50,
58 and accompanying text (discussing gun control, supermajority requirements, fed-
eral court nominee Daniel Manion, and campaign finance reform).
12 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 374 (referring to "professors of law"); Scholars' State-
ment supra note 11, at 1711 (referring to "constitutional scholars"); infra note 63 (not-
ing that the signatories were "concerned legal scholars"); see also Draft Letter to Sena-
tors Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy (referring to "professors of bankruptcy and
commercial law") (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
" The fact that only academics can sign these letters also signals that letter signers
are speaking as experts, not concerned citizens. For further discussion, see infra notes
88-91 and accompanying text.
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ingly important mechanism for academics to send a message to Con-
gress. Why, though, do people pay attention to these letters? Why
treat these letters with more deference than, say, a petition from the
ACLU or the NRA? The answer, of course, is that academics have a
reputation for placing the search for truth ahead of partisanship. Un-
like movie stars, interest groups, or the person on the street, the
credibility of academics is tied to their purported willingness to speak
"[tlruth to [p]ower.
" 14
Society, acting on this vision, accords academics certain privileges
that it accords no one else (except perhaps judges).'5 Academic free-
dom, tenure, sabbaticals, and the like encourage academics to think
independently and to challenge prevailing norms through their
16scholarship. At the same time, the trust that society has placed in
academics, as well as the resources it has provided them, are
grounded in certain assumptions about academic conduct. Academ-
ics, for example, have an obligation "to speak truthfully about the is-
sue at hand, because they have a detached cast of mind as well as a
large stock of relevant and reliable knowledge on the subject at is-
sue."17 Correspondingly, before speaking as experts, academics have
an obligation to read and to think about arguments on both sides of
an issue. The ways of the scholar, as Alexander Bickel put it, "appeal
to men's better natures" because they are about the leisure of think-
ing, training, and insulation, not "the moment's hue and cry." 8
Whether or not academics live up to this obligation, Bickel's vision
still resonates with much of the public. 9 For this very reason, policy
14 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Intellectuals' Role: Truth to Power?, WALL. ST. J., Oct 12,
1983, at A28. Whether Schlesinger, an organizer of the historian's anti-impeachment
letter, lived by this creed is another matter. See infra notes 57-60 (referring to instances
of academics' involvement in political causes).
,' Like academics, judges have a reputation for dispassionate expertise and can ill
afford for that reputation to give way to the view thatjudicial decision-making is simply
another form of politics. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
199-206 (Yale Univ. Press 1935) (expressing the view that society accepts the judgment
ofjudges so long as they think that judges are acting like lawyers--reading law and ap-
plying it--instead of politicians).
6 See David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CoNsrrtrrON 12-13 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) (exploring the theoretical
underpinnings of academic freedom). For further discussion, see infra notes 70-72
and accompanying text (arguing that an assumption of dispassionate truth-seeking is
the "first obligation" of academics).
17 Edward Shils, The Academic Ethic, in TIE CALLING OF EDUCATION 3, 107 (Steven
Grosby ed., 1997).
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (2d ed. 1986).
11 In a 1997 Gallup Poll, college teachers were ranked fourth highest for honesty
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makers and media outlets seek out academics on many of the issues
that divide the nation. Academic letter-writing campaigns likewise
capitalize on the academic's reputation for dispassionate expertise.
Consider, for example, the anti-impeachment letters. Writing "nei-
ther as Democrats nor as Republicans" (but as "professors of law"),
these citizen scholars saw the drive to impeach the President as a
threat to "our constitutional order."20 Signed by many of the nation's
most prominent law professors and historians, it is no wonder that
these letters were taken seriously by the President's supporters as well
as his foes. Upon closer inspection, however, these letter-writing
campaigns are little more than a testament to the willingness of many
academics to pawn off fake knowledge.
Of the 900 signers of the anti-impeachment letters, for example, it
is doubtful that many had thought seriously about the constitutional
standards governing impeachment. 21 Impeachment, at least until this
past year, is a subject that is rarely written about and rarely taught.2
Indeed, nearly all of the legal academics who testified before the
House Judiciary Committee were better known for their allegiance to
either liberal or conservative causes than for their scholarship about
impeachment.23 For this very reason, these academics have been
and ethics among 26 major occupations. SeeLeslie McAneny & Lydia Saad, Honesty and
Ethics PoX GALLUP NE S SERVICE, Dec. 13, 1997 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/
releases/pr971213.asp>.
20 Hearings, supra note 6, at 334, 374.
2' How many of the letter signers had, in fact, read the 200-page Starr Report is
another matter altogether. Since the theory of the letter was that whatever had taken
place was private (even the alleged perjury) and not a threat to the separation of pow-
ers, many letter signers may have found the Starr Report beside the point. It is possi-
ble, however, that some letter signers paid no mind to the letter's reasoning or dis-
agreed with the reasoning. These letter writers may have focused instead on the
conclusion. For these letter signers, the allegations contained in the Starr Report may
well have been pivotal.
See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no reason to
assume that constitutional scholars necessarily have expertise regarding impeach-
ment). Much the same can be said of the Second Amendment. Nevertheless, through
postings on a criminal law and a constitutional law list serve, law professors were in-
vited to sign onto a "legal scholar" amicus brief in a recent Second Amendment case.
For a full discussion of this brief with the author, see Interview with DavidYassky, Assis-
tant Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School (Sept. 8, 1999). See also Legal Scholars
Debate Second Amendment Case (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://abcnews.go.com/wire/us/
ap19990907_758.html> (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (discuss-
ing the disagreement among academics about the brief).
Only one witness, Mike Gerhardt, was found acceptable to both Democrats and
Republicans. Not surprisingly, Republican witnesses testified that the President's con-
duct might well be impeachable. For their part, Democratic witnesses argued that the
President's conduct could not be impeachable. More telling, many (roughly one-half)
of the law professor witnesses had not written anything about impeachment before the
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roundly criticized both for the quality of their constitutional analysis
and for "conducting a transparently political debate in constitutional
terms."24 Far more significant, most of the historians who signed the
letter were not constitutional specialists.25 Among the law professors,
only one-third of the signatories teach constitutional law.
26
Even among professors of constitutional law, moreover, there is
no reason to think that these individuals have "some expertise on the
topic of impeachment. "27 Consider, for example, professors (such as
myself) who have used Cass Sunstein's constitutional law casebook.
Just over one page of this 1800-page tome considers the constitutional• • 28
standards governing impeachment. And that one page provides ab-
Clinton scandal.
214 MichaelJ. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85
VA. L. REV. 631, 631 (1999); see a/soJohn 0. McGinnis, ImpeachableDefenses, POL' REV.,
June &July 1999, at 27, 27-29 (criticizing the reasoning and methodology of law pro-
fessors' positions on Clinton's impeachment). It is also noteworthy that scholars who
argued against the appropriateness of originalism at the Bork hearings made use of
originalism (and little else) in arguing against the Clinton impeachment. See Philip
Elman, Shame on the Partisan Professors, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at 21 (noting this
reversal of position).
SeeJesse Lemisch, Anti-Impeachment Historians and the Politics of History, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 4, 1998, at B6 (discussing the advertisement taken out by scholars
opposing the impeachment of President Clinton).
According to the biographical data contained in the 1998-99 AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLs' DIRECrORY OF LAW TEACHERs, 130 of the 452 signers
of the law professor letter list constitutional law as among the subjects that they teach.
For this very reason, the anti-impeachment letter is cut from a different cloth than, say,
letters on bankruptcy or copyright reform. In those cases, only individuals familiar
with the letter's subject matter were allowed to sign and, consequently, some mecha-
nism was in place to screen the bona fides of letter signers.
Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 191 n.6 (1999). Sun-
stein "assume [s]" that anyone who teaches "some aspect of constitutional law as part of
their curricular responsibilities" has impeachment-related "expertise." Id. Whether or
not corporations professors who teach about corporate free speech would qualify, Sun-
stein's list of assumed experts certainly includes faculty who teach courses on church
and state, freedom of speech, or state constitutional law. Sunstein also assumes that, in
the wake of Watergate, many law professors "developed genuine, if fairly general, views
on the appropriate meaning of 'high crimes and misdemeanors.'" Id. at text accom-
panying notes 12-13. But this assumption is implausible. For some law professors (my-
self included), Watergate is a distant prepubescent memory. And for those who do
remember, there is little reason to think that their undoubtedly "genuine" views meas-
ure up to the standard of expert academic opinion (especially since perjury on a pri-
vate matter was not a critical part of the Watergate drama). See also infra notes 95-96
and accompanying text (detailing the paucity of impeachment-related expertise).
2' See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 423-24 (3d ed. 1996) (dis-
cussing constitutional standards governing impeachment). As to why so little space is
given to impeachment: Casebooks focus on case law. The substantive standards gov-
erning impeachment are a nonjusticiable political question and, consequently, there is
no case law on the subject.
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solutely no guidance in assessing the appropriateness of the Clinton
impeachment. Consequently, whether or not the question raised in
the Clinton impeachment was "close," it is doubtful that professors of
constitutional law-let alone all law professors-were well positioned
to render an expert opinion on the subjectO
At one level, the lesson here is simple. Many of the law professor
and historian signatories were animated by partisanship and self-
interest, not scholarship.3 ' Needless to say, there is a real temptation
for academics who want to be part of the fray, who want to see their
names in print, who want to tell their families that they did something
that mattered, to sign a mass letter. Other academic letter signers may
not care at all about celebrity. They may, however, care a great deal
about the President's ability to pursue his agenda. In particular, parti-
san Democrats who voted for the President and support his policies
may sign the letter for political reasons.3 As it turns out (surprise),
2 Instead, the focus of this entry is that "there is no clear answer to the central
question: What is the meaning of the phrase 'high Crimes and Misdemeanors'?" Id. at
423. More striking, the Teacher's Manual accompanying this casebook asks: "Why has
the House used the impeachment route so rarely? One might explore the possibility
that impeachment for quasi-political reasons might be a good idea .... " GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL TO CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 71 (3d ed. 1996). The
Sunstein casebook is hardly unique. Some casebooks do not mention impeachment at
all. See, e.g., DANIEL A- FARBER ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE
CONSITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998). Other casebooks dedicate only a page
or two to the topic. See, eg., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTTUrTONAL LAW 411-13 (13th ed. 1997).
'0 Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying note 4. For arguments that the
constitutional question was anything but obvious, see Klarman, supra note 24, at 657-
58, and RIcHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE (1999). See also Symposium, Back-
ground and Histoy of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 601, 601 (1999) (Foreword by
Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary) (high-
lighting divergent thinking among "academic experts" on this question). If something
is truly debatable, moreover, it is especially important that letter signers are truly ex-
perts. Otherwise, there is great risk that their conclusions simply will be a reflection of
their personal preferences. More significant, the fact that some experts do not think
the constitutional question is close does not mean that those who are not experts can
sign on as experts. For further discussion, see infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text
(arguing that law professors are not experts on all legal issues merely by virtue of their
status as law professors).
"' Sunstein recognizes that "[f]or some of the signatories, perhaps this is true."
Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying notes 12-13. Sunstein does not consider
the possibility that mass letters may register bias and, consequently, are a poor device
for communicating scholarly expertise.
"2 The fact that the academy's "A" team signed onto these letters made it easier to
join the chorus. After all, if Arthur Schlessinger, Laurence Tribe, and others are will-
ing to put their stamps of approval on these letters, there is reason to think that the
letter's argument is at least plausible.
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the academy is overwhelmingly left-liberal, overwhelmingly Demo-
cratic.33 Take the case of the law professors.3 "Only [ten] percent of
[them] characterize themselves as conservative to some degree,"30 5
while more than eighty percent of them are registered Democrats.36
Therefore, many legal academics see Kenneth Starr-who argued
against abortion rights and affirmative action as the Bush administra-
tion's Solicitor General-as their nemesis. At a panel on impeach-
ment at the 1999 American Association of Law Schools convention,
for example, law professors loudly booed when it was revealed that
one of the panelists, John McGinnis, clerked for then-D.C. Circuit
Judge Starr. For these professors, signing a letter that would place
Starr's views on impeachment "outside the legal mainstream" would
be manna from heaven.
This is not to deny that some letter signers signed on for reasons
other than partisanship.37  But it simply begs the question to "as-
sum[e]" (as do defenders of the letter-writing campaign) that dispas-
A 1989 survey by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
found that, at research universities, 67% of faculty identify themselves as liberal, and
17% identify themselves as conservative. See Seymour Martin Lipset, The Sources of Po-
litical Correctness on American Campuses, in THE IMPERI1ED ACADEMY 71, 79 (Howard
Dickman ed., 1993) (arguing that political opinions on American campuses are shift-
ing to the left). In the humanities and social sciences, less than five percent of faculty
identify themselves as conservative. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTy AND FREEDOM 272
(1999) (discussing political diversity in university faculty).
' Historians too have a reputation for left-leaning partisanship. See Thomas
Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the
Sears Cas 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (1988) (describing and analyzing "vilification"
of award-winning historian Rosalind Rosenberg for providing expert testimony for
Sears, Roebuck in a sex discrimination lawsuit).
DeborahJones Merritt, Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: AnEmpiricalExplo-
ration, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 765, 780 n.54 (1998).
36James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity, Speech to the National Association of
Scholars (Jan. 5, 1997). More striking, although 14.9% of full-time working women are
Republicans, 0.5% of women law faculty are Republicans. Id. For Pierre Schlag, it is
"[o]nly because legal scholars speak within a stratified and homogeneous community
can they present their views as the 'work of reason itself.'" Book Note, Let Us Reason
Together, 112 HARV. L. REV. 958, 959 (1999) (quoting PIERRE SCHIAG, THE
ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 38 (1998)).
37 Of the 452 letter signers, Cass Sunstein identifies three who are "not normally
characterized as 'left-liberal .... '" Sunstein, supra note 27, at note 21 and accompany-
ing text. No doubt, there are others (non-left liberals) in addition to these three. I am
equally confident, however, that the overwhelming majority of signatories are-like the
academy itself-left-liberal. Furthermore,, for some letter signers, the anti-
impeachment effort served their self-interest. Specifically, since (mostly liberal) aca-
demics embrace both "judicial activism" and "big government," the scholarship and
advocacy of academics is taken more seriously by Clinton appointees than by Republi-
cans in Congress.
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sionate expertise animated law professor signatories.ss With no evi-
dence of preexisting expertise on impeachment and with ample evi-
dence that most law professors are left-liberal Democrats, the possibil-
ity of partisanship seeping into the anti-impeachment campaign is
anything but remote. 9 For this reason, letter organizers cannot rely
on assumptions; instead, they must explain why it is that letter signers
were qualified experts. Otherwise, accusations of partisan bias (like
the one levied in this article) may well stick .
For their part, organizers of the letter-writing campaign paid far
more attention to increasing their ranks than to screening the bona
fides of letter signers. At my law school, for example, a professor of
civil procedure (and signer of the letter) sent a faculty-wide e-mail dis-
tributing the letter and explaining how to sign on to it.4 ' Through an
e-mail 42 sent to me (and most other professors of constitutional law)
by Cass Sunstein, I was also invited to sign on to a companion letter.
Although telling me that "[e]very signature really counts,"43 this invita-
This, of course, is what Cass Sunstein does in his response. For Sunstein, we
should "assume that those with whom we disagree are acting in good faith on the basis
of evidence that they honestly believe to be sufficient." Sunstein, supra note 27, at text
accompanying note 24.
39 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing political views of legal
academics, including evidence that partisanship may have figured into law professor
opposition to the Starr Report); infra notes 47, 50 and accompanying text (discussing
the role played by People for the American Way in both the historians' anti-
impeachment campaign and the law professors' campaign against Bork); infra notes
63-66 (noting the critical role played by members of Congress in spurring on academic
letter-writing campaigns).
40 And, the easier it is to typecast the academy this way, the more vulnerable the
academy is to attack. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text (arguing that
"[o]ver time, the academic ethic may give way to the view that self-interest and parti-
sanship are the coins of the academic realm").
"' The historian letter-writing campaign used e-mail. The letter's author, Sean
Wilentz of Princeton, sent the letter to 30 or 40 like-minded historians who then dis-
tributed it to their colleagues. See Mike Feinsilber, 400 Historians, Rodino Resist Im-
peachment; BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 29, 1998, at A8 (noting that Wileitz e-mailed 30 or 40
historians he thought might be dismayed at the implications of an attempt to impeach
Clinton, and within three days, 300 historians agreed to sign a statement against such
an attempt).
42A not-so-random survey of constitutional law professors suggests that individuals
disinclined to sign the e-mail were kept off the distribution list. For example, only one
of the four conservative law professors whom I contacted (Steve Calabresi, John
McGinnis, Mike Paulsen, and Eugene Volokh) had received the e-mail. Also, Mike
Gerhardt, an impeachment scholar who refused to take sides, did not receive the e-
mail.
4' E-mail from Cass Sunstein to Neal Devins (Oct. 29, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity ofPennsylvania Law Review). The text of the letter reads as follows:
The undersigned professors of law come from different political parties and
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tion did not contain any analysis to support its one-sentence recom-
mendation. Finally, through a posting on the JURIST web page, the
organizers of the law professor letter circulated a follow-up letter (that
any law professor or historian could sign) which called upon the
President to resist calls for his resignation rather than give in and al-
low his resignation to "fundamentally transform the impeachment de-
vice."44
None of these open letters made expertise a prerequisite for sign-
ing. The reason, of course, was that impeachment was too politically
charged for a letter signed by, say, twelve leading academics to make a
difference. 45 And making a difference is what letter organizers cared
most about. Along the same lines, recognizing that their individual
views on impeachment were of little consequence, letter organizers
decided that they had to act like an interest group. For this very rea-
son, letter organizers did more than gather names. They worked hard
at publicizing their efforts. Anti-impeachment historians, for exam-
ple, made effective use of a press conference to release their letter.
46
Also, with the assistance of People for the American Way, the histori-
disagree on many political and legal issues; but we agree that the possible
grounds for impeachment recently identified by Kenneth Starr and David
Schippers are not an appropriate basis for impeaching a President under Arti-
cle II, section 4 of the Constitution.
Id.
44 Bernard J. Hibbitts, Law Professors Solicit Signatures for Anti-Resignation Letter, (vis-
ited May 21, 1999) <http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/resig.htm> (quoting the letter
dated Dec. 19, 1998 from Cass Sunstein and Susan Low Bloch to teachers of history
and constitutional law).
45 In sharp contrast, some letter campaigns care most about names, not numbers.
Far from mass mailings, these letters are the province of the academy'sglitterati. Some
of these letters, moreover, are published in law reviews in an effort to shape academic
opinion. While the signers of these letters are technically coauthors of these publica-
tions, many of them have no involvement in their drafting. Witness, for example, An
Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, a statement by 17 well known scholars opposed to
proposed supermajority requirements. See An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104
YALE LJ. 1539 (1995) (urging Congressman Gingrich to reconsider his proposal to
amend the House Rules to require a three-fifths vote for enactment of laws that in-
crease income taxes). One of the letter's signers, Jed Rubenfeld, in responding to
criticisms of (but refusing to defend) the Open Letter, explained that he was a "signa-
tory, but not an author" of the letter. Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in
Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 73 (1996).
46 SeeJohn F. Harris, 400 Historians Denounce Impeachment: Case Against Clinton De-
parts From Framers' Intent for Presidency, Letter Argues, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1998, at A4
(discussing a press conference at which Arthur M. SchlesingerJr. and C. Vann Wood-
ward presented an informal coalition of historians who came to Clinton's defense with
an open letter complaining that successful proceedings against Clinton would leave
the presidency "permanently disfigured").
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ans took out a full page advertisement in The New York Times.47 Minc-
ing no words, the advertisement argued that, if the President were
convicted, the presidency would be "permanently disfigured" and the
Constitution "undermine [d]."4
While organizers of the anti-impeachment campaign made
greater use of hyperbole and technology than previous lobbying ef-
forts had, they sought inspiration and guidance from the highly suc-
cessful academic campaign against Robert Bork. The anti-Bork cam-
paign revealed what grass roots lobbyists have long known, namely,
that there is strength in numbers. How better to communicate that
Robert Bork was outside the constitutional mainstream than for 2,000
law professors openly to oppose the nomination? At first, organizers
approached law school deans and professors who had taught constitu-
tional law for five years or more ("except those who were known to be
supporting Bork"41) to join the anti-Bork campaign. This effort
proved so successful that it was expanded to all law professors. A con-
tact person at most law schools was identified and that contact person
solicited signatures from her colleagues. I was contacted this way, as
were most of my colleagues.
Partisanship, of course, figured prominently in the campaign
against Bork. To begin with, the academic campaign was spearheaded
by Ricki Seidman of People for the American Way and William Taylor
of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. ° The key to the anti-
Bork letter-writing campaign, however, was the disdain in which the
legal academy held Bork. Unlike the standards governing impeach-
47 See Nat Hentoff, An Entirely New Impeachment Case WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1999, at
A21 (noting that People for American Way assisted Historians in Defense of the Con-
stitution by enabling the list price of the New York Times advertisement to be reduced
from $75,948 to $56,000).
48 Historians in Defense of the Constitution, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1998, at A17.
4 NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE
BORKAND THE POLrrcIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 143-44 (1998). For further
discussion, see infra note 109 (discussing Sunstein's view that people should only sign
petitions if they can defend the relevant position publicly but that they need not neces-
sarily defend their positions as academics).
50 See MARK GrIENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF
AmRICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK's NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT 160
(1992) (noting that Seidman and Taylor led the "effort among the anti-Bork forces to
recruit academics"). These two had previously coordinated a similar (but unsuccess-
ful) campaign against Daniel Manion, a conservative nominated to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. See id. (indicating that, while Seidman and Taylor had "little trouble
drumming up opposition" to Manion's nomination in academic circles, Manion's
nomination was ultimately approved with a one-vote margin).
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ment, Bork's theories were well known to many academics."' Never-
theless, it is doubtful that experts in commercial law, evidence, tax, se-
curities, and the like were well versed in Bork's theories. Rather,
many academics unfamiliar with Bork's writings opposed him because
of where he would take the Court and because they feared that Bork's
confirmation would strengthen the then burgeoning Federalist Soci-
ety and, with it, the power of conservatives in the legal academy.52 In
other words, left-leaning academics saw Bork as a threat to their status
and influence. In particular, his confirmation would make their
scholarship and advocacy less relevant because his views did not mesh
with their own. Bork, moreover, antagonized many legal academics
during his tour of duty in the Nixon Justice Department, which in-
cluded the firing of Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox and
the pursuit of Nixon's vendetta against Warren Court liberalism. 3
Partisan letter-writing campaigns are likely to continue, especially
among legal academics. Not only are these letters highly visible and
somewhat influential, but they also allow the rank and file of the
academy to join forces with the academy's glitterati in a common
cause. What better way to make oneself part of the "A" team than to
sign off on the constitutional analysis of Ackerman, Sunstein, Tribe,
51 For this reason, many of the people who signed letters opposing the nomination
did so, in part, because they thought Bork's writings were too rigid and too self-
righteous for him to succeed on the Court. An excellent treatment of this subject
(which does not pass judgment on whether or not Bork should have been confirmed)
can be found in ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER 27-43
(1994), which discusses Bork's relationship with what his critics defined as the main-
stream, and more specifically, how Bork's "critics define the mainstream in terms of
principle and accuse Bork of standing outside it as a covert practitioner of conservative
politics throughjudicial power." Id. at 30.
12 See GrTENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 161 (noting that professors were concerned
about the possibility of Bork's appointment because they saw him as a symbol of the
unraveling of the civil rights and civil liberties the Supreme Court had expanded over
the previous 30 years). For Bork, that battle over his confirmation pitted "left-liberal"
"intellectual class values" against populists (like him?) who believe in the primacy of
elections. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 337 (1990) ("The battle
was ultimately about whether intellectual class values, which are far more egalitarian
and socially permissive, which is to say left-liberal, than those of the public at large and
so cannot carry elections, were to continue to be enacted into law by the Supreme
Court.") (footnote omitted).
s' For a provocative argument that anti-Bork academics had a moral duty to oppose
the nomination of Anthony Kennedy (but did not do so because they held a grudge
against Bork and only Bork), see George Kannar, Citizenship and Scholarship, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2017, 2060-61 (1990) (book review) (arguing that the American public's inter-
est in making fully informed decisions-even wrong ones-required legal scholars who
had opposed Bork's nomination to take what was a nonconformist stand and publicly
oppose Kennedy's nomination).
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and the like? Along these lines, Richard Posner described the law
professor anti-impeachment letter as "a form of herd behavior (the
'herd of independent minds') by the animal that likes to see its name
in print."" The appeal of letter writing, moreover, is fueled by the
proliferation of media outlets and, with it, the opportunity for many
academics to achieve their fifteen minutes of fame. Today, academics
seek fame through talk show appearances, op-ed pieces, and trade
press books.s In this era of sound bite scholarship, it is little wonder
that being part of the story is far more appealing than writing about it
some years later.
In contrast, there is a growing perception among academics that
court-ordered social reform is a hollow hope. s Relatedly, the continu-
ing conservatism of the Supreme Court and of many federal courts of
appeal suggests that law review scholarship calling for novel judicial
solutions to social problems will fall on deaf ears.57 Perhaps for this
'" PosNER, supra note 30, at 242. Some of the letter's signatories, of course, signed
on because their analysis of both the constitutional standards governing impeachment
and the Starr Report convinced them that the President's conduct did not warrant re-
moval from office. Many academics did not sign on to the letter because they thought
it unduly partisan. Nevertheless,Judge Posner is correct in referring to the herd men-
tality of the legal academy. A significant portion of the legal academic community
signed on to these letters without independent knowledge of the constitutional stan-
dards governing impeachment. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the possible political motivations and constitutional expertise of academics who
signed letters about impeaching Clinton). Rather than stand as a roadblock to such
partisanship, cultural norms within the academy encouraged these letter signers to see
themselves as an interest group, not as free thinkers committed to the pursuit of truth.
See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing how letter organizers cared
only about increasing the number of signatories); infra notes 87-94 and accompanying
text (discussing the strong incentives of hegemony within the academy).
ss I agree with Cass Sunstein that none of these things is inappropriate. See Sun-
stein, supra note 27, at text accompanying notes 4-11. Like Sunstein, I also think it is
perfectly fine for academics (through testimony, letter writing, whatever) to speak as
experts before Congress. But academics should only speak as experts about matters on
which they have invested the time and energy necessary to hold themselves out as ex-
perts. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (contrasting Sunstein's definition
of academic experience from my own).
6 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoxLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991) ("U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of
significant social reform. At best, they can second the social reform acts of the other
branches of government.").
s1 For left-leaning academics, populist constitutional discourse is now preferred to
Court-centered social policymaking. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-6 (1999) (identifying and advocating
the current Court's "judicial minimalism"); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURT 181-82 (1999) (explaining constitutional law
as a populist narrative and advocating a populist constitutional legal system based on
1999]
178 UNIVERS17Y OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:165
reason, a 1998 report of the Twentieth Century Fund deemed letter-
writing an essential ingredient of its social reform agenda." For the
most part, these campaigns, like the academy itself, advance liberal
causes.59 Indeed, conservatives are best off not going head-to-head
against liberal letter writers. Why gather 100 signatures in support of
Bork, as did the right of center Ad Hoc Committee for Principled Dis-
cussion of Constitutional Issues?G A twenty-to-one disparity, rather
than serve as effective counter-speech, will simply prove an embar-
rassmentYL  With that said, right-of-center interests are still likely to
the Constitution and Declaration of Independence); Robin West, The Aspirational Con-
stitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 241, 245-46 (1993) (acknowledging that while such a shift is
unlikely to occur, it would constitute a shift from a judicially-enforced Constitution of
limits to a congressionally-enforced Constitution of aspirations and would help mod-
em progressive causes). For conservatives the legal academy has only itself to blame:
"it has become a heavily normative body of advocacy scholarship targeted at the federal
courts with the goal of influencing them to do things that they are extremely unlikely
to do in the current political and social climate." Steven G. Calabresi, The Crisis in Con-
stitutional Theoy, 83 VA. L. REV. 247, 266 (1997) (reviewing LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN &
MARKV. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF (1996)).
58 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND WORKING GROUP ON - CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LITIGATION, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, 100-01 (1998) (referring to a letter sent by more than
200 legal academics on campaign finance reform and contending that legal scholars
could play a critical role in campaign finance reform by signing on to such state-
ments).
59 Up until now, the most visible letters have all advanced left of center causes: af-
firmative action, abortion rights, international human rights, the defeat of conservative
judicial nominees, the defeat of supermajority rules, and the defeat of the Clinton im-
peachment. No doubt, as Sunstein argues in his response, the principles enunciated
in the anti-impeachment letter would apply to a future Republican president. See gen-
erally Sunstein, supra note 27, at note 5 (contending that the academics involved in
congressional discussions of the possibility of impeaching Clinton were not working
"for" or "with" the White House). But would Cass Sunstein organize a letter-writing
campaign to save, say, Ronald Reagan? And if he did, would the same 452 law profes-
sors sign on? See Sunstein, supra note 27, at note 19 (recognizing that it is possible but
speculative that personal opinion would affect letter-writing campaigns).
60 This letter, sent to Senators Robert C. Byrd and Robert Dole, is reprinted in 133
CONG. REc. S28853 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). With respect to impeachment, a coali-
tion of 96 academics and former government officials, including Bork, William
Bennett, and Edwin Meese, wrote to Congress that the Starr Report did, in fact, sup-
port the President's impeachment. See Don't Let the President Lie With Impunity, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at A22 (reprinting a letter signed by academics, lawyers, and for-
mer government officials which was distributed to the House Judiciary Committee and
urged the House of Representatives to impeach Clinton). Needless to say, my criticism
of the anti-Bork and anti-impeachment letter-writing campaigns might well apply to
the pro-Bork and pro-impeachment campaigns. In particular, if signatories signed on
as non-expert partisans, those signatories (and quite possibly the organizers of these
campaigns) would have violated the academic ethic.
61 Indeed, the 100 or so pro-Bork, pro-impeachment letter signers were so out-
numbered that they appeared well outside of the mainstream and, consequently,
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launch some letter-writing campaigns. Like anti-Bork and anti-
impeachment academics, conservative activists may well seek strength
in numbers, not academic expertise. For example, inJune 1999, a let-
ter opposing proposed gun control legislation was distributed to law
professors and other academics over e-mail. Recipients of this e-mail
were told: "If everyone who we are sending this to can get even a
couple other people in your department to sign this, we will end up
with well over a few hundred signatures."6 2 It did not matter whether
possible signatories were well versed in the particulars of proposed
legislation, in the "real costs" of waiting periods, or anything else.
Like the anti-Bork and anti-impeachment letters, expertise played
second fiddle to the bottom line, that is, to sending an effective politi-
cal message.
The question remains: Why are these letters taken seriously?
While it never referred to the lobbying efforts of People for the
American Way, the NAACP, or pro-choice activists, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee's report on Robert Bork trumpeted the views of legal
academics. Likewise, the President and his supporters singled out the
historian and law professor letters. Is the myth of academic expertise
a drug that somehow blinds policymakers to the partisanship of (at
least some) academic letter signers?
Not at all. Politicians and their staffers know full well that the citi-
zen scholars who send these letters often have a political ax to grind.
In fact, rather than being duped by make-believe academic experts,
elected officials sometimes sponsor these missives! Two years ago,
CongressmanJohn Conyers's office asked me to join a "community of
concerned legal scholars" in writing to Congress about intelligence
spending.63 The draft letter was addressed to none other than Con-
gressman Conyers. Equally striking (and far more significant), Senate
looked especially politically motivated.
62 E-mail fromJohn R. Lott, Jr. to James Lindgren (June 3, 1999) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
63 Draft Letter to Congressman Conyers, United States House of Representatives
(June 1997) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). I was asked to sign
on because a friend suggested my name to Conyers's office. Although Conyers's office
was coordinating this letter-signing campaign, potential signatories were directed to
contact the Center for International Policy. I do not know whether the Center for In-
ternational Policy's involvement was a subterfuge, intended to conceal Conyers's in-
volvement.
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Judiciary Committee chair and Bork foe Joseph Biden asked Chris
Schroeder, a law professor working for the committee, to help drum
up law professor opposition to Bork.6 Three other law professors
working with Biden-Walter Dellinger, Philip Kurland, and Laurence
Tribe-negotiated with People for the American Way over the text of
the law professor letter.65 Along the same lines, members of Congress
were actively involved in at least one of the law professors' anti-
impeachment letters. The invitation to join the ranks of letter signers
made clear that the letter was consequential because "[s]ome mem-
bers of the House of Representatives have suggested that it would be
very valuable for the House to hear from a large group of teachers of
constitutional law on the impeachment issue."r
For anti-impeachment House members and anti-Bork Senators,
academic letters were a kind of salve. Rather than appear overly ideo-
logical and overly partisan, lawmakers can take cover in a letter signed
by a thousand or more academics. 7 In contrast, a letter submitted by
the AFL-CIO, the National Abortion Rights Action League, or (for
that matter) the Family Research Council would call attention to, not
cloak, possible biases.68 In other words, rather than affect the thinking
" See GrTENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 161 ("Chris Schroeder, at Biden's direction,
spent much of the late summer and early fall of 1987 on the phone with scores of law
professors.").
See id. at 161 ("By late August, Seidman had negotiated the text of a letter ac-
ceptable to Kurland, Tribe, and Dellinger, and began to circulate it.").
6 Sunstein, supra note 43 (quoting one of the letters signed by anti-impeachment
law professors and sent to Congress). Sunstein never says who these members of Con-
gress are, if he responded to the requests of both Democratic and Republican leader-
ship, or, alternatively, if the letter-writing campaign was the brainchild of one or the
other side.
67 Lawmakers likewise can take cover behind academics who testify at hearings.
These academics often are contacted because they can be counted on to state a posi-
tion that supports the person who invited them to testify, usually the ranking majority
or minority member of a committee or subcommittee. For example, before I was
asked to testify about line-item veto legislation, a Senate Judiciary staff member called
me to confirm that I still subscribed to a position articulated in an article of mine.
Along the same lines, it was no accident that Republican witnesses at the House im-
peachment hearings testified that the President's conduct was impeachable whereas
Democratic witnesses testified that it was not. See Hearings, supra note 6 (suggesting
that the split on whether the President's conduct was impeachable was primarily along
party lines).
63 For this very reason, interest group representatives were not called on to testify
at the Bork confirmation hearings. Rather, "numerous witnesses from the legal acad-
emy presented the Senators with the same critique of Bork that the interest groups
would have offered, but from a more 'disinterested' perspective...." Kannar, supra
note 53, at 2041. See also Mary McGrory, The Supreme Sacrifice, WASH. PosT, Oct. 6,
1987, at A2 (recounting the Democrats' strategy of not calling upon members of inter-
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of politicians, academic letter-writing enables politicians to offer high-
minded reasons for saying and doing what they otherwise would have
said and done. Consider, for example, the anti-impeachment letters.
The votes in the House and the Senate were on largely partisan lines.6
It simply strains credibility to believe that the law professors' and his-
torians' letters moved fence sitters one or the other way. What these
letters did do, however, was to enable the President's defenders to tell
the public that their votes were cast for nonpartisan reasons (the Start
Report did not state sufficient grounds for impeachment), not for
partisan reasons (Democrats need to stick together).
Here, I think, is where the true significance of these letters lies.
Politicians feed off of these letters because of the so-called academic
ethic, that is, the notion that "the first obligation of the university
teacher is to the truth.""0 Academics, likewise, feed off of this reputa-
tion in justifying these letter-writing campaigns. "We law professors
are free from a client's interest, free from a place in a hierarchy, free
to say exactly what we think," explained Barbara Babcock, a former
Carter Administration Justice Department official and signer of both
the Bork and impeachment letters.7 ' For Sean Wilentz, principal
drafter of the historians' letter, "[tihis is not a political effort at
all.... [It is] historians speaking as historians."7 Likewise, Susan
Bloch and Jed Rubenfeld, two of the organizers of the law professors'
letter, spoke of their efforts as "nonpartisan"7 and of the need for le-
gal academics "to come out of our comfortable law review role to
make a point."7'
Letter organizers, whether or not they believe their own rhetoric,
have no choice but to perpetuate this myth. Otherwise, their missives
est groups to testify against Bork's confirmation).
69 See Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, Clinton Acquited, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at
Al (noting the partisanship present in the vote on the perjury and obstruction ofjus-
tice charges); Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
1998, at Al (noting that vote on the first article of impeachment was "largely along
party lines").
70 SHILS, supra note 17, at 49.
7' RonaldJ. Ostrow &James Gerstenzang, Bork's Shifting Views on Law Worry Senators,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987, at Al.
72 Deb Price, Historians Seek an End of Drive to Impeach, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 29,
1998, at A12.
73 Interview by Kristin Abramson with Professor Susan Bloch, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, Law Professors Send Letter Opposing Impeachment: A Conversation with Let-
ter Sponsor Professor Susan Bloch (visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.jurist.law.
pitt.edu/bloch.htm>.74 Janet Hook, Pro-Impeachment Chorus Hopes to Change Tune of Lawmakers, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, at A5.
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would be no different than those of interest groups who wear their
partisanship on their sleeves. But there is good reason to doubt
whether academics still think of themselves as truth seekers. In par-
ticular, the traditional image of the academic has given way to "post-
modernism, multiculturalism, and political correctness." 5 Conse-
quently, rather than see these letter-writing campaigns as a departure
from their scholarly endeavors, many academics increasingly see
scholarship and partisanship as inextricably linked v6 In this way, the
willingness of academics (who know next to nothing about impeach-
ment) to sign on to an anti-impeachment letter is understandable.
For similar reasons, tax and commercial law experts did not blink
when signing a letter condemningJudge Bork's interpretive theories."
Specifically, if non-self-interested knowledge does not exist, it is un-
avoidable that academics will embrace one partisan position or an-
David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?, 86 CAL. L. REV.
1377, 1378 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menand ed.,
1996)). For this very reason, defenders of academic freedom no longer speak of im-
partial scholars discovering objective truths; instead, as Ronald Dworkin puts it, aca-
demic freedom concerns the fundamental ethical "responsibility of [academics] to
find and tell and teach the truth as they see it." Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Inter-
pretation of Academic Freedom, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 190 (Louis
Menand ed., 1996); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values
in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1363 (1988) (contending'that academic
truth seeking is compromised by corporate and government funding of research).
76 Before postmodernism, of course, legal realists argued that constitutional inter-
pretation is inescapably value-laden and, as such, that constitutional analysis would al-
ways be driven by "a particular set of policy preferences that cannot be distinguished
from the preferences expressed in other political forums." LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN &
MARK V. TusHNET, REMNANTS OF BETIEF 42 (1996); see also James 0. Freedman, The
Bully Lectern, HARV. MAG.,Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 36, 36-37 (discussing some of the ways that
early twentieth-century college presidents involved themselves in the world of politics).
Perhaps more significant, many academics who sign letters do so for reasons that have
nothing to do with post-modernism. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (de-
tailing some of the reasons, other than agreement with the letters' underlying reason-
ing, why academics signed onto the anti-impeachment letter).
77 It is true, however, that tax and commercial law scholars (if they inquired) could
spot substantial deviations between Bork's constitutional views and those of their lib-
eral constitutional law colleagues. For this reason, tax and commercial law scholars
could place Bork outside of the constitutional mainstream within the academy. But
the claim of the anti-Bork campaign was that Bork was outside of the constitutional
mainstream as defined not just by the academy, but as defined by the Supreme Court.
Here, some expertise about differences between Bork's writings (including his deci-
sions as a D.C. Circuitjudge) and Supreme Court decision making would be required.
More to the point, anti-Bork letter signers would need to be able to explain why it is
that White House claims that Bork's writings were within the mainstream were incor-
rect. See The White House Report: Information on Judge Bork's QualificationsJudicial Record
& Related Subjects, reprinted in 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 187, 188 (1987) (describing why Bork
should be considered in the "mainstream of American jurisprudence").
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other.
This postmodernist dilemma is especially acute in the legal acad-
emy. Compare, for example, the academy's reaction to conflicting ar-
guments over the attainability of truth through legal scholarship.
When Michael Seidman and Mark Tushnet wrote that it is "apparent
to everyone [that all constitutional] arguments can [and will] be ma-
nipulated to advance the particular policy goal of the advocate who
makes them," no one rose up to complain. 8 In contrast, Paul Car-
rington prompted a near crisis in the academy by arguing that law
professors should believe that law and legal texts matter.7
This discomfort with truth-seeking is easily explained. Unlike
chemistry or psychology, law is not a science.80 Instead, lawyers trans-
late the knowledge, experience, and expertise of other professionals."'
SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 76, at 90. In assessing this claim, Steve
Calabresi suggested that the cause of the problem was not the unattainability of truth
but the desire of legal academics to use their scholarship to advance normative objec-
tives. See Calabresi, supra note 57, at 266 ("[Tjhe real explanation for the loss in pres-
tige of constitutional scholarship is that it has become a heavily normative body of ad-
vocacy scholarship targeted at the federal courts... .").
See "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35J. LEGAL EDuC.
1 (1985) (reprinting the correspondences among legal academics in response to Paul
D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984)). A similar uproar
was caused by the publication of DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL
REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997), a book which
assails critical race theory and other "outsider scholarship." For representative reviews
of Farber and Sherry's book, see Kathryn Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U.
CHL. L. REV. 1091, 1126 (1998) (book review) (judging the work to be "flawed and in-
flammatory"); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of Manners: How to Conduct a Conversa-
tion on Race-Standing Imperial Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEO. LJ. 1051, 1054-72
(1998) (book review) (criticizing the attack by Farber and Sherry on critical race the-
ory and suggesting ways to hold discussions on these issues); and Richard A. Posner,
The Skin Trade, NEW REPUB., Oct. 13, 1997, at 40, 43 (praising the work as "a fine book,
a work of intelligence and courage that will alter the terms of debate in academic
law"). See generally, Symposium, Essays in Response to Beyond All Reason, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 1589 (1999).
so During the late nineteenth century, Christopher Langdell and others sought to
make law a science through the categorization of decisional law. See C.C. LANGDELL, A
SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871) ("Law, considered as a sci-
ence, consists of certain principles or doctrines."). This effort, of course, proved un-
successful. SeeThomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1983)
(describing the 15ractical problems judges and lawyers encountered with Langdell's
method).
81 See E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L
REV. 38, 38 (1985) ("[Law] grows by feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing
new ones of its own."). But see Charles Fried, The Articial Reason of the Law or. What
Laurters Know, 60 TEx. L. REV. 35, 38 (1981) ("[L]aw is a relatively autonomous subject,
and.., rights will be best and most reasonably respected if reasoning about them goes
forward within its special discipline.").
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Thanks to the adversary system, moreover, partisanship figures
prominently in that translation. Legal academics then have good rea-
son to see themselves as being in the business of making arguments.
That is what they were trained to do, and that is what they teach their
students to do. That their scholarship also would be argumentative
812comes as no surprise. The surprise, instead, is that the academic
ethic is sufficiently strong to provide them with cover for such en-
deavors.
Whether or not traditional notions of truth exist, academics
should still understand that pretending to have an expert opinion on
something they know next to nothing about is a deception. Postmod-
ernism helps explain but does not excuse this deceit. Another source
of this deceit, ironically, is the special place of academics in our con-
stitutional order. Linked to the academics' reputation as truth seek-
ers, academic freedom empowers academics to speak out on public
issues without sanction. For this reason, academics sometimes see
themselves as supercitizens, entitled to speak out on issues by virtue of
their status.
Membership in the academy, however, has its responsibilities as
well as its rewards.ss Advocacy for advocacy's sake, while certainly enti-
82 Anthony Kronman, in an effort to combat the confluence of scholarship and
advocacy, argued that "law teachers have a moral responsibility" to pursue truth in
their scholarship. Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Educa-
tion, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 967 (1981). Otherwise, their students will see all law as advocacy
"which in turn encourages a cynical carelessness about the truth, thus undermining
the important good of community." Id. For this very reason, I disagree with Cass Sun-
stein's attempt to portray all legal academics as potential experts on any (law-related)
subject. Instead, speaking (as a "scholar" or "professor") on a politically hot issue re-
quires particular expertise beyond being a lawyer or law professor. See infra notes 95-96
and accompanying text (questioning Sunstein's definition of academic expertise).
One of the responsibilities of the academic, according to Edward Shils, is "the
obligation not to betray the trust which is given to him when laymen look to him for
objective knowledge and responsible judgment." SHILs, supra note 17, at 106. This
traditional view is echoed by the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP), which argues that academics "should remember that the public mayjudge his
profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accu-
rate, should exercise appropriate restraint, [and] should show respect for the opinion
of others." ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 132 (Louis Joughin ed., 1969) (quoting
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, available in American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments (visited Oct. 26, 1999)
<http://www.aaup.org/1940stat.htm>). Along the same lines, the AAUP Statement on
Professors and Political Activity specifies that faculty members "should be free to en-
gage in political activities so far as they are able to do so consistently with their obliga-
tions as teachers and scholars." AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY
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fled to constitutional protection, is not entitled to the special protec-
tions of academic freedom. More precisely, the Supreme Court's will-
ingness to treat academic free speech as more important than other
free speech claims is linked to an academic's fiduciary duty to main-
tain "standard[s] of professional integrity."84 Put another way, aca-
demic freedom is a quid pro quo. On the one hand, it protects aca-
demics from outside political pressures. On the other hand, it is a
"contingent privilege"justified by an academic's willingness to be held
accountable at a "professional level for the ethical integrity of his
work."t s
But do the responsibilities of academic freedom attach to joint let-
ters? After all, no one expects that each and every signatory has
played a hand in the letter's drafting. For similar reasons, it is to be
expected that many signatories agree with the conclusions but not the
reasoning of the letters they sign." Moreover, with the academy's glit-
terati spearheading these letter-writing campaigns, it is to be expected
that some signatories (who care that the letter's reasoning be well
thought out but know nothing about impeachment, gun control, or
whatever) sign on because they assume that these leading lights would
87not lead them astray. Finally, some signatories consider the letter's
reasoning beside the point. Their signature, instead, is about parti-
sanship and nothing else. Being able to explain why academics (who
cannot defend the reasoning of these letters) sign these missives does
not justify this practice. Rather, these letters go out of their way to
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 33 (7th ed. 1990).
William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of
Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 71 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed.,
1972); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (distinguishing aca-
demic freedom from political expression); Glenn R. Morrow, Academic Freedom, in 1
THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 4, 6 (David L. Sills ed.,
1968) ("Thejustification of academic freedom cannot be based merely on the right to
freedom of thought.... The justification of academic freedom must therefore be
sought in the peculiar character and function of the university scholar."). For an up-
date of Supreme Court academic freedom decisions, see David M. Rabban, A Func-
tional Analysis of Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amend-
ment, LAW & CoNmp. PRoas., Summer 1990, at 227 (analyzing recent Supreme
Court decisions concerning different forms of academic freedom).
Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 76. In his response, Sunstein claims that I do not
discuss what academic freedom is for. I respectfully disagree. See supra notes 15-18, 82-
83 and accompanying text (arguing that academic freedom encourages academics to
think independently and to seek truth).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (illustrating that signatories do not
necessarily agree with the texts of the letters they sign).
See supra note 32 (noting that it is easier to sign a letter written by someone you
admire).
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make clear that they are sending a professional, not a political, mes-
sage. Writing as "scholars,'ss "historians,"" "law professors,"9 and
"teachers of constitutional law,"91 these letters tout the self-described
academic expertise of their signatories. While it is to be expected that
the academics signing these letters support the outcomes they advo-
cate, it is not to be expected that many of them cannot defend (and
may well not support) the letters' reasoning. Indeed, it is the reason-
ing of academics-not the conclusions they reach-which justifies
academic freedom. It is therefore a perversion of academic freedom
to treat professional expressions of expert opinion as nothing more
than a plebiscite of personal preferences.
Widespread abuses of academic freedom, unfortunately, now
seem to be a fixture of the modem academy. Most tellingly, academ-
ics are likely to do a poor job of checking their own excesses. Peer re-
view-the mechanism by which the academy polices itself-requires
an openness to different ways of thinking. But with more than three-
fourths of the legal academy "characteriz[ing] themselves as 'moder-
ately' or 'strongly' liberal or left,"92 there are strong incentives to agree
with prevailing norms. In part, the hegemony within the academy en-
sures that like-thinking individuals will validate the arguments of other
like-thinking individuals (no matter how sound or silly they may be).
93
This is especially true among academics who think that power, not
truth, holds the key to governmental reform. For these individuals,
what matters most is that the right result is reached. In other words,
rather than encourage counterspeech, the academy and, with it, peer
8' Scholars' Statement, supra note 11, at 1712.
89 Hearings, supra note 6, at 334-39.
9 Id. at 374-83.
9' Sunstein, supra note 43.
9Merritt, supra note 35, at 780 n.54.
93 For Pierre Schlag, the sameness of viewpoints and methodologies among legal
academics explains why law professors all agree that flag burning laws are unconstitu-
tional. But outside the legal academy, say, before an American Legion in Des Moines,
the "deployment of the scam will probably not work very well." PIERRE SCHLAG, THE
ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 35 (1998). Within the academy, moreover, there is a real
risk of opprobrium for those who do not toe the company line. For example, after
publishing articles that questioned the efficacy of critical race scholarship and the
purported arrival of the "Asian American Moment" in legal scholarship, the Harvard
and Iowa law reviews published symposia filled with condemnatory essays. See generally
Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1844 (1990); Colloquy, 81 IOWAL. REV. 1467 (1996). I must confess that, as I
write these words, I feel the pressure of nonconformity bearing down on me. By taking
to task a significant chunk of the legal academy for their behavior in advancing (within
the academy) politically popular causes, I too may find myself in a hornets' nest.
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review may well impose "sharp limits on the range of respectable opin-
ion within its ranks."9
What does it mean to speak as an academic exper? Is it enough,
as defenders of the anti-impeachment letter argue, that an academic
"believed that they knew enough" by speaking with other academics
who "probably believed that they knew enough... ?"95 If this is true,
every law professor can speak as an expert on any issue. Take the re-
cent Microsoft antitrust case. Based on my watching of television
news, my conversations with colleagues, and my fuzzy (almost two
decades old) recollection of an antitrust class, I might believe that I
know enough to develop "genuine, if fairly general, views"9 on the le-
gality of Microsoft's practices. Ditto the decisions of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and the National Labor Relations
Board. According to this view, by reading the newspaper and hanging
out in the faculty lounge, I can hold myself out as an expert on all
these things.
This recalibration of what it means to be an academic expert
comes at a price. Over time, the academic ethic may give way to the
view that self-interest and partisanship are the coins of the academic
realm. Conservative critics of the academy have worked hard at por-
traying it "as a taxpayer-financed bunker inhabited by an army of
Birkenstock-shod Marxists." 97 And these critics have achieved more
than a modicum of success. A recent crop of books (includinglliberal
Education,95 The Closing of the American Mind,9 Impostors in the Temple,'
GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE MAR.RETLACE 68 (enlarged ed.
1984). For this reason, Stigler argues that academic freedom must look "inward," so
that the academy is protected from its own corrupting influences as well as those of
outsiders. See also Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, in 1 ENCYcLOPEDIA OF THE
SoCiALScENCEs 384 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1930) (stating that academic freedom
is "rendered impossible if the work of the investigator is shackled by the requirement
that his conclusions" conform to prevailing norms); David M. Rabban, Does Academic
Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy, 66 TEX. L REV. 1405, 1407-08 (1988) (arguing that
peer review should limit faculty autonomy).
95 Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying note 13.
Id. at text accompanying notes 12-13.
Suarez, supra note 3, at B8.
DINESH D'SOuzA, ILIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMPUS (1991).
AL BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION
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Telling the Truth,101 and ProfScam'0) have argued that political correct-
ness, like-minded thinking, and intolerance have corrupted the aca-
demic ethic. Columnists David Broder and Nat Hentoff, as well as
Judge Richard Posner, condemned the impeachment letter-writing
campaign for this very reason. 03 Whether this criticism will undercut
the saliency of future letter-writing campaigns remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, the academy has good reason to fear the perception that
it is filled with citizen partisans, not citizen scholars. Not only will
academic freedom suffer a body blow, professors will be handicapped
in their efforts to affect public discourse through their scholarship."'
Aside from becoming irrelevant, the academy runs another risk.
Over the past few years, social conservatives have urged donors and
university trustees to play more active roles in the life of the academy.
Among other things, trustees and donors have been urged to combat
political correctness and moral relativism.0 5 And some trustees and
donors are listening to this message. At Virginia's George Mason Uni-
versity, for example, faculty have castigated the school's board of trus-
tees for trying to impose a conservative political agenda. Specifically,
by shifting funds to programs with a conservative reputation and by
dissolving a nontraditional educational program, these trustees (all
HAS FAILED DEMOCRACYAND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS (1987).
"o MARTIN ANDERSON, IMPOSToRS IN THE TEMPLE (1992).
'01 LYNNE V. CHENEY, TELLING THE TRUTH: WHY OUR CULTURE AND OUR COUNTRY
HAVE STOPPED MAKING SENSE-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1995).
102 CHARLES J. SYKES, PROFSCAM: PROFESSORS AND THE DEMISE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (1988).
103 See Posner, supra note 30, at 240-42 (likening the law professors' campaign to "a
form of herd behavior"); David S. Broder, The Historians' Complain WASH. POST, Nov.
1, 1998, at C7 (arguing that some activist academics, including organizers of the histo-
rians' letter, risk looking "ridiculous" by "heedlessly" plunging into political debate);
Nat Hentoff, Breeding Contempt for the Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1998, at A21 (depict-
ing the signers of the historians' letter as a "herd" who employed "embarrassingly con-
torted reasoning").
104 For those who see elitist discourse as harmful to the commonwealth, of course,
this changing image of the academy will be salutory. See BORK, supra note 52, at 337
(arguing that the public explosion at Bork's nomination was driven by liberals at issue
with a more conservative general public); NAGEL, supra note 51, at 27-43 (arguing that
the legal culture is properly concerned with ideas, but the political culture is con-
cerned with the consequences of ideas, as seen within the Bork Supreme Court nomi-
nation hearings); SCHLAG, supra note 93, at 35-38 (arguing that legal thinkers tend to
be almost entirely center-left democrats and it is not surprising when they all agree).
103 See ANDERSON, supra note 100, at 194-206 (arguing that university trustees sel-
dom use their potential power and leadership effectively); NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR
THE HUMANITIES, TELLING THE TRUTH 49-51 (1992) (arguing that although trustees of
universities seldom use their authority to exercise leadership, they should exert more
influence on colleges and universities).
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but one of whom were appointed by conservative Republican gover-
nors) have broken ranks with university administrators.'6Will other
trustees follow George Mason's lead? Perhaps not. But the more po-
litical the academy is perceived, the more likely it.is that governors will
appoint political trustees.
It may be that this is the fate the academy deserves. After all, the
partisanship and misdirection of some academic letter-writing cam-
paigns contradicts some of the most basic tenets of academic freedom.
More fundamentally, the willingness of so many academics to pawn off
fake knowledge suggests that the conditions supporting academic
freedom have dissipated. Among other things, it is difficult to square
academic freedom with ideological conformity, the adverit of post-
modernism, the rise of sound bite scholarship, and, especially at law
schools, the nexus between celebrity status and partisanship. What is
truly amazing here is that the academy is risking so much to accom-
plish so little. In the cases of Bork and impeachment, for example,
the battle lines were drawn before the academics entered the fray.
More than anything, the academic participants in these wars were
stage props-brought into the drama to demonstrate that politicians
take the Constitution seriously.
What then can the academy do to rescue itself?. To start, academ-
ics ought not to remove themselves from the world of politics. The
very reason that academics possess tenure, academic freedom, and the
like is so they may speak "truth to power."10 7 Academics, however,
must be cautious in their utterances. It is not enough, for example,
that some of their colleagues might "indulge a principle of charity"
that would allow them to express an expert opinion without toiling
with research, writing, and the like.18 The price of academic freedom
is that scholars must use reason, thought, and care in defending their
positions, whether political or not. Devices that allow academics to
register positions without doing the necessary work undermine aca-
demic freedom for all. When it comes to letter writing, for example,
academics should only sign letters that they could (if asked to) defend
in public.'9 Beyond letter writing, academics should embrace both
'06 See Victoria Benning, Faculty, Board Clash at George Mason, WASH. POST, May 21,
1999, at B1 (reporting that the George Mason University faculty is battling with the
university trustees over the trustees' conservative political agenda).
107 Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 28. Moreover, with the Supreme Court signaling
its disinclination to reshape society through sweepingjudicial edicts, it is sensible that
legal academics would pay more attention to elected government reforms.
'03 Sunstein, supra note 27, at text accompanying note 24.
" In his response, Sunstein claims that he "emphatically" agrees with me that
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ideological diversity and dialectic reasoning (where each thesis is chal-
lenged by a counter-thesis). ° That way the academy can better live
up to its marketplace-of-ideas reputation.
Politically motivated academics must come to grips with a grim re-
ality, that "[i]n a world where there are no rules of scholarship or
journalism or evidence, where everything is opinion and all opinions
are alike, the market wins.""' That market, of course, is far more con-
servative than the academy. For this very reason, politically motivated
academics should see academic freedom as a bunker from which to
fight battles, not as a relic of times past. But to preserve academic
freedom, politically motivated academics must honor it, not abuse it.
For their part, academics who steer clear of partisan causes-that is,
most academics-must hold their politically active colleagues ac-
countable for abusing academic freedom. Otherwise, they too will pay
the price of membership in a once-revered profession increasingly
held in disrepute.
112
"academics should not sign letters that they could not defend publicly." Sunstein, su-
pra note 27, at text accompanying note 32. For Sunstein, however, it is not necessary
that they could defend these positions as academics-i.e., defend the substance of the
letter with a commanding knowledge of the relevant sources. See supra notes 94-96,
108 and accompanying text (discussing what it means to be an academic expert).
"10 One way of encouraging such diversity, of course, is to hire professors
who-because of academic training or ideology--see the world differently from one
another. At the least, academics should share their work (in draft) with individuals
who may well disagree with them. For this reason, the screening out of likely naysayers
from letter writers' distribution lists is inappropriate. See supra notes 42, 49 and ac-
companying text (suggesting that organizers of the anti-Bork and anti-impeachment
letters did not circulate those letters to likely naysayers).
" Mary Schweitzer, Letter to the Editor, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 17, 1998, at
B3.
112 For this very reason, the academics who suffer the greatest harm from purely
political letter-writing campaigns are those who only sign letters on subjects on which
they are experts (and organizers of mass letters who limit signatories to individuals
who have subject matter expertise).
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CASS R. SUNSTEIN
In the last few years, a number of law professors have been in-
volved in some highly public issues, not least through the circulation
of letters with multiple signatories, expressing a view on some issue of
national importance. It is not clear that there is anything like a trend
in this direction; certainly teachers of law have participated in what
some would consider "partisan politics" for many decades. But Neal
Devins is right to raise questions about the legitimacy and conse-
2quences of political involvement by academics. It is also interesting
to consider the relationship between such involvement and academic
freedom; if law professors are not concerned with the pursuit of truth,
the case for academic freedom is certainly weakened. The Clinton
impeachment provides the immediate motivation for Devins's discus-
sion. I offer a few remarks here on academic involvement in the im-
peachment debate, with a few references to my own experience,3 and
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor ofJurisprudence, Law School
and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. Professor Sunstein testi-
fied on the constitutional issues relating to the impeachment of President Clinton, see
Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives, Comm. on the Judiciay, Subcomm.
on the Constitution (Nov. 9, 1998) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Law),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File. I am grateful to Martha Nussbaum
and Richard Posner for valuable comments on an earlier draft, and to Brooke May for
research assistance.
I See, e.g., Constitutional Scholars' Conference, Joint Statement, Constitutional
Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 98
YALE L.J. 1711, 1712 (1989) (arguing that municipalities should not scrap affirmative
action programs in the wake of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson); An Open Letter to Con-
gressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539, 1539 (1995) (urging that Congressman Gingrich
rescind his proposal to amend the House Rules to require three-fifths vote for enacting
laws that increase income taxes); infra notes 6-7 (providing text of a one-sentence let-
ter opposing impeachment and a letter opposing Clinton's possible resignation).2 p
See Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of
Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 166 (1999) (arguing that "when a significant
number of law professors and historians hold themselves out as experts when they are
not... allacademics pay a price").
3 The editors have asked me to provide a few details for background; readers who
dislike this sort of thing are encouraged to skip the footnotes.
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with an eye toward drawing some general lessons about professors and
politics, including presidential politics.
I. PARTICULARS
With respect to the President, the United States has now had
three serious impeachment inquiries in its entire history. As the na-
tion began discussion of the impeachment of President Clinton in
1998, many constitutional law professors concluded that no legitimate
grounds for impeachment had been identified. On their view, the
House of Representatives had started to embark on a constitutionally
impermissible path, one with potentially significant consequences.
This seemed unfortunate not merely because of the potential removal
of the President, and hardly because of the nature of President
Clinton's particular policies, but because of the constitutional ille-
gitimacy and potentially destabilizing effect of resort to the impeach-
ment mechanism.
Some law professors believed that, as a technical matter, the con-
stitutional question was not even close.4 They believed that this inter-
pretation was not a "partisan" view, that it had nothing to do with ap-
proval of President Clinton in general, and that it was the best reading
of the Constitution-a reading that would attract support from a vari-
ety of possible approaches to interpretation and that would apply re-
gardless of the political affiliation of the President. Before the hear-
ings, members of the House of Representatives-themselves quite
uncertain about the issue-asked, in private meetings with law profes-
sors:5 What do law professors generally think? Where are they? Why
4 For a discussion of the Impeachment Clause, see Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the
President, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 279, 280-92 (1998). Devins is wrong to say that "scholars
who argued against the appropriateness of originalism at the Bork hearings made use
of originalism (and little else) in arguing against the Clinton impeachment." Devins,
supra note 2, at note 24. Professor Tribe's argument, for example, was largely textual,
see Defining "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Basic Principles (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/22398.htn> (advocating that defining impeach-
ment properly "means taking seriously exactly what the Constitution says"), and while I
did not argue against the appropriateness of originalism at the Bork hearings, my ar-
gument was typical in stressing a range of interpretive theories. SeeSunstein, supra.
5 I draw on personal experience here. There was a series of private, informal
meetings with several law professors who met, in small groups, with a large number of
representatives, many of whom were unsure about how to think about, or vote on, the
impeachment question. A vivid recollection: The representatives listened politely to
the constitutional arguments, and were clearly interested in them, but some of their
eyes really lit up only during discussion, in which law professors were not involved, of
the underlying political dynamics.
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aren't they saying anything? An obvious question was whether it
might conceivably be useful for members of Congress, and the public,
to know that there was widespread professional opinion to the effect
that impeachment would be unconstitutional.
These were the circumstances in which a number of professors
(including me) were willing to circulate and to sign two letters oppos-
ing impeachment. One of the letters, not limited to teachers of con-
stitutional law but circulated to law professors generally, provided an
extended analysis of the legal issues; the other, limited to teachers of
constitutional law,6 offered a one-sentence conclusion to the effect
that impeachment would not be "appropriate" in light of the charges
made by Judge Starr.7
Many of those who signed or circulated these letters accepted (as I
do) all or most of Devins's general views about the need to separate
professional opinion from partisan politics. To say the least, most of
those of us who were involved in all this really do not enjoy participat-
It is a considerable overstatement for Devins to say that "members of Congress
were actively involved" in any academic anti-impeachment letter. Devins, supra note 2,
at text accompanying note 66. Certainly the remarks did not lead to the letters. But I
agree with Devins about the general importance of a degree of independence on the
part of academics involved in these matters. Those of us who agreed with the White
House on the inappropriateness of impeachment made very clear-especially in sev-
eral informal discussions with lawyers there involving the constitutional standard for
impeachment-thatwe were not working "with" or "for" the White House in anyway.
Because this letter was limited to teachers of constitutional law, I think Devins is
wrong to say that none of the relevant letters "made expertise a prerequisite"-at least
if we assume that teachers of constitutional law generally have some expertise on the
topic of impeachment. Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 45.
I wrote and circulated the one-sentence letter after many discussions with other law
professors. Some people did not like this approach, on the ground that it was without
reasoning; others, including me, thought that it would be worthwhile and relevant, if
only because it would show a widespread judgment on the general constitutional ques-
tion without committing people to a particular argument about which they might have
reservations. Here is its content:
The undersigned professors and teachers of constitutional law* have diverse
political convictions and disagree on many political and legal issues; but we
agree that the possible grounds for impeachment recently identified by Ken-
neth Starr and David Schippers are not an appropriate basis for impeaching a
President under Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution.
*All of the signatories to this letter have taught the general constitutional law
course or some aspect of constitutional law as part of their curricular responsi-
bilities.
There was also a subsequent letter, circulated after impeachment, opposing res-
ignation on the ground that it would do damage to the constitutional structure. See
BernardJ. Hibbits, Law Professors Solicit Signatures for Anti-Resignation Letter (visited Oct.
27, 1999) <http://juritlaw.pitLedu/resig.htm> (containing the full text of the letter,
dated Dec. 19, 1998).
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ing in petition drives. Most of us thought that the process of sending
and responding to emails and collecting signatures was a boring, un-
pleasant, and tedious business'-part of a most unwelcome (even if
occasionally hilarious9) diversion from our academic jobs. Nothing
here seemed glamorous, a source of "fame,"10 or in anyone's self-
interest. But the relevant law professors believed that this was an ex-
ceedingly unusual event, that the House of Representatives was on the
verge of acting unconstitutionally, and that it was appropriate, and
maybe not inconceivably useful, for the public and elected representa-
tives to be aware of a widespread (though not universal) professional
opinion.
I am not entirely sure what, in particular, Devins thinks was wrong
with all this, or what lesson he wants to draw from it. He does not
argue that the impeachment of President Clinton was constitutionally
acceptable (though he may believe this). He does not demonstrate
nor even claim that the law professors who signed one or another let-
ter were wrong on the merits. Nor does he argue for the (implausi-
ble) proposition that on principle, law professors should never speak
publicly about important public issues.
Devins suggests that developments of this kind may endanger aca-
demic freedom, an empirical claim that seems to me quite doubtful,
even absurd. Is it imaginable that the tenure system for law professors
would be eliminated if law professors frequently signed petitions on
public issues? In any case, Devins does not discuss what academic
freedom is for, to wit, the power to speak controversially about the
8 A confession: The one-sentence letter was the first such letter I have ever written
and circulated, and because the process was so tedious, I hope never to have to do
such a thing again.
9 See infra note 31 (discussing Burden ofProofand television producers).
10 But see infra note 31 (discussing my dog).
I Devins follows the familiar view in stating that "Republican witnesses at the
House impeachment hearings testified that the President's conduct was impeachable
whereas Democratic witnesses testified that it was not." Devins, supra note 2, at note
67. In a sense, this statement is accurate; but my hunch is that a majority of witnesses,
on both sides, did not consider themselves "Republican witnesses" or "Democratic wit-
nesses." What a strange way to conduct a hearing on the impeachment question-as if,
before the debate even became serious, all Republicans were for impeachment and all
Democrats against it.
Perhaps the greatest peculiarity of the hearings was that a majority of the witnesses
said that the allegations in question pointed to legitimate grounds for impeachment,
thus giving the impression that teachers of constitutional law were evenly divided on
the question-when in fact the overwhelming majority of constitutional law teachers
believed that impeachment was constitutionally illegitimate or at least inappropriate.
The selection of witnesses gave a grossly distorted picture of academic opinion.
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truth as one sees it, free of risks of political reprisal. I agree with Dev-
ins that the principle of academic freedom is violated if those who en-
joy it are not acting in good faith or are not pursuing truth (not a
doubtful empirical claim about consequences but a sensible claim
about principle, which is what appears to me to underlie Devins's es-
say). But nothing in this point argues against public statements by
professors.
Devins's concerns appear narrower. It seems to me that they fall
in two categories. These categories are related but best treated sepa-
rately.
His first point has to do with the possibly limited expertise of
many or some of those who signed the relevant letters. Devins says
that "it is doubtful that many had thought seriously about the consti-
tutional standards governing impeachment. He appears to believe
that at least by implication, some or many law professors held them-
selves out as specialists or experts when, in fact, they lacked knowledge
about impeachment that would qualify them as such.
For some of the signatories, perhaps this is true. But I think that
Devins'sjudgment is too harsh. Impeachment is hardly an obscure or
invisible issue in constitutional law, and in the wake of the Watergate
controversy, many law professors developed genuine, if fairly general,
views on the appropriate meaning of the phrase "high crimes or mis-
demeanors." Certainly most teachers of constitutional law know
something about the governing legal standards; they know enough to
know, for example, that smoking marijuana or speeding would not
ordinarily count as a "high crime or misdemeanor." From there they
could reason by analogy to the view that, at least as a general rule, a
President cannot be impeached unless he has been charged with
large-scale abuse of the powers that he has by virtue of being Presi-
dent.
Those law professors who signed the longer letter but who do not
teach constitutional law probably believed that they knew enough-
from training and from substantive conversations with colleagues-to
have a reasonably informed opinion about the threshold question of
whether the charges against President Clinton made out an impeach-
able offense. Law professors who do not teach constitutional law have
informed views about many constitutional issues-for example, about
whether racial segregation is generally unconstitutional, whether quo-
tas can make for an acceptable affirmative action program, and
12 Md at text accompanying note 21.
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whether the Constitution protects the right to use contraceptives.
Many law professors believe that with respect to the charges against
President Clinton, impeachment falls in the same category.1 3 The sig-
natories likely thought, in good faith, that they knew enough about
the constitutional provision to conclude that an impeachable offense
had not been made out. It is hard to see why there is anything unto-
ward here. I agree with Devins that people should not sign petitions
when they are unable to defend the relevant position publicly; but I
would give the signatories the benefit of the doubt on this point.
Devins's second point has to do with the motivations of those who
participated in the relevant events. He says that "[m]any of the law
professor and historian signatories were animated by partisanship and
self-interest ... ."14 This is certainly possible-and I know very little
about the historians involved-but it is very hard for Devins or anyone
else to have access to the motivations of strangers. Nor is it clear what
he means by "self-interest" and "partisanship." Academics "who want
to see their names in print" 5 surely have much better ways to achieve
that goal; it is hard to believe that publication was a significant moti-
vating factor here. And contrary to Devins's suggestion, "celebrity"
16
hardly comes from signing such a letter. A few law professors may
care about celebrity, but most law professors care about the law and
about ideas.
The allegation of "partisanship"17 raises many questions. Law pro-
fessors who signed this letter were offering a judgment about the
meaning of the Constitution, a judgment that they believed it to be
true. In what sense was their motivation "partisan"?' 8 A law professor
who testifies that a proposed statute would violate the Constitution
13 Judge Posner seems to me unfair in criticizing law professors for not publicly
deploring President Clinton's conduct, which, plausibly, included perjury and obstruc-
tion ofjustice. See RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE 240-45 (1999) (lamenting
that "leaders of the legal profession might have been expected to emphasize the im-
portance of the rule of law in general and of telling the truth ... These expectations
would have been disappointed"). I know that many of those who opposed impeach-
ment on constitutional grounds believed that the relevant conduct was deplorable, and
certainly many of us emphasized, publicly and privately, the seriousness of perjury and
obstruction ofjustice. In any case, nearly everyone, including President Clinton's clos-
est friends and allies, as well as members of both parties, publicly deplored his con-
duct, and an outpouring of statements to this effect by law professors would have been
largely pointless.
14 Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 31.
is Id. at text accompanying note 32.
16 Id.
17 Id. at text accompanying note 31.
is Id. at text accompanying note 32.
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should be taken to be addressing the constitutional issue and need
not have a political motivation; what is different about a law professor
who signs a public statement about what the Constitution means?
Perhaps Devins's claim is that the professors who signed this letter
were motivated not by a considered judgment about the Constitution,
but by their extra-legal political convictions (in favor, for example, of
government regulation and the welfare state, or in favor of President
Clinton generally). But I do not know how Devins can be confident of
this uncharitable judgment, and in any case, the anti-impeachment
conclusion would hold if President Reagan, or a future Republican
President, were subject to an impeachment inquiry on the basis of
similar allegations.'9 I very much doubt that the signatories would
change their view if the accused President had been Republican. Per-
haps Devins disagrees, but he offers little basis for any such disagree-
ment.
Devins seems to think that partisanship is established by his claim
that the academy is "overwhelmingly left-liberal, overwhelmingly De-
mocratic."20 But he does not note that many people not normally
characterized as "left-liberal" signed one or more of the impeachment
letters.2 ' For what it is worth, the University of Chicago Law School is
I A possible point in support of Devins: If a group of law professors despised a
certain President, they might not go to the effort to circulate and sign a letter against
impeachment, even if they believed that the grounds for impeachment were invalid.
Perhaps some law professors did not sign the Clinton letters even though they agreed
with them, simply because they did not like President Clinton; perhaps some law pro-
fessors would not sign a similar letter on behalf of, for example, President Reagan,
even if they agreed with it.
20 Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 33.
21 These include Douglas Laycock, Stephen Macedo, and Andrzej Rapaczynski. I
am sure that there are many more and am happy to say that I do not know the political
views of the vast majority of signatories. Of course Devins is allowed to characterize
people as he chooses, but for what it is worth, I would not describe myself as a "left-
liberal," see Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying notes 33-39, or indeed as a
Democrat, see id. at note 36 and accompanying text.
Devins is misleading to suggest thatJudge Posner described the "law professor anti-
impeachment letter as 'a form of herd behavior... by the animal that likes to see its
name in print.'" Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 54 (quoting RICHARD
A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE 242 (1999)). ActuallyJudge Posner describes this as
the possible opinion of an "unkind critic," thus distancing himself from the charge,
which is not his own view. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE 242 (1999). (I
owe this correction to judge Posner.)
I also doubt that "many legal academics see Ken Starr... as their nemesis." Dev-
ins, supra note 2, at text accompanying notes 36-37. I do know that many of those (in-
cluding me) who opposed Clinton's impeachment believe that Starr was a distin-
guished judge and a distinguished Solicitor General and have not the slightest doubt
that he is an entirely honorable person. A number of us who strongly opposed im-
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not usually characterized as "left-liberal," and while I cannot speak of-
ficially or on behalf of the faculty, it seemed to me that at least a solid
majority of the faculty, including many strong critics of President
Clinton's policies, were opposed to impeachment on the ground that
it would be illegitimate or inappropriate from the constitutional point
of view. Indeed, my former colleague Michael McConnell, hardly a
left-liberal, went so far as to write a letter to Congressman Hyde,
sharply critical of President Clinton and suggesting that impeachment
would not be unconstitutional-but pleading with Hyde not to sup-
port impeachment of the President in the midst of such partisan divi-
sions.22 Was McConnell's letter inappropriate? Unacceptably parti-
san? Illegitimate because (unlike the two widely distributed letters) it
did not directly address a purely legal question?
The impeachment of President Clinton produced, on all sides,
more than enough challenges to other people's motivations.23 I am
not sure why Devins does not, with respect to law professors and histo-
rians on all sides, indulge a principle of charity-suggesting that in
cases of doubt, we should assume that those with whom we disagree
are acting in good faith and on the basis of evidence that they hon-
estly believe to be sufficient.
24
peachment, and who were quite critical of some of the decisions of the Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel, knowJudge Starr, like and respect him personally, and believe that
the 9ersonal attacks on him and his motivations were absurd and baseless.
See Letter from Michael W. McConnell, Presidential Professor, The University of
Utah College of Law, to Henry J. Hyde, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives 1-2 (Dec. 12, 1998) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review) (indicating that while "the Constitution allows for
the possibility that an elected President may so abuse the public trust that he can and
should be removed," still "a President should [not] be impeached or removed from
office solely on the votes of his political rivals").
23 This seems to me to infect RIcHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE (1999) as
well, where analysis of the constitutional issue seems to me remarkably casual and off-
hand. See id. at 94-109 (discussing the history and scope of impeachment through a
"structural and pragmatic... approach to constitutional meaning").
24 I share many of Devins's concerns about the political campaign against Judge
Robert Bork. But I do not think that the law professors who opposed Bork's confirma-
tion did so because they "saw Bork as a threat to their status and influence." Devins,
supra note 2, at text accompanying notes 51-53. I think that they did so on principle,
that is, because they believed thatJudge Bork's view about constitutional interpretation
would be a threat to constitutional ideals, properly understood. They may have been
wrong on the merits, and I agree with Devins that petitions of the sort circulated
againstJudge Bork should be rare. (In the interest of full disclosure, I should say that I
testified quite critically about Judge Bork's views on separation of powers questions,




There are much broader questions in the background. Devins
thinks that academic participation in the Clinton impeachment is part
of a larger trend and a more general problem, one that threatens aca-
demic freedom itself. Thus he writes that "[t]oday, academics seek
fame through talk show appearances, op-ed pieces, and trade press
books."2 Devins also says that "the traditional image of the academic
has given way to 'postmodernism, multiculturalism, and political cor-
rectness,'26 and hence that "there is good reason to doubt whether
academics still think of themselves as truth seekers." 7 His suggestion
appears to be that the involvement of law professors in the Clinton
impeachment signals a larger trend toward highly partisan, mostly left-
wing activity, in which law professors do not care about truth but in-
stead push some kind of political agenda. Devins suggests that if pro-
fessors are engaging in partisan politics, academic freedom is at risk. I
share many of his concerns, and I agree that the principle of academic
freedom is undermined if professors do not care about truth. But
there seem to me to be three problems with his claims here.
The first problem is that there is no single way to be a law profes-
sor. Most of us, most of the time, are devoted to teaching and re-
search; few of us "seek fame" or anything 6lse through talk shows, op-
ed pieces, and trade press books. But some professors sometimes do
express their views on talk shows, and a few more write op-ed pieces
and publish with trade presses. Why is this so terrible, or indeed ter-
rible at all? (Can anyone really object that Gerald Gunther published
his excellent book on Learned Hand 8 with Knopf rather than Stan-
ford University Press?) One of the purposes of academic freedom is
to permit professors to speak publicly without fear of reprisal, and
those who write op-eds or publish with a trade press are doing what
academic freedom is designed to permit them to do. My hunch is that
when law professors write op-eds or go on television, it is to express
the truth as they see it, not to "achieve their fifteen minutes of fame."2'
Some people spend all of their time on teaching and academic proj-
ects; others testify before Congress and write an occasional amicus
brief; still others write op-eds and say what they think on radio or tele-
Id. at text accompanying note 55.
26 Id. at text accompanying note 75 (quoting David M. Rabban, Can Academic Free-
dom SurvivePostmodernism?, 86 CAL L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1998)).
27 I.
28 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THEJUDGE (1994).
29 Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 55.
1999]
200 UNIVERS1TY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:191
vision shows. Of course some of us may not think so well of colleagues
who spend a lot of time on talk shows, especially in light of the (ri-
diculous, hilarious"0 ) restrictions of the format,3' and above all if this
comes at the expense of their scholarship and teaching. But since
there are many ways to be a good law professor, and so long as teach-
ing and research are not cheapened or neglected, I do not quite see
Devins's objection here.
The second problem with Devins's claims is that they overlook the
fact that it is perfectly responsible, maybe even a civic duty, for law
professors to participate in public affairs, at least some of the time, by
showing how what they know bears on public issues. (I do not believe
that Devins disagrees with this point.) If, for example, a teacher of
constitutional law thinks that a proposed law is unconstitutional, there
should be no taboo on her saying so, even through an op-ed piece. If
a teacher of criminal law believes that laws forbidding gang loitering
so For example: In one interview on CNN, I was required to try to stand on a stack
of extremely unsteady boxes, not as a scientific experiment or medical test or cruelty of
some kind, but so as to ensure a view of the Capitol building on the television screen.
Most of the time, it seemed likely that I would fall off. (This interview was live.) And
apparently all law professors on television are, by some firmly enforced unwritten rule,
required to try to hold a small piece of equipment in one ear, so as to be able to com-
municate with other people on the show, including the host. (It isn't easy to hold
things in your ear.) Most of the time, the small piece of equipment does not fall out;
but some of the time, it does. (This is especially troublesome when you are trying to
balance yourself on a stack of extremely unsteady boxes.) See Burden of Proof (CNN
television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1998), available in LEXIS transcript no. 98110900V12 (dis-
cussing the meaning of "other High Crimes and Misdemeanors," perjury, and Bills of
Attainder).
A personal anecdote: I appeared on several shows to discuss impeachment is-
sues, but the format seemed so confining, and so conducive to ludicrous oversimplifi-
cation, and driving there and back seemed so time consuming, that after a while I de-
cided not to do it anymore. I told a producer of CNN's Burden of Proof that I would no
longer discuss impeachment, and would appear on the program if and only if my new
dog Perry, a (photogenic) Rhodesian Ridgeback puppy, could appear with me. They
called my bluff. The show aired on December 31, 1998, and dealt with legal issues re-
lating to dogs. My dog did become at least somewhat famous; in the middle of the
show, the producer broke in to tell me that CNN was being "flooded" with calls and
compliments about Perry. Interested readers (can there possibly be any?), those who
think I'm joking, and Rhodesian Ridgeback enthusiasts can find the transcript at CNN
Burden of Proof (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 31, 1998), available in LEXIS, transcript
no. 98123100V12. [Ed. Note: Perry's photo is available at <http://student-
www.uchicago.edu/orgs/law-phoenix/2bear.html>].
A small media notation: The producers who invite people to appear on their
shows seem to have the same style and character as that of the on-air hosts of those
shows (is this an antecedentjob qualification, or does it develop over time?). Thus the
most hilarious invitation came from the producer of the show Hardbal whose invita-
tion appeared in exactly the same staccato voice as that of Chris Matthews, the host of
the show: We-want-you-on-Hardball-know-about-it?
PROFESSORS AND POLITICS
will or will not deter crime, and has reasons for the belief, it is impor-
tant for the public to know about this. This is an ordinary part of civic
discourse, and a nation is better off with it than without it. Indeed,
this kind of academic engagement is one of the things that academic
freedom is designed to allow.
Of course silence about public issues can be legitimate too.
Whether or not professors should speak publicly depends at least
partly on the justice or injustice, and on the legality or illegality, of the
practices at issue. Since silence is a choice and not a neutral position,
professors, like other citizens, are properly criticized for failing to
speak out on certain questions, at least if they have relevant expertise.
Teachers of constitutional law would have been properly criticized, I
believe, if they had remained silent during the unconstitutional im-
peachment of President Clinton.
If it is legitimate for one professor to speak publicly, it is not ille-
gitimate for a group of them to do so, at least on rare occasions.
Surely it is relevant that law professors are by their very profession
concerned with highly public issues. They are unlike teachers of
French literature, for their daily life is likely to breed expertise on is-
sues that will, at one point or another, have public salience. I em-
phatically agree with Devins's concluding suggestion-that academics
should not sign letters that they could not defend publicly.32 But this
is a test that could, I believe, be easily passed by those who signed the
anti-impeachment letters, and indeed I doubt that this test would be
flunked by many academics with respect to letters they have signed in
the past.
The final problem is that it is unclear what Devins means to claim
with his invocation of "postmodernism, multiculturalism, and political
correctness."33 Very few of those involved in the Clinton impeachment
letters have any sympathy with postmodernism, a movement that (in
my view fortunately) has had only a sporadic influence on the aca-
demic study of law-far less of an impact than, for example, that of
the economic analysis of law. "Multiculturalism" can be understood in
many different ways, and certainly no form of "multiculturalism" now
dominates law schools. "Political correctness," if understood as a so-
cial taboo on the expression of unpopular opinions, is certainly to be
deplored.3 But so understood, it is hardly limited to left-leaning aca-
32 Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 109 (advocating this test as a
means of ensuring that academics do the necessary work before registering opinions).
33 Id. at text accompanying note 75 (internal quotations omitted).
A qualification: Some unpopular opinions are properly subject to taboo; con-
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demics, and here too, I am not sure how the complaint about political
correctness bears on the points at hand. Instead of complaining
about what he appears to see as left-wing domination of law schools,
Devins might defend a substantive position that he believes is unjustly
devalued and that deserves a better hearing.
I agree with Devins's concerns about skepticism with respect to
truth, as do many others; 5 but as a class, law professors are hardly
skeptical of the idea of truth, and I do not see why Devins believes that
there is, within the law schools, much "discomfort with truth-
seeking."3 6 Law professors founded their overwhelming opposition to
the Clinton impeachment on a commitment to truth, not on skepti-
cism about truth. Nor is Devins entirely clear about the distinction
between "truth" and "political motivation." Suppose that someone
really believes that a proposed law is unconstitutional. Suppose
someone believes that some proposition about the Constitution is
true. Is there any problem with writing, or signing, a letter to that ef-
fect? What makes that action inconsistent with academic freedom?
It is time to conclude. Academics have a duty to pursue truth, and
for most academics, most of the time, participation in partisan causes
can be destructive to that endeavor. But legal academics sometimes
know things that are relevant to public life, and when this is so, they
are entitled, and sometimes obligated, to say what they know. They
may be wrong on the merits, but that is another matter.
sider the view that slavery was very good, or that the Holocaust should be celebrated as
a wonderful event.
35 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERIcAN LAW (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism
About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1994); Cass K
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV.L. REV. 741, 779-80 & n.130 (1993).
Devins, supra note 2, at text accompanying note 80. Of course there are excep-
tions, discussed and addressed in FARBER& SHERRY, supra note 35. (Of course I do not
mean to endorse, by these brief comments, everything in Farber and Sherry's contro-
versial book.)
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The filing of an antitrust suit by Major League Soccer ("MLS")
players against MIS was viewed as a rite of passage for the new
league.2 After all, every established major professional sports league
has been sued for alleged violations of the antitrust laws for practices
relating to league rules concerning everything from franchise reloca-
tion to the wages of practice squad players.3 The importance of Fraser
v. MLS for the future of professional sports leagues, however, tran-
scends the continuing legality of the MLS regulations challenged in
the suit. Fraser is momentous because it is the first antitrust challenge
t B.A. 1992, Amherst College; M.S. 1997, University of Massachusetts;J.D. Candi-
date 2000, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to express my appreciation to Pro-
fessors Glenn Wong, Lisa Pike Masteralexis, and Edward Rock. I would also like to
thank Kirstin Thorne, Bill andJane Mathias, and Thomas Rapisarda for their support.
'The court adjudicating the lawsuit has already issued one ruling on pre-trial mo-
tions made by the litigants. The motions concerned the legality of MLS's transfer fee
arrangement with Federacion Internationale de Football Associacion ("FIFA"), the
sport's international governing body. The arrangement requires any soccer league
seeking to procure the services of a MLS player to pay MLS a fee, even if the player's
MLS contract has expired. SeeFraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73,
79 (D. Mass. 1998) (denying parties' cross-motions for summary judgment regarding
MLS's transfer fee rule). The opinion did not address the single entity issue, the piv-
otal legal issue in the pending litigation and the focus of this Comment.
5After hearing of the lawsuit, NBA Commissioner David Stern reportedly told MLS
Commissioner Doug Logan, "Congratulations, you've finally arrived." Michael Rosen-
thal, MLS Raises Expectations, L.A. DAILYNEWS, Mar. 19, 1997, at S4.
3 See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (defining the extent of
the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)
(reaffirming baseball's antitrust exemption); NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust did not expire
when parties engaged in collective bargaining reached impasse); San Francisco Seals v.
NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (dismissing a hockey team's antitrust claim
against its league).
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to a "single entity league," a league that is organized as a single corpo-
ration rather than as a group of individually owned teams.4
MLS's single entity structure was designed to insulate the league
from one form of antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.5 The
league is structured as a single corporation, which wholly owns all of
the teams that compete in the league. "The Sherman Act contains a
'basic distinction between concerted and independent action."' Most
antitrust challenges to the established leagues have been brought un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act ("section 1"), which only applies to
concerted action between two economic actors: "It does not reach
conduct that is 'wholly unilateral.'" 7 The actions of a single corpora-
tion are only regulated by section 2 of the Sherman Act ("section 2"),
which prohibits monopolization or attempted monopolization of
trade.8 It is MLS's legal position that, as a single corporation, it can-
not "combine, contract, or conspire" with itself, and therefore its in-
ternal league practices are not actionable under section 1. Should the
court(s) accept MLS's argument, single entity leagues will have a sig-
nificant advantage in their labor relations relative to other leagues.9
This advantage will encourage newly forming leagues to follow MLS's
example and organize as single entities. Perhaps even more signifi-
candy, an MLS legal victory may induce more established leagues to
reorganize themselves as single entities.
Aside from facilitating the formation of new professional sports
leagues, there are no compelling policy reasons for treating MLS as a
single entity. Although it may be easy to sympathize with the players'
desire to earn what might seem to be their true market value, the
players as individual economic entities have little market value. It is
only in the context of a competitive league, provided by MLS investors
risking millions of dollars in losses, that the players' skills become
4 See Denise Kiernan, MLS: Living Single?, TE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 30, 1997, at
133 (discussing "MLS's trailblazing single-entity structure").
5 See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 186 (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing the reasons MLS structured itself as a single corporation).
6Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (quot-
ing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)).7 Id. at 768 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
8 See Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) ("Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony....").
9 The players would not be able to bring a section 1 claim against the league, thus
removing an important bargaining chip. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the
effect of a dismissal of a section 1 claim in light of the low likelihood of success on a
section 2 claim).
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valuable. Furthermore, although MLS labor restraints may hold down
salaries of players already in the league, a profitable league is likely to
expand and thus provide employment opportunities for more players.
Despite the lack of policy concerns, the players' suit is significant
because it will force the courts to consider how economic coadventur-
ers who retain some minimally disparate economic interests should be
treated under the antitrust laws. The courts' response to this question
may have a considerable effect on both traditionally organized leagues
and non-sports joint ventures that require cooperation among eco-
nomic competitors.
This Comment explores the implications of a victory for MLS in
its current litigation with its players. Part I examines the reasons a
professional sports league should be concerned with antitrust law, and
the history of the single entity question as it relates to the more "tradi-
tional" league model.'0 Part II compares the various single entity
models in existence and analyzes the potential arguments of the Fraser
litigants. It concludes, on the strength of its legal arguments, that
MLS should be considered a single entity for section 1 purposes, thus
rendering intraleague rules immune from section 1 scrutiny. Part III
discusses the viability of a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act
against a single entity league, which may limit the extent to which
MLS and other single entity leagues are shielded from antitrust scru-
tiny. Part IV explores the possibility of established, traditionally or-
ganized leagues restructuring themselves as single entities and sug-
gests one possible plan to accomplish such a reorganization.
I. ANTITRUST LAW, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES, AND
THE SINGLE ENTITY QUESTION
A. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law regulates the conduct of economic actors. Defen-
dants who violate the Sherman Act are liable for treble damages."
Therefore, Sherman Act violators may incur enormous liability for
their anticompetitive behavior. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohib-
its "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in the restraint of
'0 The National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey
League, and Major League Baseball are all organized similarly. See discussion infra Part
.C (discussing the traditional professional sports league model).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
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"12
trade or commerce .... The actions of a single economic entity are
not subject to section 1 scrutiny because section 1 requires an agree-
ment between at least two independent economic actors, commonly
called "concerted action," to satisfy the statute's "contract, combina-
tion ... or conspiracy" requirement. 3  Concerted action is assessed
under section 1 under two "complementary categories of antitrust
analysis." 14 Those restraints of trade that have no competitive benefits
are declared illegal per se.15 Such restraints include price fixing,
group boycotts, and horizontal market division. More commonly, re-
straints are assessed under the rule of reason. Restraints subject to the
rule of reason violate section 1 only if the anticompetitive effects of a
particular agreement outweigh its procompetitive effects. The com-
petitive effects of these agreements "can only be evaluated by analyz-
ing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed."
16
Section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to single firm conduct as
well as concerted action. A firm violates section 2 only when it holds
monopoly power in a particular market and engages in behavior that
constitutes an abuse of that monopoly power. The requirement that a
section 2 defendant possess monopoly power makes a section 2 claim
much more difficult to pursue than an action under section 1, which
has no such requirement.
B. Why Are Professional Sports Leagues
Concerned with Antitrust Law?
The Supreme Court noted in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Board of Regents that sports leagues and teams require a high level of
cooperation among competitors for their product to even exist.1 7 Uni-
form rules of play, restrictions on scheduling, and myriad other regu-
lations are necessary for college and professional teams to compete on
a reasonably level playing field. When sports teams within a league
1 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
:S Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
'National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
" SeeArizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (deeming
per se treatment appropriate "[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint
enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it").
16 National Soc y of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
17 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) ("'When a [hypothetical] league of professional lacrosse
teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal on the
ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams.'" (quoting ROBERT H.
BoRM, Ti3EANTITRusTPARADox278 (1978))).
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agree to certain restrictions, however, they necessarily exclude other
potential competitors, suppliers, and distributors of their product.
8
In other words, the restrictions are agreements in restraint of trade,
and, at least facially, violate section 1 of the Sherman Act 19
Just as agreements regarding the number of players who may par-
ticipate on the field of play are necessary to guarantee a level of com-
petitive balance on the field, leagues have attempted to ensure com-
petitive balance by implementing a variety of restrictions that also
interfere with players' ability to market their services. The player
draft, free agency restrictions, salary caps, and revenue sharing
agreements all restrict, to varying degrees, the wages players may earn.
The league practices at issue in Fraser are in many ways typical of the
type of restraints challenged by players under antitrust law. The stan-
dard MLS player contract gives the league the unilateral right to re-
new the contract, rather than allowing the player to sell his services to
20the highest bidder. MLS maintains a salary cap that sets the maxi-
mum amount any team may spend on player salaries. This cap is
somewhat redundant, however, as a single league official is responsi-
ble for negotiating all player contracts and thus has complete control
over each team's total salary.2 MLS also complies with the transfer fee
system created by Federacion Internationale de Football Associacion
("FIFA"), soccer's world governing body, which requires other leagues
to pay MLS for the rights to a player, even after the player's contract
has expired.2
Players' unions regard the threat of an antitrust suit as a signifi-
cant bargaining tool in negotiations with the leagues.2a However, a re-
8 For example, limiting the number of games that each team plays in a season lim-
its the supply of games that can be broadcast to the public by television networks. Al-
lowing teams to draft particular players limits those players' ability to market them-
selves in the labor supply market.
'9 The Sherman Act, however, has been interpreted to proscribe only unreasonable
restraints of trade. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) ("[I]t
was intended that the standard of reason.., be the measure used for the purpose of
determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the
wrong against which the statute provided."); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
10 (1997) ("Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement 'in re-
straint of trade,' this Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only
unreasonable restraints." (citation omitted)).
20 See MLS Players' Union iles Suit, Gannett News Service, Feb. 13, 1997, available in
1997 WL 8821935 (describing the standard MLS contract).
21 See idL (discussing MLS's salary policies).
'See id. (discussing the FIFA transfer fee system).
23 See WEMLER & ROBERTs, supra note 5, at 204 (noting that other players' unions'
inability to achieve their goals through the collective bargaining process led them to
pursue, in the alternative, antitrust challenges against their respective leagues).
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cent Supreme Court decision has limited the ability of players repre-
sented by unions to sue their respective leagues for antitrust viola-
tions. In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Court held that agreements be-
tween a multi-employer bargaining unit and a labor union are exempt
from antitrust challenge until the "agreement among employers [is]
sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective
bargaining process."14 It is unclear exactly how long employees must
wait after renouncing the collective bargaining process before courts
will decide that an agreement meets Brown's "distant in time and cir-
cumstance" standard. Nevertheless, an antitrust suit does remain an
option for players lacking the bargaining leverage to achieve accept-
able hours, wages, and working conditions through the collective bar-
gaining process.
C. The Traditional Professional Sports League Model
Four sports leagues have traditionally dominated the national
market for team sports: the National Football League ("NFL"), Major
League Baseball ("MLB"), the National Basketball Association
("NBA"), and the National Hockey League ("NHL).25 Each of these
leagues exists as the product of a contractual agreement among its in-
dependently-owned member clubs, which compete against one an-
26other in their respective sports.
The member clubs, or franchises, vary widely in how they are or-
ganized. A franchise may be organized as a partnership, a privately
held corporation, or a publicly traded corporation, among other
forms. The leagues themselves are actually unincorporated, non-
profit associations governed by an elected commissioner and an ex-
ecutive committee.27 The contract among the franchises sets forth theprocedures by which league-wide rules are adopted and enforced, and
24 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
SeeWEELER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 468 (discussing "the four historically 'ma-
jor' sports").
See id. (analyzing the structure of the traditional leagues).
See Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner
and an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 68-69
(1995) (describing the organization of the four major leagues). As a formal matter,
MLB is structured somewhat differently. The organization is divided into the Ameri-
can and National Leagues, both of which are completely independent leagues, each
with its own executive power. As a practical matter, however, the American and Na-
tional Leagues' power is delegated to the Commissioner's office and an Executive
Council, similar to the other leagues. See id. at 69.
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delegates powers to the central league office.28
D. Single Entity Theory and the Traditional Sports
League Model: Existing Case Law
The traditionally organized professional sports leagues have long
argued that they are in fact single entities, and that their practices are,
therefore, not subject to section 1 challenges that various league rules
tend to attract.2 The leagues "contend that a professional sports
league is a unique business, containing an unusual but necessary mix-
ture of interparticipant competition and cooperation not found in
any other kind of partnership or joint venture."30 Furthermore, they
argue that their teams are not competitors in a traditional business
sense, but instead are integral parts of a single entity. Although the
member clubs may be considered competitors by the public, which
focuses on the athletic competition (each league's product), in reality,
the actual outcomes of the athletic contests are irrelevant to the busi-
ness of the league. In the leagues' view, although the teams may
compete against one another for a player's services, this competition,
like that on the field, is strictly controlled by league rules that are en-
forced by the central league office, and therefore should be consid-
ered an internal business matter.1
The traditional leagues' position has received limited judicial ap-
probation. In one early case, San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, a federal
district court did hold that a professional hockey team could not sue
the league in which it competed under section I of the Sherman Act! 2
The Seals court stated that section 1 required "at least two independ-
ent business entities" and that in the production of professional
hockey games before live audiences in the United States and Canada,
"plaintiff and defendants are not competitors in the economic
sense.
"33
2' See it. at 68-69 (explaining the authority of the leagues' governing bodies).
See supra Part I.B (discusing why sports league rules give rise to antitrust claims).
" Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theoy:
A Deee of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 29 (1991).
See id. at 29, 31-32 (describing the traditional arguments raised by proponents of
the single entity defense, and emphasizing the "unique" nature of the intraleague
competition).2379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
I. at 969.
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1. Judicial Rejection of the Seals Approach:
Pre-Copperweld Cases
The single entity defense was rejected by the Second Circuit in
North American Soccer League v. NFL, in which the North American Soc-
cer League ("NASL") challenged the NFL's policy of prohibiting
football team owners from owning teams in other sports leagues un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act!' The court concluded that charac-
terizing the NFL as a single entity would create an antitrust "loophole"
that could allow the league to adopt restraints to protect individual
franchise owners."" The NASL court also emphasized the economic
independence of the NFL's franchises:
[E]ach member [club] is a separately owned, discrete legal entity which
does not share its expenses, capital expenditures or profits with other
members .... [I]n spite of the sharing of some revenues, the financial
performance of each team, while related to that of the others, does not,
because of the variables in revenues and costs as between member teams,
necessarily rise or fall with that of the others.4
Arguably, the Second Circuit's rationale values form over sub-
stance. Although each team is organized as a separate, independently-
owned entity, the NFL teams could also be viewed as acting as a single
corporate board of directors in promulgating the cross-ownership
ban. 7 Additionally, the court understates the economic interdepend-
ence of the franchises in stating that the teams share "some" revenues.
In fact, when NASL was decided, NFL teams shared 90% of League
38revenues.
3 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-57 (2d Cir. 1982).
-" See id. at 1257 ("To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to
escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit
their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit would be
outweighed by its anticompetitive effects."). This ignores the possibility of a section 2
claim, which has been viewed as a backstop to prevent enterprises from evading anti-
trust scrutiny altogether. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1910)
("[A] consideration of the text of the second section serves to establish that it was in-
tended to supplement the first and to make sure that by no possible guise could the
public policy embodied in the first section be frustrated or evaded."). As section 2 ap-
plies to single firm conduct, sports leagues would still be subject to antitrust law.
North Am. SoccerLeague, 670 F.2d at 1252.
37 The Seventh Circuit implicitly adopted this view in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1996) ("WGN').
See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir.
1984) ("Raiders") ("[A] large portion of League revenue, approximately 90%, is di-
vided equally among the teams .... ").
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Soon after the NASL decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected the sin-
gle entity defense in a suit brought by the Los Angeles Raiders and the
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com-
mision v. NFL ("Raiders").39 The suit challenged the NFL's efforts to
block the Raiders' move from Oakland to Los Angeles.0 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial court, holding that, as a matter of law, the
NFL was not a single entity.4' The court based its decision on three
main reasons:
Initially, the [district] court recognized the logical extension of [the sin-
gle entity] argument was to make the League incapable of violating
Sherman Act § 1 in every other subject restriction-yet courts have held
the League violated § 1 in other areas. Secondly, other organizations
have been found to violate § 1 though their product was "just as uni-
tary... and requires the same kind of cooperation from the organiza-
tion's members." Finally, the district court considered the argument to
be based upon the false premise that the individual NFL "clubs are not
separate business entities whose products have independent value."
42
First, the court claimed that because other courts had found the
League to have violated section 1, it must therefore be subject to sec-
tion 1.4 The other decisions cited by the court were the NASL case,
and three decisions involving NFL rules concerning player contracts:
Smith v. Pro Football, Ina,44 Mackey v. NFL,5 and Kapp v. NFL.46 The
Ninth Circuit's reliance on the latter three cases is extremely ques-
tionable. The NFL did not proffer a single entity defense in any of
those cases, so those courts simply did not consider the issue. There-
fore, the precedents on which the Raiders court relied were not par-
ticularly persuasive, even though the aforementioned courts could
"' See id. at 1390 (affirming the district court's rejection of the NFL's single entity
defense).4 0 See id. at 1385 (describing the events preceding the litigation).
4, See id at 1387 (holding that, based on the undisputed facts, the district court cor-
rectY directed a verdict for the plaintiffs).
Id. at 1387-88 (citations omitted).
See id. at 1388 ("[The logical extension of [the single entity] argument was to
make the League incapable of violating Sherman Act § 1 in every other subject restric-
tion-yet courts have held the League violated § 1 in other areas.").
44 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (challenging the legality of the NFL's player selec-
tionprocess, commonly called the draft).
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (challenging the NFL's rule allowing the league
commissioner to require a club acquiring a free agent to compensate the free agent's
former club).
16 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978) (challenging, among other things, the legality of the
NFL mandate that all players must sign a Standard Players' Contract which binds play-
ers to the NFL constitution and bylaws).
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have looked outside the parties' arguments to decide the cases on a
single entity-based rationale.
In its discussion of precedent, the Raiders court completely ig-
nored Seals, despite its seemingly direct application to the issue. In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit relegated the Seals opinion to a footnote in its
conclusion and rejected the single entity defense, stating that while
Seals was "persuasive," "existing precedent [could not] be ignored.
4 7
As "existing precedent" in reality consisted of a single Second Circuit
opinion, this portion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning appears to be
profoundly unconvincing.
Second, the Raiders court reasoned that the NFL was similar to
other businesses shown to be subject to section 1. The court noted
the existence of a Ninth Circuit exception to the finding of concerted
action where "'multiple corporations [are] operated as a single entity'
when 'corporate policies are set by one individual or by a parent cor-
poration. ,48 The NFL was not covered by this exception, however,
because "NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent corpora-
tion, but by the separate teams acting jointly." 9 The Seventh Circuit
implicitly rejected this logic in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partner-
ship v. NBA by embracing the "corporate board" analogy, which views
the clubs as members of a corporate board controlling league policy.!
It is not inaccurate to characterize a league as either "separate teams
acting jointly" or as a single firm controlled by a board of directors,
which is in part why courts willing to give the single entity argument
its due consideration have struggled a great deal to reach a conclu-
sion.
In rendering its holding, the Raiders court cited three well known
cases in which concerted action was found even though, as is the case
with a professional sports league, cooperation was necessary to pro-
duce the product:5' Associated Press v. United States,52 Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc., ("BI) 55 and United States v.
47 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1390 n.4.
4' Id. at 1388 (quoting General Bus. Sys. v. North Ar. Phillips Corp., 699 F.2d 965,
980 (9th Cir. 1983)).
49 Id. at 1389.
5095 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1996) ("WGN').
See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1389 (discussing the relevance of the three cases).
52 326 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1945) (holding that the cooperative nature of the enterprise
did not make the defendant immune to section 1 liability).
'" 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (applying rule of reason analysis to blanket license offered by
license holder of copyrighted songs).
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Sealy, Inc.4 Despite the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Raiders, these
cases are actually distinguishable because in each, the defendant in-
dependent firm had a viable product that did not require cooperation
with competitors, but chose to cooperate with competitors to produce
a second product. The cooperation was not necessary to the defen-
dants' core business in those cases, only to the additional joint ven-
ture. Members of a professional sports league have no alternative but
to cooperate with fellow members. The bedding manufacturers in
Sealy, for example, could have simply continued to manufacture their
own mattresses rather than form ajoint venture with competitors; co-
operation was not absolutely essential to the continued vitality of each
individual manufacturer's operations. An NFL team, by contrast, has
no product to offer if it does not cooperate with others.55 It could be
argued that the facts of BMA are sufficiently analogous because the in-
ability of individual license holders to protect their rights from in-
fringement made the license essentially worthless by itself; only by
combining with other license holders did the license hold value. The
BMI court assumed, nevertheless, without discussion, that the groups
of individual license holders were combinations for antitrust pur-
poses.! BMT was decided five years before Copperweld,5 7 however, and
if the case was reargued in light of Copperweld, it is possible that the
court might have accepted a single entity argument.
Third, the Raiders court refused to accept the NFL's argument
that its teams were not "'separate business entities whose products
have an independent value.' 'g The court discounted the cooperation
necessary to produce a football game because a team could play out-
side of the league.59 The value of such an undertaking, however, es-
pecially over the long term, is so small in proportion to the value real-
ized by a team competing in the NFL that it makes the court's
argument entirely unconvincing.O Although the court's independent
-" 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (finding that the joint venture among bedding manufactur-
ers violated section 1).
5 As the Seventh Circuit noted in WGN, "a league with one team would be like one
hand clapping." WGN, 95 F.3d at 598-99.
See BM, 441 U.S. at 7-9.
57 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984);seesupra
text accompanying notes 62-64.53 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1388 (citation omitted).
59 See id. at 1390 (arguing that teams could play outside of the NFL).
The NFL's Washington Redskins were recently sold for a reported $800 million.
See Adrienne T. Washington, Bully Turns Benefactor in $800 Million Stroke, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1999, at C2 (discussing the sale of the team). If the Redskins had announced
before the sale of the franchise that the team would no longer compete in the NFL,
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value claim is somewhat understandable given the existence at the
time of the United States Football League, which a NFL team could
theoretically have joined, the likelihood of such a defection in reality
was extremely small.6 ' By contrast, the independent value of the
products made by the defendants in Associated Press, BM[, and Sealy
were not based on a court's whimsical speculation, but instead on
their demonstrated performance in the marketplace. Therefore, such
a comparison is inappropriate.
2. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
Soon after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Raiders, the Supreme
Court issued a factually distinguishable decision that nonetheless
could be viewed as supporting the NFL's single entity argument. In
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the Court overturned the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, which provided that agreements
within corporations, usually between a parent corporation and its sub-
sidiary, satisfied the section 1 conspiracy requirement.62 Instead, the
Copperweld Court held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiaries constituted a single firm for antitrust purposes and were
thus exempt from section 1.63 The Court's approach to the concerted
action requirement discounted the importance of an entity's eco-
nomic form, and instead instructed courts to look at the economic re-
ality of the business's structure.6 To proponents of the professional
league's single entity argument, this new emphasis on reality over
form urged a reconsideration of the single entity claim.
3. Post-Copperweld Case Law
In the wake of the Copperweld decision, however, the courts have
generally followed Raiders and distinguished Copperweld, rather than
finding Copperweld sufficiently analogous to dismiss section 1 claims
but would instead arrange exhibition games with whatever teams they could schedule,
the team's value would have plummeted.
61 The failure of any team in one of the four major professional leagues to defect to
another league speaks to the economic irrationality of such a move.
62 467 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1984) ("Because there is nothing inherently anticompeti-
tive about a corporation's decision to create a subsidiary, the intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine 'imposes grave legal consequences upon organizational distinctions that
are of de minimis meaning and effect.'") (citations omitted).
See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 776 ("[W]e can only conclude that the coordinated
behavior of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary falls outside the reach of [section
1].").
See id. at 772 (rejecting the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine because it "looks
to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the reality").
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against the professional leagues. In Sullivan v. NFL, the First Circuit
stated that "the critical inquiry is whether the alleged antitrust con-
spirators have a 'unity of interests' or whether, instead, 'any of the de-
fendants has pursued interests diverse from those of the cooperative
itsef."6 The Sullivan court found that NFL teams compete with one
another "for things like fan support, players, coaches, ticket sales, lo-
cal broadcast revenues, and the sale of team paraphemalia."6 Due to
the existence of this off-field competition, the teams did have "diverse
interests," and thus failed the latter part of the "unity of interests"
standard.67 As a result, the Sullivan court held that NFL teams were
not a single entity for section 1 purposes.68
The Sullivan court purported to adopt the standard for interpret-
ing Copperweld set forth in City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Coop-
erative, Inc. ("Mt. Pleasant").69 In Mt. Pleasant, ajoint venture that sup-
plied electricity to rural communities was found by the court to be a
single entity. 7' The Associate Electric Cooperative featured an elabo-
rate three-tiered ownership structure. It was owned by six generation
and transmission cooperatives, which in turn were owned by forty-
three distribution companies. These distribution companies' custom-
ers-425,000 individual consumers-owned the distribution compa-
nies. 7' Therefore, the decision-making power within the Cooperative
was, as a formal matter, diffused widely among a variety of separately
owned economic entities.
Although the First Circuit in Sullivan and the Eighth Circuit in Mt.
Pleasant agreed on the same legal standard to use, they applied that
34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated
Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274-77 (8th Cir. 1988)). This approach was criticized
by the Seventh Circuit in WGN.
Although [the complete unity of interests] phrase appears in Copperve/ the
Court offered it as a statement of fact about the parent-subsidiary relation, not
as a proposition of law about the limits of permissible cooperation. As a
proposition of law, itwould be silly. Even a single firm contains many compet-
ing interests.
Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996)
("WGN").
Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1098.
6 See id. at 1099 ("NFL member clubs compete in several ways off the field, which
itself tends to show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single
enterprise under § 1.").
63 id.
0 Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
7' See id. at 271 (describing the complicated ownership and supply structure of the
cooperative).
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standard in very different ways. Much like the plaintiff in Sullivan, the
petitioner in Mt. Pleasant argued that the cooperative members had
diverse economic interests because they competed for customers, in-
cluding municipal customers, were forced to arbitrate a dispute con-
cerning rate structures, and disagreed over how to divide the coopera-
tive's profits.n The court found that this evidence proved that the
cooperative members had diverse economic interests, but "not in the
sense necessary to create a fact issue on whether these companies are
part of a single enterprise. "73 The Mt. Pleasant court's discussion of
the intracooperative competition is notable because it focused much
more on the overall purpose of the cooperative rather than on certain
areas in which cooperative members competed.
Even though the cooperatives may quarrel among themselves on how to
divide the spoils of their economic power, it cannot reasonably be said
that they are independent sources of that power. Their power depends, and
has always depended, on the cooperation among themselves.... The
disagreements we have described are more like those among the board
members of a single enterprise, than those among enterprises which are
themselves separate and independent
74
This analysis, when applied to a professional sports league, seems
to support a finding of single entity status. The NFL owners do func-
tion like "board members of a single enterprise" when they promul-
gate the league-wide rules that are at issue in antitrust claims against
the League.75 In addition, the League's economic success "depends,
and has always depended, on the cooperation among [the member
teams]." 76 In light of this language, and more significantly, the overall
reluctance of the Mt. Pleasant court to accept evidence of intracoop-
erative competition so as to create even an issue of fact, it is clear that
the Sullivan court interpreted Copperweld very differently than the Mt.
Pleasant court. Furthermore, it seems clear that an Eighth Circuit
court dutifully following Mt. Pleasant would have no choice but to hold
7 Id. at 276-77. In addition, the city argued that the cooperative members must
have competed in the labor market, see id. at 277, a factor the Sullivan court found very
persuasive in ruling that the NFL failed to meet the unity of interests standard, see Sul-
livan, 34 F.3d at 1098-99.
73 M. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 277. The procedural posture of this case further points
to the difference between the standards of the First and the Eighth Circuits. The Mi.
Pleasant petitioners merely had to show that there was a triable issue of fact regarding




that a professional sports league is a single entity.
Nevertheless, in an unpublished opinion, a district court in the
Eighth Circuit reached the same outcome as the Sullivan court by ap-
plying a different legal principle. In reviewing that trial court's deci-
sion, the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis Convention &? Visitors Commission v.
NFL noted that the district court found that the league was estopped
from arguing that its teams comprised a single economic entity be-
cause of the Ninth Circuit decision in Raiders.77 The trial court also
found that neither Copperweld nor Mt. Pleasant necessitated that it re-
consider the league's single entity argument.78 The district court did
dismiss the case during the course of the trial, however, because of in-
sufficient evidence.n The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal, and therefore did not address the NFL's cross-appeal on the
single entity question.s°
Much of the leading case law demonstrates the courts' hostility to
the single entity argument, but a Seventh Circuit case, Chicago Profes-
sional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA ("WGI'), suggests that the majority
view has not necessarily gained a consensus and that the single entity
question with regard to traditionally organized sports leagues remains
an undecided one."' In WGN, the trial court ruled that the NBA was
not a single entity because its teams did not have a "complete unity of
interest."u The Seventh Circuit vacated that holding and remanded
the case for further consideration.? The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the trial court's holding that NBA teams did not have a "complete
154 F.3d 851, 856 (8th Cir. 1998) (recounting the trial court's findings).
See id. ("The district court was not persuaded that two subsequent cases [(Copper-
weld and Mt. Pleasant)] dealing with the concept of single economic enterprise re-
quired a different result.").
See id. at 859 ("Since the court concluded that [the plaintiff] had presented no
evidence to show that the NFL's rule and the guidelines actually had caused league
teams other than the Rams to refrain from competitive bidding on the Trans World
'Dome lease, it granted the Rule 50 motion.").
'0 See id. at 865 n.9 (dismissing the NFL's cross-appeal of the trial court's single en-
tity ruling).
8'95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).82 Id. at 597. The case involved a dispute between the plaintiffs, the Chicago Bulls
basketball team and WGN, a cable television station, and the defendant NBA, over how
many Bulls games WGN was permitted to broadcast each basketball season. See id. at
595 (explaining that both sides have appealed the trial court's 30 game allowance, with
the Bulls and WGN wanting to broadcast 41 games per year, and the NBA seeking to
fix the number between 15 to 20). The league argued that the broadcasts infringed on
the rights of other cable stations that had contracted with the NBA for rights to televise
games nationally.
s See id. at 601 (vacating the district court's judgment of "all events" and remand-
ing).
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unity of interest," but held that such a determination was not neces-
sarily dispositive of the single entity question84 The court did not in-
terpret Copperweld to "hold that only conflict-free enterprises may be
treated as single entities. "m After all, the court noted, "multi-stage"
firms such as General Motors or IBM often have conflicts between
various departments." 8 According to the WGN court, Copperweld held
that the concerted action requirement exists to scrutinize "[c] onduct
that 'deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision-
making that competition assumes.'" 7  In Copperweld, the parent-
subsidiary relationship did not deprive the marketplace and, there-
fore, was not subject to section 1 scrutiny.
Applying this interpretation, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[w]e
see no reason why a sports league cannot be treated as a single firm in
this typology. " 8 The court stopped short, however, of declaring the
NBA a single entity. In remanding the case, the court stated that the
single entity question requires a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of
the league. The WGN court argued that it is entirely possible for one
league (the NBA, for example) to be characterized as a single entity
and for another league (the NHL, for example) to be subject to the
Rule of Reason. 9 Furthermore, separate aspects of league decision-
making may be characterized differently. The WGNcourt stated:
[W] e do not rule out the possibility that an organization such as the NBA
is best understood as one firm when selling broadcast rights to a network
in competition with a thousand other producers of entertainment, but is
best understood as a joint venture when curtailing competition for play-
ers who have few other market opportunities.90
The standard set forth by the WGNcourt effectively articulates why
the single entity question is so difficult, but fails to answer satisfactorily
how professional sports leagues ought to be characterized. The "de-
priving the marketplace of independent centers of decision-making"
standard fails to give much guidance to the trial courts that must actu-
ally make such determinations. Furthermore, it requires in each in-
841 d. at 598.
a Id.
6 Id.
87 Id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)).
8Id.
89 See id. at 600 ("Sports are sufficiently diverse that it is essential to investigate their
organization and ask Copperweld's functional question one league at a time....").
9Id.
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stance a fact-intensive review of the facets of a league's operation, as
well as comparison with other leagues and other business forms, to
reach a conclusion. These requirements, therefore, deny all parties
the efficiency benefits of a bright-line rule. An inquiry of this sort has
not yet taken place, as the parties in WGN reached a settlement after
the Seventh Circuit's decision was rendered.9'
A review of the case law concerning the traditional leagues' single
entity argument shows a prevailing hostility to the leagues' claim that
they constitute single economic units for antitrust purposes. Courts
have consistently followed the result reached by the court in Raiders,
notwithstanding the questionable rationale behind that decision. The
Seventh Circuit's WGN decision suggests, however, that the rule of
Raiders has not been universally accepted. The parameters of the de-
bate will undoubtedly influence the Fraser court's reasoning in affirm-
ing or denying MLS's single entity claim.
II. THE NEW PARADIGM: SINGLE ENTrTYLF-AGUES
The existing case law on the single entity question discussed in
Part I.C only directly applies to leagues organized according to the
traditional model as described in Part I.A. Partly in response to the
courts' generally hostile reaction to the established leagues' single en-
tity arguments, several upstart leagues have organized themselves as
single corporate entities.? Before evaluating the legal arguments
available to the litigants in Fraser v. AMS, it seems appropriate to heed
the Seventh Circuit's admonition.93 and examine the nature and prac-
tices of the league at issue, and compare its structure to those of fellow
single entity leagues.
A. Benefits of a Single Entity League
Given the history of repeated antitrust challenges to the tradi-
tional league practices described in Part I.B, any protection the
leagues can muster from antitrust scrutiny would benefit them con-
siderably. If the leagues are viewed as single entities, they could avoid
the potential of treble damages as well as the costs of litigation from
"See Lacy J. Banks, Fans Big Winners in NBA-WGN Settlement, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1996, at 7 (describing the effects of the settlement).
'2 See infra Part HA (discussing leagues organized as single entities).
93 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
decision in WGN).
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suits arising under section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 Potential plaintiffs
would be forced to challenge league rules as abuses of monopoly
power under section 2 of the Sherman Act, a far more difficult claim
to prove. 95 The league would thus enhance its bargaining leverage
over its players' union because the union would be unable to threaten
the league with a section 1 lawsuit.96 The corporate structure of the
league would offer other advantages as well. The league can increase
the value of its sponsorship agreements by ensuring its league-wide
sponsors that individual clubs will not enter into sponsorship agree-
ments with competitor firms that dilute the value of the league-wide
sponsor's investment.97  The corporate league can also reduce the
number of decisions that require building a consensus among league
owners. By contracting to place league decision-making power in the
hands of the central league office, the corporate league can prevent
franchises from relocating, realign divisions, and otherwise make deci-
sions that serve the purposes of the league as a whole rather than in-
dividual owners." Finally, the league can achieve economies of scalethrough increased purchasing power.99
B. Organization of MajorLeague Soccer
MLS was initially designed by Los Angeles attorney Alan Rothen-
" The Sherman Act provides that successful plaintiffs may recover three times the
amount of their actual damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
" See infra Part III (discussing section 2 liability).
9 Although the leagues are protected from antitrust challenges by players' unions
under the non-statutory labor exemption, see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 204,
it remains possible that a union could decertify and individual players, "sufficiently dis-
tant in time and circumstance" from the collective bargaining process, could bring suit
against a league. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (holding
that federal labor laws shield from antitrust attack an agreement among several em-
ployers bargaining together to implement the terms of their last best good-faith wage
offer, after reaching an impasse in bargaining with the players' union). In McNeil v.
NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992), the National Football League Players Associa-
tion decertified in order to bring suit against the NFL to challenge the League's "Plan
B" free agency rules, which ultimately resulted in a settlement that dramatically in-
creased the players' freedom of movement.
See Larry Lebowitz, Sports Inc.: Leagues Are Forming As "Single Entities" Where Deci-
sion and Profits Are Shared By All Owners, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 20,
1997, at IF (noting that the owners of the Dallas Cowboys and the New York Yankees
have signed sponsorship deals with companies that compete with official league-wide
sponsors).
See id. (explaining that the single entity model protects a league from the whims
and over-spending of an individual owner).
99 See id. (discussing how "single-entity ownership create[s] a lot of advantages in
negotiating broadcast rights and sponsorship deals").
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berg as a limited-liability Delaware corporation run by a Board of Di-
rectors appointed by league investors.0 Rothenberg planned that
MLS would own and operate all of the teams in the league, assign
players and team personnel, and set local ticket and concession prices.
League investors would merely own shares in MLS itself.'0 ' This struc-
ture effectively addressed the reasoning of the Sullivan court, which
rejected the NFL's single entity defense because NFL teams compete
off-field,' °2 by simply eliminating all forms of off-field competition.
The only competition possible in this model is in the form of the on-
field games themselves. In MLS's view, the games do not represent
competition in any economic sense, but rather represent the product
of the MLS corporation. It seems highly likely, therefore, that if MLS
had retained this structure, the players' section 1 claims in Fraser
would have been dismissed under Copperwel'
MLS was forced to modify its structure before it began operating,
however, when it had difficulty attracting investors. Potential investors
were discouraged from investing by the anonymity of their roles and
preferred to be more involved in running a team.' Under the new
arrangement, MLS retained formal ownership of its franchises but is-
sued a special class of stock to "investor-operators." This special class
of stock gave them "almost full operating control" over the manage-
ment of a particular franchise.' °5 The franchises and the league
equally share local revenues (generated by the teams from ticket sales,
concessions, signage, etc.), while MLS retains all national television
and merchandising revenues. The funds MLS receives are used in
part to pay all player salaries. The investor-operators receive divi-
dends on profits from league operations and may also sell their special
stock to outside groups, just as in traditional leagues. 6 In this new
structure, MLS teams do compete with each other in some of the
same ways noted by the Sullivan court. Thus, the new structure is
clearly a less "pure" single entity than the MLS Rothenberg originally
envisioned, and somewhat more like traditionally organized leagues.0 7
' See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 495-96 (discussing MLS's original de-
sign).
101 See idU (detailing MLS's original structure).
" See supra text accompanying notes 65-68 (discussing the Sullivan decision).
'03 See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 497 (describing the outcome as "almost
certain").
'" See id. at 496 (explaining why MLS initially had problems attracting investors).
5 Id.
"6 See id. at 496 (setting forth the details of MLS's current organization).
107 'Me structures of two other recently formed single entity sports leagues show the
extent to which the structures of single entity leagues can differ. The American Bas-
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There is another extremely important structural difference be-
tween MLS and the traditional leagues, however, which tempers intra-
league competition and thus complicates application of the Sullivan
court's standard to MLS. MLS allows its investor-operators to run
more than one team. In fact, three individual investors manage a to-
tal of seven teams, more than half of the twelve teams currently com-
peting in MLS.' °s The players and coaches selected by the MLS inves-
tor-operators with multiple teams are thus more accurately described
as "allocated" to a particular team. Overall, intraleague competition is
substantially foreclosed because so many teams share common inves-
tor-operators.1'° The prospect of the vigorous off-field competition
found by the Sullivan court is highly unlikely because of the potential
ketball League ("ABL"), which has since suspended operations and declared bank-
ruptcy, originally consisted of eight teams. SeeAmy Shipley, ABL Says It Is Bankrupt and
Shuts Down, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1998, at D1 (reporting the ABL's announcement
that it was suspending operations). Both the players and management of each team
were employed and allocated to individual teams by the league office. In addition, the
players were given a 10% interest in the ABL. See WEI=R & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at
497-98 (describing the ABL's corporate tructure). The Women's National Basketball
Association ("WNBA") could be characterized as a "less pure" single entity than the
ABL. The WNBA LLC (limited liability company) is a corporation owned by NBA De-
velopment, which in turn is owned by the 29 NBA franchises, each of which has differ-
ent owners. See id. at 497 (discussing the WNBA's structure). The NBA teams have
official control of the WNBA, but a board of eight NBA owners and the NBA commis-
sioner sets WNBA policy. The WNBA, like the ABL, hires both players and coaches,
and assigns them to individual teams. The NBA teams who play in the same city as
WNBA teams manage the franchises and receive a share of local revenues generated by
the team. See id. (contrasting the ABL and the WNBA). Since the WNBA players have
chosen to form a union and begin bargaining with WNBA management rather than
pursue litigation like the MLS players, it is unlikely that a decision regarding applica-
tion of section I to the WNBA is imminent. SeeW.H. StickneyJr., WNBA Athletes Vote to
Affiliate with NBA Players' Union, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 6, 1998, at 2 (discussing the
results of the vote certifying the National Basketball Players Association as the WNBA
players' official bargaining representative).
See Michael Hiestand, A Family That Plays Together, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1998, at
3C (noting this apparent conflict of interest). Robert Kraft and Lamar Hunt, both of
whom also own NFL franchises, operate two franchises each. See id. (asserting that
three owners control a majority of the franchise's teams). Phillip Anschutz, a part
owner of the NHL's Los Angeles Kings, operates a total of three franchises.
109 This structure also raises the danger that a single investor-operator may attempt
to load one of her teams with all of her best players. As a result, the power of the MLS
Commissioner to block trades (a power each Commissioner also enjoys in the tradi-
tional league model) is especially important in maintaining a competitive balance
throughout the league. See id. (explaining that the MLS Commissioner is "'a final
check and balance' on any owner attempting a shady trade between [her] teams").
Even without this safeguard, it is unlikely that the benefits an owner would accrue from
creating a "loaded" team would outweigh the losses the owner would suffer from the
reduced competitiveness of her other teams.
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for direct harm to the operator's other intraleague interests."0 In ad-
dition, MLS still operates two teams, which further weighs against the
existence of significant intraleague competition."' Thus, the fortunes
of a single MLS team are so inextricably linked to the success of all the
other teams that any argument emphasizing a diversity of interests
among MLS teams seems extremely far-fetched.
C. Fraser v. MLS: The Players' Claims
The league practices at issue in Fraser concern MLS's restraints on
its teams' ability to acquire players. In this area of league operations,
MLS has retained a system very close to the more pure single entity
model originally envisioned by Rothenberg. Once an investor-
operator decides which players she would like to acquire, MLS negoti-
ates a contract with the player. The terms of the agreement are sub-
ject to the league's salary cap and any restraints on player movement,
after the acceptance of which the player becomes an employee of the
league, rather than of the "allocated" team."2 The players allege that
MLS's entire system of player restraints violates the antitrust laws.
First, they argue, the salary cap, the centralized player allocation sys-
tem, and the standard reserve clause in every player contract unrea-
sonably restrict the labor market for professional soccer players in the
United States by preventing MLS teams from competing against each
other for the services of individual players."3 Second, the standard
MLS player contract unlawfully restricts the players' ability to license
their names and images."4 Third, the system of transfer fees promul-
gated by the sport's International Governing Body, FIFA, and en-
forced by the United States Soccer Federation and MLS, violates the
antitrust laws by restricting players' ability to seek employment in
"' See id. ("[T]he idea is ... successful businessmen won't abuse their multiple-
team ownerships and risk undermining the league's credibility because, ultimately,
they're business partners rather than competitors.").
' SeeJill R. Dorson, Clash Swept Up by Kraft Group: San Jose Club Sold AfterRothenberg
Deal Falls Through, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 19, 1998, at D2 (discussing MLS's current own-
ership situation).
" SeeWE1LER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 496-97 (discussing MLS's restrictions on
player contracts).
Is See Sarbjit Singh, Welcome to the Club: Upstart Major League Soccer Gets Sued, 6
SPORTS LAW.J. 217, 229-30 (1999) (discussing players' claims of antitrust violations).
4 See id. at 230 (noting the players' claim that "[the MLS standard player agree-
ment denies players a fair share of group licensing rights").
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other leagues. 5
D. Fraser v. MLS: Assessing the Arguments
In assessing the applicability to MLS of the concerted action re-
quirement of section 1, there are several arguments the Fraser court is
likely to consider.
1. Copperweld Is Controlling
MLS can argue that Fraser is factually indistinguishable from, and
therefore directly controlled by, Copperwelds bright-line rule. As MLS
and its shareholders wholly own the franchises, their intracorporate
decisions, or league rules, cannot be deemed concerted action for sec-
tion 1 purposes, and therefore are not subject to section 1 liability.
MLS can even argue that its organization is a more pure single entity
than the parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary in Cop-
perweld Under this view, MLS's franchises are not subsidiaries of the
league, but more like "plants" where the corporation outputs its
product.
2. "Form vs. Reality" Analysis
The court may decide, however, that the result in Copperweld is not
directly controlling. In that case, the players can argue that the ra-
tionale of Copperweld demands a finding of concerted action. Copper-
weld emphasizes that the concerted action requirement directs courts
to look at the economic reality, rather than the form, of the businessS • 117
association. Permitting MLS to escape section 1 liability similarly
values form over economic reality. From this perspective, the single
entity league has the same purpose, and produces the same basic
product, as the traditionally organized leagues, and therefore should
receive the same treatment under the antitrust laws. The competition
"- See id. (noting the players' transfer fee claim). The transfer fee claims concern
MLS's agreements with another economic entity, FIFA, and thus will not be affected by
MLS's single entity argument.
16 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 756 (1984)
(recounting the Copperweld Corporation's transfer of the Regal Company's assets into
a subsidiary corporation, Regal Tube). After all, MLS consists of only one corporation,
not two, as was the case in CopperwelL
17 In fact, the Court repealed the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in Copperweld
precisely because it "looks to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the real-
ity." Id. at 772.
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for coaches and other team personnel among MLS franchises is just
like the off-field intraleague competition in the traditional leagues
that the First Circuit emphasized in Sullivan.0 8
In addition, the nature of the special class of stock owned by the
investor-operators creates incentives for each operator to compete at
the expense of fellow shareholders. The investor-operators keep 50%
of the ticket sales, local broadcast, and local sponsorship revenue gen-
erated by their respective teams, and thus have divergent economic
interests. 9 Furthermore, should the investor-operator choose to sell
her stock, the stock's value will reflect her team's competitive success.
A winning team is likely to encourage greater attendance as well as
generate additional revenue by hosting playoff games. Teams with a
larger fan base and a healthy balance sheet will appreciate in value as
compared to less successful clubs with smaller followings. Although
the financial health of the league as a whole may be as, if not more,
important than the prospects of an individual franchise, the on-field
success or failure of a particular investor-operator's team affects the
return on her investment. This economic reality creates additional
incentives for the investor-operator to compete at the expense of the
rest of the league.
The players' position is problematic, however, in several respects.
First, MLS can dispute the players' characterization of "economic real-
ity." The investor-operators that the players would perceive as inde-
pendent economic actors are merely shareholders in the MLS corpo-
ration. It would be unthinkable in another context for a court to find
concerted action through the actions of the shareholders of a single
corporation. As the Seventh Circuit noted in WGN, simply because a
large corporation like GM may have employees or shareholders with
disparate interests does not mandate characterizing GM as something
other than a single entity.'20 The fact that the interests of shareholders
may diverge under certain circumstances is clearly insufficient to war-
rant a finding of concerted action.
Second, the players' argument is also questionable because courts
addressing the single entity question with respect to traditional
leagues have found that the form of a sports league (an association of
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing Sullivan).
'9 See Singh, supra note 113, at 231 (describing the allocation of MLS revenues).
120 See Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.
1996) ("WGN') ("Conflicts are endemic in any multi-stage firm... but they do not im-
ply that these large firms mustjustify all of their acts under the Rule of Reason.").
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independently owned businesses) is its economic reality.12' The fact
that the member clubs are independently owned and compete in
some respects has been more persuasive than league arguments em-
phasizing the degree of cooperation undertaken by the member
clubs. By this reasoning, Copperweld could actually be distinguished
from Fraser (to MLS's benefit) because a sports league's unique quali-
ties dictate that its form does matter, and is in fact the defining aspect
of its economic nature. In finding insufficient evidence that the in-
dependently owned franchises acted as a single entity, the court re-
jected arguments concluding that form was irrelevant.1 n Given this
precedent, the Fraser court may be required to accept a sports league's
form as indicative of its status as a single economic entity. Just as the
court in Sullivan refused to look past the divergent interests created by
independent club ownership, the Fraser court could find that the lack
of independent owners is dispositive evidence of a unitary actor. To
find otherwise would seem inconsistent with Sullivan, which, as a First
Circuit opinion, is binding precedent for the District of Massachusetts
Fraser court.
Finally, the players' position is problematic because the Copperweld
court championed the right of business associations to organize them-
selves as they deem appropriate: "[A] business enterprise should be
free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of control .... "'
The single entity structure allows MLS numerous efficiencies.'2 4
MLS's freedom to self-organize would be compromised significantly if
courts were free to ignore how a business chose to organize itself, opt-
ing instead to characterize a business as something other than its cho-
sen form.
3. Following WGA. Distinguishing MLS's Operations
As an alternative to the "form vs. economic reality" argument, the
MLS players can use the WGNopinion to distinguish certain aspects of
MLS's operations from its relations with its players, the practices at is-
121 See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that because
"NFL member clubs compete in several ways off the field," they could not be viewed as
a single entity); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389
(9th Cir. 1984) ("Raides") (finding that the clubs were "separate business entities").
2 See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (finding that NFL teams have divergent interests).
2 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984).
121 See Lebowitz, supra note 97, at IF (noting the advantages of a single entity
league, including controlling player costs, greater leverage in negotiating broadcasting
contracts, and coordinated marketing strategies that eliminate the problem of ambush
marketing).
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sue in Fraser. According to the Seventh Circuit, it is perfectly permis-
sible to treat a traditionally organized league as a single entity in some
respects and as a joint venture in others.'2 Under this view, even if
MLS is regarded as a single entity in some aspects of its operations,
such as national television and marketing deals, and franchise reloca-
tion and expansion, it should still be treated as ajoint venture in the
player market. The nature of a sports league is such that individual
teams will always compete with one another in the player market. In
order to achieve on-field competitive success, teams must make them-
selves attractive as potential employers to players both within and out-
side of the league. Although MLS is technically responsible for nego-
tiating player salaries and signing the players to employment
contracts,6 it is really the demand of the individual teams for particu-
lar players that triggers league negotiations with those players. The
league, therefore, merely acts as an agent for the teams by handling
contract negotiations. Likewise, in the traditional leagues, the com-
missioner's office must approve all contracts and trades between
teams to ensure that the transactions comply with league rules. This
rule, however, does not render the traditional leagues single entities.
The end result of these labor practices, the Fraser plaintiffs can ar-
gue, is that MLS fails both the First Circuit's and the Eighth Circuit's
.unity of interests" standards, articulated in Sullivan 27 and Mt. Pleas-
ant, 128respectively, as well as the Seventh Circuit's "depriving the mar-
ketplace of independent decision-makers" test, articulated in WGN.2
The competition between teams for players violates the "unity of in-
terests" standard because teams are pursuing disparate interests as
they attempt to attract the best players. MLS also fails the Seventh
Circuit's test because the artificial market constraints imposed by MLS
greatly reduce the autonomy of the individual decision-makers in the
players' market. The market for professional soccer players' services
in the United States would surely benefit from the removal of these
restraints.
MLS can respond to the players' labor market argument by distin-
guishing the Seventh Circuit's decision in WGN. First and foremost,
the WGN holding applies to traditional sports leagues, and not to
'
2
' See WGN, 95 F.3d at 600 ("[T]he ability of sports teams to agree on a TV contract
need not imply an ability to set wages for players.").
12 See supra text accompanying notes 100-107 (discussing MLS's structure).
2 Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099.
"'City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274-77 (8th Cir.
1988).
1'2 WGN, 95 F.3d at 598-99.
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leagues organized as single corporations. If, instead, WGNis viewed as
directly relevant, MLS can argue that the holding supports its argu-
ment. WGN directs courts to scrutinize carefully the nature and form
130of each challenged aspect of the sports league's practices. When
MLS reorganized itself into a less "pure" single entity, it did not alter
its system of negotiating all contracts with players and retaining com-
plete control over assigning players to a particular team. Even though
investor-operators may request that the league sign a particular player,
the league's control over the process remains so tight that intraleague
competition for players is muted. Although this reality has profoundly
anticompetitive effects in the player market, those effects are not rele-
vant for determining whether concerted action exists.' 31
MLS's player acquisition system is directly analogous to a corpora-
tion that solicits advice from its plant managers before hiring its em-
ployees. If these plant managers receive potentially lucrative compen-
sation bonuses when their plants outperform the other company
plants (as MLS's investor-operators do if their special class of stock
appreciates), the plant managers obviously would lobby the central
hiring office to secure the best employees for a particular plant. It is
also possible that the skills of a particular prospective employee (like
that of a superstar athlete) are so exceptional that the plant managers
would be willing to offer the prospective employee significantly more
compensation than the company is willing to pay. The company's re-
fusal to pay the employee more than what the company budgeted,
however, does not in itself create an antitrust violation. The prospec-
tive employees could argue that the company is "depriving the mar-
ketplace of independent centers of decision-making" by not allowing
the individual plant managers to pay what they believe the employee is
worth. Even so, the courts would likely honor the single corporate
form that the company had adopted and refrain from finding con-
certed action, despite the anticompetitive effect of the company's
practices. MLS's control over the supply of players entering the
league is no different from the company's control over employees in
this corporate example.
The argument against the existence of concerted action is further
strengthened by the fact that more than half of MLS's teams are
"0 See WGN, 95 F.3d at 600 ("[It is essential to investigate [a league's] organization
and ask Copperwelds functional question one league at a time-and perhaps one facet
of a league at a time .. ").
IS, The anticompetitive effects would of course become relevant if concerted action
was found.
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owned by investor-operators who own multiple teams./32 Aside from
the fact that the league would block an investor-operator from doing
so, any efforts by a particular investor-operator controlling multiple
teams to "buy a championship" for one of her teams would inevitably
damage her investment in her other team(s). Thus, for a majority of
teams, reckless spending on players would be counterproductive to
the interests of the free-spending investor-operator, not just the
league as a whole.
The weight of the arguments favors MLS's position. Substituting
the single entity sports league for the traditional model changes such
dispositive characteristics that it becomes illogical to treat a league like
MLS as a collection of economic actors competing in any meaningful
economic sense. Therefore, section 1 of the Sherman Act should not
apply to MLS.
III. THE POSSIBILrIY OF SECION 2 LIABILITY
A legal victory for MLS on the single entity question would only
result in the dismissal of the MLS players' section 1 claim. The players
could still pursue a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act because
section 2 does not have a concerted action requirement.
Section 2 prohibits monopolization and attempted monopoliza-
tion by a single economic actor. 3 The players could allege that MLS's
practices constitute an abuse of the league's monopoly power in the
market for soccer players. Generally, players who have brought anti-
trust claims against leagues have not used section 2 and proving a sec-
tion 2 violation has, in practice, been far more difficult than making a
successful section 1 claim.'34
To make a successful section 2 claim, the MLS players would first
1 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that several MLS owners op-
erate more than one MIS team).
'as See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States... shall be deemed guilty
of a felony....").
"4 SeeJacobs, supra note 30, at 28 n.12 ("[C] hallenges to league activities under sec-
tion 2 have been infrequent and, for a variety of reasons, unsuccessful."). Section 2
cases generally have featured other leagues or franchises as plaintiffs. See, e.g., United
States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the
jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of section 2 antitrust violations but liable
for only one dollar); Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1983) (up-
holding the NFL's refusal to admit a former World Football League franchise into the
NFL); American Football League v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124, 134 (4th Cir. 1963) (failing to
find that the NFL monopolized the relevant market).
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have to show that the relevant product and geographic market is the
labor market for elite professional soccer players in the United
States.Is Assuming arguendo that the players successfully characterize
this labor market as the relevant product market,'3 they will likely
have a much more difficult time proving that the relevant geographic
market is the United States. The players would have to prove that if a
hypothetical monopolist soccer league in the United States were to
impose wage restrictions that depressed wages by a small but signifi-
cant amount (usually 5-10%), players would have no option but to
sign with the monopolist league.' s This argument ignores the fact
that there are many other professional soccer leagues around the
world that offer comparable (and in many cases, superior) competi-
tion and compensation. Although players may prefer to play in an
American league for a variety of reasons, the court may view the avail-
ability of close substitutes to an American league as reason to desig-
nate the world-wide market as the relevant market for the services of
professional soccer players. Because MLS is only one of many top
leagues scattered throughout the world, it falls far short of the 50%
minimum market share generally required to prove market power.3s8
This failure to prove market power would result in dismissal of the
section 2 claim against MLS.39
135 SeeUnited States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of mo-
nopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident.").
The NFL's repeated attempts to argue that it "faces market competition" from
other professional sports leagues and other forms of entertainment have been re-
jected. WEULER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 603. It is also worth noting that there is
considerable scholarly debate as to whether the antitrust laws (either section 1 or sec-
tion 2) apply to labor markets at all. See id. at 152-53 (noting that because "monop-
sony" power held by the purchaser may merely induce a wealth transfer, and actually
enhance consumer welfare, a buyer's control of the labor market may not be subject to
antitrust scrutiny).
137 See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 1997) (de-
scribing, but not adopting, the Department of Justice's test for determining the rele-
vant~roduct market).
See Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 489 (5th Cir.
1984) ("Supreme Court cases ... suggest that absent special circumstances, a defen-
dant must have a market share of at least fifty percent before he can be guilty of mo-
nopolization.").
Even if the players' proffered market definition was accepted by the court, they
still might have difficulty proving that MLS abused its market power. The standard for
assessing what constitutes an abuse of monopoly power is the subject of considerable
disagreement. Some circuits have adopted an extremely pro-defendant test that re-
quires the plaintiff to prove that the sole purpose of the conduct at issue was to harm
BIG LEAGUE PERESTROIKA?
The problems of proving both the existence of market power and
the abuse of that power highlight some of the challenges involved in
pursuing a section 2 claim, especially against MLS. These difficulties
only further accentuate the importance of the single entity question-
should MLS prevail on that issue, it likely will be extremely well insu-
lated from any antitrust challenges by its players. 140
IV. A PLAN TO REORGANIZE THE TRADITIONAL LEAGUES
New sports leagues need not be the only leagues to enjoy the
benefits of the single entity structure. Should MLS succeed in arguing
that it is a single entity for antitrust purposes, as this Comment pre-
dicts, the traditional leagues should reorganize themselves along the
MLS (or some similar) corporate model.14' The reorganization plan
set forth in this section modifies a plan proposed by Jeffrey A. Rosen-
the defendant's competition. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that the defendant's ability to "ascrib[e] facially plausible
benefits to its integrated design" was sufficient to meet its burden of demonstrating the
lack of a violation of an antitrust-based consent decree); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a monopolist may seek
competitive advantage in a different market as long as it is merely "reaping the com-
petitive rewards attributable to its efficient size"). The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, allows a showing of "unreasonably exclusionary" conduct, which suggests more
of a balancing approach. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125
F.3d 1195, 1209 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming ajury instruction that declared "unnecessar-
ily exclu [sionary]" conduct by a monopolist illegal).
"0 The players and other parties will be able to sue under section 1, however, for
agreements MIS makes with third parties that violate the Rule of Reason. For exam-
ple, the Fraser plaintiffs have challenged the MIS-FIFA arrangement that requires out-
side leagues to pay transfer fees for the rights to all MLS players, including those whose
contracts with MIS have expired. MIS moved for summaryjudgment on the grounds
that it has not yet enforced its right to demand a transfer fee. The judge, however, de-
nied the motion. See Fraser v. MILS, 7 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75 (D. Mass. 1998) (refusing to
rule that the transfer fee question was moot even though MIS had never requested a
transfer fee).
141 The leagues may also want to wait for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit
split concerning the appropriate standard of liability for section 2 of the Sherman Act.
See supra note 139 (discussing the circuit split). If the Court adopts a defendant-
friendly standard similar to the Second Circuit's Berkey Photo test, it will provide addi-
tional incentive for the leagues to reorganize. 603 F.2d at 276. Conversely, if the
Court were to adopt a more plaintiff-friendly balancing test, like the Ninth Circuit's
"unreasonably exclusionary" standard in Image Technical Services, the difference be-
tween the standards for section 1 and section 2 liability would be less significant. 122
F.3d at 1209. This would decrease the significance of the inapplicability of section 1 to
the reorganized league. Even if the Supreme Court adopts a plaintiff-friendly stan-
dard, however, a section 2 plaintiff would still have to prove that the defendant league
possessed monopoly power, which would be very difficult in many circumstances. See
discussion supra Part III (explaining the difficulties involved in making a successful sec-
tion 2 claim).
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thal in The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem: Can Revenue Sharing
Work in which he attempts to solve an entirely different problem
plaguing one of the traditional leagues: the large disparities in the
economic strength of Major League Baseball's franchises.'
43
A. Big League Perestroika
To begin, I propose that each of the traditional leagues change
their status from an unincorporated association to a limited liability
corporation. The "corporate league" would then buy its franchises
from the owners for the franchises' value, as determined by an inde-
pendent appraiser.14 Any owner who prefers not to continue under
the new corporate system would receive cash for her franchise. Par-
ticipating owners, like MLS investor-operators, would receive two
142 Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem. Can Revenue Shar-
ing Work?, 5 SETON HALLJ. SPORT LAW 419 (1995).
4 Rosenthal's proposal included the following:
(1) Have the league "purchase" every team for its appraised value.
(2) "Sell" each team back to its original owner at the estimated
new value after calculating the impact of revenue sharing. For
owners that choose not to re-purchase their teams, solicit outside
bids.
(3) Allow teams that owe money (due to the increased value of
their team) to finance the purchase through future income (but
keep the period of time relatively short to avoid draining available
resources over a long time).
(4) Assume central league control for negotiating all local broad-
casting contracts. Attempt to cross-market by permitting multiple
games to be broadcasted into each market, particularly during the
September pennant races.
(5) Share all national and local broadcasting revenues equally.
(6) Divide gate receipts unequally-a split of approximately 67-33
seems fair (33% should go to the visitor, not the league; this re-
wards good teams who are in demand in other cities). This will en-
sure that a sufficient incentive to win remains.
(7) Attempt to negotiate some form of revenue sharing with play-
ers to avoid potentially decreasing salaries and other potential ex-
ternalities as discussed herein.
(8) Ignore fixed income such as stadium revenues for now, unless
many owners choose to forsake profit-maximizing behavior and
spend this revenue to the disadvantage of teams with less favorable
lease arrangements.
Id. at 466-67.
144 As described in Rosenthal's plan, the franchise values could be adjusted to ac-
count for anticipated changes in particular league rules. For example, baseball might
choose to adopt increased revenue sharing measures, which Rosenthal deemed essen-
tial to the game's economic stability. See id. at 423-28 (discussing the need for revenue
sharing).
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kinds of stock in return for ownership fights to their respective teams.
One class of stock would provide for the traditional voting rights
within the league that all franchise owners currently enjoy, as well as a
share of the league's profits. The other class of stock would grant
control of the day-to-day operations of the individual franchises to
their previous owners and allow the owners to sell this stock to outside
bidders. The franchises themselves could be owned directly by the in-
corporated league or exist as subsidiaries wholly owned by the parent
league corporation, similar to the defendants' arrangement in Copper-
wel 
45
The advantages of the corporate league would be manifold. First
and foremost, the league would not face section 1 liability. Because
almost every aspect of traditional league operations has been chal-
lenged under section 1, leagues necessarily are constrained in adopt-
ing new rules and entering into new arrangements by the constant
threat (if not the certainty) of a section 1 challenge. By removing sec-
tion 1 liability, the leagues would not have to overcome such barriers,
and would also avoid the expense of litigating many lawsuits. Al-
though it is certainly true that claims could still be brought under sec-
tion 2, the difficulty of making such a claim successful will likely deter
many suits. The corporate league would also enjoy increased bargain-
ing leverage over its players, increased sponsorship opportunities,
more efficient decision-making, and improved economies of scale.
B. Potential Problems with the Proposal
The proposed reorganization is admittedly a radical measure that
would fundamentally change the basic structure of each league. The
reorganization would probably raise some significant, but not insur-
mountable, problems. The advantages of the corporate league are so
sizeable, however, that a close examination of the problems facing re-
organization should not overshadow the long term benefits that the
corporate league would enjoy. As one source noted, "[i]f [NFL]
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue could convert the NFL to a single en-
tity, he'd do it tomorrow.
47
Some team owners may be strongly opposed to such a plan be-
cause they derive value from the status their control of a team brings
in the community and amongst other wealthy people. Not surpris-
" Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 756 (1984).
'46 Seesupra Part II.A (discussing the benefits of single entity leagues).
1
47Lebowitz, supra note 97, at IF.
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ingly, MLS had great difficulties attracting investors under its original
plan, which did not provide for the investors to be associated with a
particular team.4 8 The plan essentially would have turned the inves-
tors into anonymous stockholders. MLS quickly realized its mistake
and created a second class of investor-operator stock, which allows an
owner to exercise control over a particular team, and thus achieve the
public visibility that was absent in the league's original plan.'4 9 Owners
in other leagues may also fear that they will lose the ability to run their
teams without interference, as well as the community recognition that
has made sports teams such valuable commodities. By issuing the sec-
ond class of investor-operator stock, however, the reorganized leagues
can ensure that the owners retain the value they derive from the status
value of team ownership. Owners would also appreciate the fact that
the corporate league would be more profitable due to the economic
advantages gained through the change in structure.'-, Greater profit-
ability translates into both higher dividends and higher valuations of
the individual teams, which should cause the second class of stock
held by the owners to appreciate.
On the other hand, the traditional model may provide certain tax
advantages over the single entity model since owners can deduct the
operating losses of their individual franchises.'5' The projected loss of
tax benefits, however, can be figured into the original appraised price
of the franchise. Furthermore, other owners whose franchises regu-
larly recognized annual operating profits may realize tax savings un-
der the single entity plan. Thus, it is likely that any tax considerations
can be handled as an internal league matter, with some owners using
their gains to compensate others for their losses. Moreover, the
dwindling breed of owners who have held franchises for a long time,
do not have sizeable holdings in other businesses, and are concerned
chiefly with estate taxes also should not be negatively affected since
the sale of the teams to the league in exchange for stock would have
no effect on estate taxes. Thus, tax concerns should not prove to be a
significant obstacle to league reorganization.
The players' union, fearing the loss of a section 1 claim as a bar-
gaining chip with the league, may file an unfair labor practice charge
'48 See WEI.ER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 495 (discussing the problems with the
original plan).
19 See id. at 496.
5 See supra Part II.A (discussing the advantages of the corporate structure of the
league).
See I.R.C. § 165(a) (1999) (allowing a deduction for "any loss sustained during
the taxable year").
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claiming that the reorganization must be negotiated with the union.
Although employers are obligated to bargain with unions over
changes "with respect to 'wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment,'' 52 certain aspects of a firm's business are re-
served to the discretion of the firm's management and do not require
bargaining with unions. This includes the manner by which a firm
chooses to organize itself.'O Therefore, a league would not have to
bargain with the union over its decision to reorganize itself.
Additionally, the players or another party, such as the federal gov-
ernment, may also attempt to block the reorganization through anti-
trust law. The single entity question will probably not become a set-
fled matter of law following the disposition of Fraser v. ALLS, unless the
Supreme Court renders ajudgment on the matter. Until that time, a
reorganized league would have to accept a degree of uncertainty that
it may not be deemed a single entity for section 1 purposes.
Concerns about a section 2 claim may limit some of the benefits
reorganization may provide. Section 2 jurisprudence, especially re-
garding labor claims against employers, is so unsettled that the
leagues may be reluctant to risk incurring treble damages by adopting
new restraints in the player market.'5 For section 2 purposes, the tra-
ditional leagues are unlike MLS in that each one is the preeminent
league of its kind in the world. The NFL, for example, has no serious
competition from other football leagues in terms of both the quality
of play and the level of compensation for its athletes. NFL players
pursuing a section 2 claim should be able to define the relevant mar-
ket as that for elite professional football players in the United States,
where the NFL has a complete monopoly."" But even if the players
are successful in showing a single entity league has market power, the
152 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964) (quoting the
National Labor Relations Act).
"" See NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Man-
agement decisions that fundamentally alter the direction of an enterprise... generally
are not considered decisions concerning terms and conditions of employment and are
not mandatory subjects of bargaining." (citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at
223 (StewartJ., concurring))).
114 See supra notes 139, 141 (discussing the circuit split concerning section 2 stan-
dards).
"'The other major leagues-the NIL, the NBA, and MLB-might be able to ar-
gue that international leagues are viable substitutes in the market for each league's
players, but such an argument is unlikely to be successful given the sizable gap in stan-
dards of play and compensation between these North American-based leagues and
other leagues around the world.
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task of proving abuse of market power still remains a difficult one."
Finally, the provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act might be
used to attack a league's reorganization in a suit brought by the fed-
eral government or the players. Section 7 provides that "[n]o per-
son.., shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
person engaged also in commerce ... where... the effect of such ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to cre-
ate a monopoly."157 A union making a section 7 claim would attempt
to characterize the league's action as a merger, rather than a reor-
ganization, which substantially lessens competition in the player mar-
ket. The union's merger claims would be weighed against the familiar
(and heretofore unsuccessful) league claims that it is a single entity,
but also, perhaps more significantly, the Copperweld Court's emphasis
on the freedom of business enterprises to organize themselves as they
see fit.'5 6 In comparison to the traditional league model, the single
entity structure features significant efficiencies which, according to
Copperweld, a business enterprise should be able to realize, free from
government interference.' 59 A section 7 challenge, therefore, is by no
means an insurmountable obstacle for traditional leagues seeking to
enjoy the advantages of a single entity structure.
CONCLUSION
The advent of the single entity sports league may prove to be a vi-
tally important event for the future of professional sports leagues. Al-
though the demise of the American Basketball League"O shows that
single entity leagues are by no means exempt from the cruel eco-
nomic realities of competition in the sports and entertainment mar-
ketplace, the single entity form does provide a structure in which nas-
cent sports leagues may flourish more readily with proper marketing
of its product. Surely a single entity league will be able to avoid some
1'56 See supra note 139 (describing the debate over the appropriate standard for de-
termining abuse of monopoly power).
's 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
' See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984)
("[A] business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency
of control, economy of operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment
without increasing its exposure to antitrust liability.").
9 See id. at 772-73 (asserting that a corporation should be able to restructure and
reorganize its operations in order to best serve the corporation's interests, without rais-
ing assumptions of illegitimate motives).
16o See supra note 107 (describing the structure and subsequent bankruptcy of the
American Basketball League).
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of the problems confronted by upstart leagues such as the North
American Soccer League and the United States Football League.'6 '
Both of those leagues were driven into bankruptcy in part by the prof-
ligate ways of its teams in the biggest markets, which relegated smaller
market teams to second class status and diminished the on-field prod-
uct.'6 2 The single entity structure provides a solution to this problem
and thus should make the creation of new sports ventures possible. As
a general policy matter, the single entity form is therefore decidedly
pro-competitive in its effects, and actually encourages the creation of
the labor markets it may subsequently constrain.
The reorganization of the traditional leagues proposed in this
Comment remains strictly a long term possibility. Of course, a favor-
able outcome for MLS in Fraser is necessary. Nevertheless, the leagues
should begin exploring the possibility of reorganization. The contin-
ual threat of section 1 claims has hampered leagues' efforts to maxi-
mize their bargaining leverage with players' unions and exposed the
league to protracted and burdensome litigation with players, owners,
and other leagues. The removal of the section 1 threat and the poten-
tial that the single entity model holds for controlling player costs pro-
vide powerful incentives for leagues to follow MLS's lead and adopt
single entity structures.
"' See Lebowitz, supra note 97, at 1F (contrasting MILS with other upstart leagues,
including the NASL and the USFL).
'
62 See id. ("The NASL situation wasn't much different than the financial disparities
between franchises that killed the United States Football League .... ").
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INSIDER TRADING: THE "POSSESSION VERSUS USE" DEBATE
KAREN SCHOENt
INTRODUCTION
Addressing a question that has long been a subject of debate
among legal commentators,' the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits recently
held that "knowing possession" is not sufficient to impose insider trad-
ing liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.2 At issue in this debate
is whether section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require a causal connection
between the material, nonpublic information and the insider's trad-
ing-that is, a showing that the insider actually used the information-
or whether knowing possession of such information at the time of the
trade is sufficient for liability to attach.
Few courts have addressed this issue directly.3 Indeed, in many
cases it has not been necessary for the courts to address the issue: of-
ten it is clear that the insider used the information.4 As Allan Horwich
t B.A. 1994, Yale University;J.D. Candidate 2000 and M.B.A. Candidate 2000, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. I would like to express my appreciation to Professor William C.
Tyson for valuable comments on a previous draft, and to the editors of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review for all of their assistance.
' See Allan Horwich, "Use Test" in Insider Trading Cases Update, CORP. LEGAL 'TMES,
Nov. 1998, at 61 ("In the past year two Courts of Appeal have resolved a question
which had long been the subject of debate among commentators .. ").
2 SeeUnited States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 804 (1999) ("[Wle reject the government's proffered 'knowing possession' stan-
dard for insider trading violations .. .. "); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir.
1998) ("[M]ere knowing possession ... is not a per se violation.").
3 See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1334 ("Surprisingly, few courts have directly addressed
whether § 10(b) [and] Rule 10b-5... require a causal connection between the mate-
rial nonpublic information and the insider's trading or whether knowing possession of
material nonpublic information while trading is sufficient for liability."). A few courts
have addressed the issue indirectly or in dicta. See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987
F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (advocating a knowing possession standard but assert-
ing that it was unnecessary to rule on the issue); Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C.
633, 644 (1971) (appearing to advocate a "use" standard).
' See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INsIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT,
AND PREVENTION § 3.04, at 3-22 (1999) ("In the typical case, there is no question that
the insider traded in order to take advantage of material nondisclosed information.");
see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Actual Use of Inside Information at Issue
(239)
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has noted, however, "[t]he scarcity of pertinent cases does
not... mean that the question is merely of abstract interest.... [T]he
issue frequently arises in counseling [corporate executives] who may
obtain inside information pending completion of a transaction or in
the midst of a pre-established trading program." '
This Comment will examine the "possession versus use" debate,
assessing the arguments that have been made in support of the two
sides and concluding that "knowing possession" is the more appropri-
ate standard. Because one cannot develop a sensible rule without first
understanding the rule's purpose, Part I will begin with an overview of
insider trading, including the rationale underlying its prohibition.
Part II will then present the "possession versus use" debate, exploring
the origins of the debate, as well as the recent cases addressing the is-
sue. Next, Part III will examine more closely the arguments advanced
in support of the "use" standard. Advocates of the "use" standard have
based their arguments largely on Supreme Court precedent. As dis-
cussed in Part III, however, this reliance on prior case law is misplaced
because the question of "possession versus use" was not at issue in the
cases relied upon. Rather than relying on prior case law, this Com-
ment suggests that one should instead consider the reasons underly-
ing the insider trading prohibition, as well as the difficulty of proof
associated with prosecution, to determine the appropriate standard.
These considerations form the basis for the arguments in support of
the "knowing possession" standard. Part IV will discuss these argu-
ments, concluding that "possession" is the more appropriate test for
insider trading liability.
I. OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING
"'Insider trading' is a term of art that refers to unlawful trading in
securities by persons who possess material nonpublic information
about the company whose shares are traded or the market for its
NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1993, at 20 ("In most insider-trading cases .... the distinction be-
tween 'use' and 'possession' is of limited significance.").
5 Allan Horwich, Possession Versus Use: Is There a Causation Element in the Prohibition
on Insider Trading?, 52 Bus. LAiW. 1235, 1236 (1997). Horwich presents several interest-
ing hypothetical situations in which the issue might arise. Consider, for example, an
executive of a public company who, "nearing retirement, begins a regular program to
liquidate her large holding of company stock in order to diversify her portfolio, in-
structing her broker to sell 1000 shares on the first of each month. During the pro-
gram, the executive learns nonpublic negative material information about the com-
pany." Id. at 1235.
THE "POSSESSION VERSUS USE"DEBATE
shares."6 Although the federal securities laws do not expressly pro-
scribe insider trading, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934' and Rule 10b-58 promulgated thereunder by the Securities and
6 LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 1-6. This definition of insider trading, of
course, presupposes the answer to the "possession versus use" debate. Compare RALPH
C. FERRARAETAL., FERRARA ONINSIDERTRADING AND THE WALL § 2.01 [1], at 2-2 to 2-3
(1998) (explaining that insider trading occurs "when a corporate 'insider'... trades
the securities of the corporation while in possession ofmaterial, nonpublic information"
(emphasis added)), with 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS ON SECURrIMS FRAUD & COMMODMTES FRAUD § 7.4(100), at 7:101 (2d ed.
1998) ("[I]nsider trading is the use of... material nonpublic information ... to buy
securities (if the information is favorable) or sell them (if the information is unfavor-
able)." (emphasis added)). Unless quoting or describing the views of others, this
Comment will employ "possession" language when discussing the nature of insider
trading violations.
As many commentators have noted, the term "insider trading" is a misnomer. For
example, liability for insider trading has not been limited to the class of persons tradi-
tionally considered "insiders." See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 1-6 ("The pro-
hibition against insider trading applies to a larger class of persons than those tradi-
tionally considered corporate insiders."); Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading 41 BUS. LAW. 223, 224
(1985) [hereinafter Task Force Report] ("The cases in which the Commission and pri-
vate litigants have sought to impose liability under existing law have not been limited
to insiders, at least as that term is commonly understood... ."); see also infra note 12
and accompanying text (explaining that the term "insider" refers to a broader class of
persons than those traditionally considered corporate insiders). Furthermore, a per-
son may be liable for insider trading even if he did not actually trade. See Task Force
Report, supra, at 224 (explaining that "not all defendants have been traders-those who
'tip' others who then trade" have also been found guilty of insider trading); see also in-
fra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing tipper liability).
Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange-...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
a Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
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Exchange Commission ("SEC") have been interpreted as prohibiting
insider trading.9 In interpreting these provisions, the SEC and the
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.101>5 (1999).
9 The original purpose of section 10(b) was not necessarily to prohibit insider trad-
ing. See ELiZABETH SZOCIyJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEvEL
PLAYING FIELD 5 (1993) ("Contrary to popular belief, Section 10(b) ... which today is
the most commonly used section to prosecute insider trading, was not originally de-
signed to serve this purpose."); id. at 6 ("Nowhere in the legislation or in related dis-
cussions at the time is there an implication that Section 10(b) should be interpreted to
include or could be applied against insider trading."). For a comprehensive discussion
of the original purpose of section 10(b), see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990). Nor was the central
purpose of Rule 10b-5 to prohibit insider trading; indeed, the rule was initially drafted
to prevent insiders from making fraudulent statements to shareholders about the cor-
poration so that they could buy shares more cheaply. See Milton Freeman, Discussion
at the Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws (Nov. 18-19, 1966), in
22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922-23 (1967) (discussing the adoption of Rule 10b-5). In 1943,
Milton Freeman, an SEC attorney, received news about a company president who was
buying up shares of stock of his own company, simultaneously telling shareholders that
the company was faltering, though in fact the prospects of the company were ex-
tremely favorable. See id. at 922 (describing a phone call in which Freeman learned
that "'the president of some company... is... buying up the stock of his com-
pany... and... telling [shareholders] that the company is doing very badly, whereas,
in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled'"). Attempting to address this prob-
lem, Freeman drafted Rule 10b-5. See id. (explaining that Rule 10b-5 "was intended to
give the Commission power to deal with this problem").
Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994), is the only provision that expressly pro-
scribes trading by insiders. See, e.g., FERRARA ET AL, supra note 6, § 1.02(11] [a], at 1-3
("The only provision of the securities statutes that expressly regulates insider trading is
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits 'short swing' profits by officers,
directors, and the direct or indirect beneficial owners of more than 10% of any class of
equity securities." (footnote omitted)). "Short-swing" trading refers to "any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase" within a period of less than six months. 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b). Many have asserted that section 16 was designed to prevent insider trading.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (explaining that the purpose of the provision is to "prevent[ ]
the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer"). But section 16 imposes
liability on insiders who engage in short-swing trading, regardless of whether they were
in possession of material, nonpublic information at the time of the trades. And insid-
ers can avoid liability under section 16(b)-even if they are trading while in possession
of material, nonpublic information-as long as they do not enter into offsetting trans-
actions within a period of less than six months (i.e., a sale following a purchase or a
purchase following a sale). Some commentators have thus proposed alternative ex-
planations of the purpose of section 16(b). SeeKarl Shumpei Okamoto, Rereading Sec-
lion 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REv. 183, 185 (1992) ("The purpose of
Section 16(b) is not the deterrence of trading on non-public information.... Its pur-
pose is to deter insiders from trading to artificially affect market prices-to deter insid-
ers from sending false signals when in fact there is no inside information at all."); Steve
Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42
HASTINGS LJ. 393, 453 (1991) (asserting that the purpose of section 16 was to prevent
the manipulation of corporate opportunities).
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federal courts have developed two distinct theories of liability: the
"traditional" or "classical" theory, and the "misappropriation" theory
of insider trading.
A. Theories of Liability: The Classical Theory
and the Misapprnpriation Theory
Under the classical theory of insider trading, a corporate insider
may not trade in the securities of his corporation while in possession
of material, nonpublic information."0 Such trading violates section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because of the relationship of trust and confi-
dence that exists between the shareholders of a corporation and cor-
porate insiders; because of this relationship, "insiders who have ob-
tained confidential information by reason of their position with that
corporation" may not take "unfair advantage of... uninformed...
stockholders."" The term "insider" refers to a broader class of per-
sons than those traditionally considered corporate insiders and in-
cludes "temporary insiders" such as attorneys, investment bankers,
consultants, and accountants.
2
Liability, however, is not limited to those who actually trade; nor is
it limited to insiders. An insider who "tips" material, nonpublic in-
formation violates section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 if the tip breaches a
fiduciary duty and the tippee (the recipient of such a tip) trades, even
if the insider does not trade.'3 The tippee may also be liable for trad-
Section 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994), and section 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994),
also address insider trading, although neither defines insider trading or makes it ille-
gal. Section 20A provides a private cause of action for those who trade contempora-
neously with an insider trader. Section 21A provides the SEC with the authority to
seek a civil penalty against insider traders.
'0 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) ("Under the 'tradi-
tional' or 'classical theory' of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are vio-
lated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis
of material, nonpublic information.").
" M at 652 (internal quotations omitted); see also FERRARAETAL., supra note 6, §
2.01 [1], at 2-2 to 2-3 (discussing the classical theory of insider trading).
12 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 ("The classical theory applies not only to officers,
directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, ac-
countants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corpora-
tion."); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (discussing how such "outsiders"
may become fiduciaries of a corporation and subject to the insider trading restric-
tions); see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01[11], at 2-3 (noting that the term "in-
siders" also refers to "quasi-insiders" such as "attorneys, investment bankers, or other
professionals working as temporary agents of the corporation").
" See Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 237-38 (discussing the "tipper-tippee theory"
of liability); see also FERRARA ET AL, supra note 6, § 2.01[1], at 2-3 ("[T]he 'tip-
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ing if the tipper breached his fiduciary duty by conveying the informa-
tion. 4
Liability under the classical theory requires a breach of an in-
sider's duty owed to the shareholders of the corporation in whose se-
curities the insider (or a tippee) traded.'5 The classical theory thus
does not impose liability where an "individual[] 'outside' a corpora-
tion purchase[s] the corporation's securities while in possession of
material, nonpublic information that was obtained in a manner that
did not involve an insider's breach of duty." 16 Such trading has been
described as "outsider trading," since the traders are outsiders of the
corporation in whose securities they traded. 7
Recognizing this limitation of the classical theory, the SEC and the
courts developed the misappropriation theory. The misappropriation
theory imposes liability where an individual "misappropriates confi-
dential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information.' 8 Rather than predicat-
ing liability on a fiduciary relationship between the insider and the
corporation's shareholders, "the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who en-
trusted him with access to confidential information. "19 As in the case
per' ... also incur[s] liability for insider trading, even if that corporate insider did not
personally trade."). To be liable, the tipper must have received some benefit or have
intended to make a pecuniary gift to the tippee. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 ("[T]he test
is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders.").
" See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 ("[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the informa-
tion to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.").
" See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-35 (1980) (explaining that there
can be no fraud-and therefore no liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5-absent
a duty to disclose owed to the stockholders).
16 FERRARAETAL., supra note 6, § 2.01[1], at 2-3.
17 SeeJill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 198 (1991) ("Trading of this type is frequently de-
scribed as 'outsider trading,' so denominated because the traders are outsiders with
respect to the issuer of the securities they trade.").
"' United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
'9 Id. A good example of the misappropriation theory is found in O'Hagan. In that
case the defendant O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm representing Grand Met in its
planned tender offer of Pillsbury (though O'Hagan himself did not do any work for
Grand Met). Aware of the planned tender offer, O'Hagan traded in Pillsbury options
and common stock, reaping a profit of more than $4.3 million. See id. at 647-48 (de-
scribing O'Hagan's conduct).
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of the classical theory, both tippers and tippees may be liable for in-
sider trading under the misappropriation theory.0
B. Reasons for the Insider Trading Prohibition
The traditional basis for the insider trading prohibition is the be-
lief that insider trading violates our notion of "fair play" and threatens
the integrity of the capital markets.2 As the American Bar Association
20 SeeFERRARAETAL., supra note 6, § 2.01 [11, at 2-4 ("On similar reasoning, trading
based on a 'misappropriated' tip generally triggers liability for both the tippee and the
tipper.").
21 See Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 227 (asserting that the "two ... traditional
bases for prohibitions against insider trading" are the "'fair play' and 'integrity of the
markets' arguments"). Commentators have offered several additional arguments for
the prohibitions against insider trading. See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SEGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECuRnrIEs REGULATION 762 (3d ed. 1995) (asserting that because
insider-traders can profit on negative information, insider trading may create incen-
tives for insiders to act against the best interests of the corporation); Task Force Report,
supra note 6, at 228 (asserting that insider trading discourages prompt disclosure of
information since corporate insiders have an "incentive to delay [disclosure] long
enough to speculate on a stock market profit"); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider
Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market MicrostructureJustification and Optimization of
Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1, 17-46 (1993) (advocating the prohibi-
tion of insider trading by arguing that the prohibition reduces transaction costs); Roy
A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1452 (1967) (arguing, among other things, that insider trading
subjects insiders to "a conflict of interest that may affect theirjudgment not only in the
timing of disclosure, but also in the timing of the underlying events themselves [and]
may cause such events to be created"); Bevis Longstreth, Halting Insider Trading, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1984, at A27 (summarizing the arguments against insider trading and
rebutting the arguments in favor of insider trading).
Some commentators, on the other hand, have argued that insider trading should
not be prohibited. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966) (attacking the wisdom of the prohibition against insider trading and
asserting that insider trading is a useful means of compensating entrepreneurs);
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 868 (1983) (arguing that insider trading promotes market efficiency since
such trading is a means of communicating information to the market and thus causes
the stock price to move to its "correct" value sooner); Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of
Insider Trading Restictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 55 (1980) (concluding that "the harm
caused by insider trading can be objectively measured and that so measured it does not
cause any detectable injury to investors"); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law
Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970) (responding to critics of his arguments in sup-
port of insider trading).
The arguments that insider trading should be permitted, however, have gained
little support in Congress. As Congressman Dingell asserted: "We strongly disagree
with those who would seek to permeate our markets with this type of fraud. The ar-
guments in favor of insider trading are rubbish." 130 CONG. REC. 20,969 (1984). And
as Senator D'Amato stated: "Some commentators have called insider trading a victim-
less crime; however, I strongly disagree .... John Fedders, the Director of the Securi-
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Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading observed:
In our society, we traditionally abhor those who refuse to play by the
rules, that is, the cheaters and the sneaks. A spitball pitcher, or a card
shark with an ace up his sleeve, may win the game but not our respect.
And if we know such a person is in the game, chances are we won't play.
These commonsense [sic] observations suggest that two of the tradi-
tional bases for prohibitions against insider tradinare still sound: the
'fair play' and 'integrity of the markets' arguments.
Underlying the development of the insider trading prohibition is
the view that insider trading is fundamentally unfair23 As Donald
Langevoort has observed, "most people who oppose insider trading
seem to believe that quite apart from any harm caused to specific in-
vestors, insider trading is simply an unfair exploitation of information
that properly belongs to someone else." 4 The unfairness stems not
from the insider-trader's possession of superior information, but from
the trader's possession of an informational advantage that other inves-
tors cannot overcome: other investors cannot acquire the inside in-
formation.u Clearly, informational advantages exist; some investors
will necessarily have superior information as a result of superior intel-• - •26
ligence, diligence, or power. And not all such informational dispari-
ties and Exchange Commission's Division of Enforcement, has stated publicly that he
believes that those who engage in insider trading are thieves, I concur wholeheartedly
with Mr. Fedders." 130 CONG REc. 20,107 (1984).
An assessment of the various arguments is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Congress and the courts have embraced the "fairness" and "integrity of the markets"
arguments, and this Comment will proceed under the assumption that such arguments
are valid.
Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 227.
23 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961) (asserting that the "dis-
close or abstain" obligation "rests on... the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of... information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing").
24 LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.02[4], at 1-14.
2As Victor Brudney commented:
The unfairness is not a function merely of possessing more information - out-
siders may possess more information than other outsiders by reason of their
diligence or zeal - but of the fact that it is an advantage which cannot be
competed away since it depends upon a lawful privilege to which an outsider
cannot acquire access.
Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 346 (1979).
2 See id. at 360 ("[T]here may nevertheless be systematic inequality of lawful access
to information by reason of disparities among individual investors with respect to
power, wealth, diligence, or intelligence.");see also RonaldJ. Gilson, The Outside View of
Inside Trading N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1987, at E23 ("In the public mind, fairness is
equated with access. From this perspective, what is unfair about insider trading is that
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27ties should be eliminated. When other investors are unable to obtain
information, however, no matter how great their resources or dili-
gence, such informational advantages are unfair,28 and it is those in-
formational advantages that the insider trading prohibition seeks to
prevent.2
it is a game that only some can play, and participation is not based on merit.").
See Brudney, supra note 25, at 353 (explaining that "the need to encourage pri-
vate pursuit of information sets limits on the persons and information subject to the
disclosure obligations of the antifraud rules"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV.
309, 323 ("[S]ometimes nondisclosure is necessary to enable people to capture the
value of information; to permit use without disclosure is to encourage the creation of
new information.").
2' SeeBrudney, supra note 25, at 354 ("[IThe essential... element which makes an
informational advantage unusable by those who possess it in dealing with those who do
not is the inability of the latter to overcome it lawfully, no matter how great may be
their diligence or large their resources.").
This is the "equality of access to information" theory. See id. at 354-55 ("This no-
tion is sometimes cast in terms of a rule seeking to effect equal access to material in-
formation for persons trading with each other."). It should be distinguished from the
"parity-of-information" theory, which suggests that all informational disparities should
be eliminated. See id. at 355 ("[V]iewed most broadly, [the equality of access to infor-
mation theory] does not extend so far as to require actual equality or sharing of in-
formation."). AsJustice Blackmun explained:
[T]here is a significant conceptual distinction between parity of information
and parity of access to material information. The latter gives free rein to cer-
tain kinds of informational advantages that the former might foreclose, such
as those that result from differences in diligence or acumen. Indeed, by limit-
ing opportunities for profit from manipulation of confidential connections or
resort to stealth, equal access helps to ensure that advantages obtained by
honest means reap their full reward.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 252 n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also Insider Trading: Some Questions and Some Answers, 1 SEC. REG. L.J. 328, 335 (1974)
(suggesting that it is "equality of access" to information (as distinguished from "equal-
ity of information") among investors that is a goal of the antifraud provisions).
At least one commentator has argued that the insider trading laws should adopt a
parity-of-information approach. SeeJoel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities
Law ConcerningNonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1137-38 (1985) (arguing that a
parity-of-information rule "has clear advantages" including the fact that it is a "bright
line rule" that would "reassure investors that the securities markets generally prohibit
information advantages").
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the parity-of-information theory. See
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 ("[N]either the Congress nor the Commission ever has
adopted a parity-of-information rule."). Chiarella also cast doubt upon the equal access
theory, predicating liability on a fiduciary duty to shareholders. See id. at 231-33 (argu-
ing that a duty to "disclose or abstain" exists only where the insider has a fiduciary duty
to shareholders). The Supreme Court also appeared to reject the equal access theory
in United States v. O'Hagan, asserting that a fiduciary could potentially avoid liability by
disclosing to the source of the information his plans to trade. See United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) ("[Flull disclosure forecloses liability under the
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In addition to-or perhaps because of-this fundamental unfair-
ness, insider trading threatens the capital markets. The strength and
stability of the capital markets depend on investor confidence in those
marketsYs Insider trading, however, undermines investors' expecta-
tions of honest and fair securities markets. 3' If investors believe that
other market participants have an unerodable informational advan-
tage-that the markets are not fair-they will be reluctant to partici-
pate in the securities markets:
A rational buyer (or seller) in a market, who knows that the person with
whom he is dealing has material information about the value of the
product being exchanged which he could not lawfully acquire, will ei-
ther refrain from dealing with that transactor or demand a risk pre-
mium. If the market is thought to be systematically populated with such
transactors some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and oth-
ers will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to
overcome their unerodable informational advantages.
misappropriation theory... if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to
trade on the nonpublic information, there is no...
§ 10(b) violation."). This assertion implicitly rejects the equal access theory, for even if
the fiduciary disclosed his trading plans to the source of the information, he would still
have an informational advantage that could not lawfully be overcome by other inves-
tors. But see Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (endorsing the equal
access theory, asserting that "I would hold that persons having access to confidential
material information that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited by
Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advan-
tage through trading in affected securities").
'o See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275
("Capital formation and our nation's economic growth and stability depend on inves-
tor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital markets.").
3, See id. ("Insider trading threatens [the capital] markets by undermining the pub-
lic's expectations of honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by
the same rules."); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 1.02[4], at 1-15 ("Confidence in
the securities marketplace ... is diminished if shareholders believe that only those 'in
the know' can profit in the stock market.").
32 Brudney, supra note 25, at 356; see also Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforce-
ment Legislation, Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Consumer Protec-
lion and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerc4 98th Cong. 35 (1983) [here-
inafter House Hearings] (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Director of Enforcement)
("[I]f we permit [insider trading] I think it would erode investor confidence in the
marketplace and they may very well flee the marketplace and choose other invest-
ments, which would hurt the liquidity of the exchanges, the liquidity of the market-
place, and eventually the capital structure of our country."); H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at
8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6045 ("[T]he small investor will be-and
has been-reluctant to invest in the market if he feels it is rigged against him."); Task
Force Report, supra note 6, at 227-28 ("Although [we] know[] of no empirical research
that directly demonstrates that concerns about integrity affect market activity, both
authoritative commentators and common sense tell us that if investors do not antici-
pate fair treatment, they will avoid investing in securities [and] capital forma-
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It is this recognition that underlies the insider trading prohibi-
tions.3s Indeed, as SEC Enforcement Director William R. McLucas as-
serted, "one of the purposes of bringing an insider trading case, in
addition to addressing specific instances of fraud, is to ensure the in-
tegrity of the market." 4
II. THE "POSSESSION VERSUS USE" DEBATE
Although Congress has condemned insider trading and expressed
strong support for the prohibition of such conduct, s Congress has re-
sisted attempts to expressly define insider trading.m Instead, the pro-
hibition against insider trading has developed solely from judicial
(and administrative) interpretation of the anti-fraud provisions of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 101>5. The lack of a statutory definition of the
insider trading offense has led to some ambiguity regarding the type
of conduct that is prohibited 7 One such area of ambiguity is whether
the insider's motivation for trading is relevant to a determination of
insider-trading liability under Rule 101>5. At issue is whether section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 require a causal connection between the mate-
rial, nonpublic information and the insider's trading-that is, a show-
ion.. will become less attractive and more difficult.").
The central purpose of the federal securities laws is "to insure the maintenance
of fair and honest markets." 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994); see also 130 CONG. REC. 20, 109
(1984) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (describing the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 as "much needed legislation to deter insider trading, a market abuse which
threatens investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital markets").
William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Insider Trading. Is It Back or Did It Ever
Really Go Away?, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1995, at 2, 8.
See supra note 21 (quoting statements by Congressman Dingell and Senator
D'Amato as representative of Congress's support for the prohibition against insider
trading).
See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13-14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2286-87 (explaining that Congress decided not to define insider trading). The SEC
has also been reluctant to define insider trading. See 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFEI., supra
note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.4 ("Congress and the SEC strongly resisted pleas from the
bar to define insider trading."); William R. McLucas et al., Common Sense, Fexibility, and
Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 51 Bus. LAw. 1221, 1235 n.71 (1996) (noting
that the SEC submitted a proposed definition of insider trading to Congress in 1987
despite the SEC's historical position "that a codified definition... was unnecessary and
indeed, counterproductive," but explaining further that legislative efforts to define
insider trading have nonetheless been unsuccessful).
37 See Fisch, supra note 17, at 179-80 & n.5 (asserting that "the legal restrictions on
trading securities while in possession of material nonpublic information are confused
and confusing" and that "the legal uncertainty has been attributed to the absence of a
statute defining the prohibited conduct"); see also SZOCIYJ, supra note 9, at 1, 105 (re-
ferring to the "vagueness" of the insider trading prohibition).
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ing that the insider actually used the information in making his deci-
sion to trade-or whether knowing possession of such information at
the time of the trade is sufficient for liability.ss The SEC, as well as
some legal commentators, have advocated a "knowing possession"
standard, arguing that the insider's motivation for trading is largely
irrelevant.39 Other commentators, however, have advocated a "use"
Although organizations can be subject to insider trading liability under the In-
sider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA"), Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), see,
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 (ex-
plaining that the bill "expand[s] the scope of civil penalties remedies to 'controlling
persons' who fail to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading"), the "possession
versus use" debate has focused primarily on trading by individuals, rather than by or-
ganizations. Although one might argue that the debate should include corporate trad-
ing, a discussion of corporate trading is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Organizations frequently trade while in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion-often one department of an organization will trade while another department
possesses inside information about the traded securities. See John H. Sturc &
Catharine W. Cummer, Possession vs. Use for Insider Trading Liability, INSIGHTS, June
1998, at 3, 7 (explaining that a "common situation is that of an institutional investor
with separate departments, one of which may possess material nonpublic information
and another which engages in trading"). But such organizations may avoid liability-
even under a "knowing possession" standard-by erecting a "Chinese Wall," which is
essentially a set of policies and procedures designed to prevent the communication of
information between departments. See Marc I. Steinberg &John Fletcher, Compliance
Programs for Insider Trading; 47 SMU L. REV. 1783, 1803-04 (1994) ("Chinese Wall pro-
cedures consist of policies and procedures designed to control the flow of material,
nonpublic information within a multiservice financial firm."). If a Chinese Wall is in
place, inside information possessed by individuals on one side of the wall will not be
imputed to those on the other side of the wall who are engaged in trading activities.
See Horwich, supra note 5, at 1238 ("This [lack of imputation] is understood to free the
organization to trade even if trading 'while in possession' of inside information is un-
lawful."). Although few courts have addressed whether a Chinese Wall can be used by
an organization to avoid federal securities liability, the SEC explicitly approved the use
of Chinese Walls when it adopted Rule 14e-3. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1999)
(providing a safe harbor for organizations implementing Chinese Wall procedures
provided it can be shown that the "individual(s) making the investment decision on
behalf of the [organization] ... did not know the material, nonpublic information");
Steinberg & Fletcher, supra, at 1810-12 (discussing judicial and administrative treat-
ment of Chinese Walls).
39 See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1332-33 (1lth Cir. 1998) (noting that the SEC
claimed that "knowing possession of material, nonpublic information while trading is
sufficient to establish liability" and that the SEC argued that evidence that the defen-
dant knowingly possessed material, nonpublic information at the time of his trade was
sufficient to impose insider trading liability, regardless of whether or not the defen-
dant used the inside information); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01 [5], at 2-14.6 to
2-14.8 (implicitly endorsing the "knowing possession" standard-at least under the
classical theory of insider trading liability); LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-23
to 3-27 (suggesting that "knowing possession" is the appropriate test); 7 Louis Loss &
JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURrnEs REGULATION 3505 (3d ed. 1991) (advocating the "knowing
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standard, arguing that a causal connection between the inside infor-
mation and the insider's trading activity is required.40
In many insider trading cases, the difference between these two
standards is irrelevant, since it is clear that the insider traded on the
basis of the material, nonpublic information.4 ' The issue can become
important, however, in certain situations. Consider, for example, the
following situation:
The chief financial officer [("CFO")] of a publicly held company has
consistently bought shares (in the range of 2,000 to 5,000 shares) in his
company during a two- or three-day window period beginning the day af-
ter the filing of the company's quarterly report on Form 10-Q. Based on
the advice of house counsel, this timing was intended to protect the CFO
from any charges that he possessed non-public information. But in the
instant case, the day after the filing of its Form 10-Q the company (and
its senior officers) become aware of a lucrative merger proposal from a
well-financed acquirer. Knowing that such a merger was under negotia-
tion, the CFO still buys his more-or-less customary 5,000 shares (and
thereby profits handsomely when the nonpublic proposal is eventually
announced) .
In this situation, the CFO's liability for insider trading may de-
pend upon whether the "knowing possession" or the "use" standard is
employed. Under the SEC's "knowing possession" test, the CFO will
be liable for insider trading-regardless of the fact that he always buys
shares after the company files its quarterly report and regardless of his
motivation for his current purchase of shares. Under the "use" test,
however, the CFO will escape liability as long as his decision to buy
shares was not based on his knowledge of the contemplated merger-
possession" standard); Oriana N. Li, Note, United States v. Smith: The Use-Possession
Debate in SEC Enforcement Actions Under § 10(b), 74 WASH. L. REV. 395, 401-24 (1999)
(arguing that the Ninth Circuit erred in Smith by rejecting the "knowing possession"
standard).
40 See 2 BROMBERG & LOwENFELs, supra note 6, § 7.4(610) to (620), at 7:160.1 to
7:160.13 (advocating the "use" standard); Christopher J. Bebel, A Detailed Analysis of
United States v. O'Hagan: Onward Through the Evolution of the Federal Securities Laws, 59
LA. L. REV. 1, 50-53 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court's opinion in O'Hagan
supports a "use" standard); Horwich, supra note 5, at 1268-76 (discussing numerous
factors which "all point in favor of a use component"); Bryan C. Smith, Comment, Pos-
session Vensus Use: Reconciling the Letter and Spirit of Insider Trading Regulation Under Rule
10b-5, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 371, 381-86 (1999) (arguing that the policy considerations
underlying the insider trading prohibition support a "use" standard).
41 See LANGEvOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 ("In the typical case, there is no
question that the insider traded in order to take advantage of material nondisclosed
information.").
John C. Coffee, Jr., Outsider Trading After O'Hagan, CORP. COUNSELLOR, Dec.
1997, at 6, 16.
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as long as this information was not a factor in his decision to purchase
the shares. In this context, then, the "possession versus use" debate
may be quite important.
Attempting to resolve this debate, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
recently held that "knowing possession" is not sufficient to impose in-
sider trading liability.4 This Part will discuss the "possession versus
use" debate, exploring both the origins of the debate and the recent
cases addressing the issue.
A. Origins of the Debate
Federal insider trading case law can be traced back to the SEC's
seminal opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co., in which the SEC concluded
that insider trading constitutes "fraud or deceit" and thus violates Rule
lOb-5.44 In so doing, the SEC articulated the oft-cited "disclose or ab-
'3 See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e reject the
government's proffered 'knowing possession' standard for insider trading violations
.... "), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 804 (1999); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir.
1998) ("[M]ere knowing possession... is not a perseviolation.").
44 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961) (asserting that the conduct of a broker who traded on
the basis of material, nonpublic information violated Rule lOb-5). Cady, Roberts was not
the first case to hold that section 10(b) and Rule 101-5 prohibit insider trading. Sev-
eral years earlier, in Kardn v. National Gypsum Co., a federal district court reached a
similar conclusion, see 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (holding defendant corpo-
rate officers and directors liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because they
"fail[ed) to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their position,
which ... materially affect[ed] the judgment of the other party to the transaction"),
and other courts followed suit. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.02(1], at 2-14.9
("Since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. in 1947, courts have adopted the position that
Section 10(b) ... and Rule 10b-5 require corporate insiders such as officers and direc-
tors to abstain from trading in their own corporation's securities unless they have dis-
closed all material nonpublic information."). But Kardon and other cases preceding
Cady, Roberts involved face-to-face transactions between insiders and stockholders, not
impersonal transactions on a securities exchange. See id. at 2-15 (explaining that "Kar-
don and other early cases... involved only face-to-face transactions between corporate
officers and shareholders" and that "Cady, Roberts was... the first case in which Rule
10b-5 was interpreted by the SEC to ban all securities trading based on misuse of cor-
porate information, including market transactions consummated through an imper-
sonal securities market").
Long before the adoption of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, state common law dealt
with insider trading. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal
and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 37-39 (1986) (discussing the history of the
insider trading prohibition under state common law). Courts adopted several differ-
ent approaches to insider trading, but in general, insider trading was prohibited only
in the case of face-to-face transactions with shareholders or others to whom the insider
owed a fiduciary duty-no duty of disclosure existed for impersonal securities exchange
transactions. See id. at 38 ("[The insider trading rules] applied only where the insider
engaged in face-to-face transactions with existing shareholders. In exchange transac-
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stain rule," asserting that an insider is required to disclose material,
nonpublic information or abstain from trading.4 The Second Circuit
embraced this rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., holding that "any-
one in possession of material inside information must either disclose
it to the investing public, or if he is disabled from disclosing it... or
he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommend-
ing the securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed."
4
Courts and commentators, however, have failed to reach a con-
sensus on the correct interpretation of the "disclose or abstain" rule.
To some, the rule suggests that mere possession of nonpublic infor-
mation is sufficient to establish insider trading liability, and the rule
has in fact been cited for such a proposition.4 7 Others have insisted
that the maxim "disclose or abstain" fails to "capture the complexity of
the idea that [it is] supposed to represent," and have argued that it
"enjoins not all trading, but [only] trading on the basis of material non-
public information
"48
tions, the uniform rule was that no duty of disclosure existed.").
Indeed, before the federal securities legislation was enacted in 1934, "insider trad-
ing was tacitly viewed as a perk for corporate executives." SzocMJ, supra note 9, at 5.
"[M]any, if not most, of America's great fortunes accumulated at the end of the 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th were built with information-about pending
government contracts, disasters, wars, new inventions or techniques-that was not
available to the public at large." MORTON SHULMAN, THE BILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL
122 (1970).
45 See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911 (asserting that "insiders must disclose material
facts" but that if "disclosure... would be improper or unrealistic... the alternative is
to forego the transaction"); id. at 914 ("If purchasers on an exchange had available
material information known by a selling insider, we may assume that their investment
judgment would be affected and their decision whether to buy might accordingly be
modified. Consequently, any sales by the insider must await disclosure of the informa-
tion.").
16 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). The "disclose or abstain" rule was ultimately
validated by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980)
(citing with approval the SEC's assertion in Cady, Roberts that an insider has an obliga-
tion to disclose material, nonpublic information or abstain from trading). Texas Gulf
Sulphurarguably went further than Cady, Roberts and Chiarella by advocating a parity-of-
information approach. See supra note 29 (discussing the parity-of-information theory).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A] 'know-
ing possession' standard comports with the oft-quoted maxim that one with a fiduciary
or similar duty to hold material, nonpublic information in confidence must either 'dis-
close or abstain' with regard to trading."); Horwich, supra note 5, at 1240 (explaining
that Cady, Roberts can be read in support of a "knowing possession" test).
's United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1998). In reaching the
conclusion that the "disclose or abstain" rule was meant to prohibit insiders from using
nonpublic information when trading, not to enjoin trading merely because the insider
possesses nonpublic information, the Smith court made two observations. The court
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Even the SEC appears to have wavered in its interpretation of the
"disclose or abstain" rule. Despite the assertion by SEC Enforcement
Director William K McLucas that the Commission has always advo-
cated "knowing possession" as the appropriate rule for insider trading
liability,49 the SEC has been inconsistent in its interpretation of the
rule. In Investors Management Co., for example, the SEC effectively en-
dorsed a "use" requirement, asserting that a requisite element for in-
sider trading liability is "that the information be a factor in [the] deci-
sion to effect the transaction."' ° The SEC continued to explain:
"[W]here a transaction... is effected by the recipient [of material,
nonpublic information] prior to its public dissemination, an inference
arises that the information was ... a factor. The recipient of course
may seek to overcome such inference by countervailing evidence."'
But in Sterling Drug, Inc., the SEC rejected the "use" requirement sug-
gested by Investors Management and instead endorsed the "knowing
possession" standard, asserting:
The Commission... believes that Rule lOb-5 ... does not require a
showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking ad-
vantage of material non-public information.... If an insider sells his se-
curities while in possession of material adverse non-public information,
such an insider is taking advantage of his position to the detriment of
noted that in Cady, Roberts, it was clear that "the suspected insider traders had, in fact,
used inside information in consummating their trades." Id. at 1069. The court further
noted that "the SEC premised its decision, at least in part, dn the proposition that '[a]
significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside
information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.'" Id.
(citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15). See also Horwich, supra note 5, at 1239-40
("Based on this language and the cited support for it, the essence of the violation of
rule l0b-5 would appear to be making affirmative use of the infbrmation for personal
advantage.").
49 See McLucas & Angotti, supra note 34, at 4 ("The Commission has always taken
the position that once a person learns of, or 'comes into possession of,' material in-
formation, that person must either disclose the information or abstain from trading.").
50 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971).
-" Id. at 646-47. There was little evidence, however, that the transactions at issue in
this case were not motivated by inside information. See id. at 647 n.28 ("The examiner
rejected contentions by various of the respondents that their sales of... stock were
motivated by factors other than the... information."). In a concurring opinion,
Commissioner Smith recommended a stricter test, asserting that "the information
must be shown... to have substantially contributed to the trading which occurred."
Id. at 651. Commissioner Smith explained that he did "not read [the majority's] re-
quirement that the information be 'a factor' as, for instance, encompassing situations
where a firm decision to effect a transaction had clearly been made prior to the receipt
of the information and the information played no substantial role in the investment
decision." Id.
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the public.5
2
In neither of these opinions, however, did the SEC articulate a ra-
tionale for its position. 3 The SEC's seemingly abrupt and unex-
plained shift in position has served only to exacerbate the ambiguity
and has made some reluctant to accord much deference to the Com-
mission's position that "knowing possession" is the appropriate test!e
B. Recent Cases Addressing the "Possession Versus Use"Debate
More recently, three federal circuit courts have expressly exam-
ined the issue of "possession versus use."
1. The Possession Standard: United States v. Teicher
The first case to discuss carefully the "possession versus use" de-
bate was United States v. Teicher.55 In Teicher, the defendants argued
that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that the defen-
dants could be found guilty of insider trading if they possessed mate-
rial, nonpublic information at the time of their trades, regardless of
whether this information was the actual cause of those trades. 3 Al-
52 Sterling Drug, Inc., 14 S.E.C. Docket 824, 827 (1978). In SterlingDrug three di-
rectors accused of insider trading maintained that they had decided to sell stock in the
company prior to obtaining the inside information. One director presented documen-
tary evdence that he had formed an intention to sell prior to obtaining the informa-
tion and testified that he sold stock because he had retired from his position and
wished to diversify his investments. The other two directors testified that they sold
stock to satisfy various obligations. See id. at 827 (discussing the directors' testimony
regarding their reasons for selling stock).
53 The SEC did not cite any authority for its assertion in Sterling Drug, nor did the
SEC reference its opinion in Investors Management
See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (explaining that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has declined to accord much deference to the SEC's position regarding the "pos-
session versus use" debate since the SEC's position has not been consistent over time).
-" 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993). SeeLANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-23 ("The
first extensive judicial discussion of this issue is found in... United States v. Teicher.").
The case has also been referred to as the "leading case" in support of the "knowing
possession" standard. Horwich, supra note 5, at 1250.
Teicher, 987 F.2d at 119 (discussing the defendants' arguments). The district
court instructed the jury:
The government need not prove a causal relationship between the misappro-
priated material nonpublic information and the defendants' trading. That is,
the government need not prove that the defendants purchased or sold securi-
ties because of the material nonpublic information that they knowingly pos-
sessed. It is sufficient if the government proves that the defendants purchased
or sold securities while knowingly in possession of the material nonpublic in-
formation.
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though merely dicta, the Second Circuit expressly rejected the "use"
requirement advocated by the defendants and instead endorsed a
"knowing possession" standardY. The court began by observing that
"Rule 14e-3, which prohibits fraud in connection with tender offers
explicitly provides a 'knowing possession' standard.' The court then
set forth three factors in support of its position.59
First, the Teicher court stated that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 re-
quire only that a deceptive practice be conducted "'in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.'" 8 The court noted that the phrase
"in connection with" has been construed quite flexibly, suggesting
that such an interpretation supports the more flexible and less restric-
Id.
57 See id. at 120-21 (rejecting the defendants' arguments and asserting that "a num-
ber of factors weigh in favor of a 'knowing possession' standard"). The court's adop-
tion of the "knowing possession" standard was dicta since the court found it "unneces-
sary to determine whether proof of securities fraud requires a causal connection,
because any alleged defect in the instruction was harmless beyond doubt." Id. at 121.
58 Id. at 120. Rule 14e-3 provides in relevantpart:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence.., a ten-
der offer,... it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act
or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other
person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender
offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indi-
rectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought. .. by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or
sell.., such securities... unless within a reasonable time prior to any
purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed
by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1999).
The applicability of Rule 14e-3's "knowing possession" standard to the "possession
versus use" debate is somewhat questionable. In section 14(e), Congress expressly gave
the SEC the power to define fraud: "The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1998). The SEC's definition of fraud contained in Rule 14e-3 may
not be transferable to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 fraud.
-9 See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120-21. In addition to the factors discussed, the court also
asserted that the SEC's interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5 is "entitled to some consideration."
Id. at 120. Citing SterlingDru, Inc., the court noted that the SEC has "consistently en-
dorsed [the view] that a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occurs when a trade is
conducted in 'knowing possession' of material nonpublic information obtained in
breach of a fiduciary or similar duty." Id. For a discussion of SterlingDrug, Inc., see su-
pra note 52 and accompanying text.
60 Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120 (quoting section 10(b) and Rule 101-5).
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tive "knowing possession" standard.6
Second, the court argued that the "disclose or abstain" rule sup-
ports the "knowing possession" standard.62 The court explained that if
an insider is in possession of material, nonpublic information and he
chooses not to disclose such information, he must abstain from trad-
ing.6
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the court recommended
the "knowing possession" standard because it is simple to apply, re-
quiring only a determination of whether the trader possessed mate-
rial, nonpublic information.6 The "use" standard, on the other hand,
requires factual inquiries into the state of mind and motivations of the
trader.66 The court further suggested that it would be unlikely that in-
formation possessed by a trader would not in some way influence his
trades. As the court explained:
Unlike a loaded weapon which may stand ready but unused, material in-
formation can not lay idle in the human brain. The individual with such
information may decide to trade upon that information, to alter a previ-
ously decided-upon transaction, to continue with a previously planned
transaction even though publicly available information would now sug-
gest otherwise, or simply to do nothing.66
The court believed that a "use" standard would pose difficulties of
proof for the SEC or the government and would "frustrate attempts to
distinguish between legitimate trades and those conducted in connec-
tion with inside information."67
6' See id. at 120 ("We have previously stated that the 'in connection with' clause
must be 'construed... flexibly to include deceptive practices 'touching' the sale of
securities, a relationship which has been described as 'very tenuous .... '"(quoting
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981))); see alSOLANGEVOORT, supra
note 4, § 3.04, at 3-23 (explaining that the Teicher court believed that "the possession
standard better comports with the view that Rule 10b-5 should be read flexibly, not
restrictively").
62 See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120 ("[A] 'knowing possession' standard comports with
the oft-quoted maxim that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to hold material non-
public information in confidence must either 'disclose or abstain' with regard to trad-
ing.").
See id. ("When the ... insider.., is not in a position to make a public an-
nouncement, [he] must abstain.").
See id ("Finally, a 'knowing possession' standard has the attribute of simplicity.").
' See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01[5], at 2-14.6 (explaining that the Teicher
court believed that "a 'use' test would entail significant factual inquiries into the state
of mind and the motivations of the insider trader").
Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
67 RL at 121.
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2. The Use Standard: SEC v. Adler and United States v. Smith
Although Teicher devoted considerable attention to the "posses-
sion versus use" debate, the Second Circuit's discussion was merely
dicta.6e The first circuit court to directly confront the issue was the
Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Adler.' In that case, the district court effec-
tively adopted a "use" standard for insider trading, granting summary
judgment for one of the defendants because he had a preexisting plan
to sell stock.70 On appeal, the SEC argued that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment, asserting that the defendant know-
ingly possessed material, nonpublic information and that such know-
ing possession was sufficient for liability.7' Viewing the choice between
the "possession" and "use" standards as "a difficult and close question
of first impression," the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the use test
is the appropriate test. "7n The court asserted, however, that an "infer-
ence of use ... arises from the fact that an insider traded while in pos-
session of inside information. "7
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court's language in several
cases was merely dicta, the Adler court nonetheless felt that its "use"
test "best comports with the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and
with Supreme Court precedent."74 The court noted, for example, the
"use" language employed throughout the Supreme Court's opinions
in Chiarella v. United States,75 Dirks v. SEC,76 and United States v.
O'Hagan7 The court also asserted that the Supreme Court's language
in those opinions "repeatedly emphasized [a] focus on fraud and de-
ception,"78 and argued that a "knowing possession" test fails to embody
such a focus: "[W]e do not believe that the SEC's knowing possession
test would always and inevitably be limited to situations involving
68 See supra note 57 (explaining why the court's discussion was dicta).
69 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
70 See id. at 1332 (explaining that the district court granted summary judgment for
one of the defendants because his "preexisting plan to sell stock rebutted any reason-
able inference of scienter").
71 See id. ("The SEC argues that it presented evidence that [the defendant] know-
ingly possessed material nonpublic information, and thus ... violated the prohibition
against insider trading .....
72 Id. at 1337.
7 Id.
71 Id. at 1338.
75 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
76 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
78 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1338.
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fraud."7
The Adler court found support for its position in other cases as
well. Citing cases including In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation,0
the court noted that several other courts "have allowed insiders to in-
troduce evidence of preexisting plans or other 'innocuous' reasons
for sales in order to" escape liability.81
Furthermore, although the SEC advocated a "knowing possession"
standard, the court refused to defer to the SEC's position.82 The Adler
court asserted that the SEC position had not been consistent, noting
that in Investors ManagemeniP the SEC appeared to support a "use" test,
but that in SterlingDrus the SEC adopted a "knowing possession" test
without providing any rationale for the change.8s The court also ob-
served that although the SEC had expressly adopted a "knowing pos-
session" standard in the context of tender offers with Rule 14 e-3,ss the
SEC had not amended Rule 10b-5 or promulgated other rules adopt-
ing the "knowing possession" test for the more general case of insider
trading.s
Finally, the court considered the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984. Although acknowledging that Congress used the phrase "in
possession of' in the statute, the court nonetheless concluded that the
79 Id.
835 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Worlds of Wonder].
81 Ader, 137 F.3d at 1335.
82 See id. at 1339 ("We decline to accord much deference to the SEC position
44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
14 S.E.C. Docket 824 (1978).
See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339 (explaining that the SEC's position regarding the
"possession versus use" debate has not been consistent over time); see also supra notes
50-52 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's positions in Investors Management
and SterlingDrug).
"Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading in securities while in possession of material, non-
public information, if such securities are being sought (or will be sought) in a tender
offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1999) (providing that "it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice.., for [a] person who is in possession of ma-
terial [nonpublic] information relating to [a] tender offer.., to purchase or
sell... such securities"); supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 14e-3).
See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339 ("[A]Ithough the SEC has adopted such a rule in the
context of tender offers, it has not formally adopted the knowing possession test for
insider trading."). Some have questioned the SEC's ability to promulgate such a rule
under section 10(b). See Sturc & Cummer, supra note 38, at 6 (asserting that the Adler
court's "assumption about the SEC's rulemaking authority is questionable," because
"Section 10(b) does not give the SEC the same authority to make rules 'reasonably de-
signed to prevent' any acts and practices which may violate the statute as does Section
14(e), but rather only the authority to proscribe the deceptive devices themselves").
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"language of [the Insider Trading Sanctions Act] does not resolve
whether possession or use is the proper standard for an insider trad-
ing violation.'ss
The court noted that "[t]he strongest argument that has been ar-
ticulated in support of the knowing possession test is that a strict use
test would pose serious difficulties of proof for the SEC."8 Agreeing
that a trader's motivations are often difficult to prove, the court held
that an "inference of use... arises from the fact that the insider
traded while in knowing possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion."90 The Adler court asserted that such an inference would be suf-
ficient to alleviate the problems of proof.9
Shortly after the Eleventh Circuit addressed the "possession versus
use" debate, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in United States v.
Smith.92 The Smith court agreed with much of the reasoning in AdleW
3
and adopted the "use" standard.94 Because Smith involved a criminal
prosecution, however, the court stopped short of Adler's holding that
an inference of use arises when the insider trades while in possession
of material, nonpublic information: "[W]e deal here with a criminal
prosecution, not a civil enforcement proceeding, as was the situation
in Adler. We are therefore not at liberty, as was the Adler court, to es-
tablish an evidentiary presumption that gives rise to an inference of
use."
95
Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337; see also infra Part II.C (discussing the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act and Congress's role in the "possession versus use" debate).
89 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337.
90 Id.; see also id. ("[Wihen an insider trades while in possession of material non-
public information, a strong inference arises that such information was used by the
insider in trading. The insider can attempt to rebut the inference by adducing evi-
dence that there was no causal connection between the information and the trade
...... )
91 Id. ("[W]e believe that the SEC's problems [with respect to proof] are suffi-
ciently alleviated by the inference of use....").
155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
93 See id. at 1068 (agreeing with the Adler court that "a 'use' requirement [is] more
consistent with the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which emphasizes 'manipula-
tion,' 'deception,' and 'fraud'"); id ("Like our colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit, we
are concerned that the SEC's 'knowing possession' standard would not be-indeed,
could not be-strictly limited to those situations actually involving intentional fraud.").
See id. at 1069 (holding that Rule 10b-5 requires the government to "demon-
strate that the suspected inside[r] trader actually used material nonpublic information
in consummating his transaction").
95 Id.
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C. Congressional Role in the Debate
Congress also appeared to weigh in on the "possession versus use"
debate when it enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
("ITSA"). 9 The major purpose of the ITSA was to increase the sanc-
tions for insider trading by creating a new civil penalty.97 In creating
the new civil penalty, however, Congress explicitly adopted a "posses-
sion" standard: the SEC may seek the civil penalty from any person
who violates a rule or statutory provision by "purchasing or selling a
security while in possession ofmaterial, nonpublic information.",
When it adopted the ITSA, Congress expressly declined to define
insider trading. 9 Nonetheless, during the hearings on the proposed
legislation, Congress examined the "possession versus use" debate, en-
tertaining testimony from various witnesses regarding the appropriate
standard. Several witnesses urged that Congress employ "use" lan-
guage, arguing that the "possession" standard was inappropriate and
Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2274
(describing the purpose of the ITSA). Prior to the enactment of the 1TSA, the only
remedies available to the SEC for insider trading violations were injunctions against
future violations and disgorgement orders, requiring defendants to pay the profits
gained (or losses avoided). See Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The Insider Trading Sanctions
Act: Some Unfinished Business Ahead, NAT'L hJ., Oct. 15, 1984, at 18 (discussing the
remedies available to the SEC prior to the passage of the ITSA). The ITSA created ad-
ditional remedies, giving the SEC the authority to seek a civil penalty of up to three
times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided from insider trading. The statute
also increased the maximum fine for a criminal violation (not necessarily limited to
insider trading) from $10,000 to $100,000. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 1 (summariz-
ing the ITSA).
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21A(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (a) (1) (1994)
(emphasis added). Note that four years later, Congress employed the same "posses-
sion" language in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
("ITSFEA'), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (a)
(1994) ("Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regula-
tions thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, non-
public information shall be liable...." (emphasis added)).
9See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13-14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2286-87 (explaining that the Committee decided not to define insider trading in the
new legislation). Some congressional witnesses suggested that Congress should define
insider trading. Congress, however, resisted such pleas, arguing that because the in-
sider trading law was "sufficiently well-deveoped. .. to provide adequate guidance," a
definition was not needed and that a definition could reduce flexibility and create new
ambiguities. Id. at 13; see also 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFEiS, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at
7:160.4 ("Congress and the SEC strongly resisted pleas from the bar to define insider
trading.").
1999]
262 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:239
could subject defendants to the new penalty even if their motives for
trading were innocent.' ° The SEC, on the other hand, advocated the
"possession" standard.11
Advocates of the "use" standard have argued that the ITSA's "pos-
session" language does not resolve the "possession versus use" debate,
asserting that the ITSA does not define the insider trading violation
and merely sets "a condition for the SEC to seek the civil penalty
which is discretionary with the court and which is implicitly depend-
ent on the court finding a violation."0 2 They argue that the "posses-
sion" standard is a "necessary condition for the civil penalty," but that
Congress did not intend for "possession" to be "a sufficient condition
for the penalty, much less for the violation."03 These advocates con-
tend that by employing the "possession" language, Congress chose not
to involve itself in the "possession versus use" debate, leaving it to the
courts to decide whether insider trading violations require use of ma-
terial, nonpublic information or whether mere possession is suffi-
cient'l 4 Their arguments appear to be supported by the testimony of
"0 See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 116
(1984) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Faith Colish, attorney) (asserting
that "it is important to distinguish between possession and use of [inside] informa-
tion"); id. at 126 (statement of the Securities Industry Association) (explaining that
"[t]he legislation should.., be couched in terms of trading 'on the basis of' covered
information"); House Hearings, supra note 32, at 196-98 (statement of Arnold S. Jacobs,
attorney) (asserting that the "use," not the "possession" standard reflects the insider
trading case law); id. at 296-97 (statement of the New York State Bar Association Com-
mittee on Securities Regulation) (explaining that "the critical conduct is not the pur-
chase or sale of a security 'while in the possession' of material non-public information;
rather, it is the purchase or sale of a security 'on the basis' of material non-public in-
formation"); see also 2 BROMBERG & LowENFELs, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.3
("Congress chose the 'possession' language despite objections from a number of wit-
nesses that it was incorrect or inappropriate."); Stevenson, supra note 97, at 18 ("Sev-
eral congressional witnesses urged that this [possession] language be amended to limit
the penalty's applicability to people who traded 'on the basis of' material non-public
information.").
10 See House Hearings, supra note 32, at 48 (statement of Daniel L. Goelzer, SEC
General Counsel) (asserting that "possession of material inside information is the
test").
102 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.3; see also SEC v.
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998) (adopting this argument).
103 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.4.
'" See Stevenson, supra note 97, at 20 (suggesting that Congress did not employ the
"on the basis of" language in the ITSA because it "chose not to enroll itself in resolving
definitional nuances"); see also WLIAM KLS. WANG & MARc I. STEINBERG, INSIDER
TRADING § 4.4.5, at 184 (1996) ("Choice of the phrase 'while in possession of' could be
either an endorsement of the broader [possession] standard or a refusal to choose be-
tween the two standards."); StuartJ. Kaswell, An Insider's Niew of the Insider Trading and
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SEC Director of Enforcement, John M. Fedders. When the Commit-
tee was considering the "possession versus use" issue, Fedders ex-
plained:
The proposed legislation in my view goes to a remedy. It does not atthe
present time at all impact the existing case law with regard to insider
trading. It is strictly a remedy saying that if a person engages in this in-
sider trading, however defined, that then the amount of disgorgement
can be three times the ill-gained profit. And the proposed language that
you have before you, presented by the Commission, does not impact the
"based on," "in possession of," or a "knowing" standard at all.
105
But Professor Langevoort has argued that, although Congress
chose not to define insider trading, it did endorse the "possession"
standard. Noting that Congress examined the "possession versus
use" debate and heard testimony on both sides of the issue,
Langevoort argues that Congress was well aware of the implications of
its decision to include the "possession" language. 7
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 BUS. LAw. 145, 158 n.57 (1989) (explaining
that the ITSFEA's "possession" language "did not mean that [Congress] endorsed a
'possession' standard" because "[t]his language had appeared in ITSA and [Congress]
simply replicated existing language," and asserting that "this legislation was entirely
neutral with respect to the debate over the possession standard").
1o House Hearings, supra note 32, at 49 (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Direc-
tor of Enforcement). But see id. ("[I]f you put the 'knowing' standard in or if you put
the 'based on' standard in, you would be making our prosecutorial efforts much more
difficult.").
'0 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-24 ("The choice of the 'while in pos-
session of' statutory language... can be read as an endorsement of the broader [pos-
session] test for insider trading liability.").
,07 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect
on Existing Law, 37VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1290 (1984) ("[A] discussion in the course of
the House hearings suggests that the drafters were aware of precisely what they were
doing."); see also IANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-24 ("[T]he legislative history is
clear that this language was chosen to reflect precedent that makes motivation insig-
nificant in determining insider trading liability."); id. at 3-24 n.8 ("Certainly, Congress
had the opportunity to change the law to an 'on the basis of' test, but chose instead to
endorse what it felt was the preferable prevailing interpretation of the law."); Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 786 ("Congress, both in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984 and in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
opted specifically for the 'possession' test.").
Indeed, although the securities laws do not define insider trading, Congress has
described insider trading as "the term used to refer to trading in the securities markets
while in possession of 'material' information (generally, information that would be im-
portant to an investor in making a decision to buy or sell a security) that is not avail-
able to the general public." H.R. RFP. No. 98-355, at 2 (1984) (emphasis added), re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275; see also 130 CONG. REC. 20,107 (1984)
(statement of Senator D'Amato) ("Insider trading is defined loosely as 'trading while in
possession ofmaterial nonpublic information.'" (emphasis added)).
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Having briefly reviewed the "possession versus use" debate, the
next Part will examine more closely and assess the arguments that
have been offered in support of the "use" standard, concluding that
these arguments improperly rely on prior case law and are based on
incorrect interpretations of Supreme Court precedent.
III. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE "USE" STANDARD
Advocates of the "use" standard, including the Adler and Smith
courts, have found support for the "use" standard in insider trading
case law, especially in Supreme Court precedent.'08 In particular, they
have observed that such precedent contains references to the "use" of
inside information or to trading "on the basis of" such information.
These advocates have also noted the Supreme Court's emphasis on
fraud in its discussions of the insider trading prohibition. But, as will
be discussed, this reliance on prior case law-and, more specifically,
on Supreme Court precedent-is misplaced.
A. "Use"Language
Advocates of the "use" standard often point to the "use" language
employed throughout the Supreme Court opinions addressing insider
trading. They argue that this language suggests that the trader must
have actually used the information to be liable for insider trading. Re-
liance on this "use" language, however, is inappropriate. In all of the
Supreme Court cases cited by advocates of the "use" standard, it was
clear that the defendants had in fact used nonpublic information in
consummating their trades. As a result, it was natural for the Court to
employ "use" language, and the Court was not careful about distin-
guishing between "possession" and "use."
In Chiarella, for example, the Supreme Court asserted that "a duty
to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information. " 109 And throughout Chiarella, the Su-
preme Court refers to the "use" of inside information and trading "on
the basis of" such information. 0 Similarly, throughout the Dirks opin-
in See, e.g., Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337 ("[W]e believe that Supreme Court dicta and the
lower court precedent suggest that the use test is the appropriate test."). See generally
Horwich, supra note 5 (providing extensive examination of insider trading case law in
the context of the "possession versus use" debate).
"o Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
"' See, e.g., id. at 226 (explaining that in Cady, Roberts, the SEC found that a broker-
dealer violated § 10(b) by "selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information"
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ion, the Supreme Court referred to "trading on"11' inside information,
and asserted that "insiders [are] forbidden ... from personally using
"112undisclosed corporate information to their advantage." More re-
cently, in O'Hagan, the Supreme Court, referring to the "'classical
theory' of insider trading liability," explained that "[section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the se-
curities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic informa-
tion""m and, referring to the misappropriation theory, asserted that
"the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains
the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities."
4
The Supreme Court's repeated employment of phrases such as "on
the basis of'-particularly in the recent O'Hagan opinion-has sug-
gested to many observers that the Court has considered the "posses-
sion versus use" debate and has endorsed the "use" standard. 5
(emphasis added)); id. at 229 ("The federal courts have found violations of § 10(b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for their own benefit." (empha-
sis added)); id. at 230 (explaining that the "duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees
that corporate insiders... will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of mate-
rial, nonpublic information" (emphasis added)); id. at 230 n.12 ("'Tippees' of corpo-
rate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) because they have a duty not to profit
from the use of inside information .... " (emphasis added)); id. at 231 ("Petitioner's
use of that information was not a fraud under § 10(b) unless he was subject to an af-
firmative duty to disclose it before trading." (emphasis added)); id. at 233 ("We cannot
affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all partici-
pants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion." (emphasis added)); id. (referring to "the problems caused by misuse of market
information" and the "use of market information" (emphasis added)).
.. See, eg., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (explaining that in Chiarea, "the Court found
that there is no general duty to disclose before trading n material nonpublic informa-
tion" (emphasis added)); id. at 655 (referring to the "requirement of a specific rela-
tionship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside information"
(emphasis added)); id. (discussing "how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to re-
frain from trading on inside information" (emphasis added)); id. at 661 n.21 ("De-
pending on the circumstances, and even where permitted by law, one's trading on ma-
terial nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below ethical standards of
conduct." (emphasis added)).
112 Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
"3 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52 (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 656 (emphasis added). The Court employs similar language throughout
the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 655-56 (examining "the § 10(b) requirement that the mis-
appropriator's deceptive use of information be 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of [a] security'" (emphasis added)); id. at 656 (referring to a "misappropriator
who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information" (emphasis added)); id. at
659 n.9 (discussing "[section] 10(b) liability when a person trad[es] on the basis of non-
public information" (emphasis added)).
115 See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Insider Trading Liability: 'Use v. Posses-
1999]
266 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:239
As the Adler and Smith courts acknowledged, however, the Su-
preme Court's use of such language is merely dicta.' 6 The issue of
whether possession is sufficient was not before the Court in any of
those cases: in all three cases, it was clear that the defendants had in
fact used the inside information in consummating their trades.' 7 Be-
cause the defendants had used the information, it was natural for the
Court to employ "use" language; in referring to insider trading with
"use" language, the Court was merely describing what the defendants
had done in those cases. 18 Further, because, the issue of "possession
versus use" was not before the Court, it is likely that the Court did not
consider carefully its choice of language in that context. 9 Indeed, in
sion,' N.Y.LJ., Oct. 29, 1998, at 5 ("[S]everal commentators have suggested that
O'Hagan substantially undermines the SEC's 'possession' theory ... ."); Harvey L. Pitt
& Karl A. Groskaufinanis, The Supreme Court Has Upheld the Misappropriation Theory, But
How Far the SEC Will Take the Ruling Is Anything But Clear, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at B4
("O'Hagan undermines the SEC's possession theory of liability ... stress[ing] that the
test for insider trading liability is whether the person accused traded on the basis of
material, nonpublic information.").
116 See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067 (recognizing that the Supreme Court's language was
merely dicta); Adler, 137 F.3d at 1334 ("We acknowledge that the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Chiarella, Di*s, and O'Hagan is dicta, because in those cases there was no
question that the material nonpublic information was actually used in trading.").
117 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648 (explaining that O'Hagan "us[ed] for his own trad-
ing purposes material, nonpublic information regarding Grand Met's planned tender
offer [of Pillsbury]"); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648 (asserting that Dirks "disclosed [material,
nonpublic] information to investors who relied on it in trading in the shares of the
corporation"); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (referring to Chiarella's testimony at trial that he "used that information [the
names of companies that were to become the object of takeover bids] as a basis for
purchasing stock" (internal quotations omitted)).
"a See 7 Loss & SEU1GMAN, supra note 39, at 3504-05 ("When there is no question
that the inside information was actually used in trading-which is normally the case-
it seems natural to speak in terms of not trading 'on' or 'on the basis of' the informa-
tion without necessarily implying that possession alone would not suffice.").
"9 There are several lower court decisions in which the court employs both "use"
and "possession" language interchangeably. See 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFEiS, supra note
6, § 7.4(620), at 7:160.12 ("A number of other decisions speak of use (or its equiva-
lents) but also, and more or less interchangeably, of possession."); see also United States
v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that "under [the traditional
theory of insider trading] a corporate insider trades in the securities of his own corpo-
ration on the basis of material, non-public information," but that "under the misappro-
priation theory § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated whenever a person trades while in
knowingpossession of material, non-public information that has been gained in violation
of a fiduciary duty to its source" (emphasis added)); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307,
312, 314 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting that "the district court found that all [the defendants]
had violated Rule 10b-5 by trading in ... stock while in possession of material inside in-
formation," and later describing the issue before the court as "how far the courts are to
extend the private civil right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the
alleged violation is the unlawful use of inside information and the stock involved is
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O'Hagan, the Court employed "use" language when referring to Rule
14e-3, even though that rule explicitly adopted a "possession" stan-
dard."O The Court asserted: "One violates Rule 14e-3(a) if he trades
on the basis of material nonpublic information concerning a pending
tender offer that he knows or has reason to know has been ac-
quired.., from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or someone work-
ing on their behalf."1' It thus appears that the Court was not paying
close attention to its employment of "use" and "possession" language.
When analyzing the language of the Supreme Court, one must
also examine carefully the context of the Court's statements and the
point the Court was attempting to make. For example, when the Su-
preme Court declared that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information, "1n
the Court was referring to the notion that there is no fraud under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 absent a fiduciary duty to disclose informa-
tion before trading.123 The Court asserted that such a duty to disclose
"arises from a specific relationship between two parties,"124 such as a
"relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a
corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential infor-
mation by reason of their position with that corporation. "'25 Rather
than making a distinction between "possession" and "use" as an ele-
ment of an insider trading violation, the Court was instead addressing
the issue of who could be liable for insider trading-to whom the duty
to "abstain or disclose" applied. 26 And, explicitly rejecting the parity-
of-information theory, the Court concluded that the "disclose or ab-
stain" rule applies not to everyone who possesses (or uses) material,
traded upon an impersonal market" (emphasis added)); SEC v. Antar, 15 F. Supp. 2d
477, 528, 529 (D.NJ. 1998) (noting that "§ 10(b) and Rule 10>b5 are violated when a
corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material,
nonpublic information," and later asserting that "the provisions discussed above [sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] prohibit a person from selling securities while in possession of
material, nonpublic information" (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
'20 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4e-3 and observing
that it provides for a "knowing possession" standard).
121 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Chest-
man, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (1991) (en banc)).
122 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
123 See i&. ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be
no fraud absent a duty to speak").
124 Id. at 233.
'2 Id. at228.
126 See 2 BROMBERG & LOwENFELs, supra note 6, § 7.4(620), at 7:160.11
("[P]ossession is considered by the Court in reference to the creation of the disclose or
abstain duty, not in juxtaposition to use as an element of violation.").
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nonpublic information, but only to those with a pre-existing fiduciary
duty to shareholders. 
27
Similarly, in considering the Supreme Court's statements in
O'Hagan, it is important to note that the Court's discussion took place
in the context of the misappropriation theory. 12 In the context of the
"possession versus use" debate, some commentators have drawn a dis-
tinction between the classical theory of insider trading and the misap-
propriation theory.'2 They argue that the misappropriation theory
presupposes the use of inside information: underlying the theory is
the notion that "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a princi-
pal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use
of that information. " '3° Under this theory, the "misappropriation" oc-
' See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-33 (rejecting the parity-of-information theory). For
a discussion of the parity-of-information theory, see supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
,2 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649 (explaining that the Court was considering "the
propriety of the misappropriation theory under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"). For a de-
scription of the misappropriation theory, see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
'2 See, e.g., FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01 [5], at 2-14.6 to 2-14.7 (suggesting
that "the answer [to the 'possession versus use' debate] is best viewed as a function of a
number of specific factors, including: whether the case is brought under the misap-
propriation theory or the classical theory of insider trading liability"); Horwich, supra
note 5, at 1237-38 ("In order to focus the analysis of whether there is a distinction be-
tween (i) affirmatively using material inside information to trade, and (ii) trading
while in possession of material inside information but without making deliberate use
of the information, the analysis [in] this Article is limited to the classical theory."); see
also supra Part L.A (discussing the classical theory of insider trading and the misappro-
priation theory). But see infra note 133 (arguing that if one accepts the "equal-access"
theory, there is no reason to distinguish between the classical theory and the misap-
propriation theory for purposes of the "possession versus use" debate).
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. The view that the misappropriation theory presup-
poses use, however, is not universally held. See United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83,
87 (2d Cir. 1997) (asserting that "under the misappropriation theory § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 are violated whenever a person trades while in knowing possession of material, non-
public information that has been gained in violation of a fiduciary duty to its source"
(emphasis added)); LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 6.05[3], at 6-32 (referring to the
misappropriation theory and describing the prohibited conduct as "trading while in
possession" of inside information); id. at 6-32 n.16 ("Actually, an open question is
whether the misappropriation theory requires motivation or mere possession."). In-
deed, Teicher, the case in which the Second Circuit explicitly endorsed the "knowing
possession" standard, involved the misappropriation theory. See United States v.
Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the misappropriation theory and
its application to the case). The Supreme Court may have employed "use" language in
O'Hagan merely because it was clear that the defendant had in fact used the inside in-
formation. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (arguing that because the
defendant used the information, it was natural for the Court to employ "use" lan-
guage); see also 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.5(517) (3), at 7:242.27 to
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curs when the fiduciary uses the information without the principal's
knowledge or permission.3 3 Even if the Court was consciously and
purposefully employing "use" language in O'Hagan,1 32 such language is
closely linked with its discussion of the misappropriation theory and
should not be read as implicating the "possession" standard under the
classical theory.153
7:242.28 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining that "the government presented the [O'Hagan]
case in 'use' terms, probably preferring not to complicate the misappropriation issue,"
and suggesting that one should not attach too much weight to the Court's choice of
language).
1 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 ("[T]he fiduciary's fraud is consum-
mated.., when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to pur-
chase or sell securities."); Phyllis Diamond, McLucas Hails O'Hagan Ruling, But Says
Issues over Reach of Theory Remain, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1097, 1098 (1997) (quoting
SEC Enforcement Director William McLucas, who explained that "the impropriety in-
volved when someone like Mr. O'Hagan is a defendant is not getting the information"
and that the misappropriation takes place when the defendant "uses [the information]
to trade"); see also Horwich, supra note 5, at 1238 n.13 ("While it is easy to pose exam-
ples of an insider possessing nonpublic information but arguably not using it in mak-
ing a trading decision, it is much more difficult to envision a plausible situation where
someone first misappropriates information (an affirmative wrongful act) and then
trades without using it.").
112 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (asserting that because the "posses-
sion versus use" issue was not before the Supreme Court, the Court may not have paid
close attention to its choice of "possession" or "use" language).
i3 See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 6, § 2.01[5], at 2-14.7 to 2-14.8 (suggesting that
the O'Hagan Court's use of the phrase "on the basis of' is intertwined with its analysis
of the misappropriation theory and arguing that under the classical theory of insider
trading the "knowing possession" standard may still be "the better test"); Diamond,
supra note 131, at 1098 (asserting that despite the Court's "use" language in O'Hagan,
"certainly with respect to traditional insiders and certainly in the conventional analysis
of tippee liability, we would argue that the standard remains.. . 'in possession of ").
Under the Supreme Court's conceptualization of the misappropriation theory in
O'Hagan, the misappropriation involves the taking or use of inside information without
the consent of the source of the information. The duty to disclose is owed only to the
source of the information, and no violation of§ 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 occurs if the fidu-
ciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the information. See O'Hagan,
521 U.S. at 654-55 & n.6 (noting that the "disclosure obligation runs to the source of
the information" and asserting that "if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he
plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no... § 10(b) violation"). In
this sense, the misappropriation theory is quite distinct from the classical theory, and it
is on this basis that many have removed the misappropriation theory from the "posses-
sion versus use" debate. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that
some commentators have distinguished the classical theory from the misappropriation
theory in the context of the "possession versus use" debate).
If, however, one accepts the equal-access theory, one must disclose information
before trading if such information is not legally accessible to others. See supra note 29
and accompanying text (discussing the "equality of access to information" or "equal
access" theory). This theory applies to insiders and outsiders alike, see supra notes 16-
17 and accompanying text (defining "outsider trading"), effectively unifying the classi-
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Proponents of the "use" standard have relied heavily on the "use"
language employed in many of the Supreme Court cases addressing
insider trading. Such reliance, however, is misplaced. In each of
those cases, a causal connection clearly existed between the insider's
trades and the inside information. Because the defendants had in fact
used the information, it was natural for the Court to employ "use"
language. Advocates of the "use" standard have recognized that "pos-
session versus use" was not at issue in these cases and thus that the Su-
preme Court's adoption of "use" language is merely dicta. These ad-
vocates, however, have failed to recognize that the Court's choice of
language in the cases is unreliable because the Court was not careful
about distinguishing between "possession" and "use."
B. Scienter and the Emphasis on Fraud
Advocates of the "use" standard have also found support for their
position in the Supreme Court's emphasis on fraud in its discussions
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and in the scienter requirement. Li-
ability cannot attach under section 10(b) and Rule 101>5 unless it is
shown that the defendant acted with scienter.34 Although the courts
have not clearly defined the term-particularly in the context of in-
sider trading-the Supreme Court has asserted that scienter "refers to
a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
13 5
cal and misappropriation theories. Because there are no longer relevant distinctions
between the classical and misappropriation theories under this approach, arguments
regarding the "possession" or "use" standard would apply equally to both theories.
This Comment argues that the "possession" standard is the most appropriate rule, see
infra Part IV, and further recommends that the "possession" standard be applied in
insider trading cases under both the classical theory and the misappropriation theory.
This is essentially the approach embodied in Rule 14e-3 pertaining to trading in the
context of tender offers. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Rule
14e-3). There seems to be no reason, however, to limit such an approach only to ten-
der offers, and this approach should be expanded to the more general cases of insider
trading.
"4 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 ("Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
require a showing of scienter on the part of the defendant in order for liability to at-
tach.").
1 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976); see also
LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 (asserting that "the courts have never of-
fered a clear definition of scienter" and citing the Court's formulation of the term in
Hochfelder). As one commentator has observed:
Inherently an elusive concept, scienter suffers particular problems in insider
trading. It has to fit many different versions of the violation, some of them
quite peculiar. Some of the standard articulations aren't well suited to insider
trading. And, perhaps as a result, courts struggling to find words that make
sense in factual contexts use multiple expressions which are not always consis-
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Some advocates of the "use" standard have argued that a showing of
scienter requires a showing that the defendant actually used the inside
information in consummating his trade.3s These arguments, how-
ever, are based on an improper interpretation of the scienter re-
quirement in the context of insider trading.
In Adler, for example, the Eleventh Circuit argued that the defen-
dant's motivation for trading-namely, whether or not he traded on
the basis of inside information-was relevant to the issue of scienter.'1
7
The Adler court based its argument on a footnote from Dirks, in which
the Supreme Court asserted:
[M]otivation is not irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not enough
that an insider's conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation
may be found only where there is "intentional or willful conduct de-
signed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affect-
ing the price of securities.
"Iss
Similarly, in Smith, the Ninth Circuit argued that the scienter re-
quirement supports a "use" standard, contending that "an investor
who has a preexisting plan to trade, and who carries through with that
plan after coming into possession of material nonpublic information,
does not intend to defraud or deceive."39 Again, these arguments are
based on an improper interpretation of the scienter requirement in
the context of insider trading.
Under the common law concept of fraud, a defendant is said to
tent. ... Moreover, scienter is described in very different terms, sometimes in
the same court opinion.
2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(810), at 7:163.
Nor is the term scienter defined in the federal securities laws. See id. § 7.4(800), at
7:162 ("[Scienter] appears nowhere in the 1933 or 1934 Securities Acts or their
rules.").
6 See, e.g., 2 BROMBERG & LOWNENFELS, supra note 6, § 7.4(620), at 7:160.12 ("Even
if use is not specified as an element of the violation, it may be construed as a compo-
nent of another required element: scienter."); Horwich, supra note 5, at 1248 (noting
that some "cases have addressed the possession versus use issue ostensibly in the con-
text of whether scienter had been proven"). Other commentators have recognized a
link between the scienter requirement and the "possession versus use" debate, al-
though they have stopped short of asserting that the scienter requirement necessitates
the adoption of the "use" standard. See, e.g., FERRARA ET AL, supra note 6, § 2.01[5], at
2-12 ("Another important issue in insider trading cases, inextricably linked to Section
10(b)'s and Rule 10b-5's requirement of scienter, involves what is often termed the
'possession vs. use' debate.").
137 AdLer, 137 F.3d at 1334 (noting that "the majority and the dissent in Dirks dis-
agreed about whether motivation is relevant to proving scienter as an element of an
insider trading violation").
" Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23 (quoting Hochfilder, 425 U.S. at 199).
13 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
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act with scienter if he misstates a material fact, knowing that the
statement is false and intending that the recipient of such information
rely on it.140 In the context of insider trading, the scienter require-
ment has been interpreted to mean that the defendant must have had
actual knowledge of material, nonpublic information and also must
have known that the information was both material and nonpublic.141




Indeed, in interpreting the scienter requirement, one must dis-
tinguish between "the lack of good faith required for scienter" and
"bad motive," 43 which is not required. Although scienter requires in-
tent, it does not require intent "in the sense of intent to harm or do
evil"; rather, the intent required by scienter is "the intent to commit
the fraud itself."144 As William H. Kuehnle has explained, "the grava-
men of the moral deficiency in fraud is not that the defendant was try-
140 See Loss & SEuIGMAN, supra note 21, at 751 (explaining that "the defendant
must know of the falsity [of his statement] (this kind of knowledge is called 'scienter'),
but make the statement nevertheless for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely
on it").
141 SeeSEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that "the [sci-
enter] requirement is satisfied if at the time defendant purchased stock he had actual
knowledge of undisclosed material information; knew it was undisclosed, and knew it
was material"); see also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.10.3, at 328
(1986) ("The point of [Hochfelder] in this context would seem to be only that the de-
fendant must have known that the information to which he had access while trading
was material and nonpublic.").
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of whether reck-
lessness could constitute scienter, see Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12 ("In certain areas
of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes
of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in
some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5."), and "[v]irtually all lower courts addressing this issue since Hochfelder
have concluded that a rule 101-5 violation may be grounded on 'recklessness'... and
that knowing, intentional misconduct is not a necessary ingredient of establishing li-
ability." ROBERTW. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 935 (5th ed.
1994).
142 As Langevoort notes: "The law of fraud on which this [duty to disclose or ab-
stain] is based is a clear-cut disclosure duty for the benefit of the protected party, not
limited to situations where it is shown that the fiduciary was trying to take advantage of
the information." LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-26; see also RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 551 (2) (a) (1977) ("One party to a business transaction is under
a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated, (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of
a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them .... .").
143 William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Secu-
ritiesLaws, 34 HOuS. L. REV. 121, 195 (1997).
144 Id.
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ing to harm the victim, but rather that the defendant was willing to
mislead the victim."14 If, for example, an insider knowingly made
false statements to an investor about the corporation's stock, he would
be guilty of fraud-regardless of his motives for making such misrep-
resentations.1 Analogizing to the context of insider trading, a defen-
dant who knowingly trades while in possession of material, nonpublic
information acts with the requisite scienter, regardless of his motives
for trading. As the SEC argued in Smith, the "requisite intent to de-
fraud is inherent in the act of trading while in possession of inside in-
formation."47 The Adler and Smith courts fail to make this distinction
between "intent to harm" and "intent to commit fraud" when they as-
sert that a defendant does not act with the requisite scienter if he has
an "innocent" reason for trading.
Much of the confusion surrounding the scienter requirement may
be attributed to the frequent establishment of scienter through the
use of circumstantial evidence. In reading cases that have discussed
the scienter requirement, courts and commentators have confused
the reliance on use of information to prove scienter with a require-
ment that use of information be proved in order to satisfy the scienter
element. In some cases, there may not be direct evidence that the de-
fendant had knowledge of (knowingly possessed) the inside informa-
tion or that the defendant knew such information was material. In
such cases, courts may rely on "suspicious" trading as evidence that
the defendant actually knew the information, or the court may rely on
evidence that the defendant used inside information to prove that the
defendant knew such information was material. In these cases, evi-
dence of the defendant's use of information is not independently im-
portant; rather, it is relevant merely as a means of establishing that the
1 Id.
6 See id. (discussing a similar hypothetical and citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 526 (1977) as support); see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 842 n.314
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW* OF TORTS 741 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) and asserting that "the intent to deceive or mislead or
convey a false impression that is implicit in the scienter concept goes simply to the
matter of belief, or absence of belief, that the representation is true").
117 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
I See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983) (noting
that "proof of scienter required in fraud cases is often a matter of inference from cir-
cumstantial evidence"); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-22 n.2 ("Scien-
ter can, of course, be established by circumstantial evidence."); LOSS & SELIGMAN, su-
pra note 21, at 837 ("[Ilntent (or scienter) being subjective, it must often 'be inferred
from a series of seemingly isolated acts and instances which have been... aptly desig-
nated as badges of fraud." (quoting Nassan v. United States, 126 F.2d 613, 615 (4th
Cir. 1942))).
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defendant possessed the information and knew that the information
was material. In SEC v. MacDonald, for example, the defendant ap-
pealed the trial court's finding of scienter, asserting that the SEC had
failed to establish that he knew the inside information was material.'49
The court, however, found that the "inside information was a motivat-
ing factor in [the defendant's] purchase of... stock"'; ° and con-
cluded that such use of the information was evidence that the defen-
dant considered the information to be material.15'
On the other hand, where there is little or no evidence that the
defendants actually possessed material, nonpublic information, the
court may rely on evidence of legitimate or innocent reasons for trad-
ing to conclude that the defendant did not act with the requisite sci-
enter. 52 In In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, for example, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, insiders who sold some of their
shares prior to the company's bankruptcy, violated the insider trading
prohibitions.' The plaintiffs tried to use evidence of the defendants'
trading as evidence that the defendants had access to material, non-
public information.54 But, observing that the defendants sold only asmall percentage of their holdings and suffered large losses when the
19 MacDona4, 699 F.2d at 50 ("Defendant does not contest ... the court's finding
that he had knowledge of the facts found to be material, and knew such facts to be un-
disclosed. He does claim, however, that the SEC failed to establish... the necessary
third element, knowledge of materiality....").
50 Id. at 51.
"' See id. ("Obviously, if defendant himself considered the information important
in deciding whether to purchase, he knew a reasonable investor would likewise con-
sider it important in deciding whether to sell.").
152 As Langevoort explains:
In many cases, a defendant argues factually that he was not in posses-
sion ... of any inside information when he traded. The SEC... has only cir-
cumstantial evidence of possession. In this setting, many courts have wisely
taken the position that the timing of the trade (e.g., shortly after a telephone
conversation with someone who clearly knew the information and had some
reason to pass it on) suffices to create an inference of insider trading, but only
if such a trade was inconsistent with the defendant's prior pattern of trading
activity. As such, if the defendant had some predetermined plan of selling, or
was buying or selling only in normal amounts, it would rebut any inference
of... possession ....
LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-25.
"3 35 F.3d 1407, 1427 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the plaintiffs' allegations that the
defendants traded "with knowledge of undisclosed adverse, material information").
'5 See id. ("Plaintiffs assert that since these defendants sold some of their
shares... prior to [the company's] financial collapse, they must have known of some
information, not already known to the market, that signalled [the company's] immi-
nent doom." (quoting In reWorlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 871 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) [hereinafter Worlds of Wonder I1])).
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company went bankrupt, the court suggested that the trades did not
seem suspicious and asserted that one could not reasonably conclude
from such trades alone that the defendants possessed inside informa-
tion."'5 Because there was no other evidence that the defendants pos-
sessed nonpublic information, the court thus concluded that the de-
fendants lacked scienter.1m
In reading cases such as MacDonald and Worlds of Wonder, courts
and commentators have confused the reliance on use of information
to prove scienter with a requirement that use of information be
proved in order to satisfy the scienter element. Indeed, the Adler
court cited Worlds of Wonder in support of the "use" standard, asserting
that "[ i]n a number of cases, courts have allowed insiders to introduce
evidence of preexisting plans or other 'innocuous' reasons for sales in
order to rebut an inference of scienter.' 57 In particular, the Adler
court pointed to the statement in Worlds of Wonder that "'[e]ven if the
evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that one or more of the
defendants had access to inside information, the defendants' actual
trading would conclusively rebut an inference of scienter.'"58 The Ad-
ler court further observed that in Worlds of Wonder, "the court empha-
sized that some of the insiders 'sold their shares pursuant to a prede-
termined plan,' one insider sold 'because it faced a pressing need to
service a huge debt incurred from overinvesting in real estate,' and
another insider only sold a small percentage of his shares." 9 The Ad-
ler court therefore concluded that scienter requires use-not mere
possession-of inside information.' 6° But in interpreting Worlds of
Wonder, it is important to recall that there was no evidence that the de-
161fendants actually possessed any inside information. The court was not
155 See id. (asserting that "when one considers the amounts traded, Plaintiffs' claims
appear fantastic" and concluding that "no reasonablejury could find that insider trad-
ing had occurred" (quoting Worlds of Wonderl, 814 F. Supp. at 872)).
'm See id. (explaining that the "[p]laintiffs cannot point to any bit of information
traded on by these defendants that was not already known to the market" and conclud-
ing that "no reasonable jury could find.., that these defendants acted with scienter"
(quoting Worlds of Wonderl, 814 F. Supp. at 872)).
157 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1335.
Id. (quoting Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1427-28).
Id. (citing Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1427-28).
160 See id, (asserting that cases such as Worlds of Wonder "provide support for the
proposition that there is no violation of§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of some
causal connection between the material nonpublic information and an insider's trad-
ing").
161 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of evidence that
defendants possessed nonpublic information).
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suggesting that use of information is a requirement for scienter.
Rather, the defendants' preexisting trading plans were relevant only
as far as they provided evidence that the defendants did not possess
inside information. 62 Indeed, if there had in fact been independent
proof that the defendants possessed material, nonpublic information,
the court likely would have found scienter. The Adler court's conclu-
sion that the scienter requirement mandates a "use" standard is thus
based on an improper interpretation of scienter and the manner in
which it is often established in the context of insider trading.lss
The Adler court found further support for its assertion that a de-
fendant's motivation for trading is relevant in the Supreme Court's
holding that a tipper must personally benefit from his tip to be liable
for insider trading.'6 The Adler court, however, seems to have taken
the Supreme Court's holding out of context. In asserting that an in-
sider must benefit from his tip, the Supreme Court observed that not
all disclosures of confidential information constitute a breach of fidu-
ciary duty. 65 The Supreme Court noted that an insider who conveys
such information may not know that the information is confidential-
he may mistakenly believe that the information has already been pub-
licly disclosed-or the insider may not believe that such information is
material. 66 The requirement of a benefit, then, seems merely to be a
means of ensuring that the tipper-defendant knew the information
was material and nonpublic.167
Citing the O'Hagan opinion, the Adler court also claimed the sup-
162 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-25 n.1 1 (discussing Worlds of Wonder
and the inappropriateness of interpreting that case as favoring the use standard).
" See id. at 3-26 n.1 ("Citation to these sorts of cases as authority in favor of a use
standard... is plainly inappropriate."); id. at 3-25 to 3-26 ("These cases... have no
bearing whatsoever on choosing between the two standards [possession or use]-a point
that the courts in Adler and Smith unfortunately missed when they cited them in sup-
port of the use test.").
'" Adler, 137 F.3d at 1334 ("[T]he Dirks Court's holding that [a] tipper must gain
some personal advantage in order for [a] tippee to be liable for trading on material
nonpublic information, suggests that knowing possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation at the time of trading may not be enough to establish liability for insider trad-
ing."); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1983) (asserting that the insider must
benefit from his tip for there to be a breach of fiduciary duty and insider trading liabil-
ity).
1 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661-62 ("All disclosures of confidential corporate informa-
tion are not inconsistentwith the duty insiders owe to shareholders.").
166 See id. at 662 ("Corporate officials may mistakenly think the information already
has been disclosed or that it is not material enough to affect the market.").
'67 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 4, § 3.04, at 3-26 n.13 (asserting that one cannot
look to Dirks's requirement of a benefit to resolve the "possession versus use" debate).
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port of the Supreme Court for the proposition that the "knowing pos-
session test may prohibit actions that are not themselves fraudulent."'s
In particular, the Adler court noted the following assertion from
O'Hagan "under § 14(e), the Commission may prohibit acts, not
themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the pro-
hibition is 'reasonably designed to prevent.., acts and practices
[that] are fraudulent."" 69 But the Adler court misinterpreted the Su-
preme Court's discussion, taking statements it made about section
14(e) and Rule 14e-3 out of their original context. In O'Hagan, the
Supreme Court was addressing the defendant's contention that the
SEC had exceeded its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it
adopted Rule 14e-3(a)."' Although it is true that Rule 14e-3 adopted
a "knowing possession standard,"71 this aspect of the rule was not un-
der attack. Rather, O'Hagan contested the validity of Rule 14e-3(a)
because it imposes a duty to "disclose or abstain" regardless of
whether the trader has a preexisting fiduciary duty to either the
shareholders or the source of the information.'1 As the Supreme
Court asserted in Chiarella, there is no fraud absent a fiduciary duty to
disclose information before trading.ln Because Rule 14e-3 imposes
liability even where there is no such fiduciary duty, effectively prohib-
iting conduct which is not fraudulent under Chiarella, the defendant
in O'Hagan argued that the SEC had exceeded its rulemaking author-
ity to define fraud under section 14(e). The Supreme Court did not
resolve whether the SEC exceeded its section 14(e) power to define
fraud. Instead, the Court noted that section 14(e) also gave the SEC
'6' Adler, 137 F.3d at 1338 (citing O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673).
'69 Id. (citing O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673).
170 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666-67 (considering whether "the Commis-
sion... exceed[edl its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it adopted Rule 14e-
3(a) without requiring a showing that the trading at issue entailed a breach of fiduciary
duty"). Section 14(e) gave the SEC authority to "define, and prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1997).
171 See supra note 58 (discussing Rule 14e-3).
1 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 669 (explaining that "[i]n the Eighth Circuit's view,
[and presumably in the defendant's view,] because Rule 14e-3(a) applies whether or
not the trading in question breaches a fiduciary duty, the regulation exceeds the SEC's
§ 14(e) rulemaking authority"). The "possession" standard suggested for section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 liability does not eliminate the requirement of a fiduciary duty re-
quired under both the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. See supra Part
L.A (discussing the two theories of insider trading liability).
17 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondis-
closure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."); see also supra notes 122-27
(discussing Chiarella and the fiduciary duty requirement).
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"prophylactic" authority to prevent fraud,'74 and concluded that Rule
14e-3(a) "qualifies under § 14(e) as a 'means reasonably designed to
prevent' fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the
tender offer context"' 75 It was only in this context that the Supreme
Court held that under section 14(e) the SEC may prohibit actions that
are not fraudulent. When considered in the proper context, the Su-
preme Court's assertion does not support the Adler court's conclusion
that the "knowing possession" standard prohibits conduct that is not
fraudulent.
Indeed, examined in the proper context, statements by the Su-
preme Court lend little support to the arguments in favor of the "use"
standard; many of the statements relied upon by advocates of the
"use" standard have been misinterpreted and taken out of their origi-
nal context. Although reliance on Supreme Court precedent and
other insider trading case law in support of the "use" standard thus
appears unwarranted, nothing in the preceding discussion suggests
that "knowing possession" is the correct standard. 7 6 The next Part
sets forth the reasons for adopting a "possession" standard.
IV. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE "KNOWING POSSESSION" STANDARD
There are two primary reasons for adopting the "possession" stan-
dard and imposing insider trading liability for trading while in posses-
sion of material, nonpublic information. The first relates to the diffi-
culty of proving actual use. The second relates to the rationale
underlying the insider trading prohibition-the concern that inves-
174 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673 (citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1,
11 n.11 (1985), in which the Court asserted that "§ 14(e)'s rulemaking authorization
gives the Commission 'latitude,'... 'to regulate nondeceptive activities as a "reasona-
bly designed" means of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in
the meaning of the term "manipulative" itself'").
'7 Id. at 672. Note, however, that the SEC seems to have been exercising its fraud-
defining authority, rather than its prophylactic authority in Rule 14e-3 (a), see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3(a) (1999) (providing that the activity described "shall constitute a fraudu-
lent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of Section 14(e) of
the Act"), although the SEC apparently believed it was exercising its prophylactic
power in Rule 14e-3(d). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (prohibiting certain conduct
"[als a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act").
176 Indeed, because the "possession versus use" debate has not squarely been at is-
sue in prior cases, one should not interpret the language in earlier case law as endors-
ing either the "possession" or the "use" standard. See supra Part III.A (discussing the
inappropriateness of relying on "use" language in Supreme Court insider trading opin-
ions for support of the "use" standard).
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tors perceive the securities markets as fair and honest.1"
A. Difficulty of EstablishingActual Use
The SEC has advocated the "possession" standard largely because
it believes that a "use" standard would make it unnecessarily difficult
to prosecute insider trading.' Under a "use" test, the SEC (or the
government), as well as private parties, not only would be required to
establish that the defendant possessed material, nonpublic informa-
tion, but also would "have to get into his mind" to determine whether
the trade was based on such information.7 As Director McLucas ex-
plained: "The problem with the 'on the basis of standard is clear-it
makes proof of a violation subject to metaphysical impossibility....
When a trader knows the material information, divining that
he... acted 'on the basis of as opposed to 'while in possession of
may be impossible."'8 ° With the "use" standard, the concern is that in-
sider-traders will "contrive" legitimate reasons for their transactions,
offering innocent explanations such as mortgage obligations and col-
lege tuition payments."8 As the SEC asserted: "Individuals who have
actually traded on the basis of inside information frequently attempt
to invent arguments that they have traded for other reasons. Under a
'possession' standard, such post hoc rationalizations would be irrele-
vant, and could not be used to impede enforcement of the law. "'82
The Teicher court also acknowledged this concern when it endorsed
the "knowing possession" standard: "As a matter of policy then, a re-
quirement of a causal connection between the information and the
'7 See supra Part I.B (discussing the reasons for the insider trading prohibition).
1 See House Hearings, supra note 32, at 49 (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Di-
rector of Enforcement) ("[T]he 'based on' [or 'use'] standard... would ... mak[e]
our prosecutorial efforts much more difficult."). The SEC's position, however, has not
been consistent. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's
inconsistency in its interpretation of Rule 101-5).
'i House Hearings, supra note 32, at 49 (statement ofJohn M. Fedders, SEC Direc-
tor of Enforcement).
,80 McLucas & Angotti, supra note 34, at 5; see alsofDiamond, supra note 131, at 1098
(quoting McLucas's assertion that the government "cannot metaphysically get into
someone's head and discern what factors within their state of mind were directly
causal").
'8' SeeDiamond, supra note 131, at 1098 (explaining that the SEC's concern is that
"[tihere's not a defendant that comes in the door that won't have a separate, inde-
pendent, superseding tort law factor for his buying or selling activity").
182 Proposed Language for Inclusion in Committee Report on Insider Trading
Definition, 20 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 279, 280 (1988).
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trade could frustrate attempts to distinguish between legitimate trades
and those conducted in connection with inside information"8s3
B. Perception That Markets are Honest and Fair
The difficulty of establishing actual use of inside information is
not the only reason for adopting a "possession" standard. Considered
alone, such an explanation invites the inference that there is nothing
wrong with mere possession of material, nonpublic information at the
time of a trade, aside from the difficulty of proving actual use of such
information. One might infer that the securities laws seek to prevent
the use of inside information but, because of difficulties of proof, also
prohibit trading while in possession of such information-even
though the policy reasons underlying the insider trading prohibition
do not really apply to mere possession. This inference is the one that
many advocates of the "use" standard apparently have drawn in reject-
ing the SEC's rationale for the "possession" standard.Iss But the policy
reasons underlying the insider trading prohibition do apply to trading
while in possession of material, nonpublic information. Recognizing
the difficulties of proof associated with a "use" test, the Adler court
held that an "inference of use ... arises from the fact that [an] insider
traded while in knowing possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion." 'ss The problem with this approach, however, is its failure to
recognize that the rationale for the insider trading prohibition applies
'" Teicher, 987 F.2d at 121. Other commentators have also agreed with this argu-
ment. See, e.g., 7 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 39, at 3505 ("The very difficulty of es-
tablishing actual use of inside information points to possession as the test.").
184 SeeHorwich, supra note 5, at 1270 (explaining that "choosing the simpler rule is
defensible only if it comports equally well with the underlying policy of the law as does
the alternative, more complex rule," but that "that is not the case if actual use of the
inside information is what underlies the rationale for the prohibition"). Horwich is
implicitly assuming that the policy reasons for the insider trading prohibition do not
apply to trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information, provided
there is no causal connection between the trade and the information. See id. at 1271
(contending that the insider who trades merely while in possession of inside informa-
tion is "innocent"). As a result, he does not believe that such trading should be pro-
hibited merely because it may be difficult to distinguish between use and possession.
See id. at 1270-71 ("The fact that the distinction may be difficult to draw in some cases
does not mean that it cannot or should not be drawn wherever possible, so long as the
underlying policy for the prohibition can be respected.").
185 Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337; see also id. ("[When an insider trades while in possession
of material nonpublic information, a strong inference arises that such information was
used by the insider in trading. The insider can attempt to rebut the inference by ad-
ducing evidence that there was no causal connection between the information and the
trade....").
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equally to both trading on the basis of and trading while in possession of
inside information.86
The basic rationale for the insider trading prohibition is the belief
that insider trading undermines investors' expectations of honest and
fair securities markets and that, as a result, insider trading will dis-
courage investors from participating in the markets 7 The argument
is that investors view trading on the basis of material, nonpublic in-
formation as fundamentally unfair. The question, then, is whether in-
vestors would also question the fairness of markets in which investors
routinely trade while in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion-even if such traders claimed that there was no causal connec-
tion between such information and the decision to trade.
The answer to this question may be found in an observation by the
Teicher court about the nature of information. The Teicher court ob-
served: "Unlike a loaded weapon which may stand ready but unused,
material information cannot lay idle in the human brain "le Even if
an insider in possession of material, nonpublic information believes
that his trades are motivated solely by legitimate reasons, it is unlikely
that the information possessed by a trader would not in some way in-
fluence his trades. Investors are likely to believe that such informa-
tion influenced-whether consciously or subconsciously-the in-
sider's trades, despite the insider's assertions to the contrary.
Investors are likely to believe, for example, that an insider with a pre-
existing plan to sell shares to pay his daughter's college tuition, may
decide to sell 110 shares upon coming into possession of the inside
information, instead of the 100 shares he had previously planned to
sell. Investors are therefore just as likely to doubt the fairness of mar-
kets in which participants trade while in possession of inside information
as they are to doubt the fairness of markets in which participants trade
on the basis of inside information. It is for this reason that "knowing
possession" should be sufficient for insider trading liability.'8 9
"6 As the Smith court noted, another problem with this approach is that such a pre-
sumption of use cannot be applied in the criminal context. United States v. Smith, 155
F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting that in the context of a criminal prosecu-
tion, "[w]e are.., not at liberty, as was the Adler court, to establish an evidentiary pre-
sumption that gives rise to an inference of use"). On the other hand, there is no rea-
son why the standards for criminal and civil liability cannot be different; courts could
employ a "use" standard in the criminal context and a "use by presumption" standard
in the civil context.
"7See supra Part I.B (discussing the reasons for the insider trading prohibition).
" Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
"79 Note that this reasoning applies whether liability is predicated upon the classical
theory or the misappropriation theory of insider trading. Investors are just as likely to
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Advocates of the use standard suggest that there is nothing inher-
ently unfair about trading merely while in possession of material,
nonpublic information, since such trading involves no exploitation or
abuse of inside information.'" That may be true, but, as discussed
above, investors are likely to perceive such trading as unfair, believing
that a trader possessing inside information cannot escape the influ-
ence of such information. And to the extent that the insider trading
prohibition is based on the belief that investors will not participate in
a market that they perceive to be unfair, it is investors' perceptions that
are relevant in determining what conduct should be prohibited.
Some proponents of the "use" standard further suggest that it is
unfair to penalize and prevent from trading'9' the insider who engages
in a regular and periodic program of selling to liquidate his holdings
in the corporation's stock and obtain needed cash.12 For the insider
who, because of cash requirements, must sell regularly and cannot al-
ways wait until the information is publicly disclosed, the "possession"
test may seem particularly burdensome and unfair.9 3 But it need not
doubt the fairness of the markets if the trader is a corporate insider trading in the se-
curities of his corporation while in possession of inside information as they are if the
trader is an "outsider" such as O'Hagan, see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text
(discussing "outsider trading" and the O'Hagan case), trading in another corporation's
securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information obtained from an
outside (confidential) source. The "knowing possession" standard should therefore be
applied in insider trading cases under both the classical theory and the misappropria-
tion theory of insider trading liability. This conclusion clearly follows if one accepts
the concept of equality of access to information (or the "equal-access" theory). See su-
pra notes 29, 133 and accompanying text (discussing the equal-access theory and its
implications for the classical theory and misappropriation theory in the context of the
"possession versus use" debate). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the equal-
access theory, see supra note 29, and, as a result, courts and commentators may con-
tinue to distinguish between the classical theory and the misappropriation theory in
the context of the "possession versus use" debate. See supra note 129 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that some commentators have distinguished the classical theory
from the misappropriation theory for purposes of the "possession versus use" debate).
19 See Horwich, supra note 5, at 1270-76 (using various hypotheticals to suggest the
unfairness of imposing insider trading liability "when the decision to trade was made
without any exploitation of material nonpublic information").
191 Since the insider has the choice of disclosing the information or abstaining
from trading, the insider is prevented from trading only to the extent that he cannot
disclose the information. Often, however, insiders do not have the authority to dis-
close the information. See id. at 1271 n.230 ("[F]ew individual insiders have the discre-
tion or right to choose to disclose confidential material information about their em-
ployer.").
9 See id. at 1273 (discussing the case of an executive with a regular, consistent
purchase or sale program).
19s The situation is a bit different where the insider wishes to buy, rather than sell,
stock. Here, there is not the same necessity for engaging in the trade-the insider has
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be. Such an insider could, for example, maintain his stock portfolio
with an investment advisor who has complete discretion over the na-
ture and timing of transactions.'9 The investment advisor could then
execute whatever trades are necessary to provide the insider with the
cash he requires.95 The "knowing possession" standard thus goes fur-
ther than the "use" standard in ensuring the integrity of the markets,
without unnecessarily burdening insiders who wish to trade.
The Smith court, however, was concerned that a "knowing-
possession standard would... go a long way toward making insider
trading a strict liability crime."1 6 Given the statutorily authorized ten-
year prison sentence for insider trading convictions, the court was re-
luctant to adopt such a standard. 7 But the Smith court's concern was
unnecessary. The "possession" standard does not make insider trad-
ing a strict liability crime. First, the scienter requirement ensures that
the defendant knowingly (or at least recklessly) possessed inside in-
formation and that he knew such information was material.' Second,
as the Supreme Court noted in O'Hagan, a defendant may not be im-
more "flexibility" to delay his purchases until the information is disclosed to the public.
Of course, delaying purchases until disclosure may mean that the insider is purchasing
at a higher price. Nonetheless, this situation does not seem unnecessarily unfair to the
insider. Delaying the insider's purchases seems to be a reasonable price to pay for en-
suring the integrity of the market. Indeed, as between the ordinary investor and the
insider, it is the insider who is best able to bear the risk that the insider will come into
possession of inside information when he seeks to trade. See id. at 1271 (recognizing
this as a counterargument to the contention that the "possession" standard is unfair).
" SeeAlan M. Weinberger, PreventingInsider Trading Violations: A Survey of Corporate
Compliance Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 180, 188 (1990) (explaining that the New York
Stock Exchange recommends, among other things, that insiders engage in trading ac-
tivities through regular investment programs in which the timing of trades is beyond
the control of the insider); see also Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 38, at 1820 (noting
that many broker-dealer and investment firms require employees to maintain all of
their trading accounts with the firm). Of course, one could still argue that this is un-
fair, since the insider must give up discretion over his own accounts. As between the
ordinary investor and the insider, however, the insider is in the better position to bear
the "costs" of inside information. Seesupra note 193 (making this argument).
1 Such an insider could argue credibly that he did not trade, since it was his in-
vestment advisor that made the decision to trade and executed the trade.
196 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068 n.25.
19 See id. ("In view of the statutorily authorized ten-year prison sentence that may
accompany an insider trading conviction, any construction of Rule lOb-5 that de facto
eliminates the mens rea requirement should be disfavored." (citations omitted)); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994) (authorizing a ten-year prison sentence).
"8 See supra notes 134, 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing the scienter re-
quirement); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (explaining
that under 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a), "[t]o establish a criminal violation of Rule 101>5, the
Government must prove that a person 'willfully' violated the provision").
1999]
284 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA AWREVEW [Vol. 148:239
prisoned for violating Rule lOb-5 if he proves that he had no knowl-
edge of the rule.19
Both the rationale underlying the insider trading prohibition, as
well as the difficulty of proving an insider's motivation for trading,
thus suggest that courts should adopt the "knowing possession" stan-
dard for determining insider trading liability under the federal securi-
ties laws.
CONCLUSION
Advocates of the "use" standard have looked primarily to prior
case law, particularly Supreme Court precedent, for support of their
position. The problem with this approach, however, is that the ques-
tion of "possession versus use" was not at issue in the cases relied
upon, and those opinions were not careful about making a distinction
between "possession" and "use." Indeed, many of the statements re-
lied upon by advocates of the "use" standard either are dicta or have
been misinterpreted and taken out of their original context. Rather
than relying on case law, then, one should look to the reasons for the
insider trading prohibition, as well as to the difficulty of proof associ-
ated with prosecution, to determine the proper standard. Such an in-
quiry suggests that "possession" is the more appropriate standard for
imposing insider trading liability. Nonetheless, with the recent opin-
ions by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the question of "possession
versus use" seems well on its way to being resolved in favor of the "use"
standard. Until the Supreme Court explicitly addresses the question,
however, the issue will remain open for debate.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) ("[N]o person shall be subject to imprisonment under
this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no
knowledge of such rule or regulation."). Lack of knowledge of the law, however, is not
a defense to the imposition of the statutorily authorized fines of up to $1,000,000. See
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666 n.13 ("The statute provides no such defense to imposition of
monetary fines.").
